# Regulus search export

- Query: `65 FR 75378`
- Source type: All
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- Sort: relevance
- Date from: Any
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- As of: Current corpus
- Results: 8
- Exported: 2026-08-23T11:59:38.168Z

## 1. Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators With 500 or More Miles of Pipeline)

**Citation:** 65 FR 75378  
**Type / status:** rulemaking / historical  
**Agency:** Research and Special Programs Administration  
**Effective / published:** 2001-03-31 / 2000-12-01

This final rule specifies regulations to assess, evaluate, repair and validate through comprehensive analysis the integrity of hazardous liquid pipeline segments that, in the event of a leak or failure, could affect populated areas, areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage and commercially navigable waterways. OPS is requiring that an operator develop and follow an integrity management program that provides for continually assessing the integrity of all pipeline segments that could affect these high consequence areas, through internal inspection, pressure testing, or other equally effective assessment means. The program must also provide for periodically evaluating the pipeline segments through comprehensive information analysis, remediating potential problems found through the assessment and evaluation, and ensuring additional protection to the segments and the high consequence areas through preventive and mitigative measures. Through this required program, hazardous liquid operators will comprehensively evaluate the entire range of threats to each pipeline segment's integrity by analyzing all available information about the pipeline segment and consequences of a failure on a high consequence area. This includes analyzing information on the potential for damage due to excavation; data gathered through the required integrity assessment; results of other inspections, tests, surveillance and patrols required by the pipeline safety regulations, including corrosion control monitoring and cathodic protection surveys; and information about how a failure could affect the high consequence area. The final rule requires an operator to take prompt action to address the integrity issues raised by the assessment and analysis. This means an operator must evaluate all defects and repair those could reduce a pipeline's integrity. An operator must develop a schedule that prioritizes the defects for evaluation and repair, including time frames for promptly reviewing and analyzing the integrity assessment results and completing the repairs. An operator must also provide additional protection for these pipeline segments through other remedial actions, and preventive and mitigative measures.

### Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2000/12/01/00-29570/pipeline-safety-pipeline-integrity-management-in-high-consequence-areas-hazardous-liquid-operators>
- Source ID: `federal-register`
- SHA-256: `d9aa8b545a586a60664d8727e08880292275e934e65d175d8f30b27e88956055`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T06:04:51.294Z
- Document slug: `federal-register-00-29570`
- Related records: 14

## 2. Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators With 500 or More Miles of Pipelines)

**Citation:** 66 FR 9532  
**Type / status:** rulemaking / historical  
**Agency:** Research and Special Programs Administration  
**Effective / published:** 2001-03-31 / 2001-02-08

FR 75378.

### Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2001/02/08/01-3215/pipeline-safety-pipeline-integrity-management-in-high-consequence-areas-hazardous-liquid-operators>
- Source ID: `federal-register`
- SHA-256: `8ecba407150104634b1d2941767bb8a0a9da14f0018ae132ab17ab59d53447cf`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T06:04:51.294Z
- Document slug: `federal-register-01-3215`
- Related records: 0

## 3. NTSB Safety Recommendation P-95-001

**Citation:** P-95-001  
**Type / status:** guidance / guidance  
**Agency:** National Transportation Safety Board  
**Effective / published:** 1995-02-07 / 1995-02-07

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE RSPA: EXPEDITE REQUIREMENTS FOR INSTALLING AUTOMATIC- OR REMOTE-OPERATED MAINLINE VALVES ON HIGH-PRESSURE PIPELINES IN URBAN AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE AREAS TO PROVIDE FOR RAPID SHUTDOWN OF FAILED PIPELINE SEGMENTS. (Supersedes P-87-022)

### Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-95-001>
- Source ID: `ntsb-pipeline`
- SHA-256: `b638d786d75add453a47b16abcbf82b4be92e8a08989974c54e7158a8d20c348`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:57:24.741Z
- Document slug: `ntsb-recommendation-p-95-001`
- Related records: 5

## 4. NTSB Safety Recommendation P-87-005

**Citation:** P-87-005  
**Type / status:** guidance / guidance  
**Agency:** National Transportation Safety Board  
**Effective / published:** 1987-03-24 / 1987-03-24

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: ESTABLISH CRITERIA FOR USE BY OPERATORS OF PIPELINES IN DETERMINING THE FREQUENCY FOR PERFORMING INSPECTIONS AND TESTS CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATENESS OF ESTABLISHED MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE OPERATING PRESSURES.

### Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-87-005>
- Source ID: `ntsb-pipeline`
- SHA-256: `bbceba603c0b36f50783fcd37c9b9d9e57b0f34c9d9d276e9bfb78d3abc7da77`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:57:24.741Z
- Document slug: `ntsb-recommendation-p-87-005`
- Related records: 4

## 5. NTSB Safety Recommendation P-87-004

**Citation:** P-87-004  
**Type / status:** guidance / guidance  
**Agency:** National Transportation Safety Board  
**Effective / published:** 1987-03-24 / 1987-03-24

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: REQUIRE OPERATIONS OF BOTH GAS AND LIQUID TRANSMISSION PIPELINES TO PERIODICALLY DETERMINE THE ADEQUACY OF THEIR PIPELINES TO OPERATE AT ESTABLISHED MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PRESSURES BY PERFORMING INSPECTIONS OR TESTS CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING CORROSION-CAUSED AND OTHER TIME-DEPENDENT DAMAGES THAT MAY BE DETRIMENTAL TO

### Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-87-004>
- Source ID: `ntsb-pipeline`
- SHA-256: `c4ab0382fe5a072c1b05bd17e2c766452fad82a3f9231dbecd717741511a7d6d`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:57:24.741Z
- Document slug: `ntsb-recommendation-p-87-004`
- Related records: 4

## 6. NTSB Safety Recommendation P-87-023

**Citation:** P-87-023  
**Type / status:** guidance / guidance  
**Agency:** National Transportation Safety Board  
**Effective / published:** 1987-09-09 / 1987-09-09

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY: REVISE 49 CFR PARTS 192 AND 195 TO INCLUDE OPERATIONAL BASED CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING SAFE SERVICE INTERVALS FOR PIPE LINES BETWEEN HYDROSTATIC RETESTS. (Supersedes P-78-058)

### Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-87-023>
- Source ID: `ntsb-pipeline`
- SHA-256: `c950b9fa13e0ba916c6a1cb7ff6d963a240af20f5b13019344b1f584fa4a9988`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:57:24.741Z
- Document slug: `ntsb-recommendation-p-87-023`
- Related records: 4

## 7. NTSB Safety Recommendation P-87-026

**Citation:** P-87-026  
**Type / status:** guidance / guidance  
**Agency:** National Transportation Safety Board  
**Effective / published:** 1987-09-09 / 1987-09-09

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY: OBTAIN SUFFICIENT DATA ON LOW FREQUENCY, ELECTRIC RESISTANCE WELDED PIPE AND DETERMINE IF ITS CONTINUED USE PRESENTS AN UNREASONABLE HAZARD TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND TAKE APPROPRIATE REGULATORY ACTION FOR IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCIES.

### Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-87-026>
- Source ID: `ntsb-pipeline`
- SHA-256: `cb229a7bc0fc4be5648fa4c3b3d822677e354f9cd53d9f03b35821a18835e469`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:57:24.741Z
- Document slug: `ntsb-recommendation-p-87-026`
- Related records: 1

## 8. NTSB Safety Recommendation P-91-001

**Citation:** P-91-001  
**Type / status:** guidance / guidance  
**Agency:** National Transportation Safety Board  
**Effective / published:** 1991-07-17 / 1991-07-17

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION: DEFINE THE OPERATING PARAMETERS THAT MUST BE MONITORED BY PIPELINE OPERATORS TO DETECT ABNORMAL OPERATIONS AND ESTABLISH PERFORMANCE STANDARDS THAT MUST BE MET BY PIPELINE MONITORING SYSTEMS INSTALLED TO DETECT AND LOCATE LEAKS.

### Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-91-001>
- Source ID: `ntsb-pipeline`
- SHA-256: `515eb8582f9e73bbc24e70a4b3e9fa064f2a929c44a7dd62c99764fbbd8f67d4`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:57:24.741Z
- Document slug: `ntsb-recommendation-p-91-001`
- Related records: 1
