# NTSB Safety Recommendation P-19-016

**Citation:** P-19-016  
**Type / status:** guidance / guidance  
**Agency:** National Transportation Safety Board  
**Effective:** 2019-10-24  
**Published:** 2019-10-24

TO THE 31 STATES THAT ALLOW EXEMPTIONS TO PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER APPROVAL AND STAMPING FOR NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS (ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, CALIFORNIA, COLORADO, CONNECTICUT, FLORIDA, GEORGIA, IDAHO, ILLINOIS, IOWA, KENTUCKY, LOUISIANA, MAINE, MARYLAND, MINNESOTA, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, NEW YORK, NORTH CAROLINA, PENNSYLVANIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, TEXAS, UTAH,

## Document text

NTSB safety recommendation P-19-016.

TO THE 31 STATES THAT ALLOW EXEMPTIONS TO PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER APPROVAL AND STAMPING FOR NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS (ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, CALIFORNIA, COLORADO, CONNECTICUT, FLORIDA, GEORGIA, IDAHO, ILLINOIS, IOWA, KENTUCKY, LOUISIANA, MAINE, MARYLAND, MINNESOTA, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, NEW YORK, NORTH CAROLINA, PENNSYLVANIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, TEXAS, UTAH, VIRGINIA, AND WYOMING): Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping.

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Open - Await Response

Issued Date: 2019-10-24

Adopted Date: 2019-09-24

Synopsis: On September 13, 2018, about 4:00 p.m. local time, a series of structure fires and explosions occurred after high-pressure natural gas was released into a low-pressure natural gas distribution system in the northeast region of the Merrimack Valley in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The natural gas distribution system was owned and operated by Columbia Gas of Massachusetts, a subsidiary of NiSource, Inc. Columbia Gas of Massachusetts delivers natural gas to about 325,000 customers in Massachusetts. One person was killed and 22 individuals, including three firefighters, were transported to local hospitals due to injuries; seven other firefighters incurred minor injuries. The fires and explosions damaged 131 structures, including at least 5 homes that were destroyed in the city of Lawrence and the towns of Andover and North Andover. Most of the damage occurred from fires ignited by natural gas-fueled appliances; several of the homes were destroyed by natural gas-fueled explosions. Fire departments from the three municipalities were dispatched to the fires and explosions. First responders initiated the Massachusetts fire-mobilization plan and received mutual aid from neighboring districts in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine. Emergency management officials had the electric utility shut down electrical power in the area, the state police closed local roads, and freight and passenger railroad operations in the area were suspended. Columbia Gas of Massachusetts shut down the low-pressure natural gas distribution system, affecting 10,894 customers, including some outside the area who had their service shut off as a precaution. The National Transportation Safety Board made new recommendations to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration; the 31 states with an industrial exemption for natural gas infrastructure projects; the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security; and NiSource, Inc.

Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the overpressurization of the natural gas distribution system and the resulting fires and explosions was Columbia Gas of Massachusetts’ weak engineering management that did not adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee the construction project that led to the abandonment of a cast iron main without first relocating regulator sensing lines to the new polyethylene main. Contributing to the accident was a low-pressure natural gas distribution system designed and operated without adequate overpressure protection.

Keywords: Hazmat

Ntsbnumber: PLD18MR003

Report Number: PAR-19-02

Addressee Name: Commonwealth of Virginia

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2020-08-26

Addressee Acronym: VA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: VA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the Commonwealth of Virginia to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the Commonwealth of Virginia. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: VA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-06-30

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Mark C. Christie, Chairman: Please accept this in response to your letter of August 15, 2019, regarding recommendations arising from the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB" or "Board") investigation into the 2018 gas pipeline tragedy in the Merrimack Valley region of Massachusetts. The purpose of this correspondence is to provide the Board with an update as to Virginia's response to NTSB Recommendation P-19-16 and, in particular, legislative action taken in response to the recommendation. During the 2020 Legislative Session of the Virginia General Assembly, at the request of the Virginia State Corporation Commission ("Commission" or "SCC"), Senator Jeremy McPike of Alexandria introduced legislation eliminating the statutory exemption for professional engineering licensure relative to engineering services rendered in connection with natural gas project facilities subject to regulation by the SCC. Among other things, Senate Bill 385 amended and reenacted Virginia Code § 54.1-401. The bill as enacted principally created a new statute in the Virginia Code directing the Commission to promulgate regulations requiring that a licensed professional engineer exercise responsible charge over engineering projects involving gas pipeline facilities that may present a risk to public safety. In response, on May 29, 2020, the SCC issued an Order Establishing Proceeding in Case Number URS-2020-00052 ("Order") that directs the Commission's Utility and Railroad Safety Division ("Staff") to establish and coordinate a Stakeholder Group to develop and propose to the Commission recommendations concerning such regulations.2 The first meeting of the Stakeholder Group is tentatively scheduled for Wednesday, July 8, 2020. The Order further directs the Staff to submit a Report to the Commission by December 1, 2020, presenting draft regulations, findings, and recommendations responsive to the directives established by Senate Bill 385 and the Commission's Order. I trust that the Board will find responsive to this NTSB Recommendation, the Virginia General Assembly's passage of SB 385, together with the Commission's recent actions to implement this important legislation. Please do not hesitate to contact me directly with additional questions, concerns, or suggestions regarding this or any other matter related to the work of the Virginia SCC.

Addressee Acronym: VA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-08-26

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We are pleased that you have passed a new state statute that requires a licensed professional engineer to directly control and supervise engineering projects involving gas pipeline facilities that may present a risk to public safety in Virginia. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified, CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

Addressee Name: State of Nevada

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2022-06-30

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Nevada to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Nevada. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-03-04

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Susan Fisher, Senior Vice President, McDonald Carano, Government Affairs & Advocacy Group: In response to your Feb 12, 2021 letter to Nevada Governor Steve Sisolak, I would like to respond on behalf of the Nevada State Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors. The recommendation was issued October 24, 2019. The Nevada Legislature meets biennial in odd numbered years for the period of time between February 1 and June 1. So, we have only recently had the opportunity to introduce a bill to address the issue raised in your letter; to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. Immediately upon receipt of your letter in October 2019, the Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors pulled together meetings with stakeholders including the Public Utilities Association of Nevada (PUCN), Southwest Gas and NV Energy which has a natural gas franchise in the Reno/Sparks area as well as natural gas operations in several of its energy plants. The stakeholder meetings were productive as were public meetings conducted with our licensed PEs. The result is a bill to be heard next Monday 3/8 for the first time, Assembly Bill 174 (attached). We have spoken with committee members in advance to help answer any questions they may have and, knock on wood, sans any surprises, I feel comfortable we will have this bill on the books soon. I would be happy to answer any questions, if needed.

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-05-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Susan Fisher, Senior Vice President, McDonald Carano Government Affairs and Advocacy Group: The Nevada Legislature has passed AB173 unanimously from both houses. This bill contains the language to eliminate the PE Exemption for natural gas utilities. It is now on the Governor’s desk where he may take one of two actions; sign it immediately, or do nothing to let it go into effect, which it will do within five (5) days after passage. If he chooses the latter, the bill will go into effect on Saturday May 22. The bill goes into effect immediately upon passage and approval for most provisions and July 1 of this year for preparatory administrative purposes. I have attached a copy of the bill. We thank the NTSB for its advocacy on this important legislation.

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-04-14

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Susan Fisher, McDonald Carano, Government Affairs and Advocacy Group: AB173 was heard this morning in Senate Commerce & Labor. The bill had passed unanimously from the Assembly committee and full Assembly in Floor vote and I anticipate smooth sailing through the Senate as well. Thank you for the letter.

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2022-05-10

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From David Noble, Hearing Officer, State of Nevada, Public Utilities Commission: Pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes 233B.063, the Legislative Counsel Bureau ('LCB") examined the Commission's proposed regulation in Docket No. 21-06039 and returned it in revised form. Attached hereto is the revised regulation, designated by LCB as File No. R073-21, which was electronically transmitted to the Commission on January 11, 2022. Also attached hereto is the electronic mail from the LCB transmitting the revised regulation. If you have any questions, please contact me.

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2022-05-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Susan Fisher, Senior Vice President, Government Affairs and Advocacy Group: McDonald Carano: Please note that the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada (PUCN) has just posted its official Order on the regulations mentioned in my May 10 communication to Chair Homendy. I have attached it for your records.

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Nevada has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-04-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Staff level email response: Thank you for your April 14, 2021, update regarding Safety Recommendation P-19-16. We note that AB173 passed the Assembly and you anticipate that it will pass the Senate as well. Please keep us apprised of your progress to implement safety recommendation P-19-16 in Nevada.

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-04-14

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that, on March 8, 2021, the Nevada Assembly’s Committee on Commerce and Labor held a hearing on Assembly Bill 173 that, if enacted, would remove the exemption for licensed PE approval and stamping of natural gas infrastructure projects if a public utility company employee is engaged in work that the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada has determined requires licensure. This approach satisfies the intent of our recommendation when a state’s public utilities commission requires licensed PEs to directly control and supervise engineering work on natural gas infrastructure projects that may present a risk to public safety. Pending an update on your legislative and regulatory proceedings, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-07-09

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that your state legislature passed Nevada Assembly Bill No. 173 and, as a result, Nevada law has now been amended to eliminate the blanket exemption from PE approval and stamping for all natural gas infrastructure work completed by public utility company employees. The new law directs the Nevada Public Service Commission (PSC) to adopt regulations that prescribe the types of work for which a public utility employee must have a PE license. We have consistently found this approach to be acceptable when state regulations ensure that potentially dangerous natural gas infrastructure projects are done with a licensed PE’s management, review, and approval. Pending adoption by the Nevada PSC of regulations that require PE approval and stamping for gas infrastructure projects that present a material risk to public safety, Safety Recommendation P 19 16 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: NV

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2022-06-30

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that, on May 10, 2022, the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada adopted a requirement that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require approval and stamping by a licensed PE. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION. Thank you for your commitment to safety.

Addressee Name: State of Maryland

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2021-07-29

Addressee Acronym: MD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: MD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Maryland to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Maryland. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: MD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-12-16

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Jason M. Stanek, Chairman, Public Service Commission, State of Maryland, letter dated 12/16/2019: I am in receipt of your correspondence to Governor Larry Hogan on October 24, 2019, regarding the National Transportation Safety Board's ("NTSB") September 24, 2019 report, Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSBIPAR-19102. The Governor requested that I respond on his behalf. Safe and reliable gas system operation is a critical priority in the State of Maryland. Therefore, I appreciate the efforts of the NTSB investigators and NTSB Board Members in determining the Merrimack Valley accident's probable cause, findings, and recommendations to improve the management of natural gas utility activities that pose a risk to reliability and public safety. The NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Maryland." Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) Safety of natural gas infrastructure is a statutory duty of the Maryland Public Service Commission ("Commission") under the Maryland Public Utility Companies § 2-113 of the Maryland Code. An initial report prepared by Commission Staff on the impacts of removing the exemption to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects is attached. In summary, this report concludes that implementation of NTSB recommendation P-19-16 in Maryland will likely result in changes in utility processes and staff composition that will take time to implement, with potential interim impacts on response and recovery during emergencies or delays in planned projects meant to enhance safety and reliability. Commission Staff recommends that a workgroup more thoroughly consider these complex issues and potential impacts to address unintended consequences. Therefore, the State of Maryland will defer taking official action on NTSB recommendation P-19-16 at this time until a workgroup consisting of the Maryland natural gas utilities and other stakeholders can more thoroughly consider the implications of removing the exemption to professional engineer approval and stamping and offer a recommendation to the Commission. In the interim, the State of Maryland favors the approach taken in the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration ("PHMSA") pipeline safety reauthorization legislation 1 in the "Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines Enhancing Safety ("PIPES") Act of2019." The proposed PIPES Act requires that "relevant qualified personnel, such as an engineer with a professional engineer licensure, subject matter expert or other employee who possesses the necessary knowledge, experience and skills regarding natural gas distribution systems, review and certify construction plans for accuracy, completeness, and correctness." We feel that this course of action still supports the intent of NTSB recommendation P-19-16, while providing the State of Maryland an opportunity to address unintended consequences. Thank you for your continued support during Maryland's expanded consideration of the NTSB's recommended action. Memo from the Public Service Commission of Maryland, Engineering Division, dated 11/18/2019 to Jason M. Stanek, Chairman, From John Borkoski, P.E., Chief Engineer, Reviewed by Anthony Myers, Executive Director, Subject of Memo: Licensed Professional Engineer Approval and Stamping of Natural Gas Infrastructure Projects On September 13, 2018 a series of explosions and fires occurred after high-pressure natural gas was released into a low-pressure gas distribution system in the northeast region of the Merrimack Valley (Merrimack Valley Accident) in the state of Massachusetts. The distribution system was owned and operated by Columbia Gas of Massachusetts (Columbia Gas), a subsidiary of NiSource. The system over-pressure damaged 131 structures, including at least 5 homes that were destroyed in the city of Lawrence and the towns of Andover and North Andover. Most of the damage was a result of structure fires ignited by gas-fueled appliances. Several structures were destroyed by natural gas explosions. One person was killed and at least 21 individuals, including 2 firefighters, were transported to the hospital. Seven other firefighters received minor injuries. On November 14, 2018, the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") issued five urgent safety recommendations in a Safety Recommendation Report. Two of these five NTSB recommendations, one to Massachusetts and one to NiSource, Inc., impact licensed Professional Engineer ("P .E. ") approval and stamping of natural gas infrastructure projects. NTSB Recommendations 1. To the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Eliminate the professional engineer licensure exemption for public utility work and require a professional engineer's seal on public utility engineering drawings. (P-18-005) 2. To NiSource, Inc.: Revise the engineering plan and constructability review process across all of your subsidiaries to ensure that all applicable departments review construction documents for accuracy, completeness, and correctness, and that the documents or plans be sealed by a professional engineer prior to commencing work. (P-18-006) (Urgent) Regarding the implementation of licensure exemption for public utility work recommendation (P-18-005), this was addressed through the Massachusetts state legislature and the NTSB has closed this action as described in Section 2.1 on page 33 of NTSB/PAR-19/02. Massachusetts Governor Baker filed legislation titled "An Act to Ensure Safety and Soundness of the Commonwealth's Natural Gas Infrastructure." This legislation stated that, "natural gas engineering plans and specifications must bear the stamp of approval of a certified professional engineer when that work could pose a material risk to public safety, as determined by the Department of Public Utilities ("D.P.U.")." This legislation provides the Massachusetts D.P.U. with the ability to define the activities required to have a P.E. stamp through a rulemaking process. This legislation was signed into law on December 31, 2018. In early 2019, interim guidance on natural gas infrastructure work requiring licensed professional engineer approval and stamping was provided by the Massachusetts D.P.U. earlier in 2019 as follows: 1. Design and construction that creates or reconfigures gas district pressure regulator stations or gate/ take stations 2. Design and construction of new gas compressor stations 3. Design and construction of intrastate gas transmission lines 4. Uprating5 of gas transmission lines 5. Design and construction of work on gas distribution mains 6. Uprating of gas distribution mains 7. Design and construction of gas service lines that require the bypass of a gas distribution line to supply service This interim guidance provides a "stopgap" until final regulations are adopted. Subsequently, the Massachusetts D.P.U. docketed a case, D.P.U. 19-34, to define the activities required to have a P.E. stamp. The D.P.U. received initial and reply comments from various stakeholders and state gas utilities and issued an interlocutory Order ("Straw Proposal") setting forth draft regulations on October 11, 2019. Initial comments on the Straw Proposal were received on November 4, 2019 from the state's natural gas utilities and several intervenors such as the American Gas Association ("AGA"), the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General and the American Council of Engineering Companies of Massachusetts. The Straw Proposal for final regulations covers activities that pose a material risk to public safety and further delineates how natural gas companies must use P.

Addressee Acronym: MD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-07-06

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From John Borkoski P.E., Chief Engineer, Maryland Public Service Commission: A Workgroup to consider Licensed Professional Engineer Approval and Stamping of Natural Gas Infrastructure Projects in Maryland filed a report with the Maryland Public Service Commission on July 2, 2020 with recommendations for implementation of the NTSB recommendation P-19-16. This report is available at (ML# 230985) https://webapp.psc.state.md.us/newIntranet/Maillog/submit_new.cfm?MaillogPath=230985&DirPath=//Coldfusion/Casenum/Admin%20Filings/200000-249999/230985&maillognum=230985

Addressee Acronym: MD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-11-06

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Jason M. Stanek, Chairman, State of Maryland, Public Service Commission: I am in receipt of your correspondence to Governor Larry Hogan on August 26, 2020 regarding NTSB Safety Recommendation P-19-16, issued on October 24, 2019. The Governor requested that I respond on his behalf. In your letter, you requested an update regarding our progress towards implementing this recommendation. I am pleased to inform you that on October 29, 2020, the Public Service Commission publicly noticed a rulemaking proceeding (in Docket No. RM71) to incorporate NTSB’s Safety Recommendation P-19-16 into the Code of Maryland Regulations. Public comment in this proceeding is due by November 20, 2020, and the Commission will hold a hearing on December 4, 2020 to formally consider the proposed regulation. Once the proposed regulation is published in the Maryland Register, additional public comment will be received prior to convening a hearing in Spring 2021 to consider adopting the final regulation. I trust this update is responsive. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Addressee Acronym: MD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-06-15

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From John Borkoski, P.E., Chief Engineer, Maryland Public Service Commission: The NTSB issued recommendation P-19-16 to the state of Maryland on October 24, 2019, as a result of the NTSB investigation of a series of explosions and fires in the Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, on September 13, 2018. P-19-16 Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer [PE] approval and stamping. The state of Maryland has addressed this recommendation with new regulations that became effective June 14, 2021. These new regulations are available from the following web link: 20.55.10 Work Approval Please contact me if you need any further information or have questions. Thank you.

Addressee Acronym: MD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-02-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that, in Maryland, the safety of natural gas distribution systems is the responsibility of the Maryland PSC. In response to this recommendation, the PSC prepared an initial report on the impacts of removing the exemption to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects. That report concluded that implementing the action in Safety Recommendation P 19 16 will result in changes to utility processes and staff composition that will take time to implement, with potential interim impacts on response and recovery during emergencies or delays in planned projects meant to enhance safety and reliability. As a result, we note that, before taking the recommended action, the PSC is establishing a workgroup consisting of Maryland natural gas utilities and other stakeholders to consider the implications of removing the exemption. Pending completion of the workgroup’s consideration of potential unintended consequences, followed by the state of Maryland taking the recommended action, Safety Recommendation P 19 16 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: MD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-08-26

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We are aware that the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) is responsible for natural gas distribution system safety in Maryland. We note that the PSC established the PEWG to study and report on the impacts of our recommendation. The report concluded that Safety Recommendation P-19-16 should be implemented, and future natural gas infrastructure projects will be divided into covered projects that require PE approval and stamping, and noncovered projects that could be approved by a PE or other relevant qualified person. The report recommends establishing a state-audited worker qualification program modeled on the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration’s operator qualification program that is codified in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 192. We note that the PEWG modeled these project divisions on the divisions Massachusetts uses to determine which projects require PE approval, which we said met the intent of a similar recommendation we issued to Massachusetts. Because the PEWG did not recommend that Maryland require PE approval and stamping for all natural gas infrastructure projects, as recommended, we encourage you to include a catch all condition within your definition of covered work, such as for any natural gas infrastructure project that might present a material risk to public safety. We believe the recommendations proposed by the PEWG, if adopted, will satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation P-19-16, which remains classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: MD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-01-05

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We are aware that the Maryland Public Service Commission held a hearing on December 4, 2020, to formally consider a rulemaking proceeding (Docket No. RM71) to incorporate Safety Recommendation P-19-16 into the Code of Maryland Regulations. We provided written testimony, and Mr. Steve Blackistone from our Government Affairs Division testified before the commission in support of the new rule proposed by the PE Working Group. We are pleased that the commission voted unanimously to publish the proposed regulations in the Maryland Register for notice and comment, subject to nonsubstantive changes necessary to conform to the Code of Maryland Regulations drafting requirements. We note that a hearing will be held in the spring of 2021 to adopt the final regulation. Pending adoption of the final rule, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE for the state of Maryland. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: MD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-07-29

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that, effective June 14, 2021, Maryland has implemented new regulations to remove the blanket exemption for gas company employees from PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION for Maryland. Thank you for taking action to improve pipeline safety.

Addressee Name: State of Montana

Addressee Status: Closed - Reconsidered

Addressee Date Closed: 2020-08-27

Addressee Acronym: MT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: MT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Montana to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Montana. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: MT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-07-21

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Ronald Drake, President, Montana Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors: This letter is in response to your October 24, 2019 letter regarding natural gas system safety (and report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02) that was addressed to Governor Bullock and the Montana Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors. The National Transportation Safety Board’s investigation found that 31 states, including Montana, allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects. NTSB recommended that Montana remove exemptions so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. The Board has reviewed the NTSB recommendation and findings both within its full Board meetings and in greater detail among its Laws and Rules Committee. In examining our relevant rules and statutes, we have not been able to identify an exemption. As such, no action has been initiated to change our laws or rules. The Laws and Rules Committee reviewed 37-37-101, Montana Code Annotated which includes the following: (7) (a) "Practice of engineering" means: (i) any service or creative work the adequate performance of which requires engineering education, training, and experience in the application of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences to the services or creative work as consultation, investigation, evaluation, planning and design of engineering works and systems, planning the use of water, teaching of advanced engineering subjects, engineering surveys, and the inspection of construction for the purpose of ensuring compliance with drawings and specifications; (ii) any of the functions described in subsection (7)(a)(i) that embrace the services or work, either public or private, in connection with any utilities, structures, buildings, machines, equipment, processes, work systems, projects, and industrial or consumer products or equipment of mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic, or thermal nature insofar as they involve safeguarding life, health, or property. (7)(a)(ii) specifically references services or work done in connection with utilities under the definition of practice of engineering, and natural gas systems are operated by utilities. The statute in its entirety is included following in the attached pages with the relevant sections highlighted, along with the Board’s rule on sealing and stamping, ARM 24.183.511.

Addressee Acronym: MT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-08-27

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that, in the Montana Code, “practice of engineering” mandates that anyone performing service or creative work that requires engineering education, training, and experience must subject their construction to inspection to verify that it complies with drawings and specifications. This applies to public or private work in connection with any utilities, including natural gas systems. Therefore, Montana requires licensed professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects. These requirements, which existed prior to our issuing the recommendation, satisfy Safety Recommendation P-19-16, which is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

Addressee Name: State of Missouri

Addressee Status: Closed - Reconsidered

Addressee Date Closed: 2020-02-20

Addressee Acronym: MO

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: MO

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Missouri to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Missouri. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: MO

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-01-23

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Michael L. Parson, Governor, Missouri: I am in receipt of your letter dated October 24, 2019 regarding the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) September 2019 report entitled Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimeck Valley, Massachusetts. The letter references a safety recommendation from the report in which 31 states are encouraged to consider responding to - Missouri being one of those states. Specifically, the letter requests a response as to whether the State of Missouri has taken, or intends to take, actions to implement the following recommendation: to remove the exemption for professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. In reviewing the report, it is our understanding that Missouri was included among the 31 states with alleged exemptions because of Section 327 .191 (3) RSMo. However, the interpretation of the Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, Professional Land Surveyors and Professional Landscape Architects (the state entity that regulates professional engineers) (hereinafter, "Board") is that the statute does not provide for exceptions that such work be performed by professional engineers in this instance. Specifically, according to the Board, gas distribution is not generally manufacturing and therefore does not fall under the cited exemption. The Board further states that natural gas infrastructure projects fall into the same category as water and sewer projects, in that they are utilities being built for the public health and welfare. The cited Missouri statute states the exception only exists if it "does not affect the health, safety, and welfare of the public." It is the opinion of the Board that work on gas lines that go into people's homes and businesses affect the health, safety and welfare of the public and therefore requires engineering licensure under current Missouri statute. For questions or additional information please contact the Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, Professional Land Surveyors and Professional Landscape Architects.

Addressee Acronym: MO

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-02-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that the Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, Professional Land Surveyors and Professional Landscape Architects, which regulates professional engineers, believes that the relevant Missouri law, Section 327.191 (3) RSMo, does not provide for exceptions to the requirement that natural gas infrastructure projects be approved and stamped by a professional engineer. We further note that, because the board believes that gas lines that go into people’s homes and businesses affect the health, safety, and welfare of the public, work on them requires engineering licensure under current Missouri statutes. We agree with the opinion of your board; accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

Addressee Name: State of Minnesota

Addressee Status: Closed - Reconsidered

Addressee Date Closed: 2021-02-10

Addressee Acronym: MN

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: MN

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Minnesota to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Minnesota. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: MN

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-10

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Upon further reviewing Minnesota laws, we found that your state already requires PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects. Because this requirement existed prior to our issuing the recommendation, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified CLOSED-- RECONSIDERED.

Addressee Name: State of Arkansas

Addressee Status: Closed - Reconsidered

Addressee Date Closed: 2021-02-04

Addressee Acronym: AR

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: AR

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Arkansas to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Arkansas. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: AR

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-04

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Upon further reviewing Arkansas law, we found that your state already requires PE approval and stamping on natural gas infrastructure projects. Because this requirement existed prior to our issuing the recommendation, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified CLOSED-- RECONSIDERED.

Addressee Name: State of Illinois

Addressee Status: Open - Acceptable Response

Addressee Acronym: IL

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: IL

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Illinois to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Illinois. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: IL

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2022-11-07

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Carrie Zalewski, Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission: The Illinois Commerce Commission (“ICC”) is tasked with the oversight of natural gas operators and pipeline safety in Illinois, in partnership with Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and in compliance with all Federal and State regulations. The ICC is taking measures to promulgate new administrative regulations intended to implement NTSB Recommendation P-19-016 in Illinois. The ICC Staff has met with several Illinois natural gas operators to develop administrative rules that will implement the NTSB Recommendation and enable the natural gas operators to continue providing safe and reliable service to Illinois consumers. Initial meetings have proven fruitful, and the ICC Staff has prepared a draft rule, which will circulate to all Illinois natural gas operators under ICC jurisdiction. The ICC will seek to begin the rulemaking process required by the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100). More specifically, the Staff will request Commission approval to initiate a docketed proceeding to revise existing rules to comply with the Safety Recommendation P-19-016.

Addressee Acronym: IL

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Illinois has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: IL

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2022-12-19

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Your letter reports that the ICC staff has met with Illinois natural gas operators and has begun steps to initiate a rulemaking to address our recommendation. Pending the implementation of state regulations requiring that gas infrastructure projects that pose a material risk to public safety be required to be approved and stamped by a licensed professional engineer, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE for the state of Illinois.

Addressee Name: State of Utah

Addressee Status: Open - Acceptable Response

Addressee Acronym: UT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: UT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Utah to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment ??Safety management systems • Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Utah. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: UT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-11-08

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Gary R. Herbert, Governor: Thank you for your letter of October 24, 2019 expressing your agency's concern with licensing exemptions for professional engineers. (Safety Recommendation P-19-16) While we are aware of no problems caused by this licensing exemption in Utah, and our utility and petroleum companies have a long record of safe performance, I have forwarded your letter to the Utah Legislature's Occupational and Professional Licensure Review Committee for its consideration. Thank you again for bringing this matter to my attention.

Addressee Acronym: UT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-26

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Mark Steinagel, Director, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Utah Department of Commerce: Your email below was sent to two employees of our state government. In it you explain an important issue and request that the State of Utah will take the action recommended in your letter. The provision you mentioned in your letter is an exemption to the engineering license requirement and is created by the Utah State Legislature. It is important to note that any elimination or modification to the exemption you highlight must be made by the Utah State Legislature. Upon further review, we found that at the receipt of your last letter in late 2019, we forwarded your email to the appropriate legislative committee for its consideration. This email copies the legislative staff members to that committee, since this year's legislative members have not yet been appointed. The Committee is called the Occupational and Professional License Review Committee. Its webpage can be found here: https://le.utah.gov/committee/committee.jsp?year=2020&com=SPEOPL We recommend that future communications on this issue be with the Committee staff noted above or another contact in the Utah State Legislature. We have nothing further to report at this time.

Addressee Acronym: UT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: On November 8, 2019, Governor Gary R. Herbert wrote to us, explaining that he forwarded this safety recommendation to the Utah Legislature’s Occupational and Professional Licensure Review Committee for its consideration. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Utah has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: UT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-01-02

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that you forwarded this recommendation to the Utah Legislature’s Occupational and Professional Licensure Review Committee for its consideration. Please inform the committee that we would be pleased to provide it with any information available to us that may help the committee in its deliberations. Pending the Utah legislature taking the recommended action, Safety Recommendation P 19 16 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Addressee Acronym: UT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-04-14

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that our safety recommendation follow-up letter was forwarded to the staff of the Occupational and Professional License Review Committee of the Utah State Legislature. We appreciate your leadership and urge you to continue to encourage your state legislature to pass the legislation to address this important safety concern. Until Utah enacts legislation to remove the natural gas infrastructure exemption, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

Addressee Name: State of Maine

Addressee Status: Open - Acceptable Response

Addressee Acronym: ME

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: ME

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Maine to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Maine. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: ME

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -David Jackson, Executive Director, State of Maine, Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers: The State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers has been asked to address the safety recommendations the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) made in its report dated September 24, 2019: Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSBIP AR-19/02. As a result of its investigation, the NTSB determined that 31 states, including Maine, permitted exemptions to the requirement for professional engineer approval and stamping of natural gas infrastructure projects. NTSB recommended that each state "Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) The State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers has reviewed its statute and believes that natural gas infrastructure would fall under the existing statutory definition of professional engineering and that none of the existing statutory exemptions would apply. However, the Board recognizes that to eliminate confusion and to ensure that all future natural gas infrastructure projects are designed, stamped and overseen by a professional engineer it may be necessary to add clarifying language to the statute. The Board will review the existing statute and introduce legislation for the 2021 Legislative session as needed. In the near term, an effort will be made to contact natural gas companies operating in the State and advise them that their projects require the oversight of a licensed professional engineer. Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions.

Addressee Acronym: ME

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2020-03-24

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that the Maine Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers reviewed its statute and believes that natural gas infrastructure falls under the existing statutory definition of professional engineering, and that none of the existing statutory exemptions would apply. However, to eliminate confusion and to ensure that all future natural gas infrastructure projects are designed, stamped, and overseen by a professional engineer, the board plans to review the existing statute and introduce legislation for consideration during the 2021 Maine legislative session to further clarify that natural gas infrastructure projects are not subject to an exemption. In the near term, the board also plans to contact natural gas companies operating in Maine and advise them that their projects require the oversight of a licensed professional engineer. Thank you for taking action to address this recommendation. We believe that your planned revisions will satisfy the recommendation when they are completed. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Colorado

Addressee Status: Open - Acceptable Response

Addressee Acronym: CO

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: CO

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Colorado to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Colorado. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: CO

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-05-18

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Ronne Hines, Director: The office of the Board of Licensure for Architects, Professional Engineers, and Professional Land Surveyors ("Board") is in receipt of the attached NTSB Recommendations. These recommendations requested the Board seek revisions to the Colorado Revised Statutes governing engineering licensure by removing exemptions to the law '...so that future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed engineers approval and stamping". The Board does not have the authority to make, revise, or waive the laws as that authority lies with the Colorado Legislature. Bill requests are handled through the Office of Legislative Legal Services at olls.ga@state.co.us. I am also connecting you with the Department's legislative liaison Michael Nicoletti. Please accept our apologies in our delayed response to your office and thank you for the opportunity to respond.

Addressee Acronym: CO

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Colorado has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: CO

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-06-17

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We are aware that the DORA does not have the authority to change Colorado law, and we appreciate that you have encouraged your state legislature to pass the needed legislation to address this important safety concern. Pending removal of the provision exempting professional engineer approval and stamping of natural gas infrastructure projects in the state of Colorado, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of California

Addressee Status: Open - Acceptable Response

Addressee Acronym: CA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: CA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of California to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of California. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: CA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-03-08

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: -From Leslie Palmer, Director, California Public Utilities Commission, Safety and Enforcement Division: Thank you for your letter dated February 12, 2021 to Governor Gavin Newsom regarding the implementation status of Safety Recommendation P- 19- 16. The Governor's Office referred this letter to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to respond, as the CPUC is California's lead state regulatory agency for gas pipeline safety. The Safety and Enforcement Division (SEO) of the CPUC is certified to inspect and regulate intrastate pipeline safety pursuant to the state certification program of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). SEO carefully analyzed Safety Recommendation P- t 9-16, its effect on the gas utilities under CPUC jurisdiction and its impact on public safety. As a result of our analysis, SEO determined that the recommendation, if adopted, may be beneficial to gas pipeline safety. On that basis, SEO is planning to include language for future natural gas infrastructure projects to require licensed Professional Engineer (PE) approval in a forthcoming proposed revision of CPUC General Order 112, which addresses the design, construction, testing, maintenance, and operation of utility natural gas gathering, transmission and distribution piping systems. SEO will present the proposed revision to the Commission for deliberation and vote in 2021. In the meantime, California's two largest natural gas utilities are already making progress toward voluntarily implementing a requirement for PE stamps on natural gas infrastructure. Southern California Company (SoCalGas) is using a " phase-in" approach, in which PE stamps will be implemented on gas pipeline transmission facilities immediately, followed by a review. SoCalGas intends to review this new practice and analyze the results to see if any side issues need to be addressed. In the meantime, the utility is initiating necessary protocol modifications for gas distribution systems in order to require PE stamps. The utility is encouraging its engineering workforce to move towards PE licensure. Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) Gas Design Standard A-34 (Piping Design and Test Requirements) prescribes when to stamp a drawing by a PE. Please do not hesitate to reach out with any questions to me or to Terence Eng, Program Manager.

Addressee Acronym: CA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-04-14

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that the CPUC agrees with our recommendation and plans to revise its General Order 112, which addresses the design, construction, testing, maintenance, and operation of utility natural gas gathering, transmission, and distribution piping systems. These revisions will mandate that future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval. The CPUC’s Safety and Enforcement Division will present the proposed revision to the commission for deliberation and vote in 2021. In the interim, we are pleased to hear that California’s two largest natural gas utilities—Southern California Company and Pacific Gas and Electric Company—are making progress toward voluntarily implementing a requirement for PE stamping on their natural gas infrastructure projects. Pending the completion of the CPUC’s action to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE for California.

Addressee Acronym: CA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that California has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of New Mexico

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: NM

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: NM

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-05-03

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the state of New Mexico to act on the safety recommendation in this letter, which we believe will reduce the risk of future similar accidents in your state. Our September 24, 2019, report, Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, found the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems • Licensed professional engineer (PE) approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response As a result of this investigation, we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects (see section 3.4 of the report). P-19-16 Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. When we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16, we did not believe that the state of New Mexico allowed this exemption; however, we have since reviewed additional information that indicates that New Mexico does, in fact, exempt natural gas infrastructure projects from requiring PE approval and stamping. Accordingly, we are issuing Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to your state. We are vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. Please respond within 90 days of the date of this letter detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (P-19-16). Please submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Wisconsin

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: WI

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: WI

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-05-03

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the state of Wisconsin to act on the safety recommendation in this letter, which we believe will reduce the risk of future similar accidents in your state. Our September 24, 2019, report, Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, found the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems • Licensed professional engineer (PE) approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response As a result of this investigation, we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects (see section 3.4 of the report). P-19-16 Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. When we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16, we did not believe that the state of Wisconsin allowed this exemption; however, we have since reviewed additional information that indicates that Wisconsin does, in fact, exempt natural gas infrastructure projects from requiring PE approval and stamping. Accordingly, we are issuing Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to your state. We are vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. Please respond within 90 days of the date of this letter detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (P-19-16). Please submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Wyoming

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: WY

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: WY

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Wyoming to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Wyoming. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: WY

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Wyoming has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Texas

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: TX

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: TX

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Texas to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Texas. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: TX

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-01-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Texas has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of South Dakota

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: SD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: SD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of South Dakota to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of South Dakota. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: SD

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that South Dakota has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of South Carolina

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: SC

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: SC

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of South Carolina to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment ??Safety management systems • Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of South Carolina. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: SC

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that South Carolina has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: PA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: PA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: PA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Pennsylvania has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of North Carolina

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: NC

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: NC

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of North Carolina to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of North Carolina. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: NC

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that North Carolina has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of New York

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: NY

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: NY

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of New York to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of New York. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: NY

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that New York has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Nebraska

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: NE

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: NE

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Nebraska to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Nebraska. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: NE

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued and we have not received any additional information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that your state has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Mississippi

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: MS

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: MS

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Mississippi to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems • Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Mississippi. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: MS

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that your state has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Louisiana

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: LA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: LA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Louisiana to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Louisiana. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: LA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions Louisiana has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: Commonwealth of Kentucky

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: KY

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: KY

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the Commonwealth of Kentucky to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: KY

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement this recommendation. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Kentucky completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Iowa

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: IA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: IA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Iowa to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Iowa. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: IA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-17

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Iowa has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Idaho

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: ID

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: ID

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Idaho to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Idaho. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: ID

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement this recommendation. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Idaho has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Georgia

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: GA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: GA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Georgia to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Georgia. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: GA

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement this recommendation. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Georgia has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Florida

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: FL

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: FL

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Florida to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Florida. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: FL

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement this recommendation. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Florida has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Connecticut

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: CT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: CT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Connecticut to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Connecticut. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: CT

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement this recommendation. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Connecticut has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Arizona

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: AZ

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: AZ

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Arizona to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Arizona. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: AZ

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Arizona has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Alaska

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: AK

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: AK

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Alaska to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems • Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Alaska. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: AK

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Alaska has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Alabama

Addressee Status: Open - Await Response

Addressee Acronym: AL

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: AL

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2019-10-24

Communication Type: Transmittal Letter

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Alabama to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Alabama. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: AL

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-02-12

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Alabama has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN--AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Name: State of Ohio

Addressee Status: Open - Unacceptable Response

Addressee Acronym: OH

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2023-10-27

Communication Type: NPRM Response

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.

Addressee Acronym: OH

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-05-20

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: Jenifer French, Chair, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio: I am writing in response to your letter dated May 3, 2021, notifying Ohio of Safety Recommendation P-19-16 and requesting that Ohio act on that recommendation by removing the exemption in state law to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects. The State of Ohio takes pipeline safety very seriously and has adopted the Federal Pipeline Safety Regulations. Gas Pipeline Safety (GPS) is regulated by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) which has a robust GPS program and is very familiar with the circumstances surrounding the incident in the Merrimack Valley area of Massachusetts. In fact, six of the PUCO’s GPS inspectors were dispatched to the affected area to assist the Massachusetts Public Service Commission with ensuring installation of the new gas pipeline system was completed safely and according to the law. PUCO’s GPS Staff followed the Merrimack Valley investigation closely and have taken a number of actions in response to the incident to minimize the chance of a similar event occurring in Ohio. For example, the GPS section performed a state-wide low-pressure system inventory in the fall of 2019 to determine the number of low-pressure systems in Ohio, the relative risk from each, and preventative/mitigative action being taken by the operators of these systems. We continue to monitor the efforts each company is taking to prevent and mitigate the risk associated with these systems. Prior to the Merrimack Valley incident, Ohio implemented a state-specific rule applying Operator Qualification requirements described in 49 CFR 192 Subpart N to gas pipeline construction, which is in excess of requirements in the Pipeline Safety Regulations. This requirement ensures personnel performing this type of work have the requisite knowledge to perform construction functions safely. PUCO’s GPS Staff also reviewed past incidents involving the over-pressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems nationwide and concluded that the most likely source of failure for these systems is a depressurization of regulator station sensing lines, either from excavation damage to the line or from isolating and depressurizing the line as part of construction or maintenance. As a result, the PUCO’s GPS Staff modified its scheduling and compliance inspection protocols to ensure that operators verify the location of buried sensing lines and relocate them if appropriate. Staff has also given training to Ohio gas pipeline operators on the lessons learned from the NTSB investigation and best practices to prevent similar events. Most recently, the PUCO took enforcement action against Columbia Gas of Ohio for over-pressurizing a natural gas main, which occurred, in part, due to not following NTSB recommended practices. See Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Case No. 20-1759-GA-GPS. This action was swift and comprehensive and is another layer of protection in Ohio’s GPS enforcement program. Importantly, PUCO’s GPS section has many experienced investigators and is overseen by Peter Chace and Joseph Dragovich. Mr. Chace is the Division Chief that oversees GPS and has held officer positions at the National Association of Pipeline Safety Regulators (NAPSR) and is currently on the national Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC), an advisory board to the U.S. Department of Transportation who reviews proposed amendments to the Pipeline Safety Regulations to assure the technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-effectiveness and practicability of each proposal. Mr. Dragovich is the GPS Program Manager and is a Licensed Professional Engineer and former GPS Inspector for Ohio. These professionals, along with an experienced cadre of PUCO GPS inspectors, are actively engaged in the industry and its continuous efforts to improve pipeline safety. Finally, Ohio has implemented numerous changes as a result of the lessons learned from the incident in Massachusetts and is holding operators accountable. Ohio will continue to adapt and respond as new information becomes available to ensure gas pipelines systems in the state are constructed, operated, and maintained in a safe and reliable manner.

Addressee Acronym: OH

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-05-03

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the state of Ohio to act on the safety recommendation in this letter, which we believe will reduce the risk of future similar accidents in your state. Our September 24, 2019, report, Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, found the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems • Licensed professional engineer (PE) approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response As a result of this investigation, we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects (see section 3.4 of the report). P-19-16 Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. When we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16, we did not believe that the state of Ohio allowed this exemption; however, we have since reviewed additional information that indicates that Ohio does, in fact, exempt natural gas infrastructure projects from requiring PE approval and stamping. Accordingly, we are issuing Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to your state. We are vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. Please respond within 90 days of the date of this letter detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (P-19-16). Please submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

Addressee Acronym: OH

Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government

Communication Date: 2021-08-10

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: We note that you have a state-specific operator qualification (OQ) requirement for new natural gas pipeline construction. We further note that PUCO, after completing a statewide inventory of low-pressure natural gas distribution systems, has taken actions to reduce the risk of an overpressurization accident in Ohio, including the following: • Actively monitoring the efforts each private utility company is taking to prevent and mitigate the risk associated with these systems. • Training pipeline operators on the lessons learned from our investigation of the Merrimack Valley accident. • Revising its scheduling and compliance inspection protocols to ensure that operators verify the location of buried sensing lines and relocate them if appropriate. • Actively enforcing these OQ requirements and construction procedures. However, although these actions are beneficial, they do not provide a level of technical competence and accountability in engineering management that is equivalent to our recommended action. We are aware that, on October 1, 2020, despite PUCO’s enhanced safety measures, an overpressurization incident occurred at the Kitts Hill regulator station in Ohio as a result of a failure to properly relocate sensing lines. Pending action by your legislature to remove the statutory exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE for the state of Ohio. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

## Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-19-016>
- Source ID: `ntsb-pipeline`
- SHA-256: `09567fd305be60f1bd520110d4068edd93a5bc55bc23f0c5e7b47d49fddbb2e3`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:57:24.741Z
- Exported: 2026-08-24T08:19:55.487Z
- Document slug: `ntsb-recommendation-p-19-016`

### Source metadata

```json
{
  "recordKind": "ntsb_safety_recommendation",
  "safetyRecommendationNumber": "P-19-016",
  "recommendationMode": "Pipeline",
  "topicMode": "Pipeline",
  "ntsbNumber": "PLD18MR003",
  "priority": "CLASS II",
  "overallStatus": "Open - Await Response",
  "overallStatusAcronym": "OAR",
  "overallDateClosed": null,
  "lastModifiedDate": "2025-09-30",
  "reportNumber": "PAR-19-02",
  "reportUrl": "https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD18MR003.aspx",
  "transmittalLetterUrl": "http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/P-19-014-018.pdf",
  "addressees": [
    {
      "addresseeName": "Commonwealth of Virginia",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "CAA",
      "addresseeStatus": "Closed - Acceptable Action",
      "addresseeDateClosed": "2020-08-26",
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "VA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "VA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.\r\n\r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.\r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.\r\n\r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the Commonwealth of Virginia to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the Commonwealth of Virginia. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "VA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2020-06-30",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Mark C. Christie, Chairman: Please accept this in response to your letter of August 15, 2019, regarding recommendations arising from the National Transportation Safety Board (\"NTSB\" or \"Board\") investigation into the 2018 gas pipeline tragedy in the Merrimack Valley region of Massachusetts.\r\n\r\nThe purpose of this correspondence is to provide the Board with an update as to Virginia's response to NTSB Recommendation P-19-16 and, in particular, legislative action taken in response to the recommendation.\r\n\r\nDuring the 2020 Legislative Session of the Virginia General Assembly, at the request of the Virginia State Corporation Commission (\"Commission\" or \"SCC\"), Senator Jeremy McPike of Alexandria introduced legislation eliminating the statutory exemption for professional engineering licensure relative to engineering services rendered in connection with natural gas project facilities subject to regulation by the SCC. Among other things, Senate Bill 385 amended and reenacted Virginia Code § 54.1-401. The bill as enacted principally created a new statute in the Virginia Code directing the Commission to promulgate regulations requiring that a licensed professional engineer exercise responsible charge over engineering projects involving gas pipeline facilities that may present a risk to public safety.\r\n\r\nIn response, on May 29, 2020, the SCC issued an Order Establishing Proceeding in Case Number URS-2020-00052 (\"Order\") that directs the Commission's Utility and Railroad Safety Division (\"Staff\") to establish and coordinate a Stakeholder Group to develop and propose to the Commission recommendations concerning such regulations.2 The first meeting of the Stakeholder Group is tentatively scheduled for Wednesday, July 8, 2020. The Order further directs the Staff to submit a Report to the Commission by December 1, 2020, presenting draft regulations, findings, and recommendations responsive to the directives established by Senate Bill 385 and the Commission's Order.\r\n\r\nI trust that the Board will find responsive to this NTSB Recommendation, the Virginia General Assembly's passage of SB 385, together with the Commission's recent actions to implement this important legislation.\r\n\r\nPlease do not hesitate to contact me directly with additional questions, concerns, or suggestions regarding this or any other matter related to the work of the Virginia SCC."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "VA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2020-08-26",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We are pleased that you have passed a new state statute that requires a licensed professional engineer to directly control and supervise engineering projects involving gas pipeline facilities that may present a risk to public safety in Virginia. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified, CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ACTION."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Nevada",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "CAA",
      "addresseeStatus": "Closed - Acceptable Action",
      "addresseeDateClosed": "2022-06-30",
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Nevada to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Nevada. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2021-03-04",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Susan Fisher, Senior Vice President, McDonald Carano, Government Affairs & Advocacy Group: In response to your Feb 12, 2021 letter to Nevada Governor Steve Sisolak, I would like to respond on behalf of the Nevada State Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors.\r\n\r\nThe recommendation was issued October 24, 2019. The Nevada Legislature meets biennial in odd numbered years for the period of time between February 1 and June 1. So, we have only recently had the opportunity to introduce a bill to address the issue raised in your letter; to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping.\r\n\r\nImmediately upon receipt of your letter in October 2019, the Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors pulled together meetings with stakeholders including the Public Utilities Association of Nevada (PUCN), Southwest Gas and NV Energy which has a natural gas franchise in the Reno/Sparks area as well as natural gas operations in several of its energy plants.\r\n\r\nThe stakeholder meetings were productive as were public meetings conducted with our licensed PEs.\r\n\r\nThe result is a bill to be heard next Monday 3/8 for the first time, Assembly Bill 174 (attached). We have spoken with committee members in advance to help answer any questions they may have and, knock on wood, sans any surprises, I feel comfortable we will have this bill on the books soon.\r\n\r\nI would be happy to answer any questions, if needed."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2021-05-20",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Susan Fisher, Senior Vice President, McDonald Carano Government Affairs and Advocacy Group: The Nevada Legislature has passed AB173 unanimously from both houses. This bill contains the language to eliminate the PE Exemption for natural gas utilities. It is now on the Governor’s desk where he may take one of two actions; sign it immediately, or do nothing to let it go into effect, which it will do within five (5) days after passage. If he chooses the latter, the bill will go into effect on Saturday May 22.\r\n\r\nThe bill goes into effect immediately upon passage and approval for most provisions and July 1 of this year for preparatory administrative purposes.\r\n\r\nI have attached a copy of the bill.\r\n\r\nWe thank the NTSB for its advocacy on this important legislation."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2021-04-14",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Susan Fisher, McDonald Carano, Government Affairs and Advocacy Group: AB173 was heard this morning in Senate Commerce & Labor. The bill had passed unanimously from the Assembly committee and full Assembly in Floor vote and I anticipate smooth sailing through the Senate as well.\r\n\r\nThank you for the letter."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2022-05-10",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From David Noble, Hearing Officer, State of Nevada, Public Utilities Commission: Pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes 233B.063, the Legislative Counsel Bureau ('LCB\") examined the Commission's proposed regulation in Docket No. 21-06039 and returned it in revised form. Attached hereto is the revised regulation, designated by LCB as File No. R073-21, which was electronically transmitted to the Commission on January 11, 2022. Also attached hereto is the electronic mail from the LCB transmitting the revised regulation. If you have any questions, please contact me."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2022-05-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Susan Fisher, Senior Vice President, Government Affairs and Advocacy Group: McDonald Carano: Please note that the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada (PUCN) has just posted its official Order on the regulations mentioned in my May 10 communication to Chair Homendy. I have attached it for your records."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Nevada has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-04-20",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "Staff level email response: Thank you for your April 14, 2021, update regarding Safety Recommendation P-19-16. We note that AB173 passed the Assembly and you anticipate that it will pass the Senate as well. Please keep us apprised of your progress to implement safety recommendation P-19-16 in Nevada."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-04-14",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that, on March 8, 2021, the Nevada Assembly’s Committee on Commerce and Labor held a hearing on Assembly Bill 173 that, if enacted, would remove the exemption for licensed PE approval and stamping of natural gas infrastructure projects if a public utility company employee is engaged in work that the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada has determined requires licensure.\r\n \r\nThis approach satisfies the intent of our recommendation when a state’s public utilities commission requires licensed PEs to directly control and supervise engineering work on natural gas infrastructure projects that may present a risk to public safety. Pending an update on your legislative and regulatory proceedings, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-07-09",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that your state legislature passed Nevada Assembly Bill No. 173 and, as a result, Nevada law has now been amended to eliminate the blanket exemption from PE approval and stamping for all natural gas infrastructure work completed by public utility company employees. The new law directs the Nevada Public Service Commission (PSC) to adopt regulations that prescribe the types of work for which a public utility employee must have a PE license. We have consistently found this approach to be acceptable when state regulations ensure that potentially dangerous natural gas infrastructure projects are done with a licensed PE’s management, review, and approval. Pending adoption by the Nevada PSC of regulations that require PE approval and stamping for gas infrastructure projects that present a material risk to public safety, Safety Recommendation P 19 16 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NV",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2022-06-30",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that, on May 10, 2022, the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada adopted a requirement that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require approval and stamping by a licensed PE. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation \r\nP-19-16 is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION.\r\n\r\nThank you for your commitment to safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Maryland",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "CAA",
      "addresseeStatus": "Closed - Acceptable Action",
      "addresseeDateClosed": "2021-07-29",
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Maryland to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Maryland. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2019-12-16",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Jason M. Stanek, Chairman, Public Service Commission, State of Maryland, letter dated 12/16/2019: I am in receipt of your correspondence to Governor Larry Hogan on October 24, 2019, regarding the National Transportation Safety Board's (\"NTSB\") September 24, 2019 report, Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSBIPAR-19102. The Governor requested that I respond on his behalf.\r\n\r\nSafe and reliable gas system operation is a critical priority in the State of Maryland. Therefore, I appreciate the efforts of the NTSB investigators and NTSB Board Members in determining the Merrimack Valley accident's probable cause, findings, and recommendations to improve the management of natural gas utility activities that pose a risk to reliability and public safety.\r\n\r\nThe NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Maryland.\"\r\n\r\nRemove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16)\r\n\r\nSafety of natural gas infrastructure is a statutory duty of the Maryland Public Service Commission (\"Commission\") under the Maryland Public Utility Companies § 2-113 of the Maryland Code. An initial report prepared by Commission Staff on the impacts of removing the exemption to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects is attached. In summary, this report concludes that implementation of NTSB recommendation P-19-16 in Maryland will likely result in changes in utility processes and staff composition that will take time to implement, with potential interim impacts on response and recovery during emergencies or delays in planned projects meant to enhance safety and reliability. Commission Staff recommends that a workgroup more thoroughly consider these complex issues and potential impacts to address unintended consequences.\r\n\r\nTherefore, the State of Maryland will defer taking official action on NTSB recommendation P-19-16 at this time until a workgroup consisting of the Maryland natural gas utilities and other stakeholders can more thoroughly consider the implications of removing the exemption to professional engineer approval and stamping and offer a recommendation to the Commission. \r\n\r\nIn the interim, the State of Maryland favors the approach taken in the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (\"PHMSA\") pipeline safety reauthorization legislation 1 in the \"Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines Enhancing Safety (\"PIPES\") Act of2019.\" The proposed PIPES Act requires that \"relevant qualified personnel, such as an engineer with a professional engineer licensure, subject matter expert or other employee who possesses the necessary knowledge, experience and skills regarding natural gas distribution systems, review and certify construction plans for accuracy, completeness, and correctness.\" We feel that this course of action still supports the intent of NTSB recommendation P-19-16, while providing the State of Maryland an opportunity to address unintended consequences.\r\n\r\nThank you for your continued support during Maryland's expanded consideration of the NTSB's recommended action.\r\n\r\nMemo from the Public Service Commission of Maryland, Engineering Division, dated 11/18/2019 to Jason M. Stanek, Chairman, From John Borkoski, P.E., Chief Engineer, Reviewed by Anthony Myers, Executive Director, Subject of Memo: Licensed Professional Engineer Approval and Stamping of Natural Gas Infrastructure Projects\r\n\r\nOn September 13, 2018 a series of explosions and fires occurred after high-pressure natural gas was released into a low-pressure gas distribution system in the northeast region of the Merrimack Valley (Merrimack Valley Accident) in the state of Massachusetts. The distribution system was owned and operated by Columbia Gas of Massachusetts (Columbia Gas), a subsidiary of NiSource. The system over-pressure damaged 131 structures, including at least 5 homes that were destroyed in the city of Lawrence and the towns of Andover and North Andover. Most of the damage was a result of structure fires ignited by gas-fueled appliances. Several structures were destroyed by natural gas explosions. One person was killed and at least 21 individuals, including 2 firefighters, were transported to the hospital. Seven other firefighters received minor injuries.\r\n\r\nOn November 14, 2018, the National Transportation Safety Board (\"NTSB\") issued five urgent safety recommendations in a Safety Recommendation Report. Two of these five NTSB recommendations, one to Massachusetts and one to NiSource, Inc., impact licensed Professional Engineer (\"P .E. \") approval and stamping of natural gas infrastructure projects.\r\n\r\nNTSB Recommendations\r\n1. To the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Eliminate the professional engineer licensure exemption for public utility work and require a professional engineer's seal on public utility engineering drawings. (P-18-005)\r\n2. To NiSource, Inc.: Revise the engineering plan and constructability review process across all of your subsidiaries to ensure that all applicable departments review construction documents for accuracy, completeness, and correctness, and that the documents or plans be sealed by a professional engineer prior to commencing work. (P-18-006) (Urgent)\r\n\r\nRegarding the implementation of licensure exemption for public utility work recommendation (P-18-005), this was addressed through the Massachusetts state legislature and the NTSB has closed this action as described in Section 2.1 on page 33 of NTSB/PAR-19/02. Massachusetts Governor Baker filed legislation titled \"An Act to Ensure Safety and Soundness of the Commonwealth's Natural Gas Infrastructure.\" This legislation stated that, \"natural gas engineering plans and specifications must bear the stamp of approval of a certified professional engineer when that work could pose a material risk to public safety, as determined by the Department of Public Utilities (\"D.P.U.\").\" This legislation provides the Massachusetts D.P.U. with the ability to define the activities required to have a P.E. stamp through a rulemaking process. This legislation was signed into law on December 31, 2018.\r\n\r\nIn early 2019, interim guidance on natural gas infrastructure work requiring licensed professional engineer approval and stamping was provided by the Massachusetts D.P.U. earlier in 2019 as follows:\r\n1. Design and construction that creates or reconfigures gas district pressure regulator stations or gate/ take stations\r\n2. Design and construction of new gas compressor stations\r\n3. Design and construction of intrastate gas transmission lines\r\n4. Uprating5 of gas transmission lines\r\n5. Design and construction of work on gas distribution mains\r\n6. Uprating of gas distribution mains\r\n7. Design and construction of gas service lines that require the bypass of a gas distribution line to supply service\r\n\r\nThis interim guidance provides a \"stopgap\" until final regulations are adopted. Subsequently, the Massachusetts D.P.U. docketed a case, D.P.U. 19-34, to define the activities required to have a P.E. stamp. The D.P.U. received initial and reply comments from various stakeholders and state gas utilities and issued an interlocutory Order (\"Straw Proposal\") setting forth draft regulations on October 11, 2019. Initial comments on the Straw Proposal were received on November 4, 2019 from the state's natural gas utilities and several intervenors such as the American Gas Association (\"AGA\"), the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General and the American Council of Engineering Companies of Massachusetts.\r\n\r\nThe Straw Proposal for final regulations covers activities that pose a material risk to public safety and further delineates how natural gas companies must use P."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2020-07-06",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From John Borkoski P.E., Chief Engineer, Maryland Public Service Commission: A Workgroup to consider Licensed Professional Engineer Approval and Stamping of Natural Gas Infrastructure Projects in\r\nMaryland filed a report with the Maryland Public Service Commission on July 2, 2020 with recommendations for\r\nimplementation of the NTSB recommendation P-19-16. This report is available at (ML# 230985)\r\nhttps://webapp.psc.state.md.us/newIntranet/Maillog/submit_new.cfm?MaillogPath=230985&DirPath=//Coldfusion/Casenum/Admin%20Filings/200000-249999/230985&maillognum=230985"
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2020-11-06",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Jason M. Stanek, Chairman, State of Maryland, Public Service Commission: I am in receipt of your correspondence to Governor Larry Hogan on August 26, 2020 regarding NTSB Safety Recommendation P-19-16, issued on October 24, 2019. The Governor requested that I respond on his behalf.\r\n\r\nIn your letter, you requested an update regarding our progress towards implementing this recommendation. I am pleased to inform you that on October 29, 2020, the Public Service Commission publicly noticed a rulemaking proceeding (in Docket No. RM71) to incorporate NTSB’s Safety Recommendation P-19-16 into the Code of Maryland Regulations.\r\n\r\nPublic comment in this proceeding is due by November 20, 2020, and the Commission will hold a hearing on December 4, 2020 to formally consider the proposed regulation. Once the proposed regulation is published in the Maryland Register, additional public comment will be received prior to convening a hearing in Spring 2021 to consider adopting the final regulation.\r\n\r\nI trust this update is responsive. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2021-06-15",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From John Borkoski, P.E., Chief Engineer, Maryland Public Service Commission: The NTSB issued recommendation P-19-16 to the state of Maryland on October 24, 2019, as a result of the NTSB investigation of a series of explosions and fires in the Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, on September 13, 2018.\r\n\r\nP-19-16\r\n\r\nRemove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer [PE] approval and stamping.\r\n\r\nThe state of Maryland has addressed this recommendation with new regulations that became effective June 14, 2021. These new regulations are available from the following web link:\r\n\r\n20.55.10 Work Approval\r\n\r\nPlease contact me if you need any further information or have questions. Thank you."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2020-02-20",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that, in Maryland, the safety of natural gas distribution systems is the responsibility of the Maryland PSC. In response to this recommendation, the PSC prepared an initial report on the impacts of removing the exemption to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects. That report concluded that implementing the action in Safety Recommendation P 19 16 will result in changes to utility processes and staff composition that will take time to implement, with potential interim impacts on response and recovery during emergencies or delays in planned projects meant to enhance safety and reliability. As a result, we note that, before taking the recommended action, the PSC is establishing a workgroup consisting of Maryland natural gas utilities and other stakeholders to consider the implications of removing the exemption.\r\n\r\nPending completion of the workgroup’s consideration of potential unintended consequences, followed by the state of Maryland taking the recommended action, Safety Recommendation P 19 16 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2020-08-26",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We are aware that the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) is responsible for natural gas distribution system safety in Maryland. We note that the PSC established the PEWG to study and report on the impacts of our recommendation. The report concluded that Safety Recommendation P-19-16 should be implemented, and future natural gas infrastructure projects will be divided into covered projects that require PE approval and stamping, and noncovered projects that could be approved by a PE or other relevant qualified person. The report recommends establishing a state-audited worker qualification program modeled on the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration’s operator qualification program that is codified in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 192. We note that the PEWG modeled these project divisions on the divisions Massachusetts uses to determine which projects require PE approval, which we said met the intent of a similar recommendation we issued to Massachusetts. \r\n\r\nBecause the PEWG did not recommend that Maryland require PE approval and stamping for all natural gas infrastructure projects, as recommended, we encourage you to include a catch all condition within your definition of covered work, such as for any natural gas infrastructure project that might present a material risk to public safety. We believe the recommendations proposed by the PEWG, if adopted, will satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation P-19-16, which remains classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-01-05",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We are aware that the Maryland Public Service Commission held a hearing on December 4, 2020, to formally consider a rulemaking proceeding (Docket No. RM71) to incorporate Safety Recommendation P-19-16 into the Code of Maryland Regulations. We provided written testimony, and Mr. Steve Blackistone from our Government Affairs Division testified before the commission in support of the new rule proposed by the PE Working Group. \r\n\r\nWe are pleased that the commission voted unanimously to publish the proposed regulations in the Maryland Register for notice and comment, subject to nonsubstantive changes necessary to conform to the Code of Maryland Regulations drafting requirements. We note that a hearing will be held in the spring of 2021 to adopt the final regulation. Pending adoption of the final rule, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE for the state of Maryland.\r\n \r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-07-29",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that, effective June 14, 2021, Maryland has implemented new regulations to remove the blanket exemption for gas company employees from PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION for Maryland.\r\n\r\nThank you for taking action to improve pipeline safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Montana",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "CR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Closed - Reconsidered",
      "addresseeDateClosed": "2020-08-27",
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Montana to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Montana. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2020-07-21",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Ronald Drake, President, Montana Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors: This letter is in response to your October 24, 2019 letter regarding natural gas system safety (and report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02) that was addressed to Governor Bullock and the Montana Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board’s investigation found that 31 states, including Montana, allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects. NTSB recommended that Montana remove exemptions so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping.\r\n\r\nThe Board has reviewed the NTSB recommendation and findings both within its full Board meetings and in greater detail among its Laws and Rules Committee. In examining our relevant rules and statutes, we have not been able to identify an exemption. As such, no action has been initiated to change our laws or rules.\r\n\r\nThe Laws and Rules Committee reviewed 37-37-101, Montana Code Annotated which includes the following:\r\n(7) (a) \"Practice of engineering\" means:\r\n(i) any service or creative work the adequate performance of which requires engineering education, training, and experience in the application of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences to the services or creative work as consultation, investigation, evaluation, planning and design of engineering works and systems, planning the use of water, teaching of advanced engineering subjects, engineering surveys, and the inspection of construction for the purpose of ensuring compliance with drawings and specifications;\r\n\r\n(ii) any of the functions described in subsection (7)(a)(i) that embrace the services or work, either public or private, in connection with any utilities, structures, buildings, machines, equipment, processes, work systems, projects, and industrial or consumer products or equipment of mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic, or thermal nature insofar as they involve safeguarding life, health, or property.\r\n\r\n(7)(a)(ii) specifically references services or work done in connection with utilities under the definition of practice of engineering, and natural gas systems are operated by utilities.\r\n\r\nThe statute in its entirety is included following in the attached pages with the relevant sections highlighted, along with the Board’s rule on sealing and stamping, ARM 24.183.511."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2020-08-27",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that, in the Montana Code, “practice of engineering” mandates that anyone performing service or creative work that requires engineering education, training, and experience must subject their construction to inspection to verify that it complies with drawings and specifications. This applies to public or private work in connection with any utilities, including natural gas systems. Therefore, Montana requires licensed professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects. These requirements, which existed prior to our issuing the recommendation, satisfy Safety Recommendation P-19-16, which is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Missouri",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "CR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Closed - Reconsidered",
      "addresseeDateClosed": "2020-02-20",
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MO",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MO",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Missouri to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Missouri. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MO",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2020-01-23",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Michael L. Parson, Governor, Missouri: I am in receipt of your letter dated October 24, 2019 regarding the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) September 2019 report entitled Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimeck Valley, Massachusetts. The letter references a safety recommendation from the report in which 31 states are encouraged to consider responding to - Missouri being one of those states. Specifically, the letter requests a response as to whether the State of Missouri has taken, or intends to take, actions to implement the following recommendation: to remove the exemption for professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping.\r\n\r\nIn reviewing the report, it is our understanding that Missouri was included among the 31 states with alleged exemptions because of Section 327 .191 (3) RSMo. However, the interpretation of the Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, Professional Land Surveyors and Professional Landscape Architects (the state entity that regulates professional engineers) (hereinafter, \"Board\") is that the statute does not provide for exceptions that such work be performed by professional engineers in this instance.\r\n\r\nSpecifically, according to the Board, gas distribution is not generally manufacturing and therefore does not fall under the cited exemption. The Board further states that natural gas infrastructure projects fall into the same category as water and sewer projects, in that they are utilities being built for the public health and welfare. The cited Missouri statute states the exception only exists if it \"does not affect the health, safety, and welfare of the public.\" It is the opinion of the Board that work on gas lines that go into people's homes and businesses affect the health, safety and welfare of the public and therefore requires engineering licensure under current Missouri statute.\r\n\r\nFor questions or additional information please contact the Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, Professional Land Surveyors and Professional Landscape Architects."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MO",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2020-02-20",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that the Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, Professional Land Surveyors and Professional Landscape Architects, which regulates professional engineers, believes that the relevant Missouri law, Section 327.191 (3) RSMo, does not provide for exceptions to the requirement that natural gas infrastructure projects be approved and stamped by a professional engineer. We further note that, because the board believes that gas lines that go into people’s homes and businesses affect the health, safety, and welfare of the public, work on them requires engineering licensure under current Missouri statutes. \r\n\r\nWe agree with the opinion of your board; accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Minnesota",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "CR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Closed - Reconsidered",
      "addresseeDateClosed": "2021-02-10",
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MN",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MN",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Minnesota to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Minnesota. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MN",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-10",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "Upon further reviewing Minnesota laws, we found that your state already requires PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects. Because this requirement existed prior to our issuing the recommendation, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified CLOSED-- RECONSIDERED."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Arkansas",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "CR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Closed - Reconsidered",
      "addresseeDateClosed": "2021-02-04",
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AR",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AR",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Arkansas to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Arkansas. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AR",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-04",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "Upon further reviewing Arkansas law, we found that your state already requires PE approval and stamping on natural gas infrastructure projects. Because this requirement existed prior to our issuing the recommendation, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified CLOSED-- RECONSIDERED."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Illinois",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAA",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Acceptable Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "IL",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "IL",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Illinois to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Illinois. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "IL",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2022-11-07",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Carrie Zalewski, Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission:\r\nThe Illinois Commerce Commission (“ICC”) is tasked with the oversight of natural gas operators and pipeline safety in Illinois, in partnership with Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and in compliance with all Federal and State regulations. \r\nThe ICC is taking measures to promulgate new administrative regulations intended to implement NTSB Recommendation P-19-016 in Illinois. The ICC Staff has met with several Illinois natural gas operators to develop administrative rules that will implement the NTSB Recommendation and enable the natural gas operators to continue providing safe and reliable service to Illinois consumers. Initial meetings have proven fruitful, and the ICC Staff has prepared a draft rule, which will circulate to all Illinois natural gas operators under ICC jurisdiction. The ICC will seek to begin the rulemaking process required by the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100). More specifically, the Staff will request Commission approval to initiate a docketed proceeding to revise existing rules to comply with the Safety Recommendation P-19-016."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "IL",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Illinois has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "IL",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2022-12-19",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "Your letter reports that the ICC staff has met with Illinois natural gas operators and has begun steps to initiate a rulemaking to address our recommendation. Pending the implementation of state regulations requiring that gas infrastructure projects that pose a material risk to public safety be required to be approved and stamped by a licensed professional engineer, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE for the state of Illinois."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Utah",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAA",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Acceptable Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "UT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "UT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Utah to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment\r\n\r\n??Safety management systems \r\n• Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Utah. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "UT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2019-11-08",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Gary R. Herbert, Governor: Thank you for your letter of October 24, 2019 expressing your agency's concern with licensing exemptions for professional engineers. (Safety Recommendation P-19-16) While we are aware of no problems caused by this licensing exemption in Utah, and our utility and petroleum companies have a long record of safe performance, I have forwarded your letter to the Utah Legislature's Occupational and Professional Licensure Review Committee for its consideration.\r\n\r\nThank you again for bringing this matter to my attention."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "UT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-26",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Mark Steinagel, Director, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Utah Department of Commerce: Your email below was sent to two employees of our state government. In it you explain an important issue and request that the State of Utah will take the action recommended in your letter.\r\n\r\nThe provision you mentioned in your letter is an exemption to the engineering license requirement and is created by the Utah State Legislature. It is important to note that any elimination or modification to the exemption you highlight must be made by the Utah State Legislature.\r\n\r\nUpon further review, we found that at the receipt of your last letter in late 2019, we forwarded your email to the appropriate legislative committee for its consideration. This email copies the legislative staff members to that committee, since this year's legislative members have not yet been appointed.\r\n\r\nThe Committee is called the Occupational and Professional License Review Committee. Its webpage can be found here: https://le.utah.gov/committee/committee.jsp?year=2020&com=SPEOPL\r\n\r\nWe recommend that future communications on this issue be with the Committee staff noted above or another contact in the Utah State Legislature.\r\n\r\nWe have nothing further to report at this time."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "UT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "On November 8, 2019, Governor Gary R. Herbert wrote to us, explaining that he forwarded this safety recommendation to the Utah Legislature’s Occupational and Professional Licensure Review Committee for its consideration. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Utah has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "UT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2020-01-02",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that you forwarded this recommendation to the Utah Legislature’s Occupational and Professional Licensure Review Committee for its consideration. Please inform the committee that we would be pleased to provide it with any information available to us that may help the committee in its deliberations. Pending the Utah legislature taking the recommended action, Safety Recommendation P 19 16 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "UT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-04-14",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that our safety recommendation follow-up letter was forwarded to the staff of the Occupational and Professional License Review Committee of the Utah State Legislature. We appreciate your leadership and urge you to continue to encourage your state legislature to pass the legislation to address this important safety concern. Until Utah enacts legislation to remove the natural gas infrastructure exemption, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Maine",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAA",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Acceptable Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "ME",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "ME",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Maine to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Maine. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "ME",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2020-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-David Jackson, Executive Director, State of Maine, Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers: The State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers has been asked to address the safety recommendations the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) made in its report dated September 24, 2019: Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSBIP AR-19/02.\r\n\r\nAs a result of its investigation, the NTSB determined that 31 states, including Maine, permitted exemptions to the requirement for professional engineer approval and stamping of natural gas infrastructure projects. NTSB recommended that each state \"Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16)\r\n\r\nThe State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers has reviewed its statute and believes that natural gas infrastructure would fall under the existing statutory definition of professional engineering and that none of the existing statutory exemptions would apply.\r\n\r\nHowever, the Board recognizes that to eliminate confusion and to ensure that all future natural gas infrastructure projects are designed, stamped and overseen by a professional engineer it may be necessary to add clarifying language to the statute. The Board will review the existing statute and introduce legislation for the 2021 Legislative session as needed. In the near term, an effort will be made to contact natural gas companies operating in the State and advise them that their projects require the oversight of a licensed professional engineer.\r\n\r\nPlease feel free to contact us if you have any questions."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "ME",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2020-03-24",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that the Maine Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers reviewed its statute and believes that natural gas infrastructure falls under the existing statutory definition of professional engineering, and that none of the existing statutory exemptions would apply. However, to eliminate confusion and to ensure that all future natural gas infrastructure projects are designed, stamped, and overseen by a professional engineer, the board plans to review the existing statute and introduce legislation for consideration during the 2021 Maine legislative session to further clarify that natural gas infrastructure projects are not subject to an exemption. In the near term, the board also plans to contact natural gas companies operating in Maine and advise them that their projects require the oversight of a licensed professional engineer.\r\n\r\nThank you for taking action to address this recommendation. We believe that your planned revisions will satisfy the recommendation when they are completed. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.\r\n\r\n \r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Colorado",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAA",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Acceptable Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CO",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CO",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Colorado to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Colorado. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CO",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2021-05-18",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Ronne Hines, Director: The office of the Board of Licensure for Architects, Professional Engineers, and Professional Land Surveyors (\"Board\") is in receipt of the attached NTSB Recommendations. These recommendations requested the Board seek revisions to the Colorado Revised Statutes governing engineering licensure by removing exemptions to the law '...so that future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed engineers approval and stamping\". The Board does not have the authority to make, revise, or waive the laws as that authority lies with the Colorado Legislature.\r\n\r\nBill requests are handled through the Office of Legislative Legal Services at olls.ga@state.co.us. I am also connecting you with the Department's legislative liaison Michael Nicoletti.\r\n\r\nPlease accept our apologies in our delayed response to your office and thank you for the opportunity to respond."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CO",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Colorado has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CO",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-06-17",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We are aware that the DORA does not have the authority to change Colorado law, and we appreciate that you have encouraged your state legislature to pass the needed legislation to address this important safety concern. Pending removal of the provision exempting professional engineer approval and stamping of natural gas infrastructure projects in the state of Colorado, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of California",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAA",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Acceptable Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of California to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of California. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2021-03-08",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "-From Leslie Palmer, Director, California Public Utilities Commission, Safety and Enforcement Division: Thank you for your letter dated February 12, 2021 to Governor Gavin Newsom regarding the implementation status of Safety Recommendation P- 19- 16. The Governor's Office referred this letter to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to respond, as the CPUC is California's lead state regulatory agency for gas pipeline safety. The Safety and Enforcement Division (SEO) of the CPUC is certified to inspect and regulate intrastate pipeline safety pursuant to the state certification program of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).\r\n\r\nSEO carefully analyzed Safety Recommendation P- t 9-16, its effect on the gas utilities under CPUC jurisdiction and its impact on public safety. As a result of our analysis, SEO determined that the recommendation, if adopted, may be beneficial to gas pipeline safety.\r\n\r\nOn that basis, SEO is planning to include language for future natural gas infrastructure projects to require licensed Professional Engineer (PE) approval in a forthcoming proposed revision of CPUC General Order 112, which addresses the design, construction, testing, maintenance, and operation of utility natural gas gathering, transmission and distribution piping systems. SEO will present the proposed revision to the Commission for deliberation and vote in 2021.\r\n\r\nIn the meantime, California's two largest natural gas utilities are already making progress toward voluntarily implementing a requirement for PE stamps on natural gas infrastructure. Southern California Company (SoCalGas) is using a \" phase-in\" approach, in which PE stamps will be implemented on gas pipeline transmission facilities immediately, followed by a review. SoCalGas intends to review this new practice and analyze the results to see if any side issues need to be addressed. In the meantime, the utility is initiating necessary protocol modifications for gas distribution systems in order to require PE stamps. The utility is encouraging its engineering workforce to move towards PE licensure.\r\n\r\nPacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) Gas Design Standard A-34 (Piping Design and Test Requirements) prescribes when to stamp a drawing by a PE.\r\n\r\nPlease do not hesitate to reach out with any questions to me or to Terence Eng, Program Manager."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-04-14",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that the CPUC agrees with our recommendation and plans to revise its General Order 112, which addresses the design, construction, testing, maintenance, and operation of utility natural gas gathering, transmission, and distribution piping systems. These revisions will mandate that future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval. The CPUC’s Safety and Enforcement Division will present the proposed revision to the commission for deliberation and vote in 2021.\r\n\r\nIn the interim, we are pleased to hear that California’s two largest natural gas utilities—Southern California Company and Pacific Gas and Electric Company—are making progress toward voluntarily implementing a requirement for PE stamping on their natural gas infrastructure projects.\r\n\r\nPending the completion of the CPUC’s action to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE for California."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that California has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of New Mexico",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NM",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NM",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-05-03",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\n\r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the state of New Mexico to act on the safety recommendation in this letter, which we believe will reduce the risk of future similar accidents in your state. \r\n\r\nOur September 24, 2019, report, Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, found the following safety issues: \r\n\r\n•\tAdequacy of natural gas regulations\r\n•\tProject documentation\r\n•\tConstructability review\r\n•\tProject management\r\n•\tRisk assessment\r\n•\tSafety management systems\r\n•\tLicensed professional engineer (PE) approval of natural gas projects\r\n•\tEmergency response \r\n\r\nAs a result of this investigation, we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects (see section 3.4 of the report). \r\n\r\nP-19-16\r\n\r\nRemove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. \r\n\r\nWhen we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16, we did not believe that the state of New Mexico allowed this exemption; however, we have since reviewed additional information that indicates that New Mexico does, in fact, exempt natural gas infrastructure projects from requiring PE approval and stamping. Accordingly, we are issuing Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to your state. \r\n\r\nWe are vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. Please respond within 90 days of the date of this letter detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (P-19-16). Please submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Wisconsin",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "WI",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "WI",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-05-03",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\n\r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the state of Wisconsin to act on the safety recommendation in this letter, which we believe will reduce the risk of future similar accidents in your state. \r\n\r\nOur September 24, 2019, report, Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, found the following safety issues: \r\n\r\n•\tAdequacy of natural gas regulations\r\n•\tProject documentation\r\n•\tConstructability review\r\n•\tProject management\r\n•\tRisk assessment\r\n•\tSafety management systems\r\n•\tLicensed professional engineer (PE) approval of natural gas projects\r\n•\tEmergency response \r\n\r\nAs a result of this investigation, we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects (see section 3.4 of the report). \r\n\r\nP-19-16\r\n\r\nRemove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. \r\n\r\nWhen we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16, we did not believe that the state of Wisconsin allowed this exemption; however, we have since reviewed additional information that indicates that Wisconsin does, in fact, exempt natural gas infrastructure projects from requiring PE approval and stamping. Accordingly, we are issuing Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to your state. \r\n\r\nWe are vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. Please respond within 90 days of the date of this letter detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (P-19-16). Please submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Wyoming",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "WY",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "WY",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Wyoming to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Wyoming. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "WY",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Wyoming has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Texas",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "TX",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "TX",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Texas to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Texas. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "TX",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-01-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Texas has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of South Dakota",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "SD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "SD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of South Dakota to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of South Dakota. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "SD",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that South Dakota has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of South Carolina",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "SC",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "SC",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of South Carolina to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment\r\n\r\n??Safety management systems \r\n• Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of South Carolina. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "SC",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that South Carolina has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "Commonwealth of Pennsylvania",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "PA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "PA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.\r\n\r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.\r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.\r\n\r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "PA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Pennsylvania has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of North Carolina",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NC",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NC",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of North Carolina to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of North Carolina. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NC",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that North Carolina has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of New York",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NY",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NY",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of New York to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of New York. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NY",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that New York has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Nebraska",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NE",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NE",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Nebraska to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Nebraska. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "NE",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued and we have not received any additional information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that your state has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Mississippi",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MS",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MS",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.\r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.\r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.\r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Mississippi to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.\r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.\r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:\r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations\r\n• Project documentation\r\n• Constructability review\r\n• Project management\r\n• Risk assessment\r\n• Safety management systems\r\n• Licensed professional engineer approval\r\nof natural gas projects\r\n• Emergency response\r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Mississippi. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report.\r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.)\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "MS",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that your state has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Louisiana",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "LA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "LA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Louisiana to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Louisiana. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "LA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions Louisiana has completed or planned in response to this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "Commonwealth of Kentucky",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "KY",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "KY",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.\r\n\r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.\r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.\r\n\r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the Commonwealth of Kentucky to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "KY",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement this recommendation. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Kentucky completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Iowa",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "IA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "IA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Iowa to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Iowa. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "IA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-17",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Iowa has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Idaho",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "ID",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "ID",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Idaho to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Idaho. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "ID",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement this recommendation. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Idaho has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Georgia",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "GA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "GA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Georgia to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Georgia. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "GA",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement this recommendation. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Georgia has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Florida",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "FL",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "FL",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Florida to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Florida. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "FL",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement this recommendation. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Florida has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n \r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Connecticut",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Connecticut to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Connecticut. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "CT",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement this recommendation. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Connecticut has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Arizona",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AZ",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AZ",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters.\r\n\r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary.\r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.\r\n\r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Arizona to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Arizona. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AZ",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Arizona has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Alaska",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AK",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AK",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Alaska to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.\r\n\r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems \r\n• Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\n\r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Alaska. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AK",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Alaska has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Alabama",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OAR",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Await Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AL",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AL",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2019-10-24",
          "communicationType": "Transmittal Letter",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nThe attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02.. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. \r\nAll communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division.\r\n\r\nThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the State of Alabama to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. \r\nThis letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. \r\nAs a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: \r\n• Adequacy of natural gas regulations \r\n• Project documentation \r\n• Constructability review \r\n• Project management \r\n• Risk assessment \r\n• Safety management systems\r\n\r\n??Licensed professional engineer approval \r\nof natural gas projects \r\n• Emergency response \r\nAccordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Alabama. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. \r\n• Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) \r\n\r\nThe NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "AL",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-02-12",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Alabama has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN--AWAIT RESPONSE.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "addresseeName": "State of Ohio",
      "addresseeStatusAcronym": "OUA",
      "addresseeStatus": "Open - Unacceptable Response",
      "addresseeDateClosed": null,
      "addresseeDetails": [
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "OH",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2023-10-27",
          "communicationType": "NPRM Response",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. \r\n\r\nThe NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations.\r\n\r\nRelated NTSB Investigations \r\nIn February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students.  In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion.  \r\nIn September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents.  We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project.\r\n\r\nUpdates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals\r\n\r\nNPRM Commentary\r\n\r\n\tIn the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. \r\n\r\nIn the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects.  The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans.\r\n\r\nNTSB Comment\r\n\r\nWe focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. \r\n\r\nOur Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident.  \r\n\r\nOur investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic.\r\n\r\nWe issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nWe also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. \r\n\r\nFinally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping.  One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person.  \r\n\r\nThe NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. \r\n\r\nSummary\r\n\r\n\tThe NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking.\r\n\t\r\nThank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "OH",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": false,
          "communicationDate": "2021-05-20",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "Jenifer French, Chair, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio: I am writing in response to your letter dated May 3, 2021, notifying Ohio of Safety Recommendation P-19-16 and requesting that Ohio act on that recommendation by removing the exemption in state law to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects.\r\n\r\nThe State of Ohio takes pipeline safety very seriously and has adopted the Federal Pipeline Safety Regulations. Gas Pipeline Safety (GPS) is regulated by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) which has a robust GPS program and is very familiar with the circumstances surrounding the incident in the Merrimack Valley area of Massachusetts. In fact, six of the PUCO’s GPS inspectors were dispatched to the affected area to assist the Massachusetts Public Service Commission with ensuring installation of the new gas pipeline system was completed safely and according to the law.\r\n\r\nPUCO’s GPS Staff followed the Merrimack Valley investigation closely and have taken a number of actions in response to the incident to minimize the chance of a similar event occurring in Ohio. For example, the GPS section performed a state-wide low-pressure system inventory in the fall of 2019 to determine the number of low-pressure systems in Ohio, the relative risk from each, and preventative/mitigative action being taken by the operators of these systems. We continue to monitor the efforts each company is taking to prevent and mitigate the risk associated with these systems. Prior to the Merrimack Valley incident, Ohio implemented a state-specific rule applying Operator Qualification requirements described in 49 CFR 192 Subpart N to gas pipeline construction, which is in excess of requirements in the Pipeline Safety Regulations. This requirement ensures personnel performing this type of work have the requisite knowledge to perform construction functions safely.\r\n\r\nPUCO’s GPS Staff also reviewed past incidents involving the over-pressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems nationwide and concluded that the most likely source of failure for these systems is a depressurization of regulator station sensing lines, either from excavation damage to the line or from isolating and depressurizing the line as part of construction or maintenance. As a result, the PUCO’s GPS Staff modified its scheduling and compliance inspection protocols to ensure that operators verify the location of buried sensing lines and relocate them if appropriate. Staff has also given training to Ohio gas pipeline operators on the lessons learned from the NTSB investigation and best practices to prevent similar events.\r\n\r\nMost recently, the PUCO took enforcement action against Columbia Gas of Ohio for over-pressurizing a natural gas main, which occurred, in part, due to not following NTSB recommended practices. See Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Case No. 20-1759-GA-GPS. This action was swift and comprehensive and is another layer of protection in Ohio’s GPS enforcement program.\r\n\r\nImportantly, PUCO’s GPS section has many experienced investigators and is overseen by Peter Chace and Joseph Dragovich. Mr. Chace is the Division Chief that oversees GPS and has held officer positions at the National Association of Pipeline Safety Regulators (NAPSR) and is currently on the national Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC), an advisory board to the U.S. Department of Transportation who reviews proposed amendments to the Pipeline Safety Regulations to assure the technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-effectiveness and practicability of each proposal. Mr. Dragovich is the GPS Program Manager and is a Licensed Professional Engineer and former GPS Inspector for Ohio. These professionals, along with an experienced cadre of PUCO GPS inspectors, are actively engaged in the industry and its continuous efforts to improve pipeline safety.\r\n\r\nFinally, Ohio has implemented numerous changes as a result of the lessons learned from the incident in Massachusetts and is holding operators accountable. Ohio will continue to adapt and respond as new information becomes available to ensure gas pipelines systems in the state are constructed, operated, and maintained in a safe and reliable manner."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "OH",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-05-03",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. \r\n\r\nWe are providing the following information to urge the state of Ohio to act on the safety recommendation in this letter, which we believe will reduce the risk of future similar accidents in your state. \r\n\r\nOur September 24, 2019, report, Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, found the following safety issues: \r\n\r\n•\tAdequacy of natural gas regulations\r\n•\tProject documentation\r\n•\tConstructability review\r\n•\tProject management\r\n•\tRisk assessment\r\n•\tSafety management systems\r\n•\tLicensed professional engineer (PE) approval of natural gas projects\r\n•\tEmergency response \r\n\r\nAs a result of this investigation, we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects (see section 3.4 of the report). \r\n\r\nP-19-16\r\n\r\nRemove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. \r\n\r\nWhen we issued Safety Recommendation P-19-16, we did not believe that the state of Ohio allowed this exemption; however, we have since reviewed additional information that indicates that Ohio does, in fact, exempt natural gas infrastructure projects from requiring PE approval and stamping. Accordingly, we are issuing Safety Recommendation P-19-16 to your state. \r\n\r\nWe are vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. Please respond within 90 days of the date of this letter detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (P-19-16). Please submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov, and do not send both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        },
        {
          "addresseeAcronym": "OH",
          "addresseeOrganizationType": "S-State Government",
          "isFromNtsb": true,
          "communicationDate": "2021-08-10",
          "communicationType": "Official Correspondence",
          "communicationContents": "We note that you have a state-specific operator qualification (OQ) requirement for new natural gas pipeline construction. We further note that PUCO, after completing a statewide inventory of low-pressure natural gas distribution systems, has taken actions to reduce the risk of an overpressurization accident in Ohio, including the following:\r\n\r\n•\tActively monitoring the efforts each private utility company is taking to prevent and mitigate the risk associated with these systems.\r\n•\tTraining pipeline operators on the lessons learned from our investigation of the Merrimack Valley accident.\r\n•\tRevising its scheduling and compliance inspection protocols to ensure that operators verify the location of buried sensing lines and relocate them if appropriate.  \r\n•\tActively enforcing these OQ requirements and construction procedures.\r\n\r\nHowever, although these actions are beneficial, they do not provide a level of technical competence and accountability in engineering management that is equivalent to our recommended action. We are aware that, on October 1, 2020, despite PUCO’s enhanced safety measures, an overpressurization incident occurred at the Kitts Hill regulator station in Ohio as a result of a failure to properly relocate sensing lines. Pending action by your legislature to remove the statutory exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN-- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE for the state of Ohio.\r\n\r\nPlease update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response."
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "jurisdiction": "US"
}
```