# COLUMBIA GULF TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

**Citation:** CPF 420091005  
**Type / status:** enforcement / historical  
**Agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  
**Effective:** Not stated  
**Published:** 2009-02-12

CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.605(a).

## Document text

Notice of Probable Violation involving COLUMBIA GULF TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulation as 192.605(a). The case was opened on 2009-02-12 and is reported as closed as of 2011-04-01. Proposed civil penalty: $1,555,000. Assessed civil penalty: $806,500. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

420091005_FinalOrder_03212011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420091005/420091005_FinalOrder_03212011.pdf

420091005_FinalOrder_03212011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420091005/420091005_FinalOrder_03212011_text.pdf

420091005_NOPVPCP_02122009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420091005/420091005_NOPVPCP_02122009.pdf

420091005_NOPVPCP_02122009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420091005/420091005_NOPVPCP_02122009_text.pdf

420091005_Operator Response_03242009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420091005/420091005_Operator%20Response_03242009.pdf

420091005_FinalOrder_03212011_text.pdf

MAR 21 2011
Mr. Victor Gaglio
Senior Vice President, Operations and Engineering
Columbia Gulf Transmission Company
1700 MacCorkle Avenue, SE
Charleston, West Virginia 25314
Re: CPF No. 4-2009-1005
Dear Mr. Gaglio:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation and assesses a reduced civil penalty of $806,500. The penalty payment terms are set
forth in the Final Order. This enforcement action closes automatically upon payment. Service of
the Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise
provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Rod M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, PHMSA
CERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED[7005 1160 0001 0041 3627]



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, DC 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
Columbia Gulf Transmission Company, ) CPF No. 4-2009-1005
)
)
)
Respondent. )
___________________________________ )
FINAL ORDER
Between December 14, 2007 and April 2008, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), conducted a post-incident investigation of a failure on a 30-inch interstate natural gas
transmission pipeline (Line 100) that occurred on December 14, 2007, near Delhi, Louisiana
(2007 Failure).
Columbia Gulf Transmission Company (Columbia Gulf or Respondent), the owner and operator
of the pipeline that failed, operates three parallel pipelines at this location (Lines 100, 200, 300).
Columbia Gulf is owned by NiSource, Inc., an energy company engaged in natural gas
transmission, storage and distribution, as well as electric generation, transmission and
distribution. Respondent operates approximately 3,400 miles of pipeline and 11 compressor
stations located primarily in Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Kentucky.1
The 2007 Failure resulted in an explosion and fire, causing one fatality and one non-fatal injury,
property damage and the temporary closure of Interstate 20. The two individuals that were
injured were members of the public who were traveling east on I-20 at the time of the 2007
Failure.
2
On December 19, 2007, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO No. 4-2007-1017H) to
Columbia Gulf, requiring the company to take immediate corrective actions to protect public
safety.3 A third-party metallurgical firm determined the probable cause of the 2007 Failure was
external pitting corrosion of the carrier pipe inside the casing at the crossing with I-20.4
The
1 See
http://www.ngts.com/about-ngts/columbia-gulf-transmission (last accessed December 30, 2010).
2 See Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty, pg. 2 (February 12, 2009) (on file with PHMSA).
3 This Corrective Action Order (CAO) was closed on January 31, 2011.
4 See Metallurgical & Materials Technologies, Inc. (MMT) report attached as Exhibit 1 to Response. The report
stated that “moisture in the atmosphere and standing water in the bottom of the casing, in conjunction with a high



2
metallurgical firm discovered that the external corrosion was caused by moisture in the
atmosphere and standing water in the casing.5
As a result of the post-incident investigation, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director),
issued to Respondent, by letter dated February 12, 2009, a Notice of Probable Violation and
Proposed Civil Penalty (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed
finding that Respondent had violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.605, 192.617, and 192.613 and assessing
a civil penalty of $1,550,000 for the alleged violations.
Columbia Gulf responded to the Notice by letter dated March 24, 2009 (Response). The
company contested the items in the Notice and requested that the proposed civil penalty be
reduced or rescinded. Columbia Gulf did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right
to one.
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
Background
Prior to the 2007 Failure, Columbia Gulf experienced three similar incidents in the same area
involving either Line 100 or 200. In September of 2000, Columbia Gulf experienced a failure on
Line 200. The pipeline ruptured and caught fire approximately two miles from the Delhi Station.
A metallurgical evaluation performed after the failure determined that the rupture was caused by
external corrosion. Approximately a year later, in August of 2001, the operator experienced an
incident on Line 100 which the operator described as a leak. This failure was caused by external
corrosion under a casing spacer ring. A second leak occurred in September of 2006 on this same
line (Line 100) and again was caused by external corrosion. Approximately, fifteen months
later, on December 14, 2007, Line 100 ruptured. This failure was again caused by external
corrosion.
Allegations
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605, which states:
§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each
pipeline, a manual for written procedures for conducting operations and
maintenance activities and for emergency response. For transmission
lines, the manual must include procedures for handling abnormal
concentration of chlorides in the environment, and damage to and localized failure of the coating are responsible for
the corrosion noted and the failure of the pipe.” MMT report, at 30.
5 Id. at 30; See also, Response, 6.



3
operations. This manual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at
intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.
This manual must be prepared before operations of a pipeline system
commence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations
where operations and maintenance activities are conducted….
(e) Surveillance, emergency response, and accident investigation.
The procedures required by §§ 192.613(a), 192.615, and 192.617 must be
included in the manual required by paragraph (a) of this section….
§ 192.617 Investigation of Failures.
Each operator shall establish procedures for analyzing accidents and
failures, including the selection of samples of the failed facility or
equipment for laboratory examination, where appropriate, for the purpose
of determining the causes of the failure and minimizing the possibility of a
recurrence.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) and (e) and § 192.617 by
failing to follow its procedures for analyzing accidents and failures. According to OPS,
Respondent failed to follow its O&M procedures, specifically its twelve-point “Incident
Evaluation and Investigation” procedure, for a thorough incident investigation.6 Item 12 of this
procedure required Respondent’s personnel to “make recommendations to reduce the likelihood
of a reoccurrence of an incident [and] assign someone to act upon the recommendation(s) and
by either failing to make recommendations after each failure or making recommendations that
repeat failure.
track progress.”7 did not address the cause of the prior incidents and therefore could not reduce the likelihood of a
In the Notice, OPS argued that Columbia Gulf failed to follow its procedures
According to Columbia Gulf’s records supplied to OPS after the 2007 Failure, the probable
cause of the 2000 failure was external corrosion, specifically microbiological induced corrosion
(MIC).8 However, in response to this failure, Columbia Gulf recommended running a smart pig
on the Delhi to Inverness segment and installing a rectifier at the rupture site.
these recommendations could not have reduced the likelihood of a repeat failure caused by
microbiological induced corrosion. On this basis, OPS alleged that Columbia Gulf failed to
follow its Incident Evaluation and Investigation procedures.
9 OPS asserted that
6 Response, Exhibit 9, Columbia Gulf Incident Evaluation and Investigation Procedure, at 24.
7 Id.
8 Response, at 12. The metallurgist stated that “the exact cause of the corrosion was not determined. However,
isolated pitting and otherwise un-corroded pipe, the morphology of the pitted surfaces, and the detection of sulfur on
the pitted surface suggests that the pitting was due to microbiologically influenced corrosion.” See Response,
Exhibit 10.
9 Violation Report, Exhibit 4, Form #2377-EG4 completed in response to 2000 incident.



4
The cause of the 2001 leak was external corrosion under a spacing ring.
Gulf made recommendations to replace the affected pipe within the casing but did not make any
recommendations for other casings on this particular line or nearby lines.
10 In response, Columbia
Finally, in response to the third incident, which was caused by corrosion of a carrier pipe inside a
cased crossing, Columbia Gulf replaced the carrier pipe where the leak occurred and filled the
casing but did not make any recommendations to investigate other casings on the system. OPS
asserted that the recommendations Columbia Gulf did make were not specific to the cause of the
failures and therefore could not reduce the likelihood of a reoccurrence. OPS alleged that the
recommendations summarized above were not tailored to the cause of the prior failures and
therefore could not reduce the likelihood of a repeat failure.
Response
In its Response, Columbia Gulf contended that it had established the necessary procedures for
analyzing accidents and failures, its personnel followed these procedures after each incident, and
its procedures did not require the company to investigate other locations on the pipeline system
for similar deficiencies.
Columbia Gulf disagreed with OPS’ reliance on the Incident Evaluation and Investigation
procedures for all four events. Columbia Gulf asserted that its procedures entitled “Manual of
Approved Procedures” dated April 12, 1993 were in effect at the time of the 2000 and 2001
incidents and not the twelve-point Incident and Evaluation and Investigation Procedure.
11
Columbia Gulf also disagreed with the application of the Incident Evaluation and Investigation
procedures to the 2006 leak. Although these procedures were issued in 2004 and therefore were
in use at the time of the 2006 incident, Respondent stated that the 2006 incident was a Grade 2
leak and did not meet the criteria to take action under these. In support, Columbia Gulf cited
page 24 of these procedures which state that “the impact and severity of the incident shall be
argued that the requirement to make recommendations after the 2006 incident did not apply.
Since the Manual of Approved Procedures (1993) was the controlling document during the 2000
considered to determine whether an investigation is necessary.12 Therefore, Columbia Gulf
and 2001 incidents and did not require specific recommendations and the 2006 leak was not
severe enough to initiate the Incident and Evaluation Investigation Procedure (2004), Columbia
Gulf argued that Item #1 should be withdrawn.
In its Response, Columbia Gulf also confirmed the steps that it took in response to each incident
including conducting internal line inspections (ILIs), coating repairs, and replacement of pipe.
Respondent stated that it completed a high resolution internal inspection for the Delhi, LA to
Inverness, MS segment on Line 200 after the 2000 Failure.
13
Results from this ILI confirmed
10 Response, at 2.
11 Response, Exhibit 4.
12 Response, Exhibit 9, page 24.
13 Response, 13.



5
external corrosion in several locations. Thereafter, Columbia Gulf performed approximately 472
feet of pipe replacement and coating repairs.14 In 2008, Columbia Gulf completed a second ILI
at this location requiring no immediate repairs.15 Columbia Gulf maintained that an ILI is the
most effective approach for conducting inspections for wall loss due to external corrosion. After
the 2001 leak, Columbia Gulf replaced the entire segment of Line 100 involved in this specific
incident with newly coated steel pipe.16 Columbia Gulf replaced 312 feet of new pipe through
the casing and increased cathodic protection measures by installing a new rectifier and a deep
well anode bed.17 Columbia Gulf also stated that it installed 200 feet of newly coated steel pipe
and filled the casing with non-conductive casing filler material.18 When a year later, this line
ruptured (2007 Failure), Columbia Gulf stated it immediately engaged Metallurgical &
Materials Technologies, Inc. to perform a failure analysis and expedited ILIs of Lines 100, 200,
and 300. Columbia Gulf confirmed that all ILIs on Line 100 had been completed with the
exception of three segments.
19 These areas were scheduled to be completed in 2009. Columbia
Gulf also modified its leak surveillance program with respect to casings to provide for
instrumented leak surveys on a semi-annual basis.
steps were appropriate measures to minimize the likelihood of future incidents caused by
external corrosion and therefore Item #1 should be withdrawn.
20 Columbia Gulf maintained that all these
Analysis
There was some dispute as to which procedures were in effect at the time of each incident. In its
Response, Columbia Gulf argued that the procedures referenced in the Notice were not in effect
until 2003 and therefore were inapplicable in the 2000 and 2001 incidents.21
I have reviewed both sets of procedures and evaluated the parties’ arguments. I find that the
1993 procedures were Respondent’s failure investigation procedures at the time of the 2000 and
2001 incidents. These procedures required Respondent to complete Form 2377-EG4 which
included making recommendations for future action. The 1993 procedure specifically states that
“the Section Superintendent shall prepare a written report of all failures and malfunctions, as
14 Response, 7.
15 Id.
16 Response, at 8.
17 Response, at 13.
18 Response, 14.
19 Response, 9.
20 Id.
21 Only the 2004 procedures were provided to OPS in response to the January 29, 2008 Request for Specific
Information . The Request for Specific Information required Columbia Gulf to provide all procedures and
investigation reports for the 2000-2007 Incidents.



6
defined in Section II.B, using Form 2377-EG4, “Incident/Failure Report”.22 Both the 2000 and
2001 failures met Columbia Gulf’s definition of a failure in its 1993 procedures (“a failure is
further defined in Section II.B of this procedure as a “…failure or malfunction of any pipeline
facility, equipment, or component, whether or not a release of gas is involved.”)23
Although Columbia Gulf argued that it had followed its procedure for the 2000 and 2001 failures
by completing the form, the company left the recommendation section for the 2001 incident
blank.
24 The instructions for this form required personnel to “provide a full description of what
happened and respective actions as called for.”25 complete Form 2377-EG4, which included making recommended future actions, is a violation of
the operator’s 1993 procedures and accordingly I make a finding of violation.
Therefore, for the 2001 incident, the failure to
With respect to the 2000 incident, Columbia Gulf did follow its procedures by completing the
Form 2377-EG4 to include recommended future actions of “smart pig line from Delhi to
Inverness, Miss; also install rectifier in area of rupture”.26 In the Notice, OPS asserted that
because Columbia Gulf had failed to make recommendations to address microbiological induced
corrosion (MIC), a violation had occurred. However, the metallurgist stated that “the exact
cause of the corrosion was not determined.”27 Since the metallurgist could not determine if the
cause of the external corrosion was specifically microbiological induced corrosion, Respondent’s
procedures did not require it to make recommended future actions tailored toward this type of
corrosion. Although a prudent operator may have recommended future actions to address any
potential threat by microbiological induced corrosion, Columbia Gulf was not required to do so
at the time of the 2000 incident. In addition, the 1993 procedures were silent as to the types of
recommended action that should be made and only required the completion of the form. No
further detail was provided in these procedures as to the extent or substantive nature of the
recommended future actions. In fact, whether a formal investigation would occur was a
taken more expansive future action, they were not required to do so under the procedures in
2000 incident is withdrawn. A finding, however, is made with respect to the 2001 incident.
discretionary decision of the Vice President-Engineering.28 Although the company could have
effect at the time of the 2000 incident. Therefore, the probable violation associated with the
Columbia Gulf’s 2004 Incident Management Plan, including the Incident Evaluation and
Investigation procedures, was in effect at the time of the 2006 incident and 2007 Failure. These
procedures defined an incident as “a non-routine event that requires immediate company
22 Response, Exhibit 4, page 6.
23 Id. at page 2.
24 Response, Exhibits 5 and 6.
25 Response, Exhibit 4, page 17.
26 Response, Exhibit 5.
27 Response, Exhibit 10.
28 Exhibit 4, page 9.



7
response and either has or could threaten the safety or security of the public, company employees
or facilities; cause significant property damage; interrupt service; and/or bring notable attention
to the company”.29 Further, the Incident Evaluation and Investigation procedures, a subset of the
Incident Management Plan, required Respondent’s personnel to “make recommendations to
reduce the likelihood of a reoccurrence of an incident [and] assign someone to act upon the
recommendation(s) and track progress.”30 In response to the 2006 leak, the company did not
make any recommendations to reduce the likelihood of a reoccurrence. In its Response,
Columbia Gulf stated that the 2006 leak was a Grade 2 leak and did not meet the criteria of the
Incident Management Plan. In support of its argument that the 2006 leak was not an “incident”
per its Incident Management Plan, Columbia Gulf attached a Work Order Report which confirms
that the company categorized it as a leak.
which cited $150,000 of property damage and demonstrated that it was a reportable incident. It
is therefore reasonable that this incident was non-routine, required immediate company response,
involved enough property damage to require incident reporting and could have threatened the
safety or security of the public. Particularly since it was a reportable incident, Respondent
should have initiated its Incident Management Plan and made recommendations to reduce the
likelihood of a reoccurrence of an incident. On this basis, I find that Respondent did not follow
its procedures with regard to the 2006 incident.
31 However, the company filed a RSPA 7100.2 report
In the Notice, OPS alleged that Respondent failed to follow its incident investigation procedures
after the 2000, 2001, and 2006 incidents. Having reviewed the evidence, I find that Columbia
Gulf failed to follow its procedures after the 2001 and 2006 incidents but complied with its
procedures for the 2000 incident. Accordingly, having reviewed the evidence in the record, I
find that Respondent violated §§ 192.605(a) and 192.617 with respect to the 2001 and 2006
incidents.
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.605 and 192.613, which
state:
§ 195.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each
pipeline, a manual for written procedures for conducting operations and
maintenance activities and for emergency response. For transmission
lines, the manual must include procedures for handling abnormal
operations. This manual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at
intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.
This manual must be prepared before operations of a pipeline system
commence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations
where operations and maintenance activities are conducted….
(e) Surveillance, emergency response, and accident investigation.
The procedures required by §§ 192.613(a), 192.615, and 192.617 must be
included in the manual required by paragraph (a) of this section….
29 Response, Exhibit 9.
30 Id.
31 Response, Exhibit 3.



8
§ 192.613 Continuing Surveillance
(a) Each operator shall have a procedure for continuing surveillance
of its facilities to determine and take appropriate action concerning
changes in class location, failures, leakage history, corrosion, substantial
changes in cathodic protection requirements, and other unusual operating
and maintenance conditions.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) and (e) and § 192.613 by
failing to define and implement a specific continuous surveillance program to detect potential
repeat failures at cased crossings along Lines 100, 200, and 300. Specifically, the Notice alleged
that Columbia Gulf failed to have surveillance procedures which would take into account the
similar failures that occurred in 2000, 2001, 2006, and 2007 and implement a specific program
tailored to the cause of the repeated failures or leaks in this area. According to OPS, Columbia
Gulf should have recognized the pattern of failure in cased pipelines and initiated a surveillance
monitoring program to prevent related incidents elsewhere on the three parallel lines. In
response to OPS’s Request for Specific Information, Columbia Gulf provided no evidence of
continuous surveillance procedures or that such surveillance was performed on these parallel
lines to determine if other cased crossings may have had the same type of damage, corrosion, and
risk of failure.32
Response
In response to the Notice, Columbia Gulf stated that “its ongoing high resolution inspections of
the Mainlines, coupled with its instrumented leak detection surveillance program for all cased
pipe, which was in place prior to 2000, were appropriate to prevent recurrences.”33 In addition,
Columbia Gulf stated that it uses facility patrols in Class 1 and 2 areas once per calendar year, at
intervals not to exceed 15 months.34 Columbia Gulf stated that it conducted investigations after
each incident and in the company’s judgment, considered its standard and high resolution
internal pipeline inspection and instrumented leak detection for cased piping to be appropriate
continuous surveillance tools.35
Analysis
Pursuant to § 192.613 and § 192.605, Columbia Gulf was required to have and follow a
procedure for continuing surveillance to determine and take appropriate action concerning
changes in operation and maintenance conditions including failures, leakage history, and
corrosion.
”36
In the Notice, OPS alleged that the operator failed to “define and implement” a
continuous surveillance program specifically designed to detect ongoing corrosion in cased
32 See Request for Specific Information dated January 29, 2008.
33 Response, 17.
34 Notice, 4.
35 Response, 3.
36 49 C.F.R. § 192.613



9
pipelines. I have reviewed the evidence in the case file which includes the Violation Report
exhibits, the documents supplied by Columbia Gulf in response to the Request for Specific
Information, and the documents attached to the Response. I did not find any documentation of
continuous surveillance procedures implemented under § 192.613, other than the procedures
effective December 15, 2007, one day after the 2007 Failure. Since these procedures are dated
after the four incidents, they certainly do not reflect actions that Respondent took in response to
the earlier incidents.
Columbia Gulf argued in its Response that it had conducted continuous surveillance through a
series of maintenance activities such as standard and high resolution internal inspections, leak
detections, and facility patrols, however, none of these activities were incorporated into specific
surveillance procedures under § 192.613. In addition, all three of these safety measures are
already required under the pipeline safety regulations. Columbia Gulf did not accelerate the
timeframe for conducting any of the three activities which further calls into question whether the
company had a continuous surveillance program. Leakage surveys were conducted once per
calendar year at intervals not exceeding 15 months which is the required timeframe under 49
C.F.R. § 192.706. Further, Columbia Gulf cited to right-of-way patrols conducted as a method
of surveillance. However, since the prior incidents occurred in casings it is questionable whether
Respondent could have used routine right-of-way patrols as a method of continuous surveillance.
Finally, Columbia Gulf maintains that it used ILIs as the most accurate and reliable form of
surveillance. However, Respondent performed an ILI on the segment between Delhi and the
Mississippi River in 1996 and not again until after the 2007 Failure. Allowing eleven years to
pass between ILIs, which is supposedly the cornerstone of Respondent’s surveillance program,
calls into question whether Respondent had a defined surveillance program. Moreover, the ILI
completed in January of 2008 was a requirement of the Corrective Action Order issued on
December 19, 2007. If the CAO had not been issued and the ILI was performed as previously
scheduled by the company for the year 2010, fourteen years would have transpired between ILIs
for this line. In fact, the 2008 ILI required by the CAO revealed an immediate repair condition
crossing on the same segment that had failed. Certainly, performing an ILI every eleven to
involving 80% wall loss.37 This anomaly was discovered on the carrier pipe at another cased
fourteen years is not an effective form of surveillance.
Prior to December 2007, Columbia Gulf did not have procedures developed to establish a
concerted plan to identify areas experiencing unusual operating and maintenance conditions.38
Respondent has provided little or no evidence of its continuous surveillance program other than
stating that it relied on ILIs and instrumented leak surveys which do not appear to be part of a
specific plan to identify any pipeline facilities experiencing abnormal or unusual operating
conditions. Accordingly, having reviewed the evidence in the record, I find that Respondent
violated §§ 192.605(a) and 192.613.
37 Violation Report, at 3.
38 The 2007 continuous surveillance procedures which were effective after the 2007 Failure discuss quarterly
instrumented leakage surveillance which is the type of evidence that supports an ongoing continuous surveillance
program.



10
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.605(a), which states:
§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each
pipeline, a manual for written procedures for conducting operations and
maintenance activities and for emergency response. For transmission
lines, the manual must include procedures for handling abnormal
operations. This manual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at
intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.
This manual must be prepared before operations of a pipeline system
commence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations
where operations and maintenance activities are conducted….
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) by failing to follow its
procedures for the investigation of shorted casings. Specifically, Respondent’s procedure
70.01.01 in its O&M manual entitled “External Corrosion Control”, dated March 5, 2007, stated
that “as a general rule, if the potential difference between the casing and the pipeline is over 100
mV, the casing should be considered not shorted….if the potential difference between the casing
and the pipeline is less than 100 mV, the casing will be considered shorted until further testing is
completed to determine its status (clear or shorted)….if the status of the casing is unknown, it
shall be treated as a shorted casing”.39
The last annual potential survey of Line 100 at the Interstate 20 crossing occurred on
June 27, 2007. The readings revealed pipe-to-soil potential of -979 mV and the casing to soil
potential of -879 mV amounting to exactly a 100 mV difference. Respondent’s procedure
notably only covers the potential difference of over 100mV or under 100 mV but is silent as to a
potential difference that is exactly 100 mV. OPS argued that since the status of the casing was
neither shorted nor unshorted under these procedures, the status of this particular casing therefore
must be unknown. Since the operator’s procedures require personnel to treat unknown casings
as shorted necessitating additional testing, OPS asserted that Columbia Gulf should have
performed additional testing with regard to this casing. For shorted casings, the Respondent’s
procedures require “at a minimum, all shorted casings must be monitored with leakage detection
equipment according to Plan 220.03.01, Facility Patrol and Leakage Inspection.”40
Response
In its Response, Columbia Gulf asserted that it had proper O&M procedures and its personnel
handled the casing under these procedures. Columbia Gulf admitted that although the
procedures in place at the time of the 2007 Failure were not a model of clarity, the procedures
did not require an investigation to determine if the casing was metallically shorted. However,
Columbia Gulf stated that it added the casing to a list of shorted casings “that were to be
included in the instrumented continuing surveillance program for shorted casings”.
41
Columbia
39 Response, Exhibit 20, page 7-8.
40 Response, Exhibit 20, page 6.
41 Response, at 6.



11
Gulf also stated that neither the internal investigations of the 2001 and 2006 leaks nor the third-
party analysis of the 2007 pipeline failure revealed that shorted casings caused or contributed to
the 2007 Failure. Since shorted casings were not a contributing factor to the 2007 Failure,
Columbia Gulf alleged that it did not violate its O&M procedures.
Analysis
Upon consideration of all of the evidence and the arguments of the parties, I find that a violation
of § 192.605(a) occurred. I find that the status of the casing was unknown at the time of the
assessment since Columbia Gulf could not determine if it was shorted or unshorted and
Columbia Gulf therefore should have conducted additional testing on this particular casing.
I also find that Columbia Gulf did not conduct the required additional testing and therefore
violated its procedures. The operator’s procedures state that “at a minimum, all shorted casings
must be monitored with leakage detection equipment.”42 I did not find any compelling evidence
in the case file that this additional testing did in fact occur. Columbia Gulf stated in its Response
that the casing had not been tested for leaks; however, it attached a copy of a Leak Detection
Test dated “June 2007” for the “Delhi line”.43 I find that this record does not sufficiently
demonstrate that this testing occurred since it lacks a specific date other than “June 2007” and
fails to state with any specificity which casing was examined. It is also noteworthy that in order
for Columbia Gulf to conduct leak detection testing on this casing in “June 2007”, it would have
had to complete the testing on the two days directly following the assessment since the annual
potential survey of the Interstate 20 crossing occurred on Wednesday, June 27, 2007 and only
three days (two of which were business days) remained in the month of June.
Finally, Columbia Gulf was aware that there was a gap in the procedures and a prudent operator
would have treated an assessment of exactly 100 mV as a shorted casing until further testing
could occur. Based upon the foregoing, I find that there is sufficient evidence to support this
allegation of violation. Accordingly, having reviewed the evidence in the record, I find that
Respondent violated §§ 192.605(a).
ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 per
violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any related series of
violations.
49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225 require that, in determining the amount of the civil
penalty, I consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,
including adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history
42 Response, Exhibit 20, page 6.
43 Columbia Gulf stated in its Response that “…even if the casing had been tested for gas leaks, no leak would have
been detected since there was no evidence that the pitting had penetrated the wall of the pipe”. Response, at 19
(emphasis added); See Response, Exhibit 19 for a copy of the Leak Detection Test.



12
of Respondent’s prior offenses; the Respondent’s ability to pay the penalty and any effect that
the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent
in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the
economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent
damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil
penalty of $1,550,000 for the alleged violations. The Notice proposed a penalty of $760,000
(Item 1) for failing to follow procedures for analyzing the cause of an accident and minimizing
recurrences; a $35,000 civil penalty (Item 2) for failing to establish procedures for a continuous
surveillance program; and a $760,000 civil penalty (Item 3) for failing to investigate a shorted
casing.
Related in a Series Argument
In its Response, Columbia Gulf argued that the proposed civil penalties are for related in a series
of violations and therefore pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, the total civil penalty cannot exceed
$1,000,000. Respondent contends that the violations are related because more than one violation
has been cited in connection with the same incident.
Contrary to Columbia Gulf’s assertion, an operator can be cited for more than one violation in
connection with a single accident or incident. The pipeline safety laws do not require PHMSA to
select only one regulation in an enforcement matter. In exercising its rulemaking authority, a
regulatory agency often establishes numerous different regulatory requirements in the same
subject matter area.44 I am not aware of any court decision or other authority that would force an
agency to enforce only one requirement because citing more than one would make separate
requirements “related” simply because they involve the same subject matter. Rather, the statute
and implementing regulations cap the penalty amount at $1,000,000 for related violations. To be
related, the violations must be based upon the same facts and evidence. The civil penalty cap of
$1,000,000 is used narrowly in two limited cases where either 1) a single violation occurs over
the course of multiple days or 2) violations arise from a continuous, related course of conduct
and require the proof of identical facts and evidence. In the latter situation, both factors must be
met for the $1,000,000 cap to apply.45
In this case, the Notice alleged in Item 1 that Respondent violated the pipeline safety violations
by failing to follow its procedures for investigating incidents. In support of the allegation, OPS
relied on the company’s response to the Request for Specific Information; the procedures entitled
“Incident Evaluation and Investigation”; the procedures entitled “Manual of Approved
Procedures” dated April 12, 1993; Columbia Gulf’s Incident/Failure Reports for 2000 and 2001;
and the company’s failure to make recommendations to avoid a similar incident occurring on its
lines. In Item 2, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to define and implement a continuous
surveillance program in response to past accidents in the same area that were all caused by
external corrosion. In support of this violation, OPS cited to Columbia Gulf’s Continuing
44 The Code of Federal Regulations is organized into Parts, Subparts, and other subdivisions which often involve a
single subject area.
45 In the Matter of Colorado Interstate Gas Company, CPF No. 5-2008-1005 (November 23, 2008) (available at
www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/enforcement).



13
Surveillance procedures and its Mainline High Resolution Internal Inspection report (Exhibit 2 to
Response). Finally, in Item 3, the Notice alleged that Columbia Gulf failed to follow its
procedures for examining shorted casings. In support of this allegation, OPS cited to
Respondent’s External Corrosion Control procedures.
In all three items, OPS cited to different procedures to support each alleged violation. The
alleged violations do not arise from a continuous, related course of conduct but rather they are
based on distinct conduct: 1) failure to follow incident evaluation and investigation procedures;
2) failure to define and implement a continuous surveillance program; and 3) failure to
investigate a shorted casing. Therefore, these three items cannot be considered ‘related in a
series’ since they do not arise from a continuous, related course of conduct or require proof of
identical facts and evidence. It is of no consequence that these three violations arise out of a
single pipeline failure. Therefore, the $1,000,000 cap does not apply to this enforcement matter.
Civil Penalty Assessments
With respect to Item 1, the Notice proposed a penalty of $760,000 for Respondent’s violation of
§§192.605(a) and (e) and 192.617 for failing to follow procedures for analyzing the cause of
accidents for the purpose of minimizing a recurrence. As stated above, it was determined that
Columbia Gulf did not violate § 192.617 with respect to the 2000 incident. Therefore, the civil
penalty is reduced on this basis.
Columbia Gulf experienced four incidents on these lines related to corrosion since the year 2000
and failed to make recommendations to avoid repeat failures. Moreover, this violation occurred
over a series of years, involving multiple incidents. Corrosion is one of the major causes of
pipeline failure and can lead to leaks, ruptures, and explosions, presenting a major safety threat
to the public and environment. The 2007 Failure involved property damage, injuries, and a
fatality. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I
assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $736,500 for violating 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.605(a) and
(e) and 192.617.
With respect to Item 2, the Notice proposed a penalty of $35,000 for Respondent’s violation of
§ 192.605(a) and (e) and 192.613 for failing to define and implement a specific program of
continuing surveillance to detect the possibility that similar types of failures could occur at cased
crossings, in light of the 2000, 2001, 2006, and 2007 failures. It is particularly relevant that
Columbia Gulf had a series of similar incidents involving similar coating on the same lines in the
same area and failed to take more affirmative steps to monitor the situation. Developing criteria
for surveillance provides an important mechanism for considering the risks of unusual operating
conditions. Respondent has presented no information that would warrant a reduction in the civil
penalty amount proposed in the Notice for this violation. Having reviewed the record and
considered the assessment criteria, I have determined that the proposed civil penalty of $35,000
is appropriate. Accordingly, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $35,000 for violating 49
C.F.R. §§ 192.605(a) and (e) and 192.613.
With respect to Item 3, the Notice proposed a penalty of $760,000 for Respondent’s violation of
49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) for failing to follow its procedures for the investigation of shorted
casings. Although I have determined that a violation did occur, I examined Columbia Gulf’s



14
arguments that this proposed civil penalty should be reduced on account of gravity. I did not
find that Columbia Gulf’s failure to investigate a shorted casing was a contributing factor to the
2007 Incident. The only evidence of causation in the case file is the metallurgist report that
stated that the Incident was caused by moisture in the atmosphere and standing water in the
pipe.
Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $35,000 for violating 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.605(a).
46 Therefore, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess
Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each
violation, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $806,500.
Payment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations
(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require this payment be made by wire transfer, through the Federal
Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed
instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be
directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMZ-341), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike
Monroney Aeronautical Center, P.O. Box 269039, Oklahoma City, OK 73125. The phone
number for the Financial Operations Division is (405) 954-8893.
Failure to pay the $806,500 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual
rate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to
those same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if
payment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty
may result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a United
States District Court.
Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of
this Final Order. The petition must be received within 20 days of Respondent’s receipt of this
Final Order and must contain a brief statement of the issue(s). The filing of the petition
automatically stays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. All other terms of the Order,
including any required corrective action and amendment of procedures, remain in full effect
unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay. The terms and conditions of this
Final Order shall be effective upon receipt.
___________________________________ __________________
Jeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
46 Response, Exhibit 1, page 30.

## Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420091005>
- Source ID: `phmsa-enforcement`
- SHA-256: `d46fc33a507d998222174be14883b1400259c2c5816c5b3f68a4bab8acf282ce`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:44:44.458Z
- Exported: 2026-08-22T23:11:26.803Z
- Document slug: `phmsa-enforcement-420091005`

### Source metadata

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```