# ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC — Safety Order

**Citation:** CPF 320115008S  
**Type / status:** enforcement / historical  
**Agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  
**Effective:** Not stated  
**Published:** 2011-06-15

CLOSED safety order.

## Document text

Safety Order involving ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2011-06-15 and is reported as closed as of 2017-12-20. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

320115008S_Closure Letter_12202017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Closure%20Letter_12202017.pdf

320115008S_Closure Letter_12202017_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Closure%20Letter_12202017_text.pdf

320115008S_Consent Agreement_08082011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Consent%20Agreement_08082011_text.pdf

320115008S_Consent Order_08082011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Consent%20Order_08082011.pdf

320115008S_Consent Order_08082011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Consent%20Order_08082011_text.pdf

320115008S_Consent_Agreement_08082011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Consent_Agreement_08082011.pdf

320115008S_Notice of Proposed Safety Order_06152011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Safety%20Order_06152011.pdf

320115008S_Notice of Proposed Safety Order_06152011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Safety%20Order_06152011_text.pdf

320115008S_Notice of Proposed Safety Order_06152011_text.pdf

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (580)-395-3190
June 15, 2011
Mr. Wes Christensen
Senior Vice President of Operations
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103-4298
Re: CPF No. 3-2011-5008S
Dear Mr. Christensen:
Enclosed please find a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice) issued in the above-referenced
case. The Notice proposes that you take certain measures with respect to ONEOK NGL
Pipeline, LP’s (ONEOK) North System pipeline. Your options for responding are set forth in the
Notice. Your receipt of the Notice constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
We look forward to a successful resolution of this matter to ensure pipeline safety. Please direct
any questions on this matter to me at (816) 329-3800.
Sincerely,
David Barrett
Director, Central Region
PHMSA – Office of Pipeline Safety
Enclosures: Notice of Proposed Safety Order and Copy of 49 CFR § 190.239



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
CENTRAL REGION
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64106
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP ) CPF No. 3-2011-5008S
)
)
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
NOTICE OF PROPOSED SAFETY ORDER
Background and Purpose
Pursuant to Chapter 601 of title 49, United States Code, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) has initiated an investigation of the safety of ONEOK NGL
Pipeline, LP’s (ONEOK) North System pipeline, including an incident that occurred on May 14,
2011 in which ONEOK’s 106W hazardous liquid pipeline failed in a casing in Romeoville,
Illinois. In addition to the onsite examination of the failed pipe in Romeoville, Illinois,
PHMSA’s investigation included a review of ONEOK’s North System control center in Tulsa,
Oklahoma.
As a result of the investigation, it appears that a condition or conditions exist on the ONEOK’s
106W pipeline and North System control systems that pose a pipeline integrity risk to public
safety, property or the environment. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117(l), PHMSA issues this
Notice of Proposed Safety Order, notifying you of the preliminary findings of the investigation
and proposing that you take measures to ensure that the public, property, and the environment
are protected from the potential risk.
Preliminary Findings
• ONEOK’s North System is an interstate hazardous liquids pipeline system that
transports natural gas liquids (NGL) between Medford, Oklahoma and Chicago,
Illinois. The North System is approximately 1,756 miles long with 1,553 miles
located in the states of Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. The
106W line is approximately 35.23 miles long and transports NGL between Lemont
and Wayne stations located in Illinois. Many portions of the North System are bi-
directional.



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• On May 14, 2011, at approximately 3:40 p.m. CDT, a failure occurred on the 106W
line near the intersection of West 135th Street and North Weber Road in Romeoville,
IL. The failure occurred in a cased crossing under West 135th Street. Initial reports
by the Respondent indicated approximately 100 barrels of refinery grade butane were
released.
• The released butane pushed dielectric material from the annulus of the casing and out
the casing vent at West 135th Street. Local businesses including a gasoline station
were closed and evacuated. There were no injuries reported as a result of the release.
• ONEOK reported the incident to the National Response Center (NRC) on May 14,
2011 at 8:55 p.m. Eastern Time (NRC Report #976327). PHMSA initiated an
investigation of the incident, which involved an on-site investigation at the failure
location and investigation at the ONEOK’s control center in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
• The ONEOK North System control center consoles received notification of the
release by two third-parties. The first party provided a call around 3:37 CDT but did
not provide an address and hung up. The controllers began to look for any unusual
pipeline response but only had an area code to go from. At 3:42 pm CDT, a second
call came to the control room indicating a release and the emergency responder
provided a location. Controllers began to close valves in conjunction with contacting
Magellan at Wayne pump station and reversed flow into Lemont in an effort to
eliminate as much product as possible from the release site. Shutdown, isolation, and
blow down of the 106W pipeline was completed at 4:49 pm CDT.
• ONEOK purged the pipeline in the vicinity of West 135th Street and North Weber
Road. The crossing was replaced by open cutting West 135th Street and installing
new pipe and casing. The pipeline was returned to service on May 24, 2011 with a
20% pressure reduction.
• The failure occurred inside a 12-inch steel casing. PHMSA investigators and
ONEOK visually examined the failed pipe and casing at the scene, and observed a
failure that was indicative of external corrosion of the carrier pipe at the 12 o’clock
position underneath a spacer used to maintain clearance between the carrier pipe and
the casing. The failed pipe was transported to Kiefner and Associates near
Columbus, Ohio for metallurgical examination. The exact condition or conditions on
the pipeline that caused the failure are unknown at this time as final metallurgical
reports have not been completed. Based on the visual examination and the nature of
the corrosion, the same condition(s) that caused the failure could be present (or could
develop) on other areas of the pipeline and impair the reliability and serviceability of
the pipeline.
• As reported by ONEOK the 106W pipeline is generally constructed of 8-inch
diameter pipe having a multiple wall thickness ranging from 0.188 to 0.322-inch
with the predominate wall thickness being 0.188-inch, Grade API 5L X-52 pipe of



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unknown manufacture. ONEOK reports the pipe seam is high frequency electric
resistance welded (ERW) and was constructed in 1967 but could not produce
documentation confirming the manufacturer. The failed carrier pipe at West 135th
Street is 8-inch diameter, 0.250 inch wall thickness. Per the alignment sheets and
observations by PHMSA and ONEOK onsite, it is apparent the West 135th Street
crossing has been modified since the time of original construction.
• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the 106W pipeline is 1440 psig. The
discharge pressure at Lemont Pump Station was approximately 1148 psig at the time
of the failure.
• The 106W pipeline crosses heavily traveled public roadways, including East West
Tollway, Butterfield Road, and Interstate 55. The pipeline also travels through high
population areas. ONEOK indicated there are approximately 120 cased crossings of
railroads and public roadways on the 106W pipeline.
• The previous operator of the 106W pipeline performed an inline inspection (ILI) of
the pipeline in 2007 with high resolution magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and caliper
tools. A 37% deep metal loss anomaly was reported approximately 2.5 feet
downstream of the failure. Review of the raw ILI data by ONEOK after the May 14th
failure showed an indication of a feature at the point of failure under the spacer in the
casing. ONEOK has indicated that at the time of the 2007 ILI, none of the features
reported at the 135th Street crossing were actionable.
• On August 12, 2006, the previous operator of the 106W pipeline experienced a failure
on above-grade piping on the Des Plaines River bridge releasing 1,416 barrels of
butane. The cause of the failure was determined to be external corrosion.
• On May 17th PHMSA conducted controller interviews at the ONEOK facility. It was
determined that at the time of the incident, the console logger for one of the two
consoles operating the North system had quit logging commands or events and alarms
coming from the console. The absence of this SCADA data prevented ONEOK from
being able to verify the exact time certain activities had been performed in
comparison with other information.
• PHMSA determined that computational pipeline monitoring was not installed on the
North system consoles at the time of the incident. The controllers did not have
instrumentation on the 106W line except three pressures located in close proximity to
the Lemont Pump Station and it was necessary to manually record data about what
was being delivered or received.
• On Jan 26th, 2010, PHMSA issued Advisory Bulletin ADB-10-01 reminding
operators of the importance of prompt and effective leak detection capability in
protecting public safety and the environment. The Advisory Bulletin recommends an
engineering review of the pipeline system regarding leak detection applicability,



4
regular line balance activities, and the implementation of CPM leak detection systems
where feasible.
Proposed Issuance of Safety Order
Section 60117(l) of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a safety order, after
reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective measures, which may
include physical inspection, testing, repair, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making
the determination that a pipeline facility has a condition or conditions that pose a pipeline
integrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment is set forth both in the above-
referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, a copy of which is enclosed.
After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact and considering the age of the
pipeline, the proximity of the pipeline to public roadways and populated areas, the hazardous
nature of the product being transported, the pressure required for transporting the material, the
ongoing investigation to determine the condition(s) that caused the pipeline failure, the
likelihood that the condition(s) causing the failure could be present or could develop on other
areas of the pipeline, and the likelihood that such condition(s) could again impair the
serviceability of the pipeline, it appears that the continued operation of the pipeline without
corrective measures would pose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property, or the
environment.
Accordingly, PHMSA issues this Notice of Proposed Safety Order to notify ONEOK of the
proposed issuance of a safety order and to propose that the company take the measures specified
herein to address the potential risk.
Response to this Notice
In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, you have 30 days following receipt of this Notice to
submit a written response to the Regional Director who issued the Notice. If you do not respond
within 30 days, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the Notice and authorizes the
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in the Notice without further
notice to you and to issue a safety order.
In your response, you may notify the Regional Director that you intend to comply with the terms
of the Notice as proposed, or you may request that an informal consultation be scheduled.
Informal consultation provides you with the opportunity to explain the circumstances associated
with the risk condition(s) alleged in the notice and, as appropriate, to present a proposal for a
work plan or other remedial measures, without prejudice to your position in any subsequent
hearing. If you and PHMSA agree within 30 days of informal consultation on a plan and
schedule for you to address each identified risk condition, we may enter into a written consent
agreement (Agreement). PHMSA would then issue an administrative consent order
incorporating the terms of the agreement.
If a consent agreement is not reached, or if you have elected not to request informal consultation,
you may request an administrative hearing in writing within 30 days following receipt of the



5
Notice or within 10 days following the conclusion of an informal consultation that did not result
in a consent agreement, as applicable. Following a hearing, if the Associate Administrator finds
the facility to have a condition that poses a pipeline integrity risk to the public, property, or the
environment in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, the Associate Administrator may issue a
Safety Order.
Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you
must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for
confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information
qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2011-5008S and for each document
you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Proposed Corrective Measures
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117(l) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, PHMSA proposes to issue to
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP a Safety Order (Order) incorporating the following remedial
requirements with respect to the ONEOK 106W pipeline system:
1. Develop and submit a written restart plan for approval by the Director, Central
Region, PHMSA (Director) for this segment. The restart plan must provide for
adequate patrolling of the pipeline during the restart process, specify a daylight
restart, provide details associated with the monitoring of other casings, and detail
advance communications with local emergency response officials. The restart plan
must include actions taken by ONEOK to confirm the integrity of pipeline facilities
that were damaged, or were suspected of being damaged, as a result of the incident,
prior to restart. After completion of restart ONEOK shall submit within 30 days of
the receipt of the Order or Agreement documentation demonstrating the advance
communications with local emergency response officials.
2. After the line has been restarted, the operating pressure of the 106W pipeline must
not exceed 80% of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the
May 14, 2011 failure. Specifically, the discharge pressure at Lamont Station into
106W must not exceed 918 psig. This pressure reduction requires any relevant
remote or local alarm limits, software programming, set-points or control points, and
mechanical over-pressure devices to be adjusted accordingly. Documentation of the
adjustments to alarm limits, software programming, set-points etc shall be submitted.
The pressure restriction must remain in effect until written approval to increase the
pressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from
the Director, as set forth in Item 17. If the results of any action undertaken pursuant
to the Order or Agreement necessitate a reduction in the operating pressure permitted
by the Order or Agreement, ONEOK must further reduce the operating pressure
accordingly and notify the Director.



6
3. Within 15 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, submit a plan to conduct an
instrumented leak survey of the 106W pipeline system detailing the schedule for the
expeditious completion of the leak survey within 30 days of initiating the survey.
Include in the plan a description of the equipment to be used and performance
specifications describing sensitivity of leak detection. The plan must include
provision for submission of a summary report detailing the findings of the leak survey
to be provided directly from the instrumented leak survey provider to the Director.
This summary report should include a description of any elements affecting the leak
survey data, the area covered and associated ranges of the leak survey findings, and
any other items of significance such as accuracy of the instrumentation or
malfunction of equipment. The Director is to receive distribution of all resulting
reports in their entirety, including all media, at the same time they are made available
to ONEOK. The plan must provide for the ongoing performance of patrol
surveillance activities for 106W pipeline on a weekly basis until approved otherwise
by the Director.
Within 5 days from of the leak survey completion, submit a separate report detailing
the schedule of planned maintenance activities to occur as a result of the leak survey
for the 106W pipeline system.
4. Within 45 days of the Director’s approval of testing protocols, complete third-party
mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the 106W pipeline failed
pipe, the associated spacer(s) and casing as relevant to the incident. If a review of the
casing vent stacks is required for any reason based on information received from the
third-party tester, this shall be completed as well. Provide documentation verifying
manufacturer and seam type, or in the alternative the testing shall also include
examination of a sample of pipe to confirm wall thickness and seam type (low or high
frequency ERW). The testing and analysis must be completed as follows:
(A) Document the chain of custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe
section and other evidence originating from the failure site;
(B) Utilize mechanical and metallurgical testing protocols which have been
previously approved by the Director;
(C) Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the
Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a
PHMSA representative to witness the testing; and
(D) Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their
entirety, including all media, whether draft or final, to the Director at the same
time they are made available to ONEOK. Additional testing may be requested
by the Director based on metallurgical findings.



7
5. Within 30 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, conduct an evaluation of the
previous in-line inspection (ILI) results, including a review and reporting by the ILI
vendors’ analysts (including raw data) of the failed 106W pipeline as follows:
(A) Re-evaluate the 1996 and 2007 in-line inspection results to determine
whether any features with similar characteristics to the feature at the failure
site are present elsewhere on the pipeline; and
(B) Within 15 days of the completion of the re-evaluation, submit a report within
describing the process used to re-evaluate ILI results, and the results of the re-
evaluation.
6. Within 30 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, perform an ILI of the 106W
pipeline. Before performing the ILI tool run, the Director will review and approve
the final criteria and specific technology considerations ONEOK has taken into
account when selecting the specific tool. Technology considerations and final criteria
should account for the size of anomalies experienced in the casing and other 106W
pipeline specific elements. The data analysis must be completed within 60 days of
successful completion of the ILI. The ILI must include consideration of best
technology to reliably detect and size anomalies in casings. The ILI vendor shall
evaluate the results per a performance specification, including consideration of the
location and size of the defect that failed on May 14, 2011. Results of the inline
inspection must be compared with previous ILI results from 1996 and 2007. Submit
the ILI results to the Director including: the comparison with prior results, and a plan
for remediation of anomalies requiring immediate action; including criteria for
immediate action.
7. Perform corrective measures to SCADA operations as follows:
(A) Within 30 days of the receipt of the Order or Agreement, submit a review and
implementation plan to the Director for a leak detection system on the entire
North system. The implementation plan shall include a timeline to complete
implementation for all pipeline segments on all Consoles for the North system
and is not to exceed 24 months. A prioritization for all pipeline segments on
the Consoles operating the ONEOK North system is to be included in the
implementation plan submitted. This review and implementation plan shall
include instrumentation improvements. Upon completion of the review
submit a report for the Director’s approval describing the prioritization,
consideration of risk in developing schedule, implementation milestones, and
a detailed explanation of the existing and new instrumentation requirements to
be utilized for each prioritized leak detection section.
(B) Within 90 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, install and activate
additional instrumentation on the 106W pipeline. At a minimum, this
instrumentation must consist of pressure and flow monitoring at the Wayne
station IAP Valve 185 and additional pressure monitoring on either side of



8
IAP Valve 184, IAP Valve 416, and IAP Valve 4. This instrumentation shall
be used by the future leak detection system. If additional instrumentation is
required for the leak detection, this shall also be installed.
(C) Within 1 year of receipt of the Order or Agreement, update the SCADA
software to a version that will allow stale data, forced values, or points off
scan to be backlit a different color per individual point on each Function
Control Unit (FCU). Should additional time be required after initiating this
upgrade for complete implementation, ONEOK will utilize provisions
identified in Item 18.
8. Within 60 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, identify what caused the
console logger to stop working for the console assigned the tag name TCU2. Contact
the vendor and work to design and implement a software alarming system to indicate
when this happens in the future. In addition, create a “re-boot” log that records all
times, dates, identify employee performing, systems involved and /or causing, and
reasons for rebooting of SCADA PCs or servers. This log shall be kept and available
for PHMSA review upon request.
9. Within 60 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, thoroughly review and update
all written control room procedures to reflect ONEOK specific requirements and
remove references to previous pipeline operator(s).
10. Within 60 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, submit to the Director a
company-wide management of change process including attached documentation
describing the various departments that utilize the process and how the process is
implemented by all departments within ONEOK. Require all revisions to procedures,
process, assets including abandonments or idling of facilities, instrumentation,
communication, networks, or new pipeline facilities involve the control room in such
a manner as their input is provided before final decisions are made and their
involvement is performed with enough time that controller training can occur in
advance of operations of any asset associated with changes or newly operated. This
is required to involve all departments in ONEOK Partners at large including but not
limited to: asset management, scheduling, new business development, operations
(field and headquarters), communications, design and engineering (field and
headquarters), maintenance, leak detection, integrity management, IT, etc.
11. Within 90 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, design and implement a training
program for all maintenance crews requiring them to call the control room before,
during, and upon completion of all maintenance activity. The program must
emphasize that this required contact should occur as frequently as needed to keep all
controllers aware of the status of maintenance activities. This applies to any pipeline
or facility repairs, emergency response, routine valve maintenance, routine
instrumentation, or other routine maintenance.



9
12. Within 120 days of receipt of the Agreement or Order, develop and submit to the
Director for prior approval a remedial work plan that includes corrective measures.
The work plan must provide for the verification of the integrity of the 106W pipeline
and must fully address all known or suspected factors that caused or contributed to
the May 14, 2011 incident, including, but not limited to:
(A) The integration of the information developed from the actions required by the
Agreement or Order with all historical construction, operating, maintenance,
testing, and assessment data for the entire pipeline including:
(i) Within 30 days of completion of the testing and analysis required by
Items 3-6, complete a root cause failure analysis for 106W pipeline
relating to the May 14, 2011 incident that is supplemented and
facilitated by an independent third-party expert acceptable to the
Director. Elements of the root cause analysis must include, but not be
limited to: scoping document of the root cause analysis; procedures
associated with root cause analysis; multiple methods used for the
analysis and updates on each method as it progresses; contributory
factors; documentation of the decision-making process; and a final
report of the root cause process results, including any lessons learned
and whether the findings are applicable to other locations within the
ONEOK System; and
(ii) Within 30 days of completion of the root cause failure analysis,
integrate the findings of the root cause failure analysis into other data
integration efforts and the remedial work plan.
(B) The performance of additional field testing, inspections, and evaluations to
determine whether and to what extent the conditions associated with the
failure, or any other integrity-threatening conditions are present elsewhere on
the 106W pipeline. Data-gathering activities must include a review of the
failure history (in-service and pressure test failures) of the entire length of the
106W pipeline and development of a written report to the Director containing
all available information regarding locations, dates, and causes of failures.
Include a detailed description of ONEOK’s plan to confirm the integrity of the
106W pipeline, including the criteria to be used for the evaluation and
prioritization of any integrity threats and anomalies that are identified. Make
the results of the actions required by this provision available to the Director or
PHMSA’s representative;
(C) The performance of repairs or other corrective measures that fully remediate
the condition(s) associated with the pipeline failures and any other integrity-
threatening condition everywhere along the 106W pipeline where such
conditions are identified by the evaluation process. Include a detailed
description of the repair criteria and method(s) to be used in undertaking any
repairs or other remedial actions;



10
(D) Provisions for continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification
measures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the 106W pipeline
considering the results of the analyses, inspections, and corrective measures
undertaken pursuant to the Safety Order; and
(E) A proposed risk-based schedule for completion of the actions required by
paragraphs (A) through (D) of this Item, including a schedule associated with
all elements of the internal root cause analysis. Provide the Director with
advance notice of scheduled repairs.
13. The remedial work plan becomes incorporated into the Order or Agreement and must
be revised as necessary to incorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to
the Order or Agreement and whenever necessary to incorporate new information
obtained during the failure investigations and remedial activities. Submit any such
plan revisions to the Director for prior approval. The Director may approve plan
elements incrementally.
14. Implement the remedial work plan as approved by the Director, including any
revisions to the plan. The results of all actions taken in accordance with the approved
plan must be available for review by PHMSA or its representative.
15. Submit monthly reports to the Director that: (1) include available data and results of
the testing and evaluations required by the Order or Agreement; and (2) describe the
progress of the repairs and other actions being undertaken as a result of the Order or
Agreement. The first monthly report is due on the last day of the month following
receipt of the Order or Agreement. The regular intervals for submitting reports may
be adjusted with prior approval of the Director.
16. It is requested (but not required) that ONEOK maintain documentation of the costs
associated with implementation of the Safety Order, and include in each report
submitted pursuant to Item16, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation
and revision of procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline
infrastructure, including repairs, replacements and other modifications; and
(3) environmental remediation, if applicable.
17. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction set
forth in Item 2 upon a written request from ONEOK demonstrating that the hazard
has been abated and that restoring the pipeline, or portion thereof, to its pre-failure
operating pressure would be justified, based on a reliable engineering analysis
showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies,
and operating parameters of the pipeline.
18. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms of
the Safety Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause
for an extension.



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19. ONEOK may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for
Pipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator are final.
The above actions proposed to be required by this Notice of Proposed Safety Order are in
addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to ONEOK’s North System under 49
C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, under any other order issued to ONEOK under authority of 49
U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of Federal or State law.
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this proceeding and
implementation of the work plan, PHMSA may identify other safety measures that need to be
taken. In that event, ONEOK will be notified of any proposed additional measures and, if
necessary, amendments to the work plan or safety order.
___________________________________ __
June 15, 2011
David Barrett Date issued
Director, Central Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

320115008S_Consent Order_08082011_text.pdf

AUG 08 2011
Mr. Wes Christensen
Senior Vice President of Operations
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, OK 74103-4298
Re: CPF No. 3-2011-5008S
Dear Mr. Christensen:
Enclosed please find a Consent Order incorporating the terms of the Consent Agreement that you
signed on July 18, 2011. Service of the Consent Order and Consent Agreement by certified mail
is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, Pipeline Safety
Mr. David Barrett, Director, Central Region, PHMSA
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0075 9862]



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP, ) CPF No. 3-2011-5008S
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
CONSENT ORDER
By letter dated June 15, 2011 the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) Office of Pipeline Safety issued a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice) to
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP (Respondent) in this case.
In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, the Notice alleged that Respondent’s 8-inch hazardous
liquid North System pipeline has an apparent condition that, without corrective measures, would
pose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment and proposed that
Respondent take certain actions to address the condition. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the
conditions associated with a May 14, 2011 rupture that occurred at a cased crossing in
Romeoville, Illinois required corrective measures to ensure safety.
In response to the Notice, Respondent requested an informal consultation and Respondent and
PHMSA engaged in good faith settlement discussions resulting in the Consent Agreement
attached to this Order that settles all of the allegations in the Notice.
Accordingly, the foregoing Consent Agreement is hereby approved and incorporated by
reference into this Order. The Respondent is hereby ordered to comply with terms of the
Consent Agreement, effective immediately.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq. and 49 C.F.R § 190.221, failure to comply with this Consent
Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties of up to $100,000 per violation per day, or
in the referral of the case for judicial enforcement. The terms and conditions of this Consent
Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
___________________________________ __________________________
Jeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

320115008S_Closure Letter_12202017_text.pdf

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
December 20, 2017
Mr. Walter Allen
Vice President of Operations
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P.
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, OK 74103-4298
CPF 3-2011-5008S
Dear Mr. Allen:
On August 8, 2011, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
issued to ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P. (ONEOK) a Consent Order in the above-referenced
case. This Order included a Consent Agreement that described work to be performed on the
106W pipeline. By letter dated November 6, 2017, ONEOK requested written confirmation
that the Agreement is terminated. Based on our review of the documentation you provided, it
has been determined that you have completed the terms set forth in Section II (Work to Be
Performed) of the Consent Agreement.
Accordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the
matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Allan C. Beshore
Director, Central Region, OPS
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

320115008S_Consent Agreement_08082011_text.pdf

AUG 08 2011
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, DC 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP ) CPF No. 3-2011-5008S
)
)
)
Respondent )
____________________________________)
CONSENT AGREEMENT
On June 15, 2011, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), U.S. Department of Transportation, issued a Notice of Proposed Safety Order
(Notice) to ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP (Respondent). The Notice alleges that
Respondent’s 106W pipeline and the North System control systems has a condition or
conditions that, without corrective measures, would pose a pipeline integrity risk to
public safety, property, or the environment. Specifically, the Notice alleges that the
conditions that caused the May 14, 2011 failure at a cased road crossing in Romeoville,
Illinois demonstrate the presence of integrity risks on the 106W pipeline including risks
identified during a post-accident review of the North System control systems.
In connection with the issuance of the Notice, Respondent and PHMSA engaged in good
faith settlement discussions resulting in this Consent Agreement (the “Agreement”).
Having agreed that settlement of this proceeding will avoid further administrative
proceedings or litigation and that entry of this Consent Agreement is the most appropriate
means of resolving the Notice, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Part 190, without adjudication of
any issue of fact or law, and upon consent and agreement of Respondent and PHMSA
(“the Parties”), the Parties agree as follows:
I. General Provisions
1. Respondent acknowledges that as operator of the North System pipeline,
Respondent and its pipeline system are subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal pipeline
safety laws, 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq., and the regulations and administrative orders issued
thereunder. For purposes of this Consent Agreement, Respondent acknowledges that it
received proper notice of PHMSA’s action in this proceeding and that the Notice states



claims upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq. and the
regulations and orders issued thereunder.
2. Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegations in the Notice, but agrees, for
purposes of this proceeding, that the integrity risk identified in the Notice exists as
described in the Notice and agrees to address it by completing the actions specified in
Section II of this Consent Agreement (“Work to be Performed”), including the actions set
forth in any work plans and schedules each of which shall automatically be incorporated
into this agreement upon approval. This Consent Agreement does not constitute a finding
of violation of any Federal law or regulation and may not be used in any civil proceeding
of any kind as evidence or proof of any fact, fault or liability, or as evidence of the
violation of any law, rule, regulation or requirement, except in a proceeding to enforce
the provisions of this Agreement. Respondent’s participation in this Consent Agreement
shall not constitute or be construed as an admission of liability for any purpose except in
a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this Agreement.
3. After Respondent returns this signed Consent Agreement, PHMSA’s
representative will present it to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety
recommending that the Associate Administrator adopt the terms of this Agreement by
issuing an administrative order (Consent Order) incorporating the terms of this Consent
Agreement. The terms of this Consent Agreement constitute an offer of settlement until
accepted by the Associate Administrator. Upon the effective date of this Agreement, any
request for a hearing submitted by Respondent shall be automatically withdrawn.
4. Respondent consents to the issuance of the Consent Order, and hereby waives any
further procedural requirements with respect to its issuance. Except as provided in Item
29 and Section IV of this Agreement, Respondent waives all rights to contest the
adequacy of notice, or the validity of the Consent Order or this Consent Agreement,
including all rights to administrative or judicial hearings or appeals.
5. This Consent Agreement shall apply to and be binding upon PHMSA, and upon
Respondent, its officers, directors, and employees, and its successors, assigns, or other
entities or persons otherwise bound by law. Respondent agrees to provide a copy of this
Consent Agreement and any incorporated work plans and schedules to all of
Respondent’s officers, employees, and agents whose duties might reasonably include
compliance with this Agreement.
6. For all transfers of ownership or operating responsibility of the 106W pipeline, or
the North System, Respondent shall provide a copy of this Consent Agreement to the
prospective transferee at least 30 days prior to such transfer and simultaneously provide
written notice of the prospective transfer to the PHMSA Central Region Director
(Director).
7. This Consent Agreement constitutes the final, complete and exclusive agreement
and understanding between the Parties with respect to the settlement embodied in this
Agreement, and the Parties acknowledge that there are no representations, agreements or2



understandings relating to the settlement other than those expressly contained in this
Agreement, except that the terms of this Agreement may be construed by reference to the
Notice.
8. Nothing in this Consent Agreement affects or relieves Respondent of its
responsibility to comply with all applicable requirements of the Federal pipeline safety
laws, 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., and the regulations and orders issued thereunder.
Nothing in this Consent Agreement alters PHMSA’s right of access, entry, inspection,
and information gathering or PHMSA’s authority to bring enforcement actions against
Respondent pursuant to the Federal pipeline safety laws, the regulations and orders issued
thereunder, or any other provision of Federal or State law.
9. This Consent Agreement does not waive or modify any Federal, State, or local
laws or regulations that are applicable to Respondent’s pipeline systems. This Consent
Agreement is not a permit, or a modification of any permit, under any Federal, State, or
local laws or regulations. Respondent remains responsible for achieving and maintaining
compliance with all applicable Federal, State, and local laws, regulations and permits.
10. This Consent Agreement does not create rights in, or grant any cause of action to,
any third party not party to this Agreement. The U.S. Department of Transportation is
not liable for any injuries or damages to persons or property arising from acts or
omissions of Respondent or its officers, employees, or agents carrying out the work
required by this Consent Agreement. Respondent agrees to indemnify and hold harmless
the U.S. Department of Transportation, its officers, employees, agents, and
representatives from any and all causes of action arising from any acts or omissions of
Respondent or its contractors in carrying out the work required by this Agreement.
II. Work to be Performed
11. Develop and submit a written restart plan for approval by the Director, Central
Region, PHMSA (Director) for this segment. The restart plan must provide for adequate
patrolling of the pipeline during the restart process, specify a daylight restart, provide
details associated with the monitoring of other casings, and detail advance
communications with local emergency response officials. The restart plan must include
actions taken by ONEOK to confirm the integrity of pipeline facilities that were
damaged, or were suspected of being damaged, as a result of the incident, prior to restart.
After completion of restart ONEOK shall submit within 30 days of the receipt of the
Order or Agreement documentation demonstrating the advance communications with
local emergency response officials.
12. After the line has been restarted, the operating pressure of the 106W pipeline must
not exceed 80% of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the May
14, 2011 failure. Specifically, the discharge pressure at Lamont Station into 106W must
not exceed 918 psig. This pressure reduction requires any relevant remote or local alarm
limits, software programming, set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure
devices to be adjusted accordingly. Documentation of the adjustments to alarm limits,3



software programming, set-points etc shall be submitted. The pressure restriction must
remain in effect until written approval to increase the pressure or return the pipeline to its
pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the Director, as set forth in Item 27. If the
results of any action undertaken pursuant to the Agreement necessitate a reduction in the
operating pressure permitted by the Agreement, ONEOK must further reduce the
operating pressure accordingly and notify the Director.
13. Within 15 days of receipt of the Order, submit a plan to conduct an instrumented
leak survey of the 106W pipeline system detailing the schedule for the expeditious
completion of the leak survey within 30 days of initiating the survey. Include in the plan
a description of the equipment to be used and performance specifications describing
sensitivity of leak detection. The plan must include provision for submission of a
summary report detailing the findings of the leak survey to be provided directly from the
instrumented leak survey provider to the Director. This summary report should include a
description of any elements affecting the leak survey data, the area covered and
associated ranges of the leak survey findings, and any other items of significance such as
accuracy of the instrumentation or malfunction of equipment. The Director is to receive
distribution of all resulting reports in their entirety, including all media, at the same time
they are made available to ONEOK. The plan must provide for the ongoing performance
of patrol surveillance activities for 106W pipeline on a weekly basis until approved
otherwise by the Director.
Within 5 days from of the leak survey completion, submit a separate report detailing
the schedule of planned maintenance activities to occur as a result of the leak survey for
the 106W pipeline system.
14. Within 45 days of the Director’s approval of testing protocols, complete third-
party mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the 106W pipeline
failed pipe, the associated spacer(s) and casing as relevant to the incident. If a review of
the casing vent stacks is required for any reason based on information received from the
third-party tester, this shall be completed as well. Provide documentation verifying
manufacturer and seam type, or in the alternative the testing shall also include
examination of a sample of pipe to confirm wall thickness and seam type (low or high
frequency ERW). The testing and analysis must be completed as follows:
(A) Document the chain of custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe
section and other evidence originating from the failure site;
(B) Utilize mechanical and metallurgical testing protocols which have been
previously approved by the Director;
(C) Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the
Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a
PHMSA representative to witness the testing; and
4



(D) Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their
entirety, including all media, whether draft or final, to the Director at the same
time they are made available to ONEOK. Additional testing may be requested
by the Director based on metallurgical findings.
15. Within 30 days of receipt of the Order, conduct an evaluation of the previous in-
line inspection (ILI) results, including a review and reporting by the ILI vendors’ analysts
(including raw data) of the failed 106W pipeline as follows:
(A) Re-evaluate the 1996 and 2007 in-line inspection results to determine whether
any features with similar characteristics to the feature at the failure site are
present elsewhere on the pipeline; and
(B) Within 15 days of the completion of the re-evaluation, submit a report within
describing the process used to re-evaluate ILI results, and the results of the re-
evaluation.
16. Within 30 days of receipt of the Order, perform an ILI of the 106W pipeline.
Before performing the ILI tool run, the Director will review and approve the final criteria
and specific technology considerations ONEOK has taken into account when selecting
the specific tool. Technology considerations and final criteria should account for the size
of anomalies experienced in the casing and other 106W pipeline specific elements. The
data analysis must be completed within 60 days of successful completion of the ILI. The
ILI must include consideration of best technology to reliably detect and size anomalies in
casings. The ILI vendor shall evaluate the results per a performance specification,
including consideration of the location and size of the defect that failed on May 14, 2011.
Results of the inline inspection must be compared with previous ILI results from 1996
and 2007. Submit the ILI results to the Director including: the comparison with prior
results, and a plan for remediation of anomalies requiring immediate action; including
criteria for immediate action.
17. Perform corrective measures to SCADA operations as follows:
(A) Within 30 days of the receipt of the Order, submit a review and
implementation plan to the Director for a leak detection system on the entire
North system. The implementation plan shall include a timeline to complete
implementation for all pipeline segments on all Consoles for the North system
and is not to exceed 24 months. A prioritization for all pipeline segments on
the Consoles operating the ONEOK North system is to be included in the
implementation plan submitted. This review and implementation plan shall
include instrumentation improvements. Upon completion of the review
submit a report for the Director’s approval describing the prioritization,
consideration of risk in developing schedule, implementation milestones, and
a detailed explanation of the existing and new instrumentation requirements to
be utilized for each prioritized leak detection section.
5



(B) Within 90 days of receipt of the Order, install and activate additional
instrumentation on the 106W pipeline. At a minimum, this instrumentation
must consist of pressure and flow monitoring at the Wayne station IAP Valve
185 and additional pressure monitoring on either side of IAP Valve 184, IAP
Valve 416, and IAP Valve 4. This instrumentation shall be used by the future
leak detection system. If additional instrumentation is required for the leak
detection, this shall also be installed.
(C) Within 1 year of receipt of the Order, update the SCADA software to a
version that will allow stale data, forced values, or points off scan to be backlit
a different color per individual point on each Function Control Unit (FCU).
Should additional time be required after initiating this upgrade for complete
implementation, ONEOK will utilize provisions identified in Item 18.
18. Within 60 days of receipt of the Order, identify what caused the console logger to
stop working for the console assigned the tag name TCU2. Contact the vendor and work
to design and implement a software alarming system to indicate when this happens in the
future. In addition, create a “re-boot” log that records all times, dates, identify employee
performing, systems involved and /or causing, and reasons for rebooting of SCADA PCs
or servers. This log shall be kept and available for PHMSA review upon request.
19. Within 60 days of receipt of the Order, thoroughly review and update all written
control room procedures to reflect ONEOK specific requirements and remove references
to previous pipeline operator(s).
20. Within 60 days of receipt of the Order, submit to the Director a company-wide
management of change process including attached documentation describing the various
departments that utilize the process and how the process is implemented by all
departments within ONEOK. Require all revisions to procedures, process, assets
including abandonments or idling of facilities, instrumentation, communication,
networks, or new pipeline facilities involve the control room in such a manner as their
input is provided before final decisions are made and their involvement is performed with
enough time that controller training can occur in advance of operations of any asset
associated with changes or newly operated. This is required to involve all departments in
ONEOK Partners at large including but not limited to: asset management, scheduling,
new business development, operations (field and headquarters), communications, design
and engineering (field and headquarters), maintenance, leak detection, integrity
management, IT, etc.
21. Within 90 days of receipt of the Order, design and implement a training program
for all maintenance crews requiring them to call the control room before, during, and
upon completion of all maintenance activity. The program must emphasize that this
required contact should occur as frequently as needed to keep all controllers aware of the
status of maintenance activities. This applies to any pipeline or facility repairs,
emergency response, routine valve maintenance, routine instrumentation, or other routine
maintenance.
6



22. Within 120 days of receipt of the Order, develop and submit to the Director for
prior approval a remedial work plan that includes corrective measures. The work plan
must provide for the verification of the integrity of the 106W pipeline and must fully
address all known or suspected factors that caused or contributed to the May 14, 2011
incident, including, but not limited to:
(A) The integration of the information developed from the actions required by the
Agreement or Order with all historical construction, operating, maintenance,
testing, and assessment data for the entire pipeline including:
(i) Within 30 days of completion of the testing and analysis required by Items
13-16, complete a root cause failure analysis for 106W pipeline
relating to the May 14, 2011 incident that is supplemented and
facilitated by an independent third-party expert acceptable to the
Director. Elements of the root cause analysis must include, but not be
limited to: scoping document of the root cause analysis; procedures
associated with root cause analysis; multiple methods used for the
analysis and updates on each method as it progresses; contributory
factors; documentation of the decision-making process; and a final
report of the root cause process results, including any lessons learned
and whether the findings are applicable to other locations within the
ONEOK System; and
(ii) Within 30 days of completion of the root cause failure analysis, integrate
the findings of the root cause failure analysis into other data
integration efforts and the remedial work plan.
(B) The performance of additional field testing, inspections, and evaluations to
determine whether and to what extent the conditions associated with the
failure, or any other integrity-threatening conditions are present elsewhere on
the 106W pipeline. Data-gathering activities must include a review of the
failure history (in-service and pressure test failures) of the entire length of the
106W pipeline and development of a written report to the Director containing
all available information regarding locations, dates, and causes of failures.
Include a detailed description of ONEOK’s plan to confirm the integrity of the
106W pipeline, including the criteria to be used for the evaluation and
prioritization of any integrity threats and anomalies that are identified. Make
the results of the actions required by this provision available to the Director or
PHMSA’s representative;
(C) The performance of repairs or other corrective measures that fully remediate
the condition(s) associated with the pipeline failures and any other integrity-
threatening condition everywhere along the 106W pipeline where such
conditions are identified by the evaluation process. Include a detailed
7



description of the repair criteria and method(s) to be used in undertaking any
repairs or other remedial actions;
(D) Provisions for continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification
measures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the 106W pipeline
considering the results of the analyses, inspections, and corrective measures
undertaken pursuant to the Safety Order; and
(E) A proposed risk-based schedule for completion of the actions required by
paragraphs (A) through (D) of this Item, including a schedule associated with
all elements of the internal root cause analysis. Provide the Director with
advance notice of scheduled repairs.
23. The remedial work plan becomes incorporated into the Agreement and must be
revised as necessary to incorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to the
Agreement and whenever necessary to incorporate new information obtained during the
failure investigations and remedial activities. Submit any such plan revisions to the
Director for prior approval. The Director may approve plan elements incrementally.
24. Implement the remedial work plan as approved by the Director, including any
revisions to the plan. The results of all actions taken in accordance with the approved
plan must be available for review by PHMSA or its representative.
25. Submit monthly reports to the Director that: (1) include available data and results
of the testing and evaluations required by the Order or Agreement; and (2) describe the
progress of the repairs and other actions being undertaken as a result of the Agreement.
The first monthly report is due on the last day of the month following receipt of the
Order. The regular intervals for submitting reports may be adjusted with prior approval
of the Director.
26. Respondent agrees to maintain documentation of the costs associated with
implementation of the Agreement, and include in each report submitted pursuant to Item
25, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of procedures,
studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including repairs,
replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if applicable.
27. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction set
forth in Item 12 upon a written request from ONEOK demonstrating that the hazard has
been abated and that restoring the pipeline, or portion thereof, to its pre-failure operating
pressure would be justified, based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the
pressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies, and operating
parameters of the pipeline.
28. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms
of the Agreement upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for
an extension.
8



29. ONEOK may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator are final.
III. Review and Approval Process
30. With respect to any submission under Section II of this Agreement that requires
the approval of the Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or in part, the
submission, (b) approve the submission on specified conditions, (c) disapprove, in whole
or in part, the submission, or (d) any combination of the foregoing. In the event of
approval, approval in part, or approval upon conditions, Respondent will proceed to take
all action required by the submission as approved by the Director, subject to
Respondent’s right to invoke the dispute resolution procedures in Section IV with respect
to any conditions identified by the Director. In the event that the Director disapproves all
or any portion of the submission, the Director will provide Respondent with a written
notice of the deficiencies. Respondent will correct all deficiencies within the time
specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.
IV. Dispute Resolution
31. The Director and Respondent will informally attempt to resolve any disputes
arising under this Agreement. If Respondent and the Director are unable to informally
resolve the dispute within 15 days, Respondent may request in writing, within 10 days, a
written determination resolving the dispute from the Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety providing all information that Respondent believes is relevant to the dispute. If
the request is submitted as provided herein, the Associate Administrator will issue a
determination in writing which shall be final. The existence of a dispute and PHMSA’s
consideration of matters placed in dispute shall not excuse, toll, or suspend any term or
timeframe for completion of any work to be performed under this Consent Agreement
during the pendency of the dispute resolution process except as agreed by the Director or
the Associate Administrator in writing.
V. Enforcement
32. This Agreement, as adopted by the Consent Order, is subject to all enforcement
authorities available to PHMSA under 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq. and 49 C.F.R. Part 190,
including administrative civil penalties under § 60122 of up to $100,000 per violation for
each day the non-compliance continues, if PHMSA determines that Respondent is not
materially proceeding in accordance with terms of this Agreement, with determinations
made by the Director, or if such determinations are appealed with decisions of the
Associate Administrator. All work plans and associated schedules set forth or referenced
in Section II shall be automatically incorporated into this Agreement and are enforceable
in the same manner.
9



VI. Record Keeping and Information Disclosure
33. Respondent agrees to maintain records demonstrating compliance with all
requirements of this Agreement for a period of at least five years following completion of
all work to be performed. For any reports, plans, or other deliverables required to be
submitted to PHMSA pursuant to this Agreement, Respondent may assert a claim of
business confidentiality or other protections applicable to the release of information by
PHMSA, covering part or all of the information required to be submitted to PHMSA
pursuant to this Agreement in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 7. The claim of
confidentiality shall be marked in writing on each page, and shall include a statement
specifying the grounds for each claim of confidentially. PHMSA shall determine release
of any information submitted pursuant to this Consent Agreement in accordance with 49
C.F.R. Part 7, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, DOT and/or PHMSA
policies, and other applicable regulations and Executive Orders.
VII. Effective Date
34. The “Effective Date” as used herein is the date on which this Agreement has
been signed by both Respondent and PHMSA. Unless specified to the contrary, all
deadlines for actions required by this Agreement run from the date of issuance of the
Consent Order adopting this Agreement.
VIII. Modification
35. The terms of this Agreement may be modified by mutual agreement of the
Parties. Such modifications shall be in writing and shall be signed by both Parties.
IX. Termination
36. This Agreement shall terminate upon the completion of all terms set forth in
Section II (Work to Be Performed). Respondent may request written confirmation from
PHMSA when this Agreement is terminated. To the extent ongoing monitoring is
required, PHMSA may terminate this Agreement with respect to all other requirements
with the exception of such monitoring. Nothing in this Agreement prevents Respondent
from completing any of the obligations earlier than the deadlines provided for herein.
10



X. Ratification
37. The Parties’ undersigned representatives certify that they are fully authorized to
enter into the terms and conditions of this Agreement and to execute and legally bind
such party to this document.
38. The Parties hereby agree to all conditions and terms of this Consent Agreement:
For PHMSA: For Respondent:
___________________________ ____________________________
Mr. David Barrett Mr. Wes Christensen
Director, Central Region Senior Vice-President of Operations
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP
Safety Administration
_____________________ _____________________
Date Date
11

## Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320115008S>
- Source ID: `phmsa-enforcement`
- SHA-256: `44eebc953ac4d1e109a6ee66cf5678f4ae6cadf7ed857736edcc81941f87a022`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:44:44.458Z
- Exported: 2026-08-22T21:18:05.572Z
- Document slug: `phmsa-enforcement-320115008s`

### Source metadata

```json
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  "pipelineType": "INTERSTATE LIQUID ONSHORE",
  "caseStatus": "CLOSED",
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}
```