# ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

**Citation:** CPF 320135014  
**Type / status:** enforcement / historical  
**Agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  
**Effective:** Not stated  
**Published:** 2013-05-13

CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.401(b), 195.402(a), 195.406(a)(2), 195.408(a), 195.420(a), 195.428(a), 195.52(a)(2), 195.54(a).

## Document text

Notice of Probable Violation involving ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.401(b),  195.402(a),  195.406(a)(2),  195.408(a),  195.420(a),  195.428(a),  195.52(a)(2),  195.54(a). The case was opened on 2013-05-13 and is reported as closed as of 2026-05-19. Proposed civil penalty: $559,100. Assessed civil penalty: $550,400. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

320135014_Consent Agreement and Order_10232018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135014/320135014_Consent%20Agreement%20and%20Order_10232018.pdf

320135014_Consent Agreement and Order_10232018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135014/320135014_Consent%20Agreement%20and%20Order_10232018_text.pdf

320135014_Final Order_10122016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135014/320135014_Final%20Order_10122016.pdf

320135014_Final Order_10122016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135014/320135014_Final%20Order_10122016_text.pdf

320135014_NOPV PCP PCO_05132013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135014/320135014_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_05132013_text.pdf

320135014_NOPV_PCP_PCO_05132013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135014/320135014_NOPV_PCP_PCO_05132013.pdf

320135014_Operator_Request_for_Hearing_07122013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135014/320135014_Operator_Request_for_Hearing_07122013.pdf

320135014_Operator_Response_to_Notice_07122013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135014/320135014_Operator_Response_to_Notice_07122013.pdf

320135014_Region Closure Letter-Consent Agreement Termination_05192026_(08-121917S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135014/320135014_Region%20Closure%20Letter-Consent%20Agreement%20Termination_05192026_(08-121917S).pdf

320135014_Region Closure Letter-Consent Agreement Termination_05192026_(08-121917S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135014/320135014_Region%20Closure%20Letter-Consent%20Agreement%20Termination_05192026_(08-121917S)_text.pdf

320135014_NOPV PCP PCO_05132013_text.pdf

NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION
PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY
and
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
VIA FACSIMILE and UPS NEXT DAY AIR
May 13, 2013
Mr. Wes Christensen
Senior Vice President of Operations
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P.
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.L.C.
ONEOK Underground Storage Company, L.L.C.
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, OK 74102
CPF 3-2013-5014
Dear Mr. Christensen:
Representatives from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, conducted an investigation
of repeated overpressure events that occurred on May 17, 2008, at ONEOK’s natural gas
liquids (NGLs) facility in Bushton, Kansas (the Bushton facility). Initial site investigations
were conducted on May 22, 2008, and May 23, 2008. Site investigation activities were also
conducted the week of April 11, 2011. During the period from May 2008 and April 2011
PHMSA and ONEOK had additional communications and correspondence involving
engineering modeling and evaluation of the circumstances and contributing factors
involved in the accident. ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P., ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.L.C., and
ONEOK Underground Storage Company, L.L.C. are subsidiaries of ONEOK Partners, L.P.
The Bushton facility includes among other types of pipeline facilities, storage fields used to
store liquid hydrocarbons, a dedicated control room, piping manifold systems and a
fractionation plant that separates Y-grade NGLs into purity products such as liquid
propane, butane, ethane-propane mix, and natural gasoline. The products received from the



incoming pipelines include both Y-grade NGL mix and purity products. The incoming
purity products are either sent to storage wells or are sent on to other outgoing pipelines.
The incoming Y-grade NGL mix is sent either to the fractionation plant for processing, to
the storage wells for storage, or are sent on to outgoing pipelines through pipeline
manifolds. NGLs can be moved directly through the Bushton facility in continued
transportation by pipeline.
The accident involved repeated overpressure events during which a mixture of NGLs and
water were forced through the facility’s flare accumulator tank and through the flare stack.
1
The hydrocarbon liquids were forced upwards through the flare stack and were ignited by
the flare tip burners. The burning hazardous material reached the ground and fires
developed around the base of the flare stack. The releases resulted in multiple evacuations
of ONEOK and contractor personnel from the facility as well as evacuations of nearby
residences in the area.
As a result of the investigation, it appears that you have committed probable violations of
the Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The probable
violations are:
1. § 195.52 Telephonic Notice of certain accidents.
(a) At the earliest practicable moment following discovery of a release of the
hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide transported resulting in an event described
in §195.50 the operator of the system shall give notice, in accordance with
paragraph (b) of this section, of any failure that:
(2) Resulted in either a fire or explosion not intentionally set by the
operator.
ONEOK did not make a telephonic report to the National Response Center at the
earliest practicable moment following the initial unintentional release and fire at
7:41 a.m. CDT on May 17, 2008. ONEOK did not make the required telephonic
report until 12:08 p.m. CDT which was over four hours after the initial ignition and
evacuation occurred.
2. § 195.54 Accident reports.
(a) Each operator that experiences an accident that is required to be reported
under § 195.50 must, as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days after
1 The facilities at Bushton were configured at the time of the May 17, 2008, accident such that the flare stack
involved with the release served as part of the overpressure protection system connected to the piping.
ONEOK has since made modifications to this flare stack portion of the system and rerouted the outlet of the
accumulator tank to a common flare stack located in a different area of the facility.2



discovery of the accident, file an accident report on DOT Form 7000-1.
ONEOK did not file an accident report on DOT Form 7000-1 within 30 days after
the unintentional release and ignition of hydrocarbon liquids on the ground at the
Bushton Pipeline Facility on May 17, 2008. As of the date of this Notice of
Probable Violation, ONEOK has not filed a DOT Form 7000-1 report in connection
with the accident. The May 17, 2008, release resulted in a fire per 195.50(a);
therefore, a DOT Form 7000-1 is required.
3. § 195.401 General requirements.
(b) Whenever an operator discovers any condition that could adversely affect
the safe operation of its pipeline system, it shall correct the condition within a
reasonable time. However, if the condition is of such a nature that it presents
an immediate hazard to persons or property, the operator may not operate the
affected part of the system until it has corrected the unsafe condition.
On the day of the accident, ONEOK failed to correct an unsafe condition which
presented an immediate hazard to persons and property prior to resuming operation
of the affected part of the system. On four separate occasions at 7:41 a.m., 8:05
a.m., 8:49 a.m. and 9:53 a.m., a mixture of water and liquid hydrocarbons was
forced through the accumulator tank (which was full) to the flare stack. On each
occasion, the liquid mixture was forced through the system when pipeline pressure
relief valves opened and the liquid mixture flowed through the accumulator tank
and to the tip of the flare stack where the hydrocarbon mixture was ignited at the
burner tips. These conditions presented an immediate hazard to persons and
property, yet ONEOK allowed personnel to reenter the area and resumed operation
of the system without identifying the primary cause of the releases (the full
accumulator tank) and correcting the unsafe condition.
4. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system
a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at
least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to
insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared before initial
operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept
at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.
ONEOK did not follow its procedure for limiting the amount of product in the flare
system accumulator tank. A June 2011 Data Submission shows ONEOK’s
procedure entitled “SF Flare / Drain” limits the volume of liquid in the accumulator
tank (SFT-702) to 85% of the total volume as follows:3



ONEOK’s Root Cause Analysis stated, “The flare system piping and accumulator
were setting full of liquids from blowing down storage field piping in preparation
for hydro testing. …. Failure to recognize that the flare system was full of liquids
and not immediately identifying the sources relieving into the systems compounded
the flare incident.”2 A total of 242 barrels (10,164 gallons) of hydrocarbon/water
mixture was removed from the accumulator which has a capacity of 10,500 gallons.
5. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system
a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at
least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to
insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared before initial
operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept
at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.
ONEOK did not follow its procedure for isolating equipment when removing part of
the flare/drain system from service. Specifically, the isolation valve for 108
pipeline thermal relief valve was closed while the pipeline remained in operation.
ONEOK’s emergency shutdown procedures state “4. Isolate affected equipment.
(Do not by-pass safety equipment)” as shown in item 4 below. On the accident date
the thermal relief isolation valve was closed on pipeline 108 which subjected the
line to possible over pressurization.
2 Violation Report Exhibit E; ONEOK NGL Follow up to April 2011 Meeting containing Root Cause
Analysis.
4



EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN
Emergency shutdown of the storage field flare/drain system
system from service, follow the steps that are appropriate for the condition.
When a emergency condition exists and it becomes necessary to remove part or all of the flare/drain
2. Notify appropriate personnel of operational changes.
1. Initiate control procedures to ensure the safety of personnel, the environment and equipment.
4. Isolate affected equipment. (Do not by-pass safety equipment)
3. Reference the emergency response plan and take appropriate actions.
6. Generate a MO (maintenance order) for repairs.
5. Perform lockout/tagout procedures as needed.
6. $195.408 Communications.
(a) Each operator must have a communication system to provide for the
transmission of information needed for the safe operation of its pipeline
system.
ONEOK did not have a functioning communication system for monitoring the fluid
level in the accumulator tank involved in controlling receipt of hazardous liquid as
necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline system. ONEOK's investigation
report stated, "Accumulator tank level alarm was still connected into old control
room, Operator had relocated to new control, alarm had not been moved to new
control room." The control room had been recently moved in connection with a
facility expansion project. The electronic level monitor which had been connected
to the accumulator tank was disconnected from the control room alarm and ONEOK
had failed to manually monitor the liquid level in the accumulator tank.
7. § 195.406 Maximum operating pressure.
(a) Except for surge pressures and other variations from normal operations, no
operator may operate a pipeline at a pressure that exceeds any of the
following:
(2) The design pressure of any other component of the pipeline.
ONEOK operated its pipeline facilities at a pressure that exceeded the design
pressure of Dehydrator Vessel #1. Prior to the accident, Dehydrator Vessel #1 had a
reduced design pressure of 328 psig due to decreased wall thickness. The design
pressure of this vessel had been reduced to 328 psig in 1988. A review of Line 800
operation which flowed product to the dehydration isolation valve showed its range
from 395 to 460 psig within 24 hours prior to the release with no surges. On May
17, 2008, ONEOK operated the vessel at a pressure as high as 350 psig when the
isolation valve did not fully prevent product from entering the vessel. The set-point
of its overpressure protection device was 350 psig.
5



8. § 195.420 Valve maintenance.
(a) Each operator shall maintain each valve that is necessary for the safe
operation of its pipeline systems in good working order at all times.
ONEOK failed to maintain Valve 182 and Valve 152 in good working order at all
times as is necessary for the safe operation of its pipeline system. These two valves
were the main isolation valves to propane dehydrator systems #1 and #2. Both of
these valves were in the closed position but at the time of the accident
malfunctioned in a manner that allowed high pressure product to flow into their
dehydration systems which overpressured the dehydration vessels. When the
dehydration vessels were overpressured, the relief valves on these vessels opened
and product was sent to the accumulator tank and on through the flare stack.
ONEOK also failed to maintain the Buckeye Y-grade system water dump level
control valve in good working order necessary for the safe operation of its pipeline
system. This valve was found “blocked” in the open position which allowed liquid
to be fed to the flare system without necessary control.3
9. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at
intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in
the case of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to
exceed 7½ months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each
pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of
pressure control equipment to determine that it is functioning properly, is in
good mechanical condition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity
and reliability of operation for the service in which it is used.
ONEOK failed to test certain pressure relief valves to determine their adequacy
from the standpoint of capacity and reliability in providing overpressure protection.
Specifically, ONEOK failed to determine that three relief valves on propane
dehydration units #1 and #2 were adequate from the standpoint of capacity to
provide overpressure protection for their respective vessels. ONEOK’s Propane
Dehydration PSV Study conducted by ENGlobal reported on pages 1 and 5 that for
dehydration unit #1, “The relief valves (PSV-DA-167/168) on dehydration towers
(SFT-112A/113A) will not protect towers from blocked flow outlet or failure of
inlet pressure control valve (PCV-163).” The study also stated for dehydration unit
#2, “PSV-DA-142 has adequate orifice area to protect dehydration tower (SFT-
113B) from blocked flow or failure of inlet control valve (PCV-104) for supply
pressures up to 395 psig.” ONEOK’s supply pressure was 450 to 550 psig. The
PSV-DA-142 did not have adequate orifice area to handle blocked flow or failure of
3 Violation Report, Exhibit _D ONEOK NGL Follow up April to 2011 –Root Cause Analysis Section
6



PCV-104 for supply pressure greater than 395 psig. Therefore, ONEOK has not
met the requirement of §195.428(a).
Proposed Civil Penalty
Under 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed
$200,000 for each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of
$2,000,000 for a related series of violations. For violations occurring prior to January 4,
2012, the maximum penalty may not exceed $100,000 per violation per day, with a
maximum penalty not to exceed $1,000,000 for a related series of violations. The
Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and supporting documentation
involved in the above probable violation(s) and has recommended that you be preliminarily
assessed a civil penalty of $559,100 as follows:
Item number
PENALTY
1
$13,700
2
$28,700
$92,500
$100,000
$43,700
$100,000
$46,200
8
$100,000
9
$34,300
Proposed Compliance Order
With respect to item 2, pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is
enclosed and made a part of this Notice.
Response to this Notice
Enclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline
Operators in Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response
options. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is
subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive
material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete
original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you
believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe
the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you
do not respond within 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your
right to contest the allegations in this Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for
Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice without further notice to you and to
issue a Final Order.
7



In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2013-5014 and for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Sincerely,
David Barrett
Director, Central Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Enclosures: Proposed Compliance Order
Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings
8



PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
Pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P. (ONEOK) a
Compliance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the
compliance of ONEOK with the pipeline safety regulations:
1. 2. In regard to Item 2 of the Notice, submit DOT Form 7000-1 Accident Report within
30 days of issuance of the Final Order.
It is requested that ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP maintain documentation of the
safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and
submit the total to David Barrett, Director, Central, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration. It is requested that these costs be reported in two
categories: 1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures,
studies and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and
other changes to pipeline infrastructure.
9

320135014_Final Order_10122016_text.pdf

October 12, 2016
Mr. Terry K. Spencer
President and CEO
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P.
100 W. Fifth Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
Re: CPF No. 3-2013-5014, CPF No. 3-2013-5015, CPF No. 3-2013-5020
Dear Mr. Spencer:
Enclosed please find the three Final Orders issued in the above-referenced cases. The Final
Order in CPF No. 3-2013-5014 makes findings of violation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of
$550,400, and specifies actions that need to be taken by ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P., ONEOK
NGL Pipeline, L.L.C., and ONEOK Underground Storage Company, L.L.C. (collectively,
ONEOK) to comply with the pipeline safety regulations.
The Final Order issued in CPF No. 3-2013-5015 makes findings of violation, withdraws one
alleged violation, assesses a civil penalty of $159,000, and specifies actions that need to be taken
by ONEOK to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. Finally, the Final Order issued in
CPF No. 3-2013-5020 makes one finding of violation, withdraws one alleged violation, and
assesses a civil penalty of $22,500.
The penalty payment terms are set forth in each of the Final Orders. When the civil penalties
have been paid and the terms of the compliance orders completed, as determined by the Director,
Central Region, these enforcement actions will be closed. Service of the Final Orders is made
pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Acting Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure



cc: Mr. Allan Beshore, Director, Central Region, OPS
Mr. Vince Murchison, Murchison Law Firm, PLLC
325 North St. Paul Street, Suite 2700, Dallas, Texas 75201
CERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
___________________________________
In the Matter of )
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P., )
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.L.C., and ) CPF No. 3-2013-5014
ONEOK Underground Storage )
Company, L.L.C., collectively, )
)
)
)
Respondent. )
___________________________________ )
FINAL ORDER
Between May 2008 and April 2011, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), conducted an investigation of a fire that occurred at a facility of ONEOK NGL
Pipeline, L.P., ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.L.C., and ONEOK Underground Storage
Company, L.L.C. (collectively, ONEOK or Respondent) in Bushton, Kansas.1 ONEOK operates
11,500 miles of pipeline transporting hazardous liquids, including approximately 11,000 miles
transporting highly volatile liquids in Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas and several other states.2
As a result of the investigation, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued a Notice of
Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order to Respondent on
May 13, 2013 (Notice).3 In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice alleged that
Respondent committed nine violations of the pipeline safety regulations in 49 C.F.R. Part 195
and proposed a civil penalty of $559,100 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed
that corrective action be completed with respect to one of the alleged violations.
After receiving an extension of time, ONEOK responded to the Notice on July 12, 2013.
ONEOK contested the jurisdiction of PHMSA, contested the merits of the alleged violations and
requested a hearing. Additional written materials were submitted by Respondent on January 6
1 The three entities own and operate different portions of the Bushton facility. ONEOK Post-hearing
Jurisdictional Brief at 5 (Mar. 14, 2014).
2 This information is reported by Respondent for calendar year 2015 pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 195.49.
3 Two additional notices of probable violation were issued by the Director to Respondent. They were
dated May 13, 2013 (CPF No. 3-2013-5015) and July 3, 2013 (CPF No. 3-2013-5020). Separate Final
Orders are being issued in those cases.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 2
and 10, 2014. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, a hearing was held in Kansas City,
Missouri on January 15, 2014, before a Presiding Official from the Office of Chief Counsel,
PHMSA.4 After the hearing, Respondent submitted additional written materials dated April 1,
2014, and May 6, 2016. Pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), the Director submitted a written evaluation
of Respondent’s response material on April 1, 2016.
BACKGROUND
The facility at issue in this proceeding is located in a rural area near Bushton, Kansas. The
Bushton facility has inbound and outbound pipelines that transport natural gas liquids (NGLs).5
In addition to the inbound and outbound pipelines, the facility has underground storage caverns,
fractionation equipment, and in-plant piping, including pipes, valves, pumps, meters and other
equipment used to move NGLs. Central to the in-plant piping are manifolds that allow NGLs to
be directed between and among any of the inbound and outbound pipelines, storage caverns, and
fractionation equipment.6
On the morning of May 17, 2008, four releases of NGLs occurred in succession at the Bushton
facility. The releases involved a mixture of NGL hydrocarbons and water being forced through
and over the top of a flare stack connected to a flare/drain system. During at least three of the
release events, liquid hydrocarbons were ignited by the flare tip burners and fell to the ground
where fires ensued. The first event occurred at 7:41 a.m. The fourth and final event occurred at
approximately 9:53 a.m.
An investigation by Respondent concluded that excessive amounts of hydrocarbon liquids and
water had accumulated in the flare/drain system. The flare/drain system is used to collect and
dispose of liquid hydrocarbons, contaminated water, and vapor products from various sources at
the facility, such as relief valves, pressure vessels, and piping drains. The flare/drain system
consists of approximately 1050 feet of pipe, a 10,500-gallon accumulator tank and a 40-foot tall
flare stack.
The four releases occurred when hydrocarbon products were discharged into the flare/drain
system, which already contained an excessive amount of hydrocarbons and water. The
accumulator tank had not been drained and an alarm that was designed to notify Respondent of
high tank levels did not function. Approximately 250 personnel at the facility were evacuated.
Nearby residences were also evacuated. No injuries or fatalities were reported in connection
with the release and fires. After Respondent shut down the facility and emptied the flare/drain
system, the Company resumed normal operations around 6:30 p.m. the same day.
4 The hearing also concerned the notice of probable violation issued in CPF No. 3-2013-5020. A
separate hearing concerning the notice of probable violation in CPF No. 3-2013-5015 was held November
14-15, 2013. That hearing also discussed the jurisdictional issues relevant to all the proceedings.
5 NGLs are highly volatile liquids, which are hazardous liquids that form a vapor cloud when released to
the atmosphere and have a vapor pressure exceeding 276 kPa (40 psia) at 37.8 °C (100 °F). § 195.2.
6 ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 6.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 3
Following an OPS investigation, the Director, Central Region issued the present enforcement
action alleging that Respondent committed nine safety violations in connection with the event.
Respondent argued initially that PHMSA lacks authority under the Pipeline Safety Act to enforce
safety regulations at the Bushton facility. Specifically, ONEOK argued the facility is not subject
to the Pipeline Safety Act because it is a “refining” facility used in the fractionation of NGLs. At
the hearing, OPS countered that the Act applies because the facility engages in the transportation
of hazardous liquids by pipeline and NGL fractionation does not constitute refining. I consider
these jurisdictional arguments first before addressing the alleged violations.
JURISDICTION
The Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. chapter 601, charges PHMSA with prescribing and enforcing
minimum safety standards for pipeline transportation and pipeline facilities.7 “Pipeline
transportation” is defined in the Act to include “the movement of hazardous liquid by pipeline”
and “storage of hazardous liquid incidental to the movement of hazardous liquid by pipeline,”
but not the movement of hazardous liquids through “refining” facilities.8 PHMSA may enter the
premises of an owner or operator to perform an inspection and may issue administrative orders
and assess civil penalties to enforce its safety standards.9
PHMSA has adopted minimum safety standards for hazardous liquid pipelines in 49 C.F.R.
Part 195. The safety regulations apply to all parts of a pipeline facility through which hazardous
liquids move in transportation, including but not limited to pipe, equipment, facilities and
breakout tanks.10 The regulations do not apply to refining facilities or storage or in-plant piping
systems associated with refining facilities.11
Respondent argued the Bushton facility meets the exception in the Act for refining because it
“employs a refining process called fractionation” that is “the same refining process that occurs at
a crude oil refinery.”12 Respondent explained that fractionation, also known as distillation,
separates raw NGL mixture into purity products, such as propane and butane, by applying
different temperatures and pressures. No chemical change takes place to the product, but
according to Respondent the separation constitutes a physical change. In this respect Respondent
argued the Bushton facility is no different than a crude oil refinery.
7 49 U.S.C. § 60102(a).
8 § 60101(a)(22). A pipeline facility includes any pipeline, right-of-way, facility, building, or equipment
used or intended to be used in pipeline transportation. § 60101(a)(5).
9 §§ 60117(c), 60118(b) and 60122.
10 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.1(a) and 195.2.
11 § 195.1(b)(8).
12 ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 9.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 4
Respondent noted the term “refining” is not defined in the Act, but the Company suggested the
term “has a plain and unambiguous meaning.”13 An expert for Respondent cited dictionary
definitions and other sources to support his opinion that a refinery is any facility where unwanted
substances are removed to produce a higher grade or purified product.14 Respondent cited the
website of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (U.S. EIA), which defines a refinery as
an “installation that manufactures finished petroleum products from crude oil, unfinished oils,
natural gas liquids, other hydrocarbons, and oxygenates.”15 Respondent also cited an industry
publication that defines a refiner as someone involved in a process “by which the physical or
chemical characteristics of petroleum or petroleum products are changed . . . .”16 Using all of
these definitions, Respondent insisted the term refining in the Act includes NGL fractionation
performed at the Bushton facility.
Respondent argued further that legislative history and past practice of PHMSA demonstrate the
refining exception was intended to cover NGL fractionation. Respondent asserted that during the
legislative process leading to enactment of the refining exception, statements by members of
Congress and the Department of Transportation demonstrated they understood the difference
between transportation and refining and they intended the Act to exclude facilities like Bushton.
Respondent noted that PHMSA has never adopted regulations for NGL fractionation. ONEOK
reasoned that Congress must be content with the absence of regulations because Congress has
never amended the refining exception.17 Respondent also suggested that by not regulating
fractionation, the Agency too must believe the Act does not apply.
At the hearing and in its written submission, OPS disagreed with these assertions. OPS argued
that since 2006, the Agency has communicated to Respondent that the Bushton facility is
covered by the Act. As a technical matter, OPS argued that refining involves more than just
separating an NGL mixture—it involves the conversion of a crude product into another
substance, such as when crude oil is converted to gasoline. NGL fractionation, OPS argued,
merely involves the separation of a mixture and does not involve conversion of a product nor
does it change the physical or chemical characteristics of the NGL. OPS noted the Department
of Energy does not recognize the Bushton facility as a refinery.
18 Finally, OPS argued that prior
litigation by the previous owner of the Bushton facility resulted in a federal court finding the
Bushton facility was not engaged in refining.
13 ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 11.
14 ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 11.
15 U.S. EIA Definitions, Sources and Explanatory Notes, available at:
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/TblDefs/pet_pnp_capshell_tbldef2.asp (last accessed Aug. 10, 2016)
(emphasis added).
16 ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 12, quoting Manual of Oil and Gas Terms by Howard
Williams and Charles Meyers.
17 ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 16.
18 Central Region Recommendation at 5 (Apr. 1, 2016).



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 5
To these points, Respondent responded that prior written interpretations by PHMSA demonstrate
“shifting theories” of jurisdiction,19 the definition of refining offered by OPS is too narrow, and
OPS improperly treats NGL fractionation facilities different than crude oil refineries.
A. Preliminary Analysis
When deciding issues of legal interpretation, such as the scope of the Pipeline Safety Act, I first
look to the plain language of the law.20 As noted above, the Act applies by its terms to facilities
used in the “movement of hazardous liquid by pipeline” and “storage of hazardous liquid
incidental to the movement of hazardous liquid by pipeline.”21
The record shows the Bushton facility has both inbound and outbound pipelines that transport
NGLs, which are a hazardous liquid. The NGLs arrive as “Y-grade” (a raw mixture of NGLs) or
as “purity products” (NGLs previously separated from a raw mixture). Purity products arrive by
inbound pipeline and are then either transported through the facility to outbound pipelines for
continued transportation or to storage caverns for later transportation by pipeline. Incoming
Y-grade NGLs are either sent to fractionation equipment for separation and stored or transported,
sent to storage wells for fractionation or transportation at a later time, or transported directly to
outbound pipelines. In summary, the Bushton facility receives hazardous liquids in
transportation by pipeline, stores hazardous liquids incidental to their movement by pipeline, and
transports hazardous liquids from the facility by pipeline. The facility is therefore engaged in
pipeline transportation subject to the Act unless an exception applies.
Both the Act and Part 195 except the movement of hazardous liquids through refining facilities
and the storage or in-plant piping systems associated with refining facilities. The term “refining”
is not defined in the Act or regulations, but as discussed in more detail below PHMSA has
previously interpreted the refining exception as it relates to NGL fractionation.
B. Prior Interpretations
As a general matter, when deciding interpretive issues in an enforcement proceeding, I give prior
decisions by the Agency on that issue effect unless there is a compelling reason to change or
depart from the position previously adopted.22
In 2005, a representative of the Central Region, OPS attempted to perform a pipeline safety
inspection of the Bushton facility. ONEOK personnel communicated their belief that the facility
19 ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 6.
20 Plains Pipeline, L.P., CPF No. 4-2013-5007, Item 5, 2015 WL 4397455 (May 22, 2015).
21 49 U.S.C. § 60101(a)(22).
22 See, e.g., Sunoco Pipeline, LP, CPF No. 1-2014-5005, Item 1, 2016 WL 770393, at *3 (Jan. 13, 2016)
(finding a violation based on prior interpretations of a safety standard).



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 6
was not subject to PHMSA jurisdiction. In a follow-up letter from the Central Region Director,
ONEOK was asked to provide the reasons why it believed the facility was not jurisdictional.23
Respondent replied in March 2006 and explained the Bushton facility consists of underground
storage wells and associated facility piping. Product is brought into the facility by pipeline and
stored until customers request delivery by pipeline or truck. Respondent contended at that time
that the facility was not subject to Agency regulations because movement of product inside the
facility involved in-plant piping systems associated with storage and because non-pipeline modes
of transportation were used in some instances.24
The Director replied by letter dated June 27, 2006 (2006 Interpretation). The Director stated that
after reviewing the response, he disagreed with the Company’s assessment, finding the facility
was being used for the transportation of hazardous liquids. Specifically, he noted “the storage
fields are utilized for storage of product delivered to the fields by pipeline, and product is
re-injected into the pipeline for delivery to another destination by pipeline.”25 He advised
ONEOK that the Agency would be performing another scheduled inspection of the facility.
Respondent replied on November 13, 2006, stating the Company would “implement a transition
plan to convert certain of its storage assets . . . to a PHMSA/Part 195 driven hazard control
system for facilities where PHMSA has jurisdiction.”26 Respondent requested clarification that
“all pipes, valves, and other appurtenances connecting the cavern wellhead to the regulated
pipelines must comply with the PHMSA/Part 195 regulations for pipeline systems . . . but no
Part 195 regulations specific to ‘caverns’ [underground storage] currently exist.”27 Respondent
indicated it also planned to request a waiver to allow continued use of certain programs and
requested that PHMSA confirm or clarify the Company’s plan.
Additional discussions between Respondent and the Central Region demonstrated the Company
intended to follow Part 195 regulations for the Bushton facility but wanted additional guidance
on issues such as where jurisdiction started and ended.28 In early 2007, Respondent confirmed
Part 195 requirements were being integrated into its manual of written procedures for the
Bushton facility.29 By mid-2007, OPS had documented telephone and in-person conversations
with Respondent confirming the progress. Demarcation points for PHMSA-jurisdictional
facilities were completed.30 Respondent performed operator qualification (OQ) and maximum
23 OPS letter (Feb. 15, 2006), OPS Violation Report, Exhibit A: Draft OPS Failure Investigation Report
(FIR) (Apr. 29, 2013), Appendix C at 1.
24 25 26 27 28 29 ONEOK letter (Mar. 27, 2006), FIR Appendix C at 5.
OPS letter (Jun. 27, 2006), FIR Appendix C at 7.
ONEOK letter (Nov. 13, 2006), FIR Appendix C at 9.
ONEOK letter (Nov. 13, 2006), FIR Appendix C at 10.
OPS memo (Dec. 20, 2006), FIR Appendix C at 15.
ONEOK email (Jan. 15, 2007), FIR Appendix C at 16.
30 OPS memo (Apr. 16, 2007), FIR Appendix C at 20.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
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operating pressure (MOP) determination activities.31 In early 2008, Respondent called to
confirm that conversion to Part 195 regulations was complete with the exception of pressure
testing. In April 2011, Respondent confirmed that pressure testing had been completed.32
Following a meeting between Respondent and OPS on August 4, 2011, the Company submitted a
request for written interpretation concerning the jurisdictional status of the Bushton facility.
Respondent asserted in its request that Bushton was “a processing (refining) facility” and asked
whether the facility and in-plant piping and storage associated with refining were exempt under
the refining exception in the Act.33
The Director of Standards and Rulemakings of PHMSA issued an interpretation on February 28,
2012 (First 2012 Interpretation).34 The interpretation noted that the refining exception applies to
facilities used for production, refining, or manufacturing of NGLs. The Director then found that
NGLs undergo a chemical transformation during fractionation at Respondent’s facility. The
interpretation accepted Respondent’s classification of fractionation as refining, but concluded the
refining exception did not apply to in-plant piping or storage at the facility if it was also being
used for pipeline transportation.
Objecting to this conclusion, Respondent submitted a second interpretation request, this one to
the Chief Counsel.35 Respondent provided additional information, including noting that NGL
fractionation does not involve a chemical change to the NGLs but involves separating
compounds of a mixture. After reviewing this information and considering the earlier
interpretation, the Chief Counsel issued a letter to Respondent on August 8, 2012 (Second
2012 Interpretation).36 The letter confirmed the earlier decision that the presence of fractionation
equipment did not render the entire Bushton facility subject to the refining exception. The Chief
Counsel also concluded that separating an NGL mixture, where no chemical change takes place,
is not refining but merely a processing function.37 She found that fractionation equipment,
piping, and storage used exclusively for fractionation did not meet the refining exception, but she
noted such equipment is not currently regulated by existing Federal safety standards.38 Other
31 OPS memo (Jul. 25, 2007), FIR Appendix C at 17.
32 ONEOK email (Apr. 6, 2011), FIR Appendix C at 23.
33 ONEOK letter (Aug. 18, 2011), FIR Appendix D at 5.
34 OPS letter (Feb. 28, 2012), FIR Appendix D at 1.
35 ONEOK letter (May 25, 2012), ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief, Exhibit 2.
36 Chief Counsel letter (Aug. 8, 2012), FIR Appendix D at 10.
37 The interpretation referenced the definition of “refiner” in Manual of Oil and Gas Terms, Williams and
Meyers, Third Edition, but the interpretation did not quote the definition. Respondent argued the
interpretation should have accurately quoted the definition, but there is no indication the Agency relied
solely on the definition to reach its conclusion.
38 The interpretation addressed applicability of another exception for facilities used to transfer hazardous
liquids between non-pipeline modes of transportation, but Respondent does not assert applicability of that
exception here.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 8
portions of the facility used in the transportation of hazardous liquids by pipeline were found
subject to existing regulations.
Respondent submitted a third request,39 and the Chief Counsel issued another letter on November
28, 2012 (Third 2012 Interpretation).40 Her letter clarified certain points but otherwise affirmed
in all respects the findings in the Second 2012 Interpretation. She noted that a facility receiving
hazardous liquids by pipeline and reinjecting them for continued transportation by pipeline is
subject to the Act, and the presence of fractionation or separation equipment “does not mean that
virtually the entire facility is exempt from regulation,” noting such a theory could create a gap in
the regulatory framework under the Act.
In summary, PHMSA has issued four written interpretations between 2006 and 2012 regarding
the Bushton facility. In those interpretations, PHMSA determined the facility is subject to the
Act because the pipeline facility is “used in transporting hazardous liquid,” including “movement
of hazardous liquid by pipeline” and “storage of hazardous liquid incidental to the movement of
hazardous liquid by pipeline.”41 PHMSA has determined that fractionation of NGLs is not
“refining” and therefore the presence of fractionation equipment does not exempt the entire
facility from the Act.42 PHMSA has also determined that current regulations do not presently
cover certain equipment, piping, and storage used exclusively for fractionation, but the
regulations do apply to all pipes, valves and other components at the facility that are used in the
movement of hazardous liquids by pipeline.
C. Subsequent Draft Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Respondent noted that in 2014, the Agency created a working group with representatives from
PHMSA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and both PHMSA
technical advisory committees.43 The working group had a goal of clarifying regulatory
oversight of certain midstream processing facilities. The group developed draft FAQs and
presented them at an August 26, 2015, meeting of the technical advisory committees.44
The FAQs contained, among other things, definitions of “refining” and “processing,” terms that
are not otherwise defined in the Act or regulations. The definitions are relevant to the current
39 ONEOK letter (Nov. 13, 2012), ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief, Exhibit 3.
40 Chief Counsel letter (Nov. 28, 2012), FIR Appendix D at 17.
41 49 U.S.C. § 60101(a)(5), (a)(22)(A).
42 § 60101(a)(22)(B).
43 See, e.g., ONEOK Response to Region Recommendations at 13 (May 6, 2016) (discussing guidance
document titled “Delineation and Regulatory Oversight of ‘Processing’ – Oil and Gas Midstream
Facilities”). The technical advisory committees were formed under 49 U.S.C. § 60115 to carry out peer
review functions under the Act.
44 See Notice of advisory committee meeting, 80 Fed. Reg. 47032 (Aug. 6, 2015) (announcing public
meeting of advisory committees and proving link to agenda, including agenda item “BRIEFING:
Midstream Working Group”).



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
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proceeding, because as noted above, PHMSA previously determined NGL fractionation is not
“refining” under the Act, but merely processing. Processing involved in transportation that is not
otherwise “production, refining or manufacturing,” is not exempt from the Act under 49 U.S.C.
§ 60101(a)(22)(B). The FAQs sought to improve clarity by delineating regulatory responsibility
between PHMSA and OSHA where there is overlapping jurisdiction.
The definition of processing in the FAQs includes the distillation or the heating of products to
separate or purify. This definition matches the description of NGL fractionation, which uses heat
and pressure to separate the NGL mixture. The definition of refining in the FAQs is the
“chemical conversion of crude oil into refined petroleum products.”45 NGL fractionation does
not fit within the definition of refining because fractionation does not involve chemical
conversion. Accordingly, under the FAQs, NGL fractionation is not refining. This is consistent
with the Agency’s conclusion in the Second and Third 2012 Interpretations.
D. Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent argued that for a variety of reasons PHMSA should vacate the prior written
interpretations and interpret the refining exception to exempt NGL fractionation facilities and
associated piping and equipment.
1. Definitions of Refinery, Refiner, and Refining
First, Respondent cited to dictionaries and other sources that define refinery broadly to include
any place where unwanted substances are removed.46 The dictionary definitions discuss the
general concept of refining materials such as ore, sugar, and oil. Respondent contended that
NGL fractionation “fits neatly within the general concept of refining.”47
PHMSA rejects the assertion that the statutory exception to the Pipeline Safety Act should be
read to its furthest possible limits in order to accommodate “general concepts” of refining. Were
the Act interpreted to exempt any facility used in removing unwanted substances, it would result
in significant and unintended gaps in safety oversight. For example, every natural gas pipeline
facility that removes unwanted moisture from its gas stream to aid in pipeline transportation
could potentially fall under such concepts of refining and be excluded from the Act. PHMSA
does not assume Congress intended to enact an exception so expansive that it would defeat much
of the purpose of the legislation.
Respondent cited to a definition of “refining” from the website of the U.S. EIA. PHMSA does
not find the definition controlling because it was not adopted under the Pipeline Safety Act.
45 Delineation and Regulatory Oversight of “Processing” – Oil and Gas Midstream Facilities, dated
August 2015, at slide 7, available at: http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs/technical-advisory-
comm/meeting/august-25-and-26-2015-joint-meeting-gas-and-liquid (follow link to Day 2 Agenda Item 2
Presentations) (last visited Jun. 23, 2016).
46 47 ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 13.
ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 14.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
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Moreover, the U.S. EIA does not actually include the Bushton facility on its registry of
petroleum refineries in the United States.48 While Respondent argued the crude oil refining
process often uses fractionation, it does not necessarily follow that NGL fractionation on its own
constitutes refining under the Pipeline Safety Act.
Respondent also cited to a definition of “refiner” from the industry reference Manual of Oil and
Gas Terms. The definition states that a refiner is someone who produces refined products by
“changing the chemical or physical characteristics of petroleum.”49 PHMSA does not subscribe
to such a broad definition of refining under the Pipeline Safety Act, and Respondent has not
presented a reason this particular definition should be controlling given the potential gaps in
safety oversight PHMSA has previously found could result. Respondent is correct that PHMSA
referenced the same definition in the Second 2012 Interpretation and Respondent objected to the
Agency’s imprecise restatement of the definition.50 The Second 2012 Interpretation cited this
source as informational, not as controlling authority.
PHMSA is further guided by testimony presented by OPS that refining is a term commonly used
in the industry to refer to the conversion of crude petroleum into new products, not the separation
of a mixture. OPS also stated that common usage in the industry would never refer to an NGL
fractionation facility as a refinery. Respondent attempted to dispute the relevancy of common
usage, but its own arguments were tangentially based on theories of common usage.51 Given the
history of PHMSA’s interpretation of this statutory language, I find Respondent’s evidence of
other sources of definitions does not warrant vacating and revising those interpretations.
2. Legislative History
Nothing Respondent cited to in the legislative history demonstrates Congress and the Department
of Transportation intended “refining” to mean something other than PHMSA’s current
interpretation. Respondent theorized that Congress’s failure to amend the refining exception
meant that Congress approved of the absence of NGL fractionation regulations. This conjecture
is unsupported in the record. Moreover, the logic of this assumption would suggest the opposite:
Congress has amended the Act at least three times since 2006 and has never reversed PHMSA’s
interpretation that Bushton must comply with the Act. Respondent is likewise erroneous in its
assumption that PHMSA has not regulated fractionation equipment because the Agency believes
48 EIA Refinery Capacity Report, Tables 3, 4, 5 (Jun. 19, 2015) available at:
http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/refinerycapacity (last accessed Aug. 10, 2016).
49 51 ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 7.
50 The Second 2012 Interpretation found that a refinery changes the “chemical and physical”
characteristics of the product and cited to the Manual. The Manual definition states that a refinery
changes the “chemical or physical” characteristics.
ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 16.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 11
the equipment is exempted. This assumption is not accurate and otherwise not supported by the
record.52
3. Interpretations from 2006 and 2012
Respondent argued the Agency’s Bushton interpretations are inconsistent and demonstrate
“shifting theories” of jurisdiction.53 I do not find support in the record for this argument. The
2006 Interpretation explained the Bushton facility is required to comply with the pipeline safety
regulations because it transports hazardous liquids by pipeline. The First 2012 Interpretation
likewise informed ONEOK that the Act applies to the facility and the refining exception does not
exempt the entire facility. This was echoed throughout the Second and Third 2012
Interpretations. As can be expected, the interpretations were further developed in response to
each subsequent request submitted by Respondent that provided additional information. For
example, Respondent did not claim NGL fractionation constituted refining in 2006, but asserted
that for the first time in 2011.
Respondent took issue with the manner in which the Second 2012 Interpretation retracted the
Agency’s statement in the First 2012 Interpretation that fractionation was refining. The record
demonstrates, however, that the earlier conclusion was based, at least in part, on an incorrect
assumption that fractionation involved chemically changing NGLs. This erroneous assumption
was pointed out by Respondent in its letter of May 25, 2012. As a result, the Agency’s Second
2012 Interpretation noted that fractionation does not involve a chemical change to the product
and fractionation does not constitute refining. This did not change the ultimate conclusion of
either interpretation. All three 2012 interpretations concluded the refining exception did not
exempt the entire Bushton facility.
4. Other Agency Interpretations from 1998 and 1991
Respondent cited to three Agency interpretations issued in 1998 and 1991 to other pipeline
operators and argued those interpretations demonstrate historical inconsistencies. After
reviewing the interpretations, I find they do not support Respondent’s position because they all
predate the 2006 Bushton Interpretation and address different facts than are at issue in the
present matter.
The 1998 interpretation addressed applicability of the Pipeline Safety Act with respect to an
NGL “processing plant” used to remove liquid hydrocarbons accumulated during the
transmission of natural gas.54 The Agency found that removing liquids from natural gas was
covered by the Act because the process supported the transmission of gas by pipeline. As an
ancillary issue, the Agency stated other facilities “related more to processing” were considered
52 See, e.g., Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines, 76 Fed. Reg. 53086, 53098 (proposed
Aug. 25, 2011) (stating in an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking that PHMSA was considering
establishing new requirements for previously unregulated underground gas storage).
53 54 ONEOK Post-hearing Jurisdictional Brief at 6.
ONEOK Prehearing Jurisdictional Brief (Nov. 4, 2013), Exhibit 12.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 12
refining or manufacturing facilities. It was not explained in the interpretation what those other
facilities or “processing” functions were. The interpretation did not address NGL fractionation.
Another interpretation from 1991 considered whether drug and alcohol testing requirements
applied to a natural “gas processing plant.”55 The Agency concluded the plant was not subject to
safety requirements because it was engaged in rural gas gathering outside the scope of the gas
pipeline safety regulations in Part 192.56 The interpretation found the refining exception in Part
195 covered “facilities used in the collection of NGLs inside a gas processing plant.” The
interpretation concerned equipment “located on the grounds of a production facility.”
Production facilities are excepted from the Act under the same exception for refining facilities.
By contrast, the Bushton facility is not a production facility and is not engaged in production.
Production occurs prior to the commencement of transportation, whereas the Bushton facility
receives hazardous liquids already in transportation and continues to move the hazardous liquids
by pipeline. Therefore this interpretation is not applicable to the Bushton facility.
Another interpretation from 1991 considered how the pipeline safety regulations applied to a
transportation pipeline that leaves the property of the refinery.57 The Agency determined that the
regulated section of the pipeline begins at the inlet of each pressure control device on refinery
grounds that protects the pipeline outside the property. The facility at issue in the interpretation
was referred to as a refinery by both the operator and the Agency, but there is no additional
information about the facility. The interpretation did not addresses NGL fractionation or
pipeline facilities with NGL fractionation equipment.
Since the interpretations from 1998 and 1991 were all issued prior to 2006 and do not address the
same facts at issue at the Bushton facility, I find they do not support Respondent’s argument.
5. Alleged Uncertainty and Confusion
Finally, throughout this proceeding Respondent has argued that the Notice, proposed civil
penalties, and proposed compliance order must all be withdrawn due to the perception of
jurisdictional uncertainty and confusion surrounding application of the pipeline safety
regulations at Bushton. Respondent’s claims of “uncertainty” are questionable given the history
of dialogue between ONEOK and PHMSA on this issue.
As explained in more detail above, the Agency’s 2006 Interpretation informed Respondent that
the Bushton facility must comply with the pipeline safety regulations and provided the legal
basis for that decision. This determination was later confirmed in three subsequent
interpretations issued in 2012, which also explained the basis for jurisdiction under the Act.
While each subsequent interpretation differed to the extent necessary to address new information
55 57 ONEOK Prehearing Jurisdictional Brief, Exhibit 11.
56 Safety regulations for natural gas pipelines in 49 C.F.R. Part 192 are separate from safety regulations
for hazardous liquid pipelines in Part 195.
ONEOK Prehearing Jurisdictional Brief, Exhibit 10.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 13
and arguments presented by Respondent,58 the interpretations were consistent in their conclusion.
Respondent has been given more than enough notice since at least 2006 that its facility must
comply with the pipeline safety regulations. Therefore it is not evident how or when Respondent
became “confused” about application of the safety regulations. ONEOK’s own conduct
demonstrated it understood its obligations. After receiving the 2006 Interpretation, ONEOK
committed to bring its facility into compliance and took actions in furtherance of that
commitment. For these reasons I dismiss Respondent’s arguments about jurisdictional
uncertainty.
E. OPS Legal Citation
In its post-hearing submission, OPS argued that a judicial challenge by the previous owner of the
Bushton facility, Enron Gas Processing Company, resulted in a federal court finding NGL
fractionation was not refining.59 Enron had brought an action against the Internal Revenue
Service after the agency attempted to tax the company’s gas processing facilities as a refinery.
Enron argued NGL fractionation did not render the facility a refinery under the tax law. The
court agreed that the gas processing facility was not a refinery. While the Enron case interpreted
the Petroleum Excise Tax and not the Pipeline Safety Act, the case is relevant insofar as the
Bushton facility has previously been adjudged to be a facility that is not a refinery.60
F. Conclusion
PHMSA has determined in previous interpretations that the Bushton facility must comply with
the Act because the facility engages in pipeline transportation of hazardous liquids. PHMSA has
previously determined the refining exception does not exempt the facility because NGL
fractionation is not refining. Respondent has not demonstrated this interpretation is inconsistent
with the Act. Absent clear direction by Congress to the contrary, I conclude the prior
interpretations are reasonable and consistent with the Act’s purpose to protect against risks posed
by pipeline transportation.
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
Having confirmed the Bushton facility is required to be in compliance with the pipeline safety
regulations, I consider the allegations in the Notice that Respondent failed to comply with the
pipeline safety regulations. The Notice alleged that Respondent committed nine violations of 49
C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:
58 For example, Respondent never claimed its facility was engaged in “refining” until 2011. ONEOK
letter (Mar. 27, 2006), FIR Appendix C at 3-6 (claiming an exception because the in-plant piping systems
are “associated with storage”).
59 Enron Gas Processing Co. v. United States, No. CIV. A. H-94-1390, 1996 WL 753961 (S.D. Tex.
April 9, 1996).
60 The court found the gas processing facilities were not refineries under the Petroleum Excise Tax
because they receive gas feedstock rather than crude oil or natural gasoline feedstock.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 14
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.52(a)(2), which states:
§ 195.52 Immediate notice of certain accidents.
(a) Notice requirements. At the earliest practicable moment following
discovery of a release of the hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide
transported resulting in an event described in § 195.50, the operator of the
system must give notice, in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section,
of any failure that . . .
(2) Resulted in either a fire or explosion not intentionally set by the
operator . . . .
(b) Information required. Each notice required by paragraph (a) of this
section must be made to the National Response Center either by telephone
to 800-424-8802 (in Washington, DC, 202-267-2675) or electronically at
http://www.nrc.uscg.mil . . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.52(a)(2) by failing to notify the National
Response Center (NRC) at the earliest practicable moment following discovery of a release of
hazardous liquid resulting in a fire. Specifically, the Notice alleged that on May 17, 2008, a
release of hazardous liquid and unintentional fire occurred at the Bushton facility at 7:41 a.m.
Central Time (CT). The Notice alleged that Respondent failed to telephonically report the
accident until 12:08 p.m. CT, approximately 4.5 hours later.
Respondent argued that it acted at the earliest practicable moment by attempting to call the NRC
at 10:15 a.m., about 2.5 hours after the accident. An employee testified at the hearing that he
called the NRC at 10:15 a.m., but no one answered. When no one answered, he resumed his
other duties until he called the NRC again at 12:08 p.m. Respondent argued the regulation does
not mandate any specific timeframe for reporting accidents, and therefore the Company
complied with the regulation by reporting the accident at the earliest practicable moment.
Respondent also argued the flare/drain system that experienced the accident is not a “pipeline or
pipeline system” subject to the reporting requirement.
Analysis
Section 195.52 requires pipeline operators to immediately report certain accidents to PHMSA by
giving notice to the NRC. The notice must be given “at the earliest practicable moment
following discovery” of any accident that involves certain consequences, including any release
of hazardous liquid resulting in a fire or explosion not intentionally set by the operator.
PHMSA has interpreted the term “earliest practicable moment” to mean “within 1-2 hours after
discovery” in most cases.61 This interpretation is not codified in the regulation, but has been
communicated to the regulated community for over 40 years, including though multiple advisory
61 Pipeline Safety Alert Notice ALN-91-01 (Apr. 15, 1991), available at
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs/advisory-bulletin (last accessed Aug. 10, 2016).



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
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bulletins and enforcement actions.62 The interpretation allows for the possibility that an operator
could be justified in taking longer than 2 hours to report an accident. For example, an accident
might be detected by an employee in a remote area without telephone service. In most cases,
however, the regulation requires telephonic reporting within 1-2 hours.
The accident and fire in this case occurred at a facility that was fully staffed. Respondent
discovered the accident as soon as it occurred. The regulation required Respondent to
telephonically report the accident as soon as practicable, and Respondent has presented no
evidence to justify needing more than 1-2 hours to report the accident.
Respondent indicated it attempted to contact the NRC about 2.5 hours after the accident and no
one answered the phone. I find it implausible that that no one answered at the NRC, which raises
the question of whether Respondent dialed the correct number or allowed the phone to ring long
enough. Notwithstanding, Respondent’s attempt to notify the NRC was more than 2 hours after
discovery.63 Furthermore, Respondent did not attempt to call back immediately. Instead
Respondent waited almost two more hours until attempting to file the report. I find no
justification for this delay.
Respondent’s argument that the flare/drain system is not a “pipeline or pipeline system” is
rejected. Section 195.2 defines a pipeline to include not just line pipe, but all appurtenances
connected to pipe and any other equipment or facilities used in the transportation of hazardous
liquids. Respondent’s flare/drain system consists of pipe and other equipment and is used in the
transportation of hazardous liquids by collecting NGLs that are released through relief valves,
pressure vessels, and piping drains.
Accordingly, having reviewed the record, I find Respondent violated § 195.52 by failing to give
notice at the earliest practicable moment of an accident involving a fire not intentionally set by
the operator until more than four hours after the accident.
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.54(a), which states:
§ 195.54 Accident reports.
(a) Each operator that experiences an accident that is required to be
reported under § 195.50 must, as soon as practicable, but not later than 30
days after discovery of the accident, file an accident report on DOT Form
7000-1.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.54(a) by failing to file a written accident
report within 30 days of an accident. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent never filed
62 Buckeye Partners, LP, Decision on Petition for Reconsideration, CPF No. 3-2010-5006, 2013 WL
5305820 (Aug. 1, 2013) (noting that since 1971, PHMSA has consistently found through interpretations,
advisory bulletins, and numerous enforcement cases that “earliest practicable moment” means within 1-2
hours).
63 See, e.g., Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, CPF No. 3-2012-5018, Item 1, 2013 WL 5883399
(Aug. 22, 2013) (finding a violation of § 195.52 for giving notice to NRC 2.5 hours after discovery).



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
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a written accident report on DOT Form 7000-1 in connection with the accident that occurred on
May 17, 2008.
In its written response and at the hearing, Respondent argued the flare/drain system is not a
pipeline subject to the reporting requirement. This argument is rejected for the reasons stated in
Item 1. Accordingly, having reviewed the record, I find Respondent violated § 195.54(a) by
failing to file a written accident report in connection with the accident on May 17, 2008.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b)(1), which states:
§ 195.401 General requirements.
(b) An operator must make repairs on its pipeline system according to
the following requirements:
(1) Non Integrity management repairs. Whenever an operator
discovers any condition that could adversely affect the safe operation of its
pipeline system, it must correct the condition within a reasonable time.
However, if the condition is of such a nature that it presents an immediate
hazard to persons or property, the operator may not operate the affected
part of the system until it has corrected the unsafe condition.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.401(b)(1) by failing to correct a hazardous
condition that adversely affected safe operation of the pipeline system. Specifically, the Notice
alleged that on May 17, 2008, four separate releases occurred in which a mixture of water and
liquid hydrocarbons was forced through an accumulator tank when pressure relief valves opened.
The instances occurred at 7:41 a.m., 8:05 a.m., 8:49 a.m. and 9:53 a.m. On each occasion, the
liquid mixture flowed to the tip of the flare stack where it was ignited at the burner tips.
Evacuated personnel were allegedly allowed to reenter the area and resume operations even
though Respondent had not identified the primary cause of the releases and had not corrected the
condition, which presented an immediate hazard to persons and property.
Respondent contested the alleged violation by arguing that no unsafe condition existed that
presented an immediate hazard. Respondent also argued that only three fires occurred not four
and that personnel were not allowed to reenter the area. In addition, Respondent contended that
no pipeline operations were resumed prior to correcting the alleged condition.
Analysis
Section 195.401(b)(1) requires pipeline operators to correct within a reasonable time any
condition that could adversely affect the safe operation of a pipeline system. In addition, if a
condition presents an immediate hazard to persons or property, the pipeline operator may not
operate the affected part of the system until it has corrected the unsafe condition.
On May 17, 2008, Respondent’s pipeline facility experienced an unintentional and uncontrolled
release of hazardous liquids. Four consecutive releases of hazardous liquids occurred. At least
three of those releases ignited causing a fire. These facts are sufficient to prove a condition that
adversely affected safe operation. The condition also presented an immediate hazard to persons



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
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and property. Even if workers were not physically located next to the flare, as Respondent
contended, the uncontrolled release of hazardous liquids and fire were an immediate hazard to
the property in addition to any operating personnel that responded to the emergency.
Since the condition adversely affected safe operation and presented an immediate hazard,
§ 195.401(b)(1) required Respondent to correct the condition within a reasonable time and
prohibited Respondent from operating the system until the immediate hazard had been corrected.
The first flare event began at approximately 7:41 a.m. when the field flare started smoking.
Several minutes later, liquids were emitted from the flare stack, ignited, and caused several fires
on the ground near the flair stack. In response to the release and fire, an employee closed the
relief valve on the 108 pipeline preventing one source of product from entering the flare/drain
system. Closure of the valve did not correct the condition because other sources of product
could still enter the flare/drain system. A second flare event occurred at 8:05 a.m.
The employee then operated the incoming valve on the #1 dehydration unit, which eliminated
another source of product from the flare/drain system. This too did not stop the hazardous
condition. At 8:38 a.m., personnel requested all pipelines into and out of the Bushton facility be
shut down. A third flare event occurred at 8:49 a.m. An employee operated the valve on the #2
dehydration unit and Respondent requested the 800 pipeline delivering product to Bushton be
shut down. At 9:53 a.m., a fourth event occurred. At 10:05 a.m., Respondent discovered the
liquid level control valve on the incoming Buckeye Pipeline water knock out drum was blocked
in the open position, allowing water and possibly Y-grade material to flow into the flare/drain
system. This valve was closed and no additional relief events occurred.
Respondent described all of these events as “a single, continuous effort to identify and correct
potential causes of the flare overflows.”64 While Respondent contended that all pipelines were
shut down at 8:38 a.m.,65 the record reflects the system was not shut down by 8:38 a.m.
Additional flare events continued to occur at 8:49 a.m. and 9:53 a.m. It was not until
Respondent closed the valve on the incoming Buckeye Pipeline that additional product was
prevented from entering the flare/drain system causing additional flare events. It took
Respondent over two hours to stop the flare events, primarily due to Respondent’s decision to
eliminate “potential causes . . . one by one . . . over time . . . until a complete, plant-wide
shutdown was effected.”66 Respondent did not initiate an immediate shutdown following the
first event to prevent additional product from feeding into the flare/drain system. For this reason,
I find that Respondent did not correct the flare condition within a reasonable time.
By not initiating a timely shutdown, Respondent also failed to comply with the prohibition
against operating the system until a hazard had been corrected. Respondent argued that it never
“operated” the system during the sequential shutdown, but I find Respondent did permit the
continued operation of the system as more product was allowed to enter the flare/drain system
64 65 66 ONEOK Post-hearing Merits Brief at 64 (Apr. 1, 2014).
ONEOK Post-hearing Merits Brief at 68.
ONEOK Post-hearing Merits Brief at 67.



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from various sources. This resulted in additional flare events and fires occurring. The
flare/drain system was serving in an operation and maintenance function for Respondent’s
pipeline facility and continued to be in operation until Respondent completed a shutdown
stopping the flow of product into the system.
Accordingly, having reviewed the record, I find Respondent violated § 195.401(b)(1) by failing
to correct within a reasonable time a condition that adversely affected safe operation.
Respondent also violated § 195.401(b)(1) by failing to cease operations until the immediate
hazard had been corrected.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall
be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its manual of
written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance activities. Specifically, the
Notice alleged that Respondent did not follow the procedure for limiting the amount of product
in the flare system accumulator tank. The Notice alleged Respondent’s procedures prohibited
the amount of liquid in the accumulator tank from being 85 percent or more of the total volume
of the tank, but according to Respondent’s Root Cause Analysis (RCA) the amount of liquid in
the tank was almost 97 percent at the time of the accident.67 The RCA also found the accident
was compounded by Respondent’s failure to recognize the flare system was full and its failure to
immediately identify sources relieving into the systems.
Respondent did not contest the factual allegations, but only contested the violation on
jurisdictional grounds. Those arguments have already been rejected. Accordingly, having
reviewed the record, I find Respondent violated § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its manual of
written procedures for limiting the volume of product in the flare system accumulator tank.
67 The Notice alleged that the capacity of the accumulator was 10,500 gallons and that 242 barrels or
10,164 gallons of hydrocarbon mixture were later removed from the tank.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
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Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall
be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its manual of
written procedures for handling emergencies. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent
did not follow its written procedure when shutting down the flare/drain system. The procedures
allegedly prohibited bypassing safety equipment, but on the day of the accident, Respondent
closed and bypassed a thermal relief isolation valve subjecting the 108 pipeline to possible
overpressure.
At the hearing, Respondent acknowledged the thermal relief valve had been isolated, but argued
there were other safety devices in place so the pipeline was never exposed to a possibility of
overpressure. Respondent also argued the relief valve in question was designed to relieve
thermal pressure if the pipeline is blocked in; it is not designed to relieve surges when the
pipeline is in operation. The pipeline was in operation on the day of the accident. Respondent
therefore reasoned that isolation of the thermal relief valve did not expose the pipeline to any
increased risk of overpressure.
Finally, Respondent argued the written procedures cited in the Notice did not actually apply to
the thermal relief valve in question. Respondent contended that a different manual of written
procedures applied to this portion of the Bushton facility. The procedure that did apply,
Respondent argued, did not prohibit isolating the thermal relief valve on the 108 pipeline.
At the hearing, OPS argued that regardless of the design of the valve and presence of other relief
valves, the relief valve at issue was a safety device and had been isolated contrary to the express
provision of the cited procedures. OPS also argued that even if Respondent had some other
procedures, the emergency procedures cited in the Notice prohibited the operator from bypassing
the safety equipment at issue.
Analysis
Section 195.402(a) requires operators to follow their procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. The
written procedures referenced in the Notice were titled “SF Flare/Drain” and dated October
2003. The procedures stated they applied to the flare/drain system, “comprised of PSV’s, drains,



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
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piping, an accumulator tank and a flare stack.” Procedures for normal operations, normal
shutdown and emergency shutdown of the flare/drain system were included in the written
procedures. With respect to emergency shutdown, the procedures stated: “When [an] emergency
condition exists and it becomes necessary to remove part of or all of the flare/drain system from
service . . . (4) Isolate [the] affected equipment. (Do not by-pass safety equipment).”68
At the hearing, Respondent confirmed the thermal relief valve at issue was a safety device that
connected directly to the flare/drain system. On the day of the accident, Respondent isolated the
thermal relief valve in an attempt to stop the source of product from being introduced to the
flare/drain system. The Violation Report noted that during the investigation by OPS, ONEOK
personnel stated that the Company procedure was to close isolation valves immediately upstream
of relief valves feeding the flare/drain system. This is consistent with the written SF Flare/Drain
procedures cited in the Notice.69
I find that the procedures cited in the Notice were specifically tailored to the piece of pipeline
equipment at issue in this Item. By comparison, the other procedures referenced by Respondent
have only general emergency response provisions and do not include any specific procedures for
shutting down the Flare/Drain system. The record supports finding Respondent’s personnel were
using the procedures cited in the Notice on the day of the accident. Respondent failed to comply
with those procedures when it isolated the thermal relief valve. Whether or not this impacted
safety in light of the other safety devices present on the pipeline is more appropriately considered
below with respect to the civil penalty assessment.
Accordingly, having reviewed the record, I find Respondent violated § 195.402(a) by failing to
follow its written procedures for handling emergencies when it bypassed a piece of safety
equipment.
Item 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.408(a), which states:
§ 195.408 Communications.
(a) Each operator must have a communication system to provide for
the transmission of information needed for the safe operation of its
pipeline system.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.408(a) by failing to have a communication
system to provide for the transmission of information needed for safe operation of the pipeline
system. Specifically, the Notice alleged that an alarm used to monitor the amount of fluid in the
accumulator tank was not operational because it was connected to an old control room that was
no longer in use.
Respondent argued § 195.408(a) did not require a communication system for the accumulator
tank because the tank is not used to “control receipt and delivery” of hazardous liquids.
68 69 OPS Violation Report, Exhibit E at 9.
OPS Violation Report at 30.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
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Respondent bases this argument on paragraph (b) of § 195.408, which was not cited in the
Notice. This paragraph requires that the communication system monitor operational data as
required pursuant to § 195.402(c)(9).70 That regulation, in turn, requires monitoring of data for
facilities that “control receipt and delivery of the hazardous liquid.” Respondent argued the
accumulator tank only collects liquid and vapors and does not control receipt and delivery;
therefore no communication system is required.
Analysis
Section 195.408(a) requires operators to have a communication system to provide for the
transmission of information needed for the safe operation of the pipeline system. In this case,
Respondent had a communication system designed to transmit information about the level of
hazardous liquids in the accumulator tank to the control room of the Bushton facility.
Information about the level of product inside the tank is necessary for safe operation and
maintenance of the facility. Without such information, controllers do not know when the amount
of hazardous liquids has reached levels that present a risk of an emergency.
Section 195.408(b) states that the communication system must include certain capabilities “as a
minimum.” Respondent’s argument that the accumulator tank did not require a functioning
alarm because that is not explicitly listed in paragraph (b) cannot be sustained. The capabilities
listed in § 195.408(b) are only a minimum subset of what is required under paragraph (a). The
communication system required under paragraph (a) requires the transmission of any
“information needed for the safe operation” of the pipeline. As noted above, the level of
hazardous liquids in the accumulator tank is information necessary for safe operation.
Respondent’s communication system did not transmit information to Respondent’s control room
as it was designed because the tank level alarm was still connected to an old control room that
was no longer in use. For this reason, I find Respondent violated § 195.408(a) by failing to have
a communication system that transmitted tank level information needed for safe operation of the
pipeline system.
Item 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(a)(2), which states:
§ 195.406 Maximum operating pressure.
(a) Except for surge pressures and other variations from normal
operations, no operator may operate a pipeline at a pressure that exceeds
any of the following . . .
(2) The design pressure of any other component of the pipeline.
70 § 195.408(b) states: “The communication system required by paragraph (a) of this section must, as a
minimum, include means for . . . [m]onitoring operational data as required by § 195.402(c)(9).” Section
195.402(c)(9) requires procedures for: “In the case of facilities . . . that control receipt and delivery of the
hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide, detecting abnormal operating conditions by monitoring pressure,
temperature, flow or other appropriate operational data and transmitting this data to an attended location.”



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
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The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.406(a)(2) by operating the dehydrator
vessel #1 at a pressure higher than its design pressure. The Notice alleged the dehydrator vessel
had a design pressure of 328 psig. On the day of the accident, the dehydrator vessel was
allegedly operated as high as 350 psig when an isolation valve did not fully prevent product from
entering the vessel. The set point of the relief valve on the dehydrator vessel was 350 psig. Line
800, which flowed product to the dehydration isolation valve, had been operating at pressures
ranging from 395 psig to 460 psig in the 24-hour period preceding the accident on May 17, 2008.
In its written submission, Respondent did not contest the factual allegations, but contested the
violation on jurisdictional grounds. I have already rejected those arguments. Accordingly,
having reviewed the record, I find Respondent violated § 195.406(a)(2) by operating the
dehydrator vessel at a pressure that exceeded its design pressure.
Item 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(a), which states:
§ 195.420 Valve maintenance.
(a) Each operator shall maintain each valve that is necessary for the
safe operation of its pipeline systems in good working order at all times.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.420(a) by failing to maintain each valve that
is necessary for safe operation of its pipeline system in good working order. Specifically, the
Notice alleged that Respondent failed to maintain valves 182 and 152, which were the isolation
valves for propane dehydrator systems #1 and #2.
The Notice alleged the valves were in the closed position and malfunctioned in a manner
allowing high pressure product to flow into the dehydration systems, which overpressured the
dehydration vessels. When the dehydration vessels were overpressured, relief valves on the
vessels opened and product was sent to the accumulator tank and flare stack. The Notice also
alleged that Respondent failed to maintain the Y-grade system water dump level control valve,
which was found blocked in the open position allowing liquid to feed the flare system without
necessary controls.
In its written submission, Respondent did not contest the factual allegations, but contested the
violation on jurisdictional grounds. I have rejected those arguments. Accordingly, having
reviewed the record, I find Respondent violated § 195.420(a) by failing to maintain each valve in
good working order at all times.
Item 9: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), which states:
§ 195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection
systems.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator
shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar
year, or in the case of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at
intervals not to exceed 7 1/2 months, but at least twice each calendar year,
inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 23
regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it
is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate
from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service
in which it is used.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.428(a) by failing to inspect and test each
pressure relief valve to ensure it is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability.
Specifically, the Notice alleged Respondent failed to ensure that three relief valves on its
propane dehydration units #1 and #2 were adequate from the standpoint of capacity to provide
overpressure protection for the vessels. The three valves were 167, 168, and 142. Evidence
produced by OPS included a third-party study conducted on behalf of Respondent that found the
valves were unable to provide protection from blocked flow or failure of inlet pressure control.
Respondent argued OPS did not meet its burden of proof because the third-party study was “not
based on the requirements of PHMSA’s regulations.”71 Respondent stated the scope of work for
the study discussed calculation of relief rates “in accordance with OSHA 1910 and API STD
521.”72 Since the study referenced standards other than the pipeline safety regulations,
Respondent argued the study cannot be used as evidence of a violation.
Analysis
Section 195.428(a) requires pipeline operators to periodically test and inspect relief valves to
ensure they are adequate from the standpoint of capacity. The third-party study of relief valves
at Bushton indicated valves 167 and 168 had a supply pressure capacity of 415 psig, and valve
142 had a supply pressure capacity of 395 psig. The study indicated the potential pressure that
could be produced by the storage caverns was between 450 psig to 550 psig, higher than the
capacity of the relief valves. This information demonstrates the relief valves were not adequate
from the standpoint of capacity, regardless of the standard used by the study to calculate
individual relief rates.
Having reviewed the record, I find Respondent violated § 195.428(a) by failing to ensure the
relief valves were adequate from the standpoint of capacity.
The findings of violation in this Final Order will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent
enforcement action taken against Respondent.
ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed
$100,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any
71 ONEOK Post-hearing Merits Brief at 94.
72 OPS Violation Report, Exhibit F, EnGlobal Propane Dehydration PSV Study at 2 (July 2009).



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related series of violations.73 violations cited above in Items 1 through 9.
The Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $559,100 for the
In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I
must consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,
including adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history
of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that the penalty may have on Respondent’s ability to
continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the
pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the
violation without any reduction because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice
may require.
As a general matter, Respondent argued there should be no civil penalty because PHMSA has
departed from its policy of not inspecting or penalizing NGL fractionation facilities. Respondent
referenced a 1991 interpretation as evidence of this policy and claimed PHMSA’s 2012
Interpretations fail to explain the departure. Moreover, Respondent argued, the penalties in this
case are for conduct that took place prior to issuance of the 2012 Interpretations.
Contrary to Respondent’s assertions, PHMSA has not departed from any policy, nor has PHMSA
ever adopted a policy of nonenforcement against NGL facilities like Bushton. OPS produced
several examples of previous enforcement actions taken against NGL facilities.74 The 1991
interpretation cited by Respondent provides no support for its position, as the “refinery” at issue
in that interpretation was not stated to be an NGL facility.75 Respondent has been on notice since
at least 2006 that its facility must comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The Company
expressly committed to comply with the regulations and took specific actions to come into
compliance. 76 ONEOK understood its compliance obligations prior to the conduct at issue.
Respondent also argued the penalties should be withdrawn because PHMSA failed to publish in
the Federal Register or post on the Agency’s website a civil penalty summary document.
Respondent received the document titled “Civil Penalty Summary” prior to the hearing. The
document contains ranges of penalty amounts and credits the Agency considers under the
assessment criteria in 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225. Respondent argued the
73 The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, § 2(a),
125 Stat. 1905 (Jan. 3, 2012) increased the maximum civil penalty for a violation of the pipeline safety
standards to $200,000 per violation for each day, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for a related series of
violations. These amounts are periodically adjusted for inflation. Inflation Adjustment of Maximum
Civil Penalties, 81 Fed. Reg. 42564 (Jun. 30, 2016).
74 OPS Prehearing Submission, Exhibit 14. Moreover, the absence of prior enforcement does not equate
to an affirmative statement of administration policy. See ANR Pipeline Co., CPF No. 3-2007-1006, 2010
WL 6564317 (Dec. 30, 2010) (citing MetWest Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 560 F.3d 506, 510 (D.C. Cir.
2009)).
75 ONEOK Prehearing Jurisdictional Brief, Exhibit 10.
76 FIR Appendix C at 9, 16-23.



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Agency failed to notify the public of this document as required by the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).
Contrary to Respondent’s assertion, PHMSA has made this document available to the public. In
a final rule published in 2013, PHMSA explained to pipeline operators that the document
outlines how civil penalties are calculated generally and notified operators the document is
available upon request.77 PHMSA was also providing the document upon request prior to that
publication.78 PHMSA provided a copy of the document to Respondent in this case.79
Respondent also argued the proposed penalties should be withdrawn because PHMSA failed to
make public other documents, such as staff manuals and penalty worksheets. Respondent
contended the Agency used nonpublic staff manuals to “guide agency officials in their
application of the statutory penalty considerations.”80 Again, the record does not support
Respondent’s claim. PHMSA makes available to the public on its website all Agency staff
manuals.81 The Electronic Reading Room contains not only staff manuals and instructions, but
final orders and opinions, policy statements, and frequently requested records.
With respect to the penalty worksheet, PHMSA has previously denied requests for the penalty
calculation,82 finding an operator has “sufficient information about the penalty to allow a
meaningful and targeted response.”83 The penalty assessment factors are listed in § 190.225 and
Respondent received the Violation Report, Civil Penalty Summary document, and an OPS
employee was present at the hearing to answer questions about the penalty. The Violation
Report explained each of the statutory assessment factors and described the facts that were
considered under each factor to support the penalty. Respondent had an opportunity to provide
any information relevant to the assessment factors, and if appropriate, to disprove any of the
factual assertions made by OPS that influenced the penalty amount.
The Civil Penalty Summary document that was provided to Respondent discusses each
assessment factor, explains the range of penalties that may be assessed under each factor, and
77 Administrative Procedures; Updates and Technical Corrections, 78 Fed. Reg. 58897, 58901 (Sept. 25,
2013).
78 See, e.g., BP Pipelines (North America), Inc., CPF No. 3-2010-5007, n.13, 2012 WL 6946973 (Dec.
27, 2012) (providing a copy of Civil Penalty Summary document).
79 ONEOK Post-hearing Merits Brief at 34.
80 ONEOK Post-hearing Merits Brief at 35-36
81 PHMSA Electronic Reading Room is available at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/foia/e-reading-room (last
visited Aug. 1, 2016.)
82 See, e.g., BP Pipelines (North America), Inc., CPF No. 3-2010-5007, n.13, 2012 WL 6946973 (Dec.
27, 2012) (denying request for penalty worksheet, but providing copy of Civil Penalty Summary
document).
83 Enterprise Products Operating LLC, CPF No. 4-2013-5011, 2016 WL 1104436, at *7–8 (Feb. 4, 2016);
ExxonMobil Pipeline Co., Decision on Reconsideration, CPF No. 4-2013-5027, 2016 WL 2753318, at
*11 (Apr. 1, 2016).



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explains the type of evidence or facts that will result in higher or lower penalties under each
assessment factor. This information corresponds directly to the particular facts of each violation
that were noted in the Violation Report. Respondent can discern how the alleged facts of its case
fit into the range of conduct and how that influenced the proposed penalty. Given all of this
information provided to Respondent, PHMSA finds the Company had access to all of the
information needed to respond to the proposed penalty.
In addition, I reject Respondent’s assertion that the worksheet represents an ex parte
communication to the Presiding Official, since the document is not otherwise provided to either
Respondent or the Director, his staff, or regional counsel.84 Respondent’s contention that more
information must be provided by the Agency so the Company can “learn whether OPS is
following its own procedures” is also rejected. Respondent has failed to provide any supported
claim that Agency procedures were not followed.85 Respondent’s assertion that PHMSA
improperly allows the same employee to develop a proposed penalty and assist the Presiding
Official is also rejected as factually incorrect.86
Having dismissed Respondent’s general arguments, I now evaluate the assessment criteria as
they relate to the proposed civil penalties for the nine violations. The Violation Report noted
Respondent had two prior offenses in the five-year period prior to issuance of the Notice.
Item 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $13,700 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.52(a)(2). Respondent failed to report at the earliest practicable moment the release and
fire that occurred at the Bushton facility on May 17, 2008.
The proposed penalty was based on assertions in the Notice and Violation Report relevant to the
penalty assessment criteria in § 190.225. With regard to the nature, circumstances, and gravity
of the violation, OPS noted in the Violation Report this violation concerned a failure to file an
accident report, the violation was discovered by PHMSA, and safety was minimally affected.
Respondent’s only response to these factors was that no violation occurred.
With regard to the degree of Respondent’s culpability, the Violation Report did not suggest any
credit under this factor. Although Respondent eventually reported the accident, the Company
did not do so until over four hours after it occurred. Likewise, with regard to Respondent’s good
faith in attempting to comply, the Violation Report did not suggest any credit because ONEOK
was aware of the requirement and did not report the accident at the earliest practicable moment.87
84 See § 190.210(b) (prohibiting ex parte communications in an enforcement proceeding).
85 ONEOK Post-hearing Merits Brief at 41.
86 See § 190.210(a) (implementing a separation of functions in enforcement proceedings). Respondent
appears to rely on testimony at the hearing, but to the extent anyone at the hearing suggested an employee
may participate in both functions, that is not accurate.
87 At the hearing OPS indicated the wrong box was checked on the Violation Report with regard to good
faith.



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Respondent argued the penalty should be reduced because the Company attempted to report the
accident, but no one answered the phone. This argument is rejected because even the purported
unsuccessful attempt to contact the NRC was made more than 1-2 hours after the accident.
Respondent then unjustifiably waited an additional 2 hours before providing notice to the NRC.
I find the proposed penalty amount is appropriate under the assessment factors. Accordingly,
having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, Respondent is assessed a civil
penalty of $13,700 for the violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.52(a)(2).
Item 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $28,700 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.54(a). Respondent failed to file a written accident report within 30 days of the accident
that occurred on May 17, 2008.
With regard to nature and circumstances, OPS noted in the Violation Report this violation
concerned a failure to file an accident report and it was discovered by PHMSA. With regard to
gravity, OPS noted that safe operation was minimally affected. With regard to culpability and
good faith, the Violation Report suggested no credit under these factors.
In regard the proposed penalty for Item 2, Respondent only repeated arguments that I have
already addressed above. I find the proposed penalty amount is appropriate under the assessment
factors. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria,
Respondent is assessed a civil penalty of $28,700 for the violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.54(a).
Item 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $92,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.401(b)(1). Respondent failed to correct within a reasonable time a condition causing the
release of hazardous liquids. Respondent also failed to cease operations until the immediate
hazard had been corrected.
With regard to nature and circumstances, OPS noted in the Violation Report that the violation
concerned the operation of facilities and was discovered by PHMSA. Respondent argued the
penalty should be withdrawn because no violation occurred and OPS did not identify “what
Bushton facilities Respondent continued to operate” during the accident.88 Since the finding of
violation already explains how Respondent violated the regulation, this argument is rejected.
With regard to gravity, OPS noted the violation increased the severity of the consequences of an
accident. Respondent argued the penalty should be reduced because although 250 employees
were evacuated, they were only evacuated once. I find Respondent’s argument does not warrant
reducing the penalty.89
With regard to culpability, the Violation Report suggested a credit because Respondent took
steps to address the issue by closing relief valves, even though those actions did not fully comply
88 ONEOK Post-hearing Merits Brief at 70 (internal quotations omitted).
89 Respondent also argued against certain statements in the “Consequences” section of the Violation
Report, but such statements do not factor into the penalty under the assessment criteria.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 28
with the regulation. Respondent requested the penalty be further reduced because there is no
evidence any facility was operated by the Company after the flare event. This argument is
rejected for the same reasons discussed in the finding of violation. With regard to good faith, the
Violation Report did not suggest any further credit. Respondent also repeated several other
arguments that have already been rejected.
I find the proposed penalty amount is appropriate under the assessment factors. Accordingly,
having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, Respondent is assessed a civil
penalty of $92,500 for the violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b)(1).
Item 4: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $100,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(a). Respondent failed to follow its written procedures for limiting the volume of
product in the flare system accumulator tank.
With regard to nature and circumstances, OPS noted in the Violation Report that this violation
concerned a failure to follow procedures and was discovered by PHMSA. With regard to
gravity, OPS noted the violation contributed to the cause of an accident or increased the severity
of the consequences of an accident. With regard to culpability and good faith, the Violation
Report suggested no credit under these factors.
Respondent argued the penalty should be reduced because the duration of the violation was only
one day. This fact is already reflected in the proposed penalty amount.90 Respondent also
repeated other arguments that have already been rejected.
I find the proposed penalty amount is appropriate under the assessment factors. Accordingly,
having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, Respondent is assessed a civil
penalty of $100,000 for the violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a).
Item 5: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $43,700 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(a). Respondent failed to follow its written procedures for handling emergencies when
the Company bypassed a piece of safety equipment.
With regard to nature and circumstances, OPS noted in the Violation Report that this violation
concerned a failure to follow procedures and was discovered by PHMSA. With regard to
gravity, OPS noted the violation significantly compromised safety at a plant, storage field, or
similar area where a major construction projected involving over 250 people was in progress.
The Violation Report suggested no credit under the culpability and good faith factors.
Respondent argued the penalty should be reduced because the conduct did not significantly
compromise safe operation. At the hearing, Respondent explained that the valve in question is a
thermal relief valve, which relieves pressure from thermal increases when the pipeline is blocked
in. It is not designed or intended to relieve surge pressures when the pipeline is in operation like
the day of the accident.
90 OPS Violation Report at 24 (noting under gravity that the number of instances of the violation is “1”).



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 29
While improper closure of any relief valve impacts safety, Respondent has demonstrated that its
failure to follow procedures by closing the thermal relief valve on the day in question did not
have a “significant” impact because the valve was only designed to operate during block-in to
relief thermal pressure increase, and the pipeline was not blocked in at the time. Thus a
reduction to the penalty is appropriate.
Respondent also repeated other arguments that have already been rejected. Accordingly, having
reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, Respondent is assessed a reduced
civil penalty of $37,500 for the violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a).
Item 6: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $100,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.408(a). Respondent failed to have a communication system that transmitted information
about the volume of product in the flare system accumulator tank.
With regard to nature and circumstances, OPS noted in the Violation Report that this violation
concerned faulty equipment and was discovered by PHMSA. With regard to gravity, OPS
alleged the violation contributed to the cause of an accident or increased the severity of an
accident. By not having an operational tank level alarm, Respondent was unaware that liquids in
the tank exceeded safe levels, which resulted in hazardous liquids being pushed through the flare
where they ignited causing a fire and evacuations. The Violation Report suggested no credit
under the culpability and good faith factors. Respondent only repeated arguments that have
already been rejected.
I find the proposed penalty amount is appropriate under the assessment factors. Accordingly,
having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, Respondent is assessed a civil
penalty of $100,000 for the violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.408(a).
Item 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $46,200 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.406(a)(2). Respondent operated a dehydrator vessel at pressures exceeding the design
pressure of the vessel.
With regard to nature, OPS noted in the Violation Report that this violation concerned records,
activities, and faulty equipment. I disagree with this assessment. The violation concerned
Respondent’s operation of a pipeline facility, which constitutes an activities violation. Under
PHMSA’s consideration of nature, an activities violation will result in a lower penalty than an
equipment violation. Therefore a reduction to the proposed penalty is appropriate under this
factor.
With regard to circumstances and gravity, OPS noted the violation was discovered by PHMSA
and significantly compromised safety at a plant, storage field, or similar area where a major
construction projected involving over 250 people was in progress. The Violation Report
suggested no credit under the culpability and good faith factors.
Respondent only repeated arguments that have already been rejected. Accordingly, having
reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, Respondent is assessed a reduced
civil penalty of $43,700 for the violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(a)(2).



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 30
Item 8: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $100,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.420(a). Respondent failed to maintain two valves that malfunctioned, allowing high
pressure product to overpressure the dehydration vessels.
With regard to nature and circumstances, OPS noted in the Violation Report that this violation
concerned a failure to maintain valves in good working order and was discovered by PHMSA.
With regard to gravity, OPS alleged the violation was a causal factor in the accident because the
failure to maintain the isolation valves permitted unintended flow of product resulting in the
overpressure events. The Violation Report suggested no credit under the culpability and good
faith factors.
Respondent only repeated arguments that have already been rejected. Accordingly, having
reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, Respondent is assessed a civil
penalty of $100,000 for the violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(a).
Item 9: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $34,300 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.428(a). Respondent failed to ensure that three relief valves were adequate from the
standpoint of capacity.
With regard to nature and circumstances, OPS noted in the Violation Report that this violation
concerned a failure of equipment and was discovered by PHMSA. With regard to gravity, OPS
alleged the violation significantly compromised pipeline safety. The Violation Report suggested
no credit under the culpability and good faith factors.
Respondent only repeated arguments that have already been rejected. Accordingly, having
reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, Respondent is assessed a civil
penalty of $34,300 for the violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a).
In summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the
Items cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $550,400.
Payment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations
(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require the payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal
Reserve Communications System (Fedwire) to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed
instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be
directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMZ-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike
Monroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S Macarthur Blvd, Oklahoma City, OK 73169. The
Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.
Failure to pay the $550,400 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual
rate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to
those same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if
payment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty
may result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district
court of the United States.



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 31
COMPLIANCE ORDER
The Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to the violation cited above in Item 2.
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of hazardous liquids
by pipeline or who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable
safety standards established under chapter 601.
With regard to the proposed compliance order, Respondent repeated arguments that have already
been rejected.91 Accordingly, pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R.
§ 190.217, Respondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the
pipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations:
1. With respect to the violation of § 195.54(a) (Item 2), Respondent must file an
accident report on DOT Form 7000-1 for the accident that occurred May 17, 2008, at
the Bushton facility. The form must be filed within 30 days of issuance of the Final
Order.
2. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety improvement
costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the
Director. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: (1) total cost
associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and
(2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline
infrastructure.
The Director may grant an extension of time to comply with this Compliance Order upon a
written request timely submitted by Respondent demonstrating good cause for an extension.
Failure to comply with this Order may result in administrative assessment of civil penalties not
to exceed the amounts set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 190.223 (currently $205,638 for each violation for
each day the violation continues) or in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in a
district court of the United States.
Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a petition for reconsideration of this Final
Order to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, D.C. 20590, no later than 20 days after receipt of the
Final Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a statement of the issue(s) and
meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a petition automatically stays
the payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the order, including corrective
action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay.
91 ONEOK Post-hearing Merits Brief at 17 (arguing the proposed compliance order should be withdrawn
due to a lack of fair notice of the basis and scope of PHMSA’s jurisdiction).



CPF No. 3-2013-5014
Page 32
The terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49
C.F.R. § 190.5.
____________________________ ____________________
Alan K. Mayberry Date Issued
Acting Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

320135014_Consent Agreement and Order_10232018_text.pdf

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P., )
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.L.C., and ) CPF Nos. 3-2013-5014
ONEOK Underground Storage ) 3-2013-5015
Company, L.L.C., collectively, ) 3-2013-5020
)
Respondents. )
____________________________________)
CONSENT AGREEMENT AND ORDER
Whereas, on May 13, 2013, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), issued two Notices of Probable Violation, Proposed
Civil Penalties, and Proposed Compliance Orders (NOPVs) to ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P.,
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.L.C. (ONEOK NGL Pipeline), and ONEOK Underground Storage
Company, L.L.C. (ONEOK Underground Storage) (collectively, ONEOK or Respondents).1 On
July 3, 2013, OPS issued a third NOPV to ONEOK.2
Whereas, ONEOK NGL Pipeline operates approximately 11,500 miles of pipeline transporting
hazardous liquids, including approximately 11,000 miles transporting highly volatile liquids in
Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas and several other states.3 The ONEOK system includes natural gas
liquids (NGL) fractionation facilities and associated underground storage facilities located in
Bushton, Kansas (Bushton Plant). ONEOK Hydrocarbon, L.P. (ONEOK Hydrocarbon) is the
operator of the fractionation facilities and associated piping at the Bushton Plant. ONEOK
Underground Storage is the operator of the underground storage facilities and associated piping
at the Bushton Plant.
Whereas, at the request of Respondents and in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, informal
hearings were held in Kansas City, Missouri, before a Presiding Official from the Office of Chief
1 CPF No. 3-2013-5014 and CPF No. 3-2013-5015.
2 CPF No. 3-2013-5020. OPS issued an amended NOPV in CPF No. 3-2013-5020 on August 15, 2013.
3 This information is reported by Respondents for calendar year 2016 pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 195.49.
Consent Agreement and Order Page | 1



Counsel, PHMSA.4 The Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety issued Final Orders in all
three enforcement cases on October 12, 2016 (Final Orders), assessing civil penalties in the total
amount of $731,900 and adopting compliance orders requiring that ONEOK implement specified
actions at the Bushton Plant.5
Whereas, on November 16, 2016, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, and after receiving an
extension of time, Respondents filed a Petition for Reconsideration regarding the compliance
order issued in CPF No. 3-2013-5015. On December 5, 2016, Respondents also filed a Payment
of Penalties Under Protest for CPF No. 3-2013-5020 and CPF No. 3-2013-5014 and paid a total
of $572,900 in civil penalties. On December 15, 2016, ONEOK filed a Compliance Action
Made Under Protest for CPF No. 3-2013-5014.
Whereas, on February 25, 2013, ONEOK Hydrocarbon, ONEOK Underground Storage, and
ONEOK NGL Pipeline filed a Petition for Review of certain PHMSA letters of interpretation in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in ONEOK Hydrocarbon,
et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, et al., No. 13-1040.
Whereas, on January 6, 2017, ONEOK Hydrocarbon, ONEOK Underground Storage and
ONEOK NGL Pipeline filed Petitions for Review of the Final Orders in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in ONEOK Hydrocarbon, et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Transportation, et. al., Nos. 17-1004, 17-1005, and 17-1006.
Whereas, on January 12, 2017, the court granted ONEOK’s unopposed motion to consolidate all
of the Petitions for Review and to hold the consolidated case in abeyance pending resolution of
the Petition for Reconsideration filed in CPF No. 3-2013-5015.6
Whereas, on June 14, 2017, a meeting between ONEOK and PHMSA (Parties) was held at
PHMSA Headquarters in Washington, DC, to discuss resolution of the issues pending in these
enforcement cases. The Parties have engaged in good-faith discussions regarding the Final
Orders and have agreed that settlement of these proceedings will avoid further administrative
proceedings or litigation, and that entry of this Consent Agreement and Order is the most
appropriate means of resolving the Final Orders without additional adjudication of any issue of
fact or law.
4 A hearing concerning the NOPV in CPF No. 3-2013-5015 was held on November 14-15, 2013. A
separate hearing concerning the NOPVs in CPF Nos. 3-2013-5014 and 3-2013-5020 was held on January
15, 2014.
5 A Corrected Final Order was issued for CPF No. 3-2013-5015 on October 13, 2016, due to a
typographical error.
6 ONEOK Hydrocarbon, et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, et al., D.C. Cir. Nos. 13-1040, 17-1004,
17-1005, and 17-1006 (consolidated under No. 13-1040).
Consent Agreement and Order Page | 2



NOW, THEREFORE, upon consent and agreement of the Parties, it is hereby Ordered and
Adjudged as follows.
A. PHMSA’s Jurisdiction and Regulatory Oversight
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. ONEOK acknowledges, as operator of the Bushton Plant, that the Bushton Plant is subject to
PHMSA’s jurisdiction under the Federal pipeline safety laws, 49 U.S.C. § § 60101, et seq.,
and the regulations and administrative orders issued thereunder, as found by the Final Orders.
Although the parties agree that the Bushton Plant is subject to PHMSA’s jurisdiction, as
described in the Final Orders, for purposes of this Consent Agreement and Order, and subject
to conditions and limitations set forth herein, the Parties agree that PHMSA will exercise
regulatory oversight over certain portions of the Bushton Plant, identified as the “PHMSA
Regulated Piping” in the drawing attached as Exhibit A, and the photographs attached as
Exhibit B to this Consent Agreement and Order, which exhibits are incorporated herein by
reference. Such Exhibits shall be considered Business Confidential Information submitted
voluntarily by ONEOK pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and otherwise to
contain critical energy infrastructure information. The scope of the PHMSA Regulated
Piping and the Exhibits might change in the future, based on the reviews described by
Paragraph 6 below.
ONEOK acknowledges that it has marked its physical facilities and revised appropriate
drawings to identify the PHMSA Regulated Piping, as reflected in the Exhibits attached
hereto, and that, consistent with the provisions of this Consent Agreement and Order,
ONEOK will comply with 49 C.F.R. Part 195 with respect to the PHMSA Regulated Piping.
The piping at the Bushton Plant that is not identified in the Exhibits to this Consent
Agreement and Order as the PHMSA Regulated Piping, and the piping at the Bushton Plant
that is not identified as PHMSA Regulated Piping upon review as required in Paragraph 6 of
this Consent Agreement and Order, is subject to regulatory oversight by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and is referred to as “OSHA
Regulated Piping”. If OSHA expressly declines to apply Process Safety Management (PSM)
regulations to any portion of the OSHA Regulated Piping, PHMSA will assume regulatory
oversight of that portion. Nothing in this Consent Agreement and Order affects the
regulatory oversight of PHMSA and/or OSHA over any portion of the Bushton Plant not
specifically identified in the Exhibits to this Consent Agreement and Order.
For purposes of this Consent Agreement and Order, PHMSA Regulated Piping shall be
identified at the frequency described in Paragraph 6 in accordance with the following criteria:
a. For purposes of this Consent Agreement and Order and identifying PHMSA Regulated
Piping, the fractionation facilities at the Bushton Plant shall be deemed to be
“processing” facilities.
b. Piping located downstream of the first inbound pressure control device entering the
Bushton Plant and upstream of the last pressure control device leaving the Bushton
Plant is PHMSA Regulated Piping if the predominant use of such piping is to bypass
Consent Agreement and Order Page | 3



6. 7. processing (i.e., is used for a predominantly transportation purpose). If the
predominant use of such piping is for processing purposes or is only occasionally used
to bypass processing (such as to accommodate temporary maintenance or repairs or
other short-term events) such piping is OSHA Regulated Piping.
c. Piping that predominantly bypasses a pressure control device or that bypasses a
processing facility that is no longer in service is PHMSA Regulated Piping.
d. Piping that is located on the grounds of the Bushton Plant that connects two (2)
processing units, or is otherwise used for a processing purpose, is OSHA Regulated
Piping if the piping is located downstream of the first pressure control device entering
the Bushton Plant and upstream of the last pressure control device leaving the Bushton
Plant.
e. Pumps and associated controls used predominantly to move product for transportation
purposes are subject to the requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 195.
f. Piping associated with underground storage used for the purpose of managing the
processing facility inventory is OSHA Regulated Piping. Piping associated with
storage caverns used for transportation is PHMSA Regulated Piping.
ONEOK will review the predominant use of the PHMSA Regulated Piping and the OSHA
Regulated Piping at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,
to determine whether or not the predominant use of piping has changed. ONEOK will also
review the predominant use of any newly constructed pipe at the Bushton Plant upon
construction completion. If, after conducting the review required by this Paragraph, ONEOK
determines that any portion of the PHMSA Regulated Piping or newly constructed piping is
predominantly used for processing purposes, that portion shall thereafter be considered
OSHA Regulated Piping. If, after conducting the review required by this Paragraph,
ONEOK determines that any portion of the OSHA Regulated Piping or newly constructed
piping is predominantly used for transportation purposes, that portion shall thereafter be
considered PHMSA Regulated Piping. If any such changes occur, ONEOK will revise the
physical demarcations and appropriate drawings and procedures, and other relevant records,
consistent with current PHMSA regulations and policy or consistent with current OSHA
regulations and policy, as the case may be. ONEOK will revise its records, as necessary, to
incorporate new information obtained during these reviews. ONEOK will give written notice
to the Director of any changes to the classification of piping as PHMSA Regulated Piping or
OSHA Regulated Piping, and will submit to the Director copies of drawings, similar in form
to the Exhibits, that are revised as a result of a review undertaken pursuant to this Paragraph.
The Parties agree that, if PHMSA objects to any change in classification of piping as
PHMSA Regulated Piping or OSHA Regulated Piping, the parties will meet and confer to
resolve their disagreement.
The underground storage caverns at the Bushton Plant, which store hazardous liquid
petroleum products, are subject to the safety regulations and requirements of the Kansas
Department of Health and Environment. This does not preclude future regulation of
Consent Agreement and Order Page | 4



ONEOK’s underground storage caverns by PHMSA should PHMSA issue minimum safety
standards for underground hazardous liquid storage facilities.
B. Implementation of Part 195
8. According to the timing and deadlines set forth herein, and subject to the conditions and
scope limitations set forth herein, the PHMSA Regulated Piping shall be subject to
PHMSA’s 49 C.F.R. Part 195 regulations. With respect to existing piping that will become
PHMSA Regulated Piping on the Effective Date of this Consent Agreement and Order,
ONEOK shall implement the applicable requirements of Part 195 no later than 90 days after
such Effective Date. The date on which such implementation is completed will be the “In-
Service Date” for such piping. With respect to any OSHA Regulated Piping that becomes
PHMSA Regulated Piping in the future pursuant to Paragraphs 5 & 6 hereof, ONEOK shall
implement the applicable requirements of Part 195 no later than 90 days after the date that
ONEOK provides notification to the Director pursuant to Paragraph 6 hereof that such piping
has become PHMSA Regulated Piping. ONEOK may request an extension of time beyond
the 90-day period by providing a written request to the Director along with a reasonable basis
no later than fifteen (15) business days before the completion deadline. Not later than five
(5) business days following receipt of a request for an extension of time, the Director shall
grant or deny such request in writing. The Director shall provide a reasonable basis for any
denial of a request for an extension of time.
C. Record-Keeping
9. ONEOK will retain records relating to compliance with Part 195 with respect to piping that
becomes PHMSA Regulated Piping on or after the In-Service Date in conformance with the
recordkeeping provisions of Part 195.
10. Subject to the provisions of this Consent Agreement and Order, ONEOK’s historical (i.e., for
the time period prior to the In-Service Date of any piping that becomes PHMSA Regulated
Piping hereunder) records of maintenance and operations, pipeline integrity, and testing
related to the PHMSA Regulated Piping and OSHA Regulated Piping shall be available to
PHMSA for informational purposes. Such historical records include, but are not limited to,
records pertaining to inspections, corrosion control, leaks, abnormal operating conditions,
failure records, along with any related with root cause analysis reports, mill test reports
(MTR) and hydrostatic pressure testing. ONEOK will maintain any such historical records,
existing upon the Effective Date, for the life of the facility.
11. The Parties acknowledge that, with respect to the PHMSA Regulated Piping and the OSHA
Regulated Piping, Respondents do not possess complete historical documentation related to
compliance with Part 195 of PHMSA’s regulations. Therefore, this Consent Agreement and
Order shall not be interpreted as establishing an obligation or creating a liability with respect
to any provision of Part 195 for the period before any In-Service Date on which piping
becomes PHMSA Regulated Piping pursuant to this Consent Agreement and Order.
Consent Agreement and Order Page | 5



12. ONEOK agrees to maintain records of review, demarcation, and drawings related to the
facility reviews that ONEOK will perform under Paragraph 6 for a period of at least five (5)
years following completion of each review.
13. For any review documentation or other deliverables required to be submitted to PHMSA
pursuant to this Consent Agreement and Order, ONEOK may assert a claim of business
confidentiality or other protections applicable to the release of information by PHMSA,
covering part or all of the information required to be submitted to PHMSA pursuant to this
Consent Agreement and Order in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 7. Any claim of
confidentiality shall be marked in writing on each page, and shall include a statement
specifying the grounds for each claim of confidentiality. PHMSA will determine whether to
release any such information submitted pursuant to this Consent Agreement and Order in
accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 7, the Freedom of information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, DOT and
PHMSA policies, and other applicable regulations and Executive Orders.
D. The Administrative and Judicial Proceedings
14. PHMSA accepts the payment of $572,900 which ONEOK remitted under protest to PHMSA
on December 5, 2016, as full accord and satisfaction of Respondents’ civil penalty
assessment in these enforcement proceedings.
15. Immediately upon the Effective Date, the Parties will file a joint motion of voluntary
dismissal asking the Court to dismiss, with prejudice, the Petitions for Review filed in
ONEOK Hydrocarbon, et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, et al., D.C. Cir. Nos. 13-1040,
17-1004, 17-1005, and 17-1006 (consolidated under No. 13-1040), with each Party bearing
its own costs and fees.
16. Upon issuance of this Consent Agreement and Order and the Court’s dismissal of the
Petitions for Review, these enforcement proceedings will be closed, and ONEOK’s Petition
for Reconsideration of the Final Order issued in CFP No. 3-2013-5015 and protests will be
deemed moot.
E. Miscellaneous Provisions
17. The terms of this Consent Agreement and Order shall become effective (i.e. “Effective
Date”) upon the last day of execution by the Parties’ respective authorized representatives.
This Consent Agreement and Order may be modified only by written agreement signed by
both Parties.
18. ONEOK consents to the issuance of this Consent Agreement and Order, and hereby waives
any further procedural requirements with respect to its issuance. ONEOK waives all rights to
contest the adequacy of notice, or the validity of this Consent Agreement and Order,
including all rights to administrative or judicial hearings or appeals; provided, however, that
any dispute concerning the implementation of this Consent Agreement and Order shall be
resolved in the manner provided in Paragraph 28.
Consent Agreement and Order Page | 6



19. This Consent Agreement and Order affirms and upholds all findings of violation of PHMSA
regulations set forth in the Final Orders. This Consent Agreement and Order supersedes the
Compliance Order contained in the Corrected Final Order issued by PHMSA in CPF No. 3-
2013-5015 on October 13, 2016. Each allegation of violation cited in the Notice may be
considered by PHMSA as a prior offense in any future enforcement action brought against
Respondents by PHMSA. This Consent Agreement and Order, however, does not constitute
a finding of violation of any other Federal law or regulation and may not be used in any civil
proceeding of any kind as evidence or proof of any fact, fault or liability, or as evidence of
the violation of any law, rule, regulation or requirement, except in a proceeding to enforce
the provisions of this Consent Agreement and Order.
20. This Consent Agreement and Order shall apply to and be binding upon PHMSA and its
successors and upon ONEOK and its successors and assigns. ONEOK agrees to provide a
copy of this Consent Agreement and Order to the officers of ONEOK NGL Pipeline and
ONEOK Underground Storage who are responsible for pipeline operations. A copy of this
Consent Agreement and Order and any incorporated work plans and schedules will be
maintained at the Bushton Plant and will be made available to ONEOK employees whose
duties might reasonably include compliance with the terms of the Consent Agreement and
Order.
21. For all transfers of ownership interests or operating responsibility of the Bushton Plant,
ONEOK shall provide a copy of this Consent Agreement and Order to the prospective
transferee at least 30 days prior to such transfer and subsequently shall provide written notice
of any such transfer to the Director not more than 60 days following any such transfer.
22. All references to “Director” in this Consent Agreement and Order shall refer to the Director,
Central Region, PHMSA Office of Pipeline Safety. Information, reports, and notifications
required by this Consent Agreement and Order shall be submitted to: Director, Central
Region, PHMSA Office of Pipeline Safety, 901 Locust Street, Suite 462, Kansas City, MO
64106.
23. Subject to the terms of this Consent Agreement and Order, no provision contained herein
affects or relieves ONEOK of its responsibility to comply with all applicable requirements of
the Federal pipeline safety laws, 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101, et seq., and the regulations and orders
issued thereunder regarding the PHMSA Regulated Piping. Nothing in this Consent
Agreement and Order shall limit or reduce PHMSA's right of access, entry, inspection, and
information-gathering or its authority to bring enforcement actions against ONEOK pursuant
to the Federal pipeline safety laws, the regulations and orders issued thereunder, or any other
applicable provision of Federal or State law.
24. This Consent Agreement and Order does not waive or modify any Federal, State, or local
laws or regulations that are applicable to ONEOK’s pipeline systems. This Consent
Agreement and Order is not a permit, or a modification of any permit, under any Federal,
State, or local laws or regulations. ONEOK remains responsible for achieving and
maintaining compliance with all applicable Federal, State, and local laws, regulations and
permits.
Consent Agreement and Order Page | 7



25. This Consent Agreement and Order does not create rights in, or grant any cause of action to,
any third person not a party to this Consent Agreement and Order. The U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) is not liable for any injuries or damages to persons or property arising
from acts or omissions of ONEOK or its officers, employees, or agents carrying out the work
required by this Consent Agreement and Order.
26. This Consent Agreement and Order shall be subject to all enforcement authorities available
to PHMSA under 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101, et seq., and 49 C.F.R. Part 190, including
administrative civil penalties under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, of up to $205,638 per violation for
each day the violation continues. This shall include any failure of ONEOK to comply with
the terms of this Consent Agreement and Order. All maps, drawings, schematics, and
associated schedules set forth or referenced in this Consent Agreement and Order, or attached
as an exhibit to this Consent Agreement and Order, shall be automatically incorporated into
this Consent Agreement and Order and shall be enforceable in the same manner.
27. This Consent Agreement and Order constitutes the final, complete and exclusive agreement
and understanding between the Parties with respect to the settlement embodied in this
Consent Agreement and Order, and the Parties acknowledge that there are no representations,
agreements or understandings relating to the settlement other than those expressly contained
in this Consent Agreement and Order.
28. The Director and ONEOK will attempt to resolve any disputes arising under this Consent
Agreement and Order informally. If Respondents and the Director are unable to informally
resolve the dispute within forty-five (45) days of receipt of Respondents’ written notice
invoking dispute resolution, Respondents may request in writing, within fifteen (15) days
thereafter, a written determination resolving the dispute from the Associate Administrator for
Pipeline Safety, along with all information that Respondents believe is relevant to the
dispute. If the request is submitted as provided herein, the Associate Administrator will issue
a final determination in writing. The existence of a dispute and PHMSA’s consideration of
matters placed in dispute will not excuse, toll, or suspend any term or timeframe for
completion of any work to be performed under this Agreement during the pendency of the
dispute resolution process, except as otherwise agreed by the Director or the Associate
Administrator in writing.
F. Ratification
29. The Parties’ undersigned representatives certify that they are fully authorized to enter into the
terms and conditions of this Consent Agreement and Order and to execute and legally bind
each such Party.
Consent Agreement and Order Page | 8



30. The Parties hereby agree to all conditions and terms of this Consent Agreement and Order:
For PHMSA: For Respondents:
_________________________ _______________________
Alan K. Mayberry Wesley Christensen
Associate Administrator Senior Vice President,
for Pipeline Safety Operations
_________________________ ________________________
Date Date
Consent Agreement and Order Page | 9

320135014_Region Closure Letter-Consent Agreement Termination_05192026_(08-121917S)_text.pdf

U.S. Department
of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
1100 Main Street, Suite 800
Kansas City, MO 64105
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: randy.lentz@oneok.com
May 19, 2026
Randy Lentz
EVP, Chief Operating Officer
ONEOK
100 West 5th Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
RE: CPF Nos. 3-2013-5014, 3-2013-5015, and 3-2013-5020
Dear Mr. Lentz:
On October 23, 2018, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
issued a Consent Order incorporating the terms of the Consent Agreement entered into between
PHMSA and ONEOK in the above-referenced cases.
The Consent Agreement included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessments. Based on
our review of the documentation provided, and confirmation of payment of the civil penalty, it has
been determined that ONEOK has complied with the terms of the Consent Agreement and Order.
No outstanding or ongoing obligations remain under the Consent Agreement and Order.
Accordingly, these cases are now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the
matters involved in these cases. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
AJ McKean
Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
cc: Charles Misak, Director - Integrated Operations Services, ONEOK, charles.misak@oneok.com
Scott D. Schingen, SVP Operations and Engineering, ONEOK, scott.schingen@oneok.com

## Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320135014>
- Source ID: `phmsa-enforcement`
- SHA-256: `ac16834f32716c9ab18fc3b67eefb4b6c76f9b545f33c62bd9e90de5caad3e3c`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:44:44.458Z
- Exported: 2026-08-23T06:02:05.239Z
- Document slug: `phmsa-enforcement-320135014`

### Source metadata

```json
{
  "cpf": "320135014",
  "operator": "ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC",
  "region": "Central",
  "pipelineType": "INTERSTATE LIQUID ONSHORE",
  "caseStatus": "CLOSED",
  "citedSections": [
    "195.401(b)",
    "195.402(a)",
    "195.406(a)(2)",
    "195.408(a)",
    "195.420(a)",
    "195.428(a)",
    "195.52(a)(2)",
    "195.54(a)"
  ],
  "dataAsOf": "08/04/2026 12PM",
  "caseDataAsOf": "2026-08-04",
  "attachmentCount": 10,
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    {
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  ],
  "extractedAgencyDocumentCount": 4,
  "attachmentPolicy": "Official attachment links are retained. Agency-issued documents may also include a verified local PDF and page-level text representation.",
  "jurisdiction": "US",
  "operatorName": "ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC"
}
```