# CCPS TRANSPORTATION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

**Citation:** CPF 320215002  
**Type / status:** enforcement / historical  
**Agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  
**Effective:** Not stated  
**Published:** 2021-02-10

CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.264(a), 195.264(b)(1)(i), 195.401(b)(1), 195.402(a), 195.420(b), 195.428(a), 195.430(a), 195.505(b), 195.52(a), 195.567(c), 195.573(a)(1), 195.573(c), 195.573(e), 195.581(a).

## Document text

Notice of Probable Violation involving CCPS TRANSPORTATION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.264(a),  195.264(b)(1)(i),  195.401(b)(1),  195.402(a),  195.420(b),  195.428(a),  195.430(a),  195.505(b),  195.52(a),  195.567(c),  195.573(a)(1),  195.573(c),  195.573(e),  195.581(a). The case was opened on 2021-02-10 and is reported as closed as of 2022-06-22. Proposed civil penalty: $354,100. Assessed civil penalty: $282,900. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

320215002_Closure Letter_06222022_(18-157171S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_Closure%20Letter_06222022_(18-157171S).pdf

320215002_Closure Letter_06222022_(18-157171S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_Closure%20Letter_06222022_(18-157171S)_text.pdf

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_Final%20Order_10122021_(18-157171S).pdf

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_Final%20Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_02102021.pdf

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_02102021_text.pdf

320215002_Operator Response to Notice_03112021.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_03112021.pdf

320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf

October 12, 2021
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: michael.koby@enbridge.com
Mr. Michael Koby
Vice President, U.S. Operations
Enbridge Inc.
5400 Westheimer Court
Houston, Texas 77056
Re: CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Dear Mr. Koby:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation, assesses a civil penalty of $282,900, and specifies actions that need to be taken by
Enbridge Inc., to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms are set
forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance
order completed, as determined by the Director, Central Region, this enforcement action will be
closed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the date of transmission as
provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Gregory A. Ochs, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA
Mr. Dave Stafford, Manager, U.S. Pipeline Compliance, Enbridge Inc.,
david.stafford@enbridge.com
CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
Enbridge Inc., ) CPF No. 3-2021-5002
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
From March 5 to 9, April 2 to 6, May 7 to 11, May 21 to 25, June 11 to 15, and June 25 to 29,
2018, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), inspected the records and
facilities of several subsidiaries of Enbridge Inc., (Enbridge or Respondent) namely, CCPS
Transportation, LLC; Enbridge Storage (Cushing), LLC; Enbridge Storage (Patoka), LLC; and
Illinois Extension Pipeline Company in Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, and Illinois. These
facilities include two tank farms with a total of 89 tanks and approximately 1,338 miles of crude
oil pipelines.
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,
by letter dated February 10, 2021, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and
Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice
proposed finding that Respondent had committed nine violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195, proposed
assessing a civil penalty of $354,100 for the alleged violations, and proposed ordering
Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice included an
additional five warning items pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.205, which required no further action,
but warned the operator to correct the probable violations or face possible future enforcement
action.
Enbridge responded to the Notice by letter dated March 11, 2021 (Response). Enbridge
contested some of the allegations, offered additional information in response to the Notice, and
requested that the proposed civil penalty be reduced. Enbridge did not request a hearing and
therefore has waived its right to one.



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 2
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.264, which states:
§ 195.264 Impoundment, protection against entry, normal/emergency
venting or pressure/vacuum relief for aboveground breakout tanks.
(a) A means must be provided for containing hazardous liquids in the
event of spillage or failure of an above-ground breakout tank.
(b) After October 2, 2000, compliance with paragraph (a) of this
section requires the following for the aboveground breakout tanks specified:
(1) For tanks built to API Spec 12F, API Std 620, and others (such as
API Std 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)), the installation of
impoundment must be in accordance with the following sections of NFPA-
30 (incorporated by reference, see § 195.3);
(i) Impoundment around a breakout tank must be installed in
accordance with section 22.11.2;…
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.264 by failing to provide a means
for containing hazardous liquids in the event of spillage or failure of above-ground breakout
tanks built to American Petroleum Institute (API) Specification 12F, API Standard 620 and
others (such as API Standard 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)), by installing impoundments
around certain breakout tanks built after October 2, 2000, at Enbridge’s Cushing Tank Farm
facility. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to install impoundments (i.e.,
intermediate dikes) in accordance with section 22.11.2 of NFPA-30, a standard promulgated by
the National Fire Protection Association and incorporated by reference in 49 C.F.R. § 195.3.
Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation, the proposed civil penalty, or the proposed
compliance order associated with this Item. In its Response, Enbridge indicated that it had
begun work to remediate impoundment at the location and planned to complete work within six
months of the Final Order. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that
Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.264 by failing to provide a means for containing hazardous
liquids in the event of spillage or failure of above-ground breakout tanks built to American
Petroleum Institute (API) Specification 12F, API Standard 620 and others (such as API Standard
650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)) at the Cushing Tank Farm.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies….



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 3
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to follow its written procedure “09-03-02
Removing Water / Snow from Tank Roofs.” Step 5 of the procedure for Removing Water
requires operator personnel to “[m]onitor water from bottom drain valve for visible product for at
least 10 min checking drain valve every 30 min until draining is complete.” During the 2018
PHMSA field inspection, however, Enbridge representatives stated that the Cushing Tank Farm
facility keeps all tank roof drains open at all times, including at night and on weekends. This
practice is inconsistent with Enbridge’s procedure for Removing Water, specifically the
monitoring required under Step 5. Additionally, the practice of leaving the tank roof drains open
at all times, including at night, conflicts with a specific warning in the procedure that states: “Do
not leave tank roof drains and firewall drains open…at night.”
On May 31, 2018, in response to OPS’ inquiries about Enbridge’s practice of draining tank roofs
at the Cushing Tank Farm facility, Cushing staff stated that the practice of leaving the tank roof
drains open had been in place prior to Enbridge acquiring the facility. Cushing staff also stated
that the procedure would only apply to instances where the roof drain valve was closed.
However, there is no indication in the procedure that it was limited to instances where the roof
drain valve was closed.
In its Response, Enbridge acknowledged that the Cushing Tank Farm failed to comply with the
procedure but asserted that the descriptive language in the Notice was incorrect because the
Cushing Tank Farm operation is now in alignment with other locations and no longer leaves tank
roof drains open, and at no time are both the roof drains and dike drains open at the same time.
For this reason, Enbridge requested that this Item be reduced to a warning item with no civil
penalty.
Having considered the Response, I find the record confirms that Enbridge failed to follow the
procedure. Although Enbridge has since discontinued its practice of leaving tank roof drains
open at the Cushing Tank Farm, this was the practice at the location at the time of PHMSA’s
inspection in 2018. Therefore, there is no basis to withdraw this item or otherwise reduce it to a
warning. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated
49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting
normal operations and maintenance activities.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies . . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities.



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 4
Specifically, Enbridge failed to follow its procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves,”
when testing pressure safety valves (PSVs). Procedure 03-07-03 sets forth a 14-step process for
inspecting and testing PSVs that PHMSA inspectors witnessed Enbridge’s technicians not
properly following.
Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with
this Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated
49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting
normal operations and maintenance activities.
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies . . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities.
Specifically, Enbridge failed to follow its procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves”
when checking pressure relief set points. Step 10 of the procedure for inspecting and testing
pressure relief/safety valves sets forth measures for checking pressure relief set points for the
valves, which includes recording the current pressure-relief setting as “Task” on the work order
and then creating a follow-up work order to document the adjustments being made. However,
Enbridge did not complete these specific measures under Step 10 of the procedure by failing to
document the current “as found” relief pressures in the follow-up work orders.
Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with
this Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated
49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting
normal operations and maintenance activities.
Item 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(b), which states:
§ 195.420 Valve maintenance.
(a) . . . .
(b) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months, but at
least twice each calendar year, inspect each mainline valve to determine that
it is functioning properly.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(b) by failing to inspect each
mainline valve at least twice each calendar year, at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge’s valve maintenance records demonstrated that
seven valves had not been inspected at least twice each calendar year.



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 5
In its Response, Enbridge acknowledged that the required inspection interval was not met for
five of the seven valves listed in the Notice. Enbridge stated “[v]alves meeting the definition of
mainline valves and requiring semi-annual inspection are shaded orange on Exhibit NOPV-6,
attached to this response. However, as shown in the exhibit, the two highlighted valves (TP-63-
BV-1 and TP-63-CSV-12) are not shaded orange, and the required inspection frequency is three
years.” For these reasons, Enbridge requested that PHMSA amend the descriptive language for
this Item and reduce the civil penalty accordingly.
Based on the additional information provided in the Response, and the Regional Director’s
written evaluation of the response material submitted pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), I agree that
there were five, rather than seven missing mainline valve inspections, to be completed at
intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year, as required by
§ 195.420(b).
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.420(b) by failing to inspect five mainline valves at least twice each calendar year, at
intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months. I withdraw the allegation that there were an additional two
missed valve inspections.
Item 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), which states:
§ 195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator
shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar
year, or in the case of pipeline used to carry highly volatile liquids, at
intervals not to exceed 7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year,
inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure
regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is
functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate from
the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in
which it is used.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to inspect each
non-highly volatile liquid (HVL) overpressure safety device at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year. Specifically, Enbridge failed to conduct 12
inspections of overpressure safety devices on its system in 2016 and 2017.
Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with
this Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated
49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to inspect each non-HVL overpressure safety device at
intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.
Item 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), which states:
§ 195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 6
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator
shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar
year, or in the case of pipeline used to carry highly volatile liquids, at
intervals not to exceed 7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year,
inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure
regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is
functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate from
the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in
which it is used.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to determine, over
a period of three years, whether 53 pressure-control devices on its non-HVL pipeline were
adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operations for the service in which
they were used, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.1
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge had missed a total of 159 inspections and tests of
its overpressure safety devices to determine if they were adequate from the standpoint of
capacity, and Enbridge was not able to produce any records demonstrating that it had completed
such determinations.
Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with
this Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated
49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to determine, over a period of three years, whether 53 pressure-
control devices on its non-HVL pipeline were adequate from the standpoint of capacity and
reliability of operations for the service in which they were used, at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year.
Item 12: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c), which states:
§ 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?
(a) . . . .
(c) Rectifiers and other devices. You must electrically check for proper
performance each device in the first column at the frequency stated in the
second column.
Rectifier
Reverse current switch
Diode
Device Check frequency
At least six times each calendar
year, but with intervals not
exceeding 2 ½ months.
Interference bond whose failure would
jeopardize structural protection
1 These 53 devices were different from the ones cited in Item 7. Unlike the devices cited in Item 7 where
Respondent primarily missed a single inspection in either 2016 or 2017, the 53 devices cited in Item 8 all had missed
capacity determinations and they were missing for consecutive years from 2016 to 2018.



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 7
Other interference bond
At least once each calendar year,
but with intervals not exceeding
15 months.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c) by failing to electrically
check for proper performance of rectifiers and critical bonds at least six times each calendar year,
but with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months. The Notice alleged that as identified during the
PHMSA inspection of Enbridge’s corrosion control records, 11 checks were not completed on
four rectifiers and 13 checks were not completed on three critical bonds.
In its Response, Enbridge accepted the violation in part, and contested the violation in part, while
noting that there were mitigating factors. Additionally, Enbridge questioned the amount of the
proposed civil penalty in relation to penalties to other operators for the same alleged violation.
Arguments in the Response for this Item were separately addressed for “Rectifiers” and “Critical
Bonds.”
Rectifiers
Enbridge contested a portion of Item 12, which alleged that it failed to electrically check for
proper performance of rectifiers at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not
exceeding 2 ½ months. The Notice alleged that 11 checks were not completed on four rectifiers.
Enbridge agreed that three of the 11 checks were not completed as alleged in the Notice, and
contested eight of the missing rectifier inspections by noting in its Response:
The subject rectifiers all have remote monitoring units installed on them for
recording automated measurements. When the remote monitoring unit is
not functioning properly, a technician is sent to the rectifier to repair the
unit and obtain any voltage and amperage measurements required by the
CFR. That data is then manually entered into the cathodic protection
database called PCS. In this case, when the remote monitoring units were
not operating properly a technician did visit the location and recorded the
measurements in the logbook located at the rectifier. However, those
measurements were not recorded in PCS.
Having considered the information submitted, I find the information does not demonstrate that
Respondent was in compliance with § 195.573(c) at the time the violations were alleged to have
occurred. During PHMSA’s inspection in 2018, records collected indicated gaps between
required checks on each of the four rectifiers. In particular, Exhibit M of the Violation Report
contains the Enbridge Energy Rectifier Inspection Report showing the following gaps that do not
comply with the 2 ½-month interval in § 195.573(c): (1) L63 MP 71.62 from December 15, 2016
to May 9, 2017; (2) Patoka MP 120 from December 30, 2016 to July 13, 2017; (3) Patoka MP
5347 from January 1, 2017 to June 28, 2017; and (4) Patoka MP 5354 from June 21, 2016 to
April 19, 2017.
Despite this evidence of noncompliance, Respondent contended that checks were performed at



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 8
requisite intervals during those gaps. For several reasons, I find Respondent has not rebutted the
evidence of noncompliance. First, Respondent’s contention conflicts with its own records. The
Enbridge Energy Rectifier Inspection Report demonstrates that no readings were taken during
these gaps. PHMSA’s inspection occurred over a year after the checks were missed and at that
time Respondent’s records still reflected that no check had been performed. There is no
evidence in the record that checks took place during the gaps besides Respondent’s own
assertion. Respondent provided a table of measurements purported to be from a logbook but
provided no copy of the logbook and no contemporaneous records of the checks. The table
provided was not contemporarily signed, dated, and does not otherwise provide any proof that
the measurements were recorded at the time these checks were performed. Moreover,
Respondent provided this information more than three years after PHMSA brought the
noncompliance to Respondent’s attention during the inspection.
Finally, as Respondent explained in its Response, its process of performing checks when a
remote monitoring unit is not functioning properly, as it was in the case of all four rectifiers,
involves a technician repairing the unit, taking readings, and entering the data into the cathodic
protection database. Despite Respondent’s assertion that checks were performed at intervals of
2 ½ months, the evidence demonstrates Respondent never entered any data into the cathodic
protection database at that time or even by the time PHMSA conducted an inspection a year
later. Therefore, Respondent did not follow its process for performing checks.
For these reasons, the information Enbridge provided in their Response is not sufficient to show
that they performed the required checks under § 195.573.
Critical Bonds
The Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to electrically check for the proper performance of
critical interference bonds at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding
2 ½ months. As identified during PHMSA’s inspection of Enbridge’s corrosion control records,
13 checks were allegedly not completed on three critical bonds. Enbridge contested all 13
missing critical bond inspections by noting in its Response:
Bond current measurements at MP 423.5056, MP 423.5056A and
423.5056B were incorrectly identified as “Critical” bonds in the PCS
database where Enbridge records cathodic protection data. These three
locations should have been identified as “Informational” bonds as they are
not interference bonds between Enbridge and Magellan, but are bonds tied
into a common bus bar with Magellan. These three locations are current
measurements between the three Magellan structures and read for
informational purposes only.
Based on a review of the Response, and the Regional Director’s written evaluation of the
response material submitted pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), I find that these bonds were not critical
bonds under § 195.573(c). Therefore, I withdraw from this item the 13 alleged instances of
violation for a failure to check the proper performance of critical interference bonds.



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 9
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.573(c) in 11 instances by failing to electrically check for proper performance of four
rectifiers at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months.
Further, I withdraw the 13 alleged instances of violation for a failure to check critical
interference bonds.
Item 14: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a), which states:
§ 195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric
corrosion and what coating material may I use?
(a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is
exposed to the atmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this
section.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a) by failing to provide
protection against atmospheric corrosion by cleaning and coating each pipeline or portion of
pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere. Specifically, during the field inspection of
Enbridge’s Concordia Station, the Notice alleged that PHMSA observed that the coating had dis-
bonded and/or flaked at the pipe-to-soil transitions on both unit sump drain lines.
Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with
this Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated
49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a) by failing to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion by
cleaning and coating each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere.
These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement
action taken against Respondent.
ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed
$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any
related series of violations.2
In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I
must consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,
including adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history
of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue
doing business; the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety
regulations; and self-disclosure or actions to correct a violation prior to discovery by PHMSA.
In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction
because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice
proposed a total civil penalty of $354,100 for the violations cited above.
2 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223.



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 10
Item 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $29,700 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.264, for failing to provide a means for containing hazardous liquids in the event of spillage
or failure of above-ground breakout tanks built to API Specification 12F, API Standard 620 and
others (such as API Standard 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)), by installing impoundments
around certain breakout tanks built after October 2, 2000, at Respondent’s Cushing Tank Farm.
Enbridge did not contest the violation or the proposed civil penalty. Based upon the foregoing, I
assess Respondent a civil penalty of $29,700 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.264.
Item 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $19,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(a), for failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities. Enbridge requested the alleged violation be reduced to a
warning, but for the reasons stated above, I rejected this request. Respondent did not otherwise
provide information to mitigate the civil penalty. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent
a civil penalty of $19,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a).
Item 4: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $19,600 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(a), for failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities, by failing to properly follow the 14-step process in its
procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves.” Enbridge did not contest this allegation of
violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I
assess Respondent a civil penalty of $19,600 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a).
Item 5: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $16,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(a), for failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities, for failing to complete Step 10 of its procedure “03-07-03
Pressure Relief / Safety Valves.” Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the
proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent
a civil penalty of $16,500 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a).
Item 6: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $21,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.420(b), for failing to inspect each mainline valve at least twice each calendar year, at
intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months. As discussed in more detail above, Respondent provided
additional information in its Response indicating that there were five, rather than seven missing
mainline inspections, to be completed at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months, but at least twice
each calendar year, therefore reducing the instances of violation from seven to five. Based upon
the foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $20,300 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.420(b).
Item 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $22,800 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.428(a), for failing to inspect each non-HVL overpressure safety device at least once each
calendar year at intervals not exceeding 15 months. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of
violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I
assess Respondent a civil penalty of $22,800 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a).
Item 8: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $36,200 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 11
§ 195.428(a), for failing to determine, over a period of three years, whether 53 pressure-control
devices on its non-HVL pipeline were adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of
operation for the service in which they were used, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at
least once each calendar year. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the
proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent
a civil penalty of $36,200 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a).
Item 12: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $170,0003 for Respondent’s violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c), for failing to electrically check for proper performance of rectifiers and
critical interference bonds at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding
2 ½ months. For the reasons stated above, the penalty assessment is reduced based on the
withdrawal of 13 instances, resulting in a reduction of instances of violation from 23 to 10.
Respondent also noted in its Response that “the proposed penalty amount for violating this
standard is not in line with penalties issued to other operators for alleged violations of the same
standard, which also warrants a reduction in the penalty.” PHMSA calculates the penalty
amount for the individual circumstances based on multiple factors. With regard to the nature of
the violation, Item 12 was an activities violation for a failure to complete proper performance
checks. With regard to circumstances, the violation was discovered by PHMSA. With regard to
gravity, there were 10 instances of the violation, and the violation occurred within a high
consequence area (HCA) or “could affect” HCA. With regard to culpability, Enbridge failed to
comply with an applicable requirement. Lastly, there were no aggravating or mitigating factors
considered for Item 12. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty
of $99,500 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c).
Item 14: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $19,300 for Respondent’s violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a), for failing to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion by
cleaning and coating each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere.
Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with
this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $19,300 for violation
of 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a).
In summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the
Items cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $282,900.
Payment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations
(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal
Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed
instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be
directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike
Monroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 79169.
The Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.
3 While the Notice alleged a total of 24 instances of violation, the proposed civil penalty for Item 12 was calculated
based on only 23 instances of violation. The 13 instances of violation for an alleged failure to check the proper
performance of critical interference bonds has been subtracted from the 23 alleged instances of violation, resulting in
10 remaining instances of violation for Item 12.



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 12
Failure to pay the $282,900 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual
rate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to
those same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if
payment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty
may result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district
court of the United States.
COMPLIANCE ORDER
The Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Item 2 in the Notice for a violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.264. Under 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the
transportation of hazardous liquids or who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to
comply with the applicable safety standards established under chapter 601. Pursuant to the
authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217, Respondent is ordered to take the
following actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety regulations applicable to its
operations:
1. With respect to the violation of § 195.264 (Item 2), Respondent must install
intermediate berms in accordance with NFPA-30 for the containment areas in the
Cushing Tank Farm facility identified in Item 2 of the Notice.
2. Respondent must correct these inadequacies and supply evidence of drawings and
photos to the Director, Central Region, OPS, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, within six months of issuance of the Final Order.
The Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a
written request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an
extension.
PHMSA requests that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs
associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the Director. It is
requested that these costs be reported in two categories: (1) total cost associated with
preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and (2) total cost associated with
replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties
not to exceed $200,000, as adjusted for inflation (see 49 C.F.R. § 190.223), for each violation for
each day the violation continues or in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in a
district court of the United States.
WARNING ITEMS
With respect to Items 1, 9, 10, 11 and 13, the Notice alleged probable violations of Part 195, but
identified them as warning items pursuant to § 190.205. The warnings were for:



CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 13
49 C.F.R. § 195.52(a) (Item 1) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to give notice at
the earliest practicable moment, but no later than one hour after confirmed
discovery, to the National Response Center following the release of
approximately 10 barrels of crude oil and the shutdown of Enbridge’s Line 63,
which Enbridge reported 2 hours and 10 minutes after confirmed discovery;
49 C.F.R. § 195.430(a) (Item 9) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to perform an
annual inspection of firefighting equipment at the Patoka facility in 2016, as
specified by its procedures, to ensure the equipment was in proper operating
condition at all times;
49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b) (Item 10) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to follow its
own written qualification program for ensuring through evaluation that
individuals performing covered tasks were qualified when two individuals
performed a covered task without being qualified;
49 C.F.R. § 195.567(c) (Item 11) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to maintain
seven test lead wires in a condition that would enable the operator to obtain
electrical measurements to determine whether cathodic protection on the pipeline
complied with § 195.571;
49 C.F.R. §§ 195.573(e) (Item 13) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to correct
deficiencies in corrosion control at seven test point locations on certain non-HCA
pipeline segments, as required by § 195.401(b)(1).
If OPS finds a violation of any of these items in a subsequent inspection, Respondent may be
subject to future enforcement action.
Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final
Order to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of
Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address, no later than 20 days after receipt of service of this
Final Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a statement of the issue(s) and
meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a petition automatically stays
the payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the order, including corrective
action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay.
The terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49
C.F.R. § 190.5.
October 12, 2021
___________________________________ __________________________
Alan K. Mayberry Date Issued
Associate Administrator



for Pipeline Safety
CPF No. 3-2021-5002
Page 14

320215002_Closure Letter_06222022_(18-157171S)_text.pdf

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: and jim.ramness@enbridge.com
michael.koby@enbridge.com; david.stafford@enbridge.com;
June 22, 2022
Michael Koby
Vice President, US Pipelines
Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership
5400 Westheimer Court
Houston, Texas 77056
Re: CPF 3-2021-5002
Dear Mr. Koby:
On October 12, 2021, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
issued a Final Order in the above-referenced case to Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership
(Enbridge) and its subsidiaries, namely, Enbridge Storage, LLC; Enbridge Storage, LLC; CCPS
Transportation, LLC; and Illinois Extension Pipeline Company,. This Order included a Civil
Penalty assessment in the total amount of $354,100, as well as a Compliance Order with respect
to Item 2 of the Notice requiring Enbridge, and its subsidiaries, to take specific actions to ensure
compliance with the pipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations. Based on our review
of the documentation provided and confirmation of payment of the civil penalty, it has been
determined that Enbridge, and its subsidiaries, have complied with the terms of this Order.
Accordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the
matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Gregory A. Ochs
Director, Central Region, OPS
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
cc: Dave Stafford, david.stafford@enbridge.com
Jim Ramness, jim.ramness@enbridge.com

320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf

NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION
PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY
and
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: david.stafford@enbridge.com
February 10, 2021
Mr. Michael Koby
Vice President US Operations
Enbridge Energy Inc.
5400 Westheimer Ct.
Houston, Texas 77056
michael.koby@enbridge.com and
CPF 3-2021-5002
Dear Mr. Koby:
On March 5 to 9, April 2 to 6, May 7 to 11, May 21 to 25, June 11 to 15 and June 25 to 29,
2018, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code
(U.S.C.) inspected the records and facilities of several of your subsidiaries, namely, Enbridge
Storage (Cushing), LLC; Enbridge Storage (Patoka), LLC; CCPS Transportation, LLC; and
Illinois Extension Pipeline Company in Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri and Illinois. These
facilities include two tank farms with a total of 89 tanks and approximately 1,338 miles of
crude oil pipelines.
As a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the
Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items
inspected and the probable violations are:
1. § 195.52 Immediate notice of certain accidents.
(a) Notice requirements. At the earliest practicable moment following discovery,
of a release of the hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide transported resulting in an



event described in §195.50, but no later than one hour after confirmed discovery, the
operator of the system must give notice, in accordance with paragraph (b) of this
section of any failure that: . . .
The PHMSA inspection revealed that Enbridge failed to give notice at the earliest
practicable moment, but no later than one hour after confirmed discovery, to the
National Response Center following a release of a hazardous liquid resulting in an
event described in 49 C.F.R. § 195.50. Specifically, on May 2, 2017, a sump-pump
overfill situation occurred, resulting in a release of approximately 10 barrels of crude
oil and the shutdown of Enbridge’s Line 63 (Pakota Station) in Illinois. According to
Accident Report 20170177-22368, Enbridge identified the accident at 10:22 a.m., and
confirmed discovery at 10:24 a.m. when resources first arrived onsite. However,
Enbridge did not give notice to the National Response Center of the accident until
12:34 p.m., which exceeded the one-hour notification requirement under § 195.52(a)
by 1 hour and 10 minutes.
2. § 195.264 Impoundment, protection against entry, normal/emergency venting or
pressure/vacuum relief for aboveground breakout tanks.
(a) A means must be provided for containing hazardous liquids in the event of
spillage or failure of an above-ground breakout tank.
(b) After October 2, 2000, compliance with paragraph (a) of this section requires
the following for the aboveground breakout tanks specified:
(1) For tanks built to API Spec 12F, API Std 620, and others (such as API Std
650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)), the installation of impoundment must be
in accordance with the following sections of NFPA-30 (incorporated by reference,
see § 195.3);
(i) Impoundment around a breakout tank must be installed in accordance with
section 22.11.2; . . .
Enbridge failed to provide a means for containing hazardous liquids in the event of
spillage or failure of above-ground breakout tanks built to American Petroleum
Institute (API) Specification 12F, API Standard 620 and others (such as API Standard
650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C), by installing impoundments around certain
breakout tanks built after October 2, 2000, at the company’s Cushing Tank Farm
facility. Specifically, Enbridge failed to install impoundments in accordance with
section 22.11.2 of NFPA-30, a standard promulgated by the National Fire Protection
Association and incorporated by reference in 49 C.F.R. § 195.3.
2



During the field inspection of the Cushing Tank Farm facility, PHMSA observed that
several groups of tanks did not have intermediate berms, as required by section 22.11.2
of NFPA-30. That section provides, in relevant part:
NFPA 30 – Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
22.11.2 ….
22.11.2.6.3.5 Whenever two or more tanks storing Class I liquids, any one of
which is over 150 ft (45 m) in diameter, are located in a common diked area,
intermediate dikes shall be provided between adjacent tanks to hold at least
10 percent of the capacity of the tank so enclosed, not including the volume
displaced by the tank.
PHMSA identified several containment areas at the Cushing Tank Farm facility storing
Class I liquids where there were two or more tanks, each being more than 150 feet in
diameter, that lacked intermediate dikes between adjacent tanks and that could hold at
least 10 percent of the tank so enclosed, not including the volume displaced by the
tank. In an email to PHMSA dated March 21, 2019, Enbridge acknowledged that it
had conducted a survey of the Cushing Tank Farm facility and had identified the
following tanks as being non-compliant with NFPA-30 section 22.11.2. A total of 23
tanks in five containment areas failed to comply with NFPA-30 section 22.11.2, as
follows:
Containment Area / Tanks Year Built
1. 1036, 1037, 1038 2012
2. 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2008
3. 2235, 2236, 2237, 2243, 2244 2006 (Tanks 2235-37) & 2011 (Tanks
2243-44)
4. 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233,
2234
2007
5. 3361, 3362, 3363, 3364 2006
3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. . . .
Enbridge failed to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities. Specifically, the company failed to follow its
written procedure “09-03-02 Removing Water/Snow from Tank Roofs.” Step 5 of the
procedure for Removing Water requires operator personnel to “[m]onitor water from
bottom drain valve for visible product for at least 10 min. checking drain valve every 30
3



4. min until draining is complete.” However, this procedure does not reflect the actual
practice followed in the field.
During the PHMSA field inspection, Enbridge representatives stated that the Cushing
Tank Farm facility keeps all tank roof drains open at all times, including at night and
on weekends. This practice is inconsistent with Enbridge’s procedure for Removing
Water, specifically the monitoring required under Step 5. Additionally, the practice of
leaving the tank roof drains open at all times, including at night, conflicts with a
specific warning in the procedure that states: “Do not leave tank roof drains and
firewall drains open … at night.”
On May 31, 2018, in response to OPS’ inquiries about Enbridge’s practice of draining
tank roofs at the Cushing Tank Farm facility, Cushing staff stated that the practice of
leaving the tank roof drains open had been in place prior to Enbridge acquiring the
facility. Cushing staff also stated that the procedure would only apply to instances
where the roof drain valve was closed. However, there is no indication in the
procedure that it was limited to instances where the roof drain valve was closed.
Therefore, Enbridge’s statements and practices demonstrate that Enbridge failed to
follow its written procedure 09-03-02.
§195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This …
Enbridge failed to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities. Specifically, the company failed to follow its
procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves,” when testing pressure safety
valves (PSVs). Specifically, procedure 03-07-03 sets forth a 14-step process for
inspecting and testing PSVs.
During PHMSA’s field inspection at the CCPS Spearhead Pipeline in Illinois from
June 25 to 29, 2018, the following series of events occurred. Enbridge’s technicians
failed to follow the company’s 14-step process laid out in procedure 03-07-03 during
the following instances:
 Step 9 was completed before step 1 – equipment was attached to the PSV
before calling the control room as required in Step 1.
 During Step 10, the compressed nitrogen tank valve was supposed to be slowly
opened until the PSV activated. However,
o The nitrogen tank valve was opened quickly so that the PSV tripped
several times a second before the nitrogen tank valve closed after
several seconds.
4



5. o The entire nitrogen tank was emptied so much that another tank had to
be retrieved to conduct the test.
o When Enbridge personnel observing the test determined that the
technician’s performance was unsatisfactory, Enbridge suspended the
technician as of 6/29/2018.
o The technician requalified on 9/12/2018.
 Technicians in Illinois failed to complete Step 11 by updating the field tags
with the date of the test. The Area supervisor and five technicians that were
interviewed stated that it was the practice in this location not to use field tags,
despite the procedure requirements.
PHMSA’s inspectors witnessed Enbridge’s technicians not properly following the 14-
step procedure for testing PSVs, which demonstrates a failure to comply with §
195.402(a).
§195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This …
Enbridge failed to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities. Specifically, the company failed to follow its
written procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves.” Step 10 of the
procedure for inspecting and testing pressure relief/safety valves sets forth measures
for checking pressure relief set points for the valves, which includes recording the
current pressure-relief setting as “Task” on the work order and then creating a follow-
up work order to document the adjustments being made. However, Enbridge did not
complete these specific measures under Step 10 of the procedure.
During the field inspection, PHMSA discovered that technicians were recording the
setting “found / left” data in the field on a paper form, but were not updating the work
order. Enbridge provided copies of the paper form for three of the five pressure-relief
valves listed below. Technicians used this paper form in the field but Enbridge was
unable to provide follow-up work orders, as required by the procedure.
The following records lacked “found / left” pressure readings:
1. CG-159-PSV-3 – Missing the “as found” relief pressure reading from the 2016
detailed work order.
2. CG-155-PSV-1 – Missing the “as found” relief pressure reading from the 2017
detailed work order.
3. NI-55-PSV-1 – Missing the “as found” relief pressure from the 2016 detailed
work order.
5



4. QT-59-PSV-1 – Missing the “as found” relief pressure from the 2017 detailed
work order.
By failing to document the current “as found” relief pressures in the follow-up work
orders, Enbridge failed to follow its written procedure, as required by § 195.402(a).
6. §195.420 Valve maintenance.
(a) . . . .
(b) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 7½ months, but at least twice
each calendar year, inspect each mainline valve to determine that it is functioning
properly.
Enbridge failed to inspect each mainline valve at least twice each calendar year, at
intervals not exceeding 7½ months. PHMSA’s review of Enbridge’s valve maintenance
records found that the following seven valves had not been inspected at least twice each
calendar year:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. TP-63-BV-1 – Missing first inspection of 2016.
TP-63-CSV-12 – Missing first inspection of 2016.
DT-63-SSV-1 – Missing first inspection of 2016.
DT-63-SSV-2 – Missing first inspection of 2016.
FB0168.17-63-V-1 – Missing first inspection of 2016.
FB0168.18-63-V-1 – Missing first inspection of 2016.
FH0000.03-59-V-1 – Missing first inspection of 2017.
Therefore, Enbridge failed to inspect seven mainline valves, at intervals not exceeding
7½ months, but least twice each calendar, as required by § 195.420(b).
7. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at
intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the
case of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 71∕2
months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure
limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control
equipment to determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical
condition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of
operation for the service in which it is used.
Enbridge failed to inspect each non-highly volatile liquid (HVL) overpressure safety
device at least once each calendar year at intervals not exceeding 15 months. The
6



following 12 overpressure safety devices were not inspected annually for a total of 12
inspections that were not conducted:
1. CG-55-PCV-1 – Missing 2016 and 2017 inspections.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. TP-203-PSV-4 – Missing 2016 inspection.
TP-203-PSV-3 – Missing 2016 inspection.
TP-203-PSV-2 – Missing 2016 inspection.
TP-203-PSV-1 – Missing 2016 inspection.
TP-202-PSV-1 – Missing 2016 inspection.
TP-202-PCV-1 – Missing 2016 inspection.
TP-201-PSV-1 – Missing 2016 inspection.
TP-101-PSV-15C – Missing 2016 inspection.
10. TP-101-PSV-121 – Missing 2016 inspection.
11. FH0124.93-55-PT-2 – Missing inspection in calendar year 2016 (inspection on
11/13/2015 & 1/24/2017).
Therefore, Enbridge failed to conduct 12 inspections of overpressure safety devices on
its system in 2016 and 2017, as required by § 195.428(a).
8. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at
intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the
case of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 71∕2
months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure
limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control
equipment to determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical
condition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of
operation for the service in which it is used.
Enbridge failed to determine, over a period of three years, whether 53 pressure-control
devices on its non-HVL pipeline were adequate from the standpoint of capacity and
reliability of operation for the service in which they were used, at intervals not
exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.1
PHMSA’s review of Enbridge’s pressure-control records noted that Enbridge had not
determined that the capacity was adequate for 53 overpressure safety devices as
required by §195.428. Specifically, Enbridge had missed a total of 159 inspections
and tests of its overpressure safety devices to determine if they were adequate from the
standpoint of capacity, nor was Enbridge able to produce any records demonstrating it
1 These 53 devices were different from the ones cited above it Item 7.
7



had completed such determinations. The 53 overpressure safety devices and 159
missing capacity inspections and tests are as follows:
Pipeline facility In-service
Date
Spearhead
Pipeline, Line 55
>5 years Number of
overpressure-
protection
valves to be
inspected per
year
15 Number of
missed capacity
reviews
Years of Missed
Inspections
Spearhead
Pipeline, Line 59
Dec. 2014 Cushing
Terminal
>5 years 16 Patoka Terminal >5 years 11 SAX Nov. 2015 2 45 9 27 48 33 159
Therefore, Enbridge failed to determine whether pressure-control devices on its non-
HVL pipeline were adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of
operation for the service in which they were used, at intervals not exceeding 15
months, as required by §195.428(a), as well as the requirements of Enbridge’s own
procedure “Pressure Control Valve Capacity and Reliability Assessment.”2
2016, 2017, 2018
2016, 2017, 2018
2016, 2017, 2018
2016, 2017, 2018
6 2016, 2017, 2018
Total 53 9. §195.430 Firefighting equipment.
Each operator shall maintain adequate firefighting equipment at each pump
station and breakout tank area. The equipment must be—
(a) In proper operating condition at all times;
Enbridge failed to perform an annual inspection of firefighting equipment at the
Patoka facility in 2016. Enbridge staff stated that the annual fire extinguisher
inspection was not completed to their knowledge and the employees that were there at
that time are no longer with Enbridge. Firefighting equipment inspections are required
by NFPA-30, incorporated by reference into Part 195 at § 195.3, and Enbridge’s
procedure “04-03-02 Fire Extinguishers – Inspection.” Enbridge was not able to
2 The purpose of the “Pressure Control Valve Capacity and Reliability Assessment” procedure is to “outline the
process to the process to be followed for the assessment of capacity and reliability on Pressure Control Valves
(PCV) as per … 49 CFR 195.428.”
8



provide documentation demonstrating that the firefighting equipment had been
inspected in 2016 to ensure it was in proper operating condition at all times.
10. §195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The
program shall include provisions to:
(a) . . . .
qualified; . . . .
(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are
Enbridge failed to follow its own written qualification program for ensuring through
evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks were qualified. Enbridge’s
Regional Management reported to PHMSA that two individuals had performed
covered tasks when they were not qualified per the company’s written operator
qualification program. Records show that in each instance the covered task was
performed by unqualified individuals only one time.
1. 2. Covered task 51, “Valves and Actuators,” was performed by an unqualified
individual on 4/25/2017; the qualification had expired on 3/19/2017 and the re-
qualification did not occur until 6/15/2017.
Two covered tasks were performed by an individual before being qualified. First,
Task 91, “Pressure Relief Valve Test,” was performed on 9/9/2016 before the
qualification date of 7/7/2017. Second, Task 51, “Valves and Actuators,” was
performed on 10/21/2016 before the qualification date of 2/23/2017.
11. §195.567 Which pipelines must have test leads and what must I do to install and
maintain the leads?
(a) . . . .
(c) Maintenance. You must maintain the test lead wires in a condition that
enables you to obtain electrical measurements to determine whether cathodic
protection complies with §195.571.
Enbridge failed to maintain test lead wires in a condition that would enable the
operator to obtain electrical measurements to determine whether cathodic protection
on the pipeline complied with § 195.571. A review of Enbridge’s corrosion-control
records showed that the following seven test lead wires were not adequately
maintained to allow testing at the required inspection cycles:
1. Line 59, MP 30.1 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017.
9



12. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Line 59, MP 41.82 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017.
Line 59, MP 256.25 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017.
Line 59, MP 298.4 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017.
Line 59, MP 364.17 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017.
Line 59, MP 529.31 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017.
Line 55, MP 487.9089 - No readings due to bad test lead in 2016 and 2017.
§195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?
(a) . . . .
(c) Rectifiers and other devices. You must electrically check for proper
performance each device in the first column at the frequency stated in the second
column.
Device
Check frequency
Rectifier
Reverse current switch
Diode
At least six times each calendar year, but
with intervals not exceeding 21∕2 months.
Interference bond whose failure
would jeopardize structural
protection
Other interference bond
At least once each calendar year, but with
intervals not exceeding 15 months.
Enbridge failed to electrically check for proper performance of rectifiers at least six
times each calendar year, at intervals not to exceed 2½ months. As identified during
the PHMSA inspection of Enbridge’s corrosion- control records, 11 checks were not
completed on the following 4 rectifiers:
1. 2. 3. 4. Line 63, MP 71.62 - Missing 2 readings between 12/15/2016 to 5/9/2017.
Patoka Terminal, MP 120 - Missing 3 readings between 12/30/2016 to 7/13/2017.
Patoka Terminal, MP 5347 - Missing 2 readings between 1/1/2017 to 6/28/2017.
Patoka Terminal, MP 5354 - Missing 4 readings between 6/21/2016 to 4/19/2017.
Enbridge also failed to electrically check for the proper performance of critical
interference bonds at least six times each calendar year, at intervals not to exceed 2½
months. As identified during the inspection of Enbridge’s corrosion-control records,
13 checks were not completed on the following three critical bonds:
1. Line 55, MP 423.5056 - Missing the first 3 readings in 2017, and the last reading in
2017 (total of 4).
10



2. 3. Line 55, MP 423.5056A - Missing 5 readings in 2017 (only reading was on
6/26/2017) (total of 5).
Line 55, MP 423.5056B - Missing 4 readings in 2017 (only readings were on
6/26/2017 and 12/4/2017) (total of 4).
13. §195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?
(a) Protected pipelines. You must do the following to determine whether
cathodic protection required by this subpart complies with §195.571:
(1) Conduct tests on the protected pipeline at least once each calendar year, but
with intervals not exceeding 15 months….
(e) Corrective action. You must correct any identified deficiency in corrosion
control as required by §195.401(b). However, if the deficiency involves a pipeline
in an integrity management program under §195.452, you must correct the
deficiency as required by §195.452(h).
and
§195.401(b) General Requirements.
(a) . . .
(b) An operator must make repairs on its pipeline system according to the
following requirements:
(1) Non Integrity management repairs. Whenever an operator discovers any
condition that could adversely affect the safe operation of its pipeline system, it
must correct the condition within a reasonable time. However, if the condition is
of such a nature that it presents an immediate hazard to persons or property, the
operator may not operate the affected part of the system until it has corrected the
unsafe condition.
Enbridge failed to correct deficiencies in corrosion control on certain non-HCA
pipeline segments, as required by § 195.573(e). Under that section, operators must
correct any identified deficiencies in corrosion control as provided by § 195.401(b)(1),
which states that whenever an operator discovers a condition that could adversely
affect the safe operation of a non-HCA pipeline, it must correct the condition within a
reasonable time.
The following seven test point locations had identified deficiencies of low cathodic
protection potentials for multiple surveys in a row.3 However, there is no evidence
3 Enbridge utilized the -0.850 V “instant off” criteria.
11



that Enbridge took measures to correct the deficiencies within a reasonable amount of
time or prior to conducting the next inspection required under § 195.573(a).
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Line 55, MP 266.6379 - Instant off reading on 5/14/2016 was -0.726 mV and on
6/20/2017 it was -0.597 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017.
Line 55, MP 507.4760 - Instant off reading on 4/16/2016 was -0.750 mV and on
6/8/2017 it was -0.795 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017
Line 59, MP 163.090 - Instant off reading on 5/15/2016 was -0.840 mV and on
6/21/2017 it was -0.717 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017.
Line 59, MP 164.0010 - Instant off reading on 7/9/2015 was -0.825 mV, on
5/16/2016 was -0.694 mV and on 6/21/2017 it was -0.565 mV. No additional
readings taken in 2017.
Line 59, MP 164.0040 - Instant off reading on 7/9/2015 was -0.815 mV, on
5/16/2016 was -0.646 mV and on 6/21/2017 it was -0.560 mV. No additional
readings taken in 2017.
Line 59, MP 435.1000 - Instant off reading on 4/15/2016 was -0.680 mV and on
6/8/2017 it was -0.708 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017.
Line 59, MP 435.1300 - Instant off reading on 5/15/2016 was -0.587 mV and on
6/8/2017 it was -0.634 mV. No additional readings taken in 2017.
Therefore, Enbridge failed to correct the seven identified deficiencies of low cathodic
protection potentials within a reasonable time, as required by § 195.573(e).
14. §195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric corrosion and what
coating material may I use?
(a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed
to the atmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this section.
Enbridge failed to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion by cleaning and
coating each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere. During
the field inspection of Enbridge’s Concordia Station, PHMSA observed that the
coating had dis-bonded and/or flaked at the pipe-to-soil transitions on both unit sump
drain lines. These observations, which were documented with photographic evidence,
show that Enbridge failed to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion on its
pipeline by cleaning and coating each portion of pipeline that is exposed to the
atmosphere.
Proposed Civil Penalty
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to
exceed $218,647 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,186,465
for a related series of violations. For violations occurring on or after November 27, 2018 and
12



before July 31, 2019, the maximum penalty may not exceed $213,268 per violation per day,
with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,132,679. For violations occurring prior to
November 2, 2015, the maximum penalty may not exceed $200,000 per violation per day.
with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,000,000 for a related series of violations. PHMSA
has reviewed the circumstances and supporting documentation involved in the above probable
violations and has recommended that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of
$354,100 as follows:
Item number
PENALTY
2
$ 29,700
3
$ 19,000
4
5
$ 19,600
$ 16,500
6
$ 21,000
7
$ 22,800
8
$ 36,200
12
$170,000
14
$ 19,300
Warning Items
With respect to items 1, 9, 10, 11 and 13 we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting
documents involved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement
action or penalty assessment proceedings now. We advise you to promptly correct these
items. Failure to do so may result in additional enforcement action.
Proposed Compliance Order
With respect to item 2 pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to Enbridge Storage (Cushing).
Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and made a part of this
Notice.
Response to this Notice
Enclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline
Operators in Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response
options. All material you submit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly
available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential
treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide
a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment
redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).
13



Following the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, or request
a hearing under 49 CFR § 190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of this
Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and
authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this
Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order. If you are responding to this
Notice, we propose that you submit your correspondence to my office within 30 days from
receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good cause.
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2021-5002 and, for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Sincerely,
Gregory A. Ochs
Director, Central Region, OPS
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Enclosures: Proposed Compliance Order
Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings
CC: Dave Stafford, Manager, US Pipeline Compliance, 119 N. 25th Street East,
Superior, WI 54880 david.stafford@enbridge.com
14



PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
Pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Enbridge Inc. (Enbridge), in regards to its
subsidiary Enbridge Storage (Cushing) LLC a Compliance Order incorporating the following
remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of Enbridge with the pipeline safety
regulations:
1. 2. 3. In regard to Item Number 2 of the Notice pertaining to Enbridge’s failure to
follow NFPA-30 section 22.11.2 when designing tank impoundments in the
Cushing Tank Farm facility and not installing intermediate berms, Enbridge
must install intermediate berms in accordance with NFPA-30 for the
containment areas identified in Item Number 2 of the Notice.
Enbridge must correct these inadequacies within six months of issuance of a
Final Order and supply evidence of drawings and photos to Gregory Ochs,
Director, Central Region, OPS, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration.
It is requested (not mandated) that Enbridge maintain documentation of the
safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and
submit the total to Gregory Ochs, Director, Central Region, OPS, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. It is requested that these costs be
reported in two categories: 1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of
plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with
replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.
15

## Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320215002>
- Source ID: `phmsa-enforcement`
- SHA-256: `034b57fbc9fbbe7af60d38a54c2c6ca2fe628c3ce65a29fa218fbb8cf18edf7c`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:44:44.458Z
- Exported: 2026-08-23T13:03:37.616Z
- Document slug: `phmsa-enforcement-320215002`

### Source metadata

```json
{
  "cpf": "320215002",
  "operator": "CCPS TRANSPORTATION, LLC",
  "region": "Central",
  "pipelineType": "INTERSTATE LIQUID ONSHORE",
  "caseStatus": "CLOSED",
  "citedSections": [
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    "195.264(b)(1)(i)",
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    "195.420(b)",
    "195.428(a)",
    "195.430(a)",
    "195.505(b)",
    "195.52(a)",
    "195.567(c)",
    "195.573(a)(1)",
    "195.573(c)",
    "195.573(e)",
    "195.581(a)"
  ],
  "dataAsOf": "08/04/2026 12PM",
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}
```