# WEST TEXAS GULF PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation

**Citation:** CPF 420165022  
**Type / status:** enforcement / historical  
**Agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  
**Effective:** Not stated  
**Published:** 2016-07-07

CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.204, 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(13), 195.402(c)(3), 195.402(c)(5), 195.402(c)(6), 195.402(e)(9), 195.505, 195.505(a), 195.505(b), 195.505(d), 199.105(b), 199.225(a)(1).

## Document text

Notice of Probable Violation involving WEST TEXAS GULF PIPELINE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.204,  195.402(a),  195.402(c)(13),  195.402(c)(3),  195.402(c)(5),  195.402(c)(6),  195.402(e)(9),  195.505,  195.505(a),  195.505(b),  195.505(d),  199.105(b),  199.225(a)(1). The case was opened on 2016-07-07 and is reported as closed as of 2019-12-09. Proposed civil penalty: $1,539,800. Assessed civil penalty: $1,019,200. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

420165022_Corrected Final Order_12092019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_Corrected%20Final%20Order_12092019.pdf

420165022_Corrected Final Order_12092019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_Corrected%20Final%20Order_12092019_text.pdf

420165022_Final Order_11082019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_Final%20Order_11082019.pdf

420165022_Final Order_11082019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_Final%20Order_11082019_text.pdf

420165022_NOPV PCP PCO_07072016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_07072016.pdf

420165022_NOPV PCP PCO_07072016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_07072016_text.pdf

420165022_Operator Response to Notice and Request for Hearing_08042016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/420165022/420165022_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20and%20Request%20for%20Hearing_08042016.pdf

420165022_Final Order_11082019_text.pdf

November 8, 2019
Mr. Kelcy L. Warren
Chief Executive Officer
Energy Transfer Partners, LP
8111 Westchester Drive
Dallas, Texas 75225
Re: CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Dear Mr. Warren:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case to your subsidiary,
Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP. It withdraws three allegations of violation, makes other findings
of violation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $1,019,200, and withdraws the proposed
compliance order. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil
penalty has been paid, as determined by the Director, Southwest Region, this enforcement action
will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is effective upon the date of mailing,
as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Mary McDaniel, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
__________________________________________
In the Matter of )
Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP, ) CPF No. 4-2016-5022
a subsidiary of Energy Transfer Partners, LP, )
)
)
)
Respondent. )
__________________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
From March to September 2015, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),
conducted an accident investigation of the facilities and records of Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP
(Respondent), in Wortham, Texas. Sunoco owned1 the West Texas Gulf Pipeline Company
(WTG), a 26-inch, 580-mile pipeline system that transports crude oil from Colorado City to
Longview, Texas, with additional delivery points along the Gulf Coast. On March 4, 2015,
following an information request from the public, OPS initiated an investigation into an accident
at Respondent’s Wortham facility in Texas. On or about February 19, 2013, vapors ignited while
welders were performing a pipeline modification, resulting in a serious injury.
As a result of the investigation, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to
Respondent, by letter dated July 7, 2016, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty,
and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice
proposed finding that Sunoco committed violations of 49 C.F.R. Parts 195 and 199 and proposed
assessing a civil penalty of $1,539,800 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed
ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.
Sunoco responded to the Notice by letter dated August 4, 2016 (Response). Sunoco contested all
of the allegations, offered additional information in response to the Notice, and requested a
hearing. A hearing was subsequently held on March 28, 2017, in Houston, Texas, with an
attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. At the hearing, Respondent was
represented by counsel.
1 At the time of the accident, Sunoco owned WTG. On April 28, 2017, Energy Transfer Partners (ETP) and Sunoco
Logistics Partners merged. This pipeline is now fully owned by Energy Transfer Partners (ETP). See
https://ir.energytransfer.com/news-releases/news-release-details/sunoco-logistics-partners-and-energy-transfer-
partners-announce/. (last accessed October 1, 2019).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 2
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Parts 195 and 199, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.204, which states:
§ 195.204 Inspection–general.
Inspection must be provided to ensure that the installation of pipe or
pipeline systems is in accordance with the requirements of this subpart. Any
operator personnel used to perform the inspection must be trained and
qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected. An operator must not
use operator personnel to perform a required inspection if the operator
personnel performed the construction task requiring inspection. Nothing in
this section prohibits the operator from inspecting construction tasks with
operator personnel who are involved in other construction tasks.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.204 by failing to ensure that the
operator personnel, or third-party inspector, that it used to perform inspections was trained and
qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected. On the day of the accident, Respondent’s
third-party contractor, Sprint Pipeline Services (Sprint), was tying in a 50-foot section of pipe.
Mustang Engineering (Mustang) was overseeing the construction work as a third-party inspector.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Mr. Tolbert (Mustang employee) was performing
inspections on February 18-19, 2013, despite the fact that he was neither trained nor qualified in
the construction tasks being performed.
At the hearing, Sunoco acknowledged that it was unable to present any evidence that Mr. Tolbert
was qualified at the time of OPS’ accident investigation. However, Sunoco produced some
evidence in support of its contention that Mr. Tolbert was trained to the regulatory standard.
First, Sunoco noted that OPS’ investigator, Ms. Molly Atkins, had attached Mr. Tolbert’s 2010
resume to the Violation Report. This resume lists various qualifications. Second, Sunoco
pointed to a deposition transcript2 that discusses the general process that Mustang used to qualify
its inspectors. It argued that, even if it was not able to produce any direct evidence linking this
process to Mr. Tolbert, given the time frame of the inspection services (February 18-19, 2013),
Mr. Tolbert would have undergone a training and qualification process. Third, Respondent
stated that its contract with Mustang required them to ensure that its inspectors were
appropriately qualified.
OPS countered that Sunoco is ultimately responsible for ensuring that its personnel, including its
third-party contractors, are “trained and qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected.”
Sunoco provided no direct evidence that Mr. Tolbert was qualified to oversee the work being
performed on February 18-19, 2013. While the regulation does not require an operator to have a
specific qualification process, it must ensure that its personnel are “trained and qualified” to the
task by establishing a standardized process that itemizes the training and qualification process for
2Sunoco presented evidence throughout the hearing that was produced pursuant to a third-party civil litigation
related to the Wortham accident. This litigation will be referred to as “the Talbot litigation.”



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 3
different construction phases. Despite the fact that Sunoco was able to produce Mr. Tolbert’s
resume and provide evidence that it established an inspector vetting process around the time of
the accident, it has no direct evidence that Mustang (or Sunoco) followed any process to
establish Mr. Tolbert’s qualifications for the specific phases of work that he was overseeing on
February 18-19, 2013.3 In its Post-Hearing Brief, Sunoco focuses on the phase of construction
(demagnetization) that was occurring at the time of the accident. However, the Notice alleges,
and I agree, that Mr. Tolbert was required to be properly qualified for all of the phases of
construction that he was overseeing on February 18-19, 2013.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Sunoco failed to ensure that the
operator personnel used to perform inspections were trained and qualified in the phases of
construction to be inspected.
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(13) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator personnel to
determine the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and
maintenance and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13) by failing to follow its
own procedures for periodically reviewing its work and determining the effectiveness of the
procedures used in normal operation and maintenance and taking corrective action where
deficiencies are found. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to follow these
procedures at the Wortham facility: Hot Work Procedure HS-P-009, Lockout-Tagout Program
HS-P-005, and Overview of Work Permits Procedure HS-G-012. Each procedure required
Sunoco to conduct evaluations at certain intervals to ascertain whether Hot Work,
Lockout/Tagout (LOTO), and Work Permit procedures were being followed. During OPS’
3 “Mr. Herring: Right, he didn’t specifically mention Mr. Tolbert…What we have available is Mustang’s
representations of the process that they followed (Hearing Transcript, at 44).”



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 4
yearlong investigation4, Sunoco was unable to provide any records for the Wortham facility that
demonstrated it performed these evaluations.
At the hearing, Sunoco produced records that it claimed were discovered in paper form just prior
to the hearing. These included: (1) a collection of executed permits (Hearing Exhibit 1) and (2) a
collection of lockout-tagout inspection checklists (Hearing Exhibit 2). In the Regional Director’s
written evaluation of the response material submitted in the Post-Hearing Brief, the Director
noted that Exhibit 1 does not indicate whether the required audit occurred or include the required
review. After reviewing the documents submitted in these exhibits, the Director stated that each
form either lacked specific detail or was not signed by authorized representatives.
After conducting a review of these documents and Sunoco’s own procedures, I find that Sunoco
did not fully comply with any of these procedures. The Respondent argues that, as an unmanned
facility, Wortham was not required to comply with the annual evaluation requirements
enumerated in these three procedures. I do not agree. The procedures themselves do not include
an exception for unmanned facilities, and there is no question that the Wortham facility did not
conduct an evaluation of the Hot Work Procedure in 2013. In addition, as noted by the Director,
the evaluations that were submitted appear incomplete (unsigned).
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13) by failing to follow its own procedures for periodically reviewing its
work and determining the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and
maintenance and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(e) Emergencies. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include procedures for the following to provide safety when an
emergency condition occurs:
(1) ….
(9) Providing for a post accident review of employee activities to
determine whether the procedures were effective in each emergency and
taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
4 The investigation was initiated on March 4, 2015, and continued until issuance of the Notice on July 7, 2016.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 5
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(e)(9) by failing to follow its
own procedures to provide for a post-accident review of employee activities to determine
whether the procedures were effective in an emergency and taking corrective action where
deficiencies are found. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to conduct a review
following the Wortham accident to determine whether its procedures were effective or to take
any corrective action. Sunoco’s procedure OPER-PR-002 (Paragraph 4.3.3), Spill Reporting,
Root Cause Analysis and Documentation, required Sunoco to prepare a Serious Incident
Investigation Report (SII) following the Wortham accident. Pursuant to the SII, Sunoco was to
develop a “Lessons Learned” document that complies with § 195.402(e)(9), or “provide(s) for a
post-accident review of employee activities to determine whether the procedures were effective
in each emergency and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.” However, at the
time of OPS’ inspection, Mr. Todd Nardozzi, Compliance Manager, Sunoco, stated that Sunoco
had never completed a “Lessons Learned” document.5
At the hearing and in its Post-Hearing Brief, Sunoco acknowledged that it never developed a
“Lessons Learned” document and therefore failed to follow its own procedure.6 However, it
contended that Item 3 was duplicative of the allegation in Item 4 and relies on the same failure to
follow OPER-PR-002, or to prepare a complete and accurate Serious Incident Investigation
Report for the Wortham accident. I will discuss this argument further in the discussion of Item
4. However, this Item alleges, and I so find, that Sunoco failed to complete its Serious Incident
Investigation Report, an integral part of complying with the regulatory requirement to conduct a
post-accident review.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(e)(9) by failing to follow its own procedures to provide a post-accident review
of employee activities to determine whether its procedures were effective and taking corrective
action where deficiencies were found.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
5 Violation Report, at 22.
6 “Mr. Dunleavy: We have not located a lessons-learned (Transcript, at 76).”



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 6
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(5) Analyzing pipeline accidents to determine their causes.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(5) by failing to follow its
own procedures for analyzing pipeline accidents to determine their causes. Specifically, the
Notice alleged that the Respondent failed to perform a complete analysis into the cause of the
accident, as required by OPER-PR-002. This procedure comprises 11 pages and “defines the
process by which spills are reported and documented.” The Notice alleges that the operator
failed to comply in the following ways: (1) failure to provide complete and accurate photographs
from the accident scene, as required by OPER-PR-002, Section 4.2; and (2) failure to assemble
an investigation team composed of cross functional employees, as required by OPER-PR-002,
Paragraph 4.3.3. The Notice also alleges various failures to adequately evaluate the Project
Work Plan.
At the hearing, the Respondent did not contend that it abided by OPER-PR-002. However, it
stated that § 195.402(e)(9) and § 195.402(c)(5) required the same post-accident review and
therefore Sunoco’s collective failure to follow the procedure should constitute a single violation.
OPS argued that § 195.402(e)(9) and § 195.402(c)(5) required the completion of different
analyses. Item 3 focused on Sunoco’s failure to complete a Lessons Learned document that
would have put Sunoco into compliance with the required post-accident review (§ 195.402(e)(9))
when an emergency condition occurs (emphasis added). Item 4, however, (§ 195.402(c)(5))
focuses on Sunoco’s failure to analyze the cause of this accident pursuant to its manual for
maintenance and normal operations (emphasis added). In OPS’ view, Items 3 and 4 are
therefore properly the basis of two separate violations of two separate procedures required by
different parts of § 195.402.
Admittedly, Item 4 refers to Sunoco’s failure to complete the Lessons Learned document (Item
3) and how this failure also violates § 195.402(c)(5). Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932) requires a determination of whether there are two offenses or only one. 7 The
relevant test is to determine whether the multiple alleged violations “each require proof of any
additional fact or have their own ‘evidentiary basis.’”8 I find that there is a separate evidentiary
basis for Item 4 – apart from the failure to complete the Lessons Learned document.
The Violation Report details multiple instances where Sunoco failed to follow its own procedural
requirements. Simply because these actions are required by the same 11-page procedure that
also required the “Lessons Learned” document does not mean that Sunoco’s failure cannot form
the basis of separate violations. In this case, there are two separate acts, including: (1) failure to
provide complete and accurate photographs from the accident scene, as required by OPER-PR-
002, Section 4.2; and (2) failure to assemble an investigation team composed of cross functional
7 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
8 In re Colo. Interstate Gas, Final Order, CPF No. 5-2008-1005, 2009 WL 5538649, at **11-13 (D.O.T Nov. 23,
2009).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 7
employees, as required by OPER-PR-002, Paragraph 4.3.3. These acts are separate from the
“act” of failing to complete the Lessons Learned document.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(5) by failing to follow its own procedures for analyzing pipeline accidents to
determine their causes.
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(6) Minimizing the potential for hazards identified under paragraph
(c)(4) of this section and the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed
under paragraph (c)(5) of this section.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(6) by failing to prepare and
follow its own procedure for minimizing the potential for hazards identified under paragraph
(c)(4) and the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed under paragraph (c)(5).
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco’s procedure OPER-PR-002 (Paragraph 4.3.3), Spill
Reporting, Root Cause Analysis and Documentation, required Sunoco to take prompt remedial
action to minimize the possibility of accident recurrence. In 2009, Sunoco experienced an
accident on the West Texas Gulf Pipeline in Colorado City. In the Violation Report, OPS stated
that the circumstances of the 2009 Colorado City accident were similar in nature to the 2013
Wortham accident in the following ways: failure (1) to make required notice to the NRC; (2) to
timely submit a Form 7000-1; (3) to take corrective actions where deficiencies were found in
determining the effectiveness of procedures; (4) to perform annual audits of work processes; (5)
to prevent ignition of vapors; (6) to properly isolate or make safe for welding, cutting, and
associated hot work activities; and (7) to follow operating and maintenance procedures. On
account of the 2009 Colorado City accident, a Final Order was issued to Sunoco on August 1,
2012.9 It found that Sunoco, among other things, failed to follow its procedures and adequately
9 See In the Matter of Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP, Final Order, CPF No. 4-2010-5010 (Aug. 1, 2012). Decision
on Petition for Reconsideration (Dec. 31, 2012).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 8
investigate the accident.
At the hearing, Sunoco stated that the Colorado City and Wortham accidents were different in
nature and circumstance, despite the fact that both accidents involved a failure to follow
procedures during hot work,10 leading to a fire that caused injuries. Sunoco stated that the
Wortham accident happened solely due to human error, or the fact that its contractor personnel
failed to properly ground his equipment. In Colorado City, the explosion occurred when vapors
passed through a mud plug during welding, allowing the explosion to occur. In its view, there
was nothing in the 2009 Colorado City accident to learn from that would have prevented the
2013 Wortham accident because the contractor employee simply made a mistake in the latter
accident. Given these differences, the Respondent argued that OPS did not meet its burden of
proving that, even if Sunoco had identified the issues in Colorado City, that the Wortham
accident would not have occurred.11
This regulation does not require OPS to prove that the failures in Colorado City and Wortham
are identical, or even largely similar. It simply requires that, when an operator experiences a
failure, it take steps to minimize the potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) of
§ 195.402 and the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed under (c)(5) of § 195.402.
§ 195.402 (c)(4) requires that an operator’s manual for maintenance and normal operations
include a procedure for “Determining which pipeline facilities are located in areas that would
require an immediate response by the operator to prevent hazards to the public if the facilities
failed or malfunctioned.” Section 195.402 (c)(5) requires that an operator’s manual for
maintenance and normal operations include a procedure for “Analyzing pipeline accidents to
determine their causes.” Sunoco’s procedure OPER-PR-002 (Paragraph 4.3.3), Spill Reporting,
Root Cause Analysis and Documentation is the procedure that Sunoco implemented to fulfill the
regulatory requirements of § 195.402 (c)(5).
OPS argued that Sunoco’s failure to perform a root cause analysis following the 2009 accident
allowed the Wortham accident to occur because Sunoco failed to complete its Serious Incident
Investigation or its Lessons Learned document in order to properly minimize the potential for
future hazards, as required by § 195.402(c)(6). I agree. It is enough that OPS establish that
Sunoco failed to take any action, as required by OPER-PR-002, to produce a complete root cause
failure analysis following the Colorado City accident. If Sunoco had completed this analysis, it
could have argued that it fulfilled its obligation to minimize the potential for a future incident. It
is evident that Sunoco failed to take any action following the Colorado City accident to minimize
the potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) or the possibility of recurrence of
accidents analyzed under paragraph (c)(5).
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(6) by failing to prepare and follow its own procedure for minimizing the
10 Hot work is any work that involves burning, welding, using fire- or spark-producing tools, or that produces a
source of ignition. See https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/oilandgas/general safety/hot work welding html (last
accessed October 1, 2019).
11 Mr. Nordozzi (Senior Manager, DOT Compliance): “There wasn’t a failure of the mud plug itself like we saw in
Colorado City where the vapors passed by vapor barrier. So I think that’s the distinction between the two that we
are trying to illustrate.” (Transcript, at 74).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 9
potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) and the possibility of recurrence of
accidents analyzed under paragraph (c)(5).
Item 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b), which states:
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The program shall include provisions to:
(a) ….
(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks
are qualified;
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b) by failing to have and
follow a written qualification program with provisions to ensure through evaluation that
individuals performing covered tasks are qualified. Specifically, the Notice alleged that two
welders directly involved in the Wortham accident did not have proper qualifications.
At the hearing, Sunoco stated that its welders were properly qualified to weld despite the fact
that their ISNetworld records showed that their qualifications were expired. Sunoco’s written
Operator Qualification procedures, Section 5.3, detail requalification frequency and afford a
three-month grace period (beyond the standard 36 months). It is undisputed that both welders
were within the three-month grace period. OPS argued that ISNetworld, the record keeper for
Sunoco’s OQ records, does not permit a three-month grace period, and therefore both welders
were unqualified at the time of the accident.
Despite the contradiction between the procedures and the ISNetworld records, the Respondent
was not out of compliance, per its own procedures. Both welders were within the three-month
grace period. Based upon the foregoing, I hereby order that Item 6 be withdrawn.
Item 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(d):
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The program shall include provisions to:
(a) ….
(d) Evaluate an individual if the operator has reason to believe that the
individual's performance of a covered task contributed to an accident as
defined in Part 195;
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(d) by failing to have and
follow a written qualification program with provisions to evaluate an individual if the operator
has reason to believe that the individual’s performance of a covered task contributed to an
accident, as defined in Part 195. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco allowed Mr. Vern
Tolbert, Mr. Waymen Casey, and Mr. Danny Tant, all of whom were involved in the February
19 accident, to complete tie-in welds on February 20, 2013 (the day after the accident), without
conducting the requisite evaluation into their performance.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 10
At the hearing, Sunoco argued that this violation is duplicative of Item 6, relies on the same
regulatory provision, and involves the same qualification issues. As stated above, I withdrew
Item 6, rendering the duplication issue moot.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.505(d) by failing to have and follow a written qualification program with
provisions to evaluate an individual if the operator has reason to believe that the individual’s
performance of a covered task contributed to an accident, as defined in Part 195.
Item 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b), which states:
§ 199.105 Drug tests required.
Each operator shall conduct the following drug tests for the presence of
a prohibited drug:
(a) ….
(b) Post-accident testing. As soon as possible but no later than 32 hours
after an accident, an operator must drug test each surviving covered
employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to
the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to
the accident. An operator may decide not to test under this paragraph but
such a decision must be based on specific information that the covered
employee's performance had no role in the cause(s) or severity of the
accident.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b) by failing to conduct post-
accident drug testing for each surviving covered employee whose performance of a covered
function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing
factor to the accident. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco reported on PHMSA Form
7000-1 that it did not conduct any testing on employees or contractors following the Wortham
accident. Sunoco also did not justify its decision not to test based on specific information that
the covered employee’s performance had no role in the cause or severity of the Wortham
accident.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation.
Accordingly, based upon a review of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 199.105(b) by failing to conduct post-accident drug testing for each surviving covered
employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot
be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident.
Item 9: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.225, which states in
relevant part:
§ 199.225 Alcohol tests required.
Each operator must conduct the following types of alcohol tests for the
presence of alcohol:
(a) Post-accident.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 11
(1) As soon as practicable following an accident, each operator must test
each surviving covered employee for alcohol if that employee's
performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or
cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident.
The decision not to administer a test under this section must be based on
specific information that the covered employee's performance had no role
in the cause(s) or severity of the accident.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.225(a)(1) by failing to conduct
post-accident alcohol testing for each surviving covered employee for alcohol if that employee's
performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely
discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco
did not perform any post-accident alcohol testing following the Wortham accident or justify the
decision not to conduct testing.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 199.225(a)(1) by failing to conduct post-accident alcohol testing for each surviving
covered employee for alcohol if that employee's performance of a covered function either
contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the
accident.
Item 10: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance
with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to include
procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each
of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 12
Control). Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco did not have a procedure for the
installation and operation of bentonite mud plugs that were installed on this Project.
At the hearing, Sunoco presented a recommended practice (RP)12 that it contended met the
regulatory requirement for two reasons. First, Sunoco asserted that the RP was compulsory, as it
was included in its contract with the subcontractor performing the work and the contractor
treated the RP as a procedure. In addition, the Respondent pointed to deposition testimony in
which the subcontractor discussed the RP and verified that it was followed.
OPS declined to treat the RP as a procedure and maintains that Item 10 should be upheld as a
violation. During the hearing, I questioned Respondent’s counsel about whether and how an RP
constitutes a procedure. I am not convinced that, simply because the RP was presented to the
contractor as compulsory for this project, Respondent achieved regulatory compliance. Sunoco
must have a procedure (not an RP) that is prepared and followed for its pipeline system. Even if
I accept that the RP was compulsory for this project, that does not meet the regulatory
requirement, which requires that there be a procedure for Sunoco’s pipeline system as a whole.
In its Post-Hearing brief, Sunoco also argues that it was not required to have a procedure for the
installation of mud plugs. I disagree. At the hearing, both parties agreed that operators must
have a procedure to isolate hot zones from potential vapors and that mud plugs are one way to
achieve such isolation. During the hearing, the Regional Director stated: “[E]very operator, I
would think – feel free to contradict me – would have a way of isolating work areas from the
product. That’s a common thing. Mr. Dresh (Sunoco, Director of Integrity Projects): I agree a
hundred percent with that statement…”13 It is not necessary for every operator to have a
procedure for the installation of mud plugs. However, once Sunoco determined that it would use
mud plugs as an isolation device, it was required to have a procedure. Since I find that the RP
was not a procedure for the purposes of determining compliance with § 195.402(c)(3), I find that
Respondent did not achieve regulatory compliance.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to include procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing
the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and
Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion Control).
Item 11: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
12 Fire Clay mudpack RP dated 5/30/08.
13 Transcript, at 133.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 13
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance
with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to follow
procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each
of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion
Control). Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to follow seven items in its Hot
Work Procedure HS-P-009 during the work performed at Wortham from 2012-2013 (Items
11(a)-(g)). These items alleged that the Respondent:
(a) Did not ensure that Hot Work permits were issued for all time frames and applicable
activities related to cutting, removing and replacing a 50-foot section of pipe between
February 18 and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated Wortham facility as required
by Section 3.0;
(b) Delegated the responsibility to issue Hot Work permits to the Contract Inspector who was
not trained or qualified in evaluating the hazards, air monitoring, fire prevention, and
monitoring, or issuing Hot Work Permits in accordance with the SPLP Hot Work
procedure;
(c) Failed to coordinate corrective measures with Health, Environment, and Safety (HES)
personnel to address the deficiencies in the Work Permit system;
(d) Did not provide a copy of the HS-P-009 procedure to its contractor or contractor
personnel or ensure they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the
procedure to enable them to adhere to the SPLP Hot Work Permit Procedures;
(e) Failed to ensure that continuous atmospheric monitoring, or monitoring frequently
enough to detect hazardous vapors was occurring in the area where the Hot Work was
being performed on the removal and replacement of the 50-foot section of pipe between
February 18 and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated Wortham facility;
(f) Failed to ensure that a trained fire watch was assigned during all times that Hot Work was
being performed on the removal and replacement of the 50-foot section of pipe between
February 18 and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated Wortham facility; and
(g) Failed to perform an adequate evaluation of the Hot Work/Work Permit procedures or
observation of active tasks to identify that failures of its processes were occurring.
The Respondent presented evidence that contradicted the specific allegations set forth in the
Notice, or 11(b) - (g). The majority of Respondent’s supporting evidence is deposition testimony
from the Talbot litigation between Sunoco and an injured third-party contractor. This litigation



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 14
produced deposition testimony14 that the Respondent is using here for the purposes of rebutting
this (and other) allegations. I will note here that this accident occurred in 2013, the Talbot
litigation was initiated in March 2014, and OPS began its investigation in March 2015. The
Violation Report states that OPS interviewed Mr. Thomas Bushong (former Sunoco employee
and initial on-site Incident Commander) and Mr. Danny Tant (Sprint welder involved in the
accident). Both stated that there was no fire watch at the site or continuous monitoring for
vapors at the time of the accident. 15 The Respondent states that the deposition testimony is
sufficient to rebut these allegations. However, I am affording higher evidentiary value to the
specific statements of the individuals who were present at the time of the accident and were
interviewed by OPS. There was no reason for Mr. Bushong or Mr. Tant to dissemble during
OPS’ investigation – and I find this testimony more credible than the deposition testimony relied
upon by the Respondent, which was given during civil litigation where the Respondent was
defending itself against claims of negligence.
There was no specific rebuttal of the allegation included in 11(a), that Hot Work permits were
not issued for all time frames and for all applicable activities. Therefore, I find that Respondent
violated 11(a). As for 11(b), that the Respondent delegated the responsibility to issue Hot Work
permits to Mr. Tolbert, who was not trained or qualified, I found in Item 1 that Mr. Tolbert was
not properly qualified. Therefore, the Respondent did delegate this responsibility to an
unqualified person. 11(c) alleged that the Respondent failed to coordinate corrective measures
with HES. In its Post-Hearing Brief, Respondent alludes to the fact that “if there were
deficiencies to address it would have been evaluated and addressed as part of that process (the
566 inspections Sunoco conducted in year 2012). This is insufficient to rebut the specific
allegation found in 11(c) regarding the coordination with HES. 11(d) alleges that Sunoco did not
provide a copy of the HS-P-009 procedure to its contractor or contractor personnel or ensure they
were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the procedure to enable them to adhere to
the SPLP Hot Work Permit Procedures. The Respondent rebuts this allegation by referring to
deposition testimony that states that all procedures were provided to the contractors pursuant to
their onboarding. As I have discussed above, I find that the testimony and evidence in the
Violation Report is more persuasive since it was obtained from the contractor personnel directly
involved in this accident. I also find that the Respondent failed to ensure that continuous
atmospheric monitoring, or monitoring frequently enough to detect hazardous vapors was
occurring in the area where the Hot Work was being performed on the removal and replacement
of the 50-foot section of pipe between February 18 and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated
Wortham facility (11(e)). I find that the Respondent failed to ensure that trained fire watch was
assigned during all times that Hot Work was being performed on the removal and replacement of
the 50-foot section of pipe between February 18 and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated
Wortham facility (11(f)). Lastly, notwithstanding the Respondent’s submittal, I find that there is
no direct evidence that it performed an adequate evaluation of the Hot Work and Work Permit
14 Mr. Gust (Mustang corporate representative) stated that “Mustang affirmatively marketed to Sunoco . . . that
Mustang is familiar with all applicable federal, state, and local permit requirements, project specifications and
applicable codes.” Transcript, at 44. Mr. Waymond Casey (Superintendent, Sprint Pipeline) stated that “Sprint went
through and physically inspected the locations of the events. We know that there was monitoring going on and that
they had, at least preliminarily, tests for any vapors that were passing around the mud plug.” Transcript, at 85.
15 Violation Report, at 80.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 15
procedures or observed active tasks to identify that failures of its processes were occurring. The
Violation Report includes persuasive testimony from both employees and contractors that were
present at the time of the accident that the foregoing procedures actions were not taken.
The Respondent also argued that, because of the overlap between the requirements of the work
permit and the hot work permit, that Items 11 and 12 should constitute one violation.16 After
reviewing both permits, I acknowledge that the work permit and the hot work permit are one
document, albeit with different requirements. Nonetheless, as pointed out by OPS in its written
evaluation, “they are two distinct procedures with a variety of procedural differences between
them.”17 Below, I address this argument in greater detail.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to follow its Hot Work Procedure.
Item 12: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance
with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to follow
procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each
of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion
Control). Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to follow nine separate items (12 (a)
– (i)) in its work permit issuance procedure, HS-G-012. These items alleged that the
16 “To the extent that the allegations for Alleged Violation 11 are the same as Alleged Violation …and are not
withdrawn as requested due to PHMSA’s failure to meet its burden of proof, then, consistent with Blockburger and
Colorado Interstate Gas Company, they should be withdrawn from Alleged Violation 11 because they allege facts
duplicative of those already found in Alleged Violations 1, 2, or 12.” Operator Post Hearing Brief, at 22.
17 Regional Recommendation, at 9.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 16
Respondent:
(a) Did not ensure Work Permits were issued for all time frames and applicable activities
related to cutting, removing and replacing a 50-foot section of pipe between February 18
and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated Wortham facility as required by Section 3.0
General Requirements;
(b) Failed to designate a Qualified Person to issue and monitor the Work Permit as required
by Section 5.0 Procedure/Process;
(c) Failed to coordinate corrective measures with HES to address the deficiencies in the
Work Permit system identified after the 2010 accident;
(d) Did not provide a copy of the HS-G-012 procedure to its contractor or contractor
personnel or ensure they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the
procedure to enable them to adhere to the SPLP Hot Work Permit Procedures;
(e) Did not ensure that the Work Permits described and authorized the specific work planned
by employees or contractors. The description of the work, “Shut Down Work Continue-
Cold Cut, Welding, Bolting Up” was so general in nature it did not allow a proper hazard
evaluation or identify all of the tasks to be performed for the timeframe in which the
accident occurred;
(f) Failed to ensure that the Work Permit addressed the LOTO Program HS-P-005, and did
not provide a copy of the procedure to the personnel performing the work at the time of
the accident;
(g) Failed to ensure that the Work Permit, as issued, correctly identified the hazards. The
Work Permit 418311 issued on February 19, 2013, clearly indicated that the Equipment
Status was “Drained, Depressured, Safe to Open, Contains Oil, LO/TO” by the checked
boxes. There was no indication of the actual condition of the piping;
(h) Failed to perform an adequate evaluation of the Work Permit procedures of observation
of active tasks to identify that these failure of its processes were occurring; and
(i) Failed to maintain the Work Permit records in accordance with its procedure.
Sunoco contested 12 (a), (b), (c), (d), (h) and (i), largely through deposition testimony from the
Talbot litigation. It is difficult to ascertain OPS’ position on the specific factual evidence
presented at the hearing because it is not explicitly addressed in the Region Recommendation. In
addition, the specific factual allegations involved in this Item are repeated in Item 11, casting
significant doubt on whether there are two offenses or only one.18 The Respondent has proffered
enough evidence in support of its contention that the same acts and omissions are involved.
Therefore, I find that Items 11 and 12 have the same evidentiary bases. Accordingly, both Items
should constitute one violation.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I withdraw this allegation of violation.
Item 13: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
18 See, In the matter of Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 2009 WL 5538649, CPF No. 5-2008-1005 (Nov. 23, 2009).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
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emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance
with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to follow its
procedure for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each
of the requirements of this Subpart and Subpart H of this part. Specifically, the Notice alleged
that Sunoco failed to follow twelve provisions in its procedure, Lockout/Tagout Program HS-P-
005. These items alleged that the Respondent:
(a) Failed to perform an annual audit or compliance verification after an accident that
involved a failure of the LOTO Program at the Wortham facility;
(b) Failed to identify and control the energy source that resulted in serious injury to a welder
during the project activities;
(c) Failed to provide a copy of the HS-P-005 procedure to its contractor or contractor
personnel or ensure they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the
procedure to enable them to adhere to the LOTO Program procedures;
(d) Failed to identify the specific steps for shutting down, isolating, blocking, and securing
the system(s) or the specific requirements for testing the system(s) to assure that all
energy sources had been completely controlled;
(e) Failed to establish a clear understanding of the LOTO boundaries of the facility, leading
to confusion on how to ensure flow was maintained during the facility shutdown;
(f) Failed to ensure that the ECP matched the Work Plan, as detailed in the Stand Alone WP;
(g) Failed to enter the LOTO Form Number on the Work Permit in the blank space next to
the LO/TO checkbox as required by the LOTO Procedure, for the Work Permit issued for
2-19-2013;
(h) Failed to maintain the LOTO records in accordance with its procedure;
(i) Failed to demonstrate verification of LOTO was performed over multiple shifts between
February 17, 2013, and February 22, 2013, by failing to document the transfer of
ownership, or complete the Verification of Equipment Isolation on the ECP;
(j) Failed to ensure that the contractors understood and complied with the restrictions of the
company’s ECP, as required by the LOTO procedure. The SPLP supervisor of the
department overseeing the work (Engineering – Capital Projects) was tasked with this
duty;



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
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(k) Failed to insert a blank or blind in the line if working on a pressurized system where
valve leaks may re-pressurize the line. SPLP allowed the use of mud plugs for which it
did not have a formal procedure; and
(l) Failed to inform all “affected employees, and all other employees working in or entering
the work area, that LOTO is to be performed.”
At the hearing, Sunoco presented testimony in support of its compliance with Items 13(b), (d) –
(j), and (l). It also introduced a diagram to show that the failure to lock out or tag out valves did
not cause this accident. In addition, the Respondent argued that 13(a), (c), and (k) were
duplicative of other allegations of violation.
After reviewing the evidence, I am withdrawing 13(a) – (l) because the Recommendation does
not address the Respondent’s arguments. I find that there is insufficient evidence to support the
allegations contained in this Item.
Item 14: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505, which in relevant
part:
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505 by failing to have and follow a
written qualification program. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to follow eight
separate provisions of its written Operator Qualification plan. Those provisions are failure to
ensure that:
(a) Its’ contractors were aware of what tasks were covered tasks and that covered tasks may
only be performed by persons qualified under the program;
(b) Its’ construction project manager was aware of the requirements for covered tasks on the
Wortham Project;
(c) A copy of the HS-P-005 procedure was provided to its contractor or contractor personnel
to ensure that they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the procedure to
enable them to adhere to the Operator Qualification Program procedures;
(d) Records were kept for employees performing covered tasks on the Wortham project,
specifically the welder injured and the contractor inspector;
(e) Records were entered into ISNetworld by its contractors having employees performing
covered tasks on the Wortham project, specifically for the welder that was injured and the
contractor inspector;
(f) Qualifications of personnel involved in the accident were suspended, even though this
was identified as an action in the Serious Incident Investigation to be completed;
(g) Section 16.0 of its OQ Program to evaluate individuals performing covered tasks and
maintain compliance records was followed; and
(h) Section 17.0 of its OQ Program was followed by failing to review and modify the OQ
Program, as necessary after the 2009 accident, and again after the 2013 accident to ensure
compliance with the Program.
At the hearing, Sunoco stated that it objected to the fact that this violation relied on the “exact



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 19
same facts … that should be considered duplicative. … [and that] 14 is essentially a summary of
the previous items.”19 Each of the preceding eight failures constitute separate violations of the
operator qualification regulations. However, I do agree that 14(c) is duplicative and therefore
withdraw it. In its Post Hearing Brief, the Respondent did not refute the factual allegations
contained in this Item but reiterated its argument that these allegations are duplicative of
previous Items. However, I have withdrawn Items 6, 12, and 13, which moots the Respondent’s
arguments regarding duplication. Therefore, I find that, with the exception of 14(c), I find that
Respondent failed to follow the remaining seven provisions, all required by its written Operator
Qualification plan.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.505 by failing to have and follow a written qualification program.
Item 15: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505, which in relevant
part:
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The program shall include provisions to:
(a) Identify covered tasks;
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(a) by failing to have and
follow a written qualification program, including a provision to identify covered tasks.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to include the installation and operation of
bentonite mud plugs as a covered task in its written OQ plan.
At the hearing, Sunoco objected to this item as duplicative of Item 6 (failure to ensure through
evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are qualified; § 195.505(b)), Item 7 (failure
to evaluate an individual if an operator has reason to believe that an individual’s performance of
a covered task contributed to an accident; § 195.505(d)), and Item 14 (failure to have and follow
its written Operator Qualification Program; § 195.505). There is no validity to this argument.
Item 620 alleged that Sunoco failed to qualify individuals performing covered tasks; Item 7
alleged that Sunoco failed, after the accident, to evaluate an individual performing covered tasks;
and Item 14 alleged eight separate violations of Sunoco’s written qualification program. This
Item alleges that Sunoco failed, pursuant to § 195.505(a), to identify the isolation of vapors using
mud plugs as a covered task, in its written Operator Qualification Plan, during 2012-2013. As I
discussed in Item 10, Sunoco was required to include a procedure for the installation of mud
plugs once it determined that it would use mud plugs as an isolation device.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.505(a) by failing to have and follow a written qualification program, including a
provision to identify covered tasks.
These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement
19 Transcript, at 171 (2-10).
20 Item 6 has been withdrawn.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
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action taken against Respondent.
ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed
$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any
related series of violations.21 In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.
§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,
circumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the
degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that
the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent
in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the
economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent
damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil
penalty of $1,539,800 for the violations cited above.
Item 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $43,200 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.204, for failing to ensure that any operator personnel used to perform an inspection be
trained and qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected. In its Post-Hearing Brief22
,
Sunoco argued that the civil penalty should be withdrawn or, in the alternative, reduced. In
support of its argument for a reduction, the Respondent contended that the nature and gravity
designations should be changed to reflect that this was solely a recordkeeping issue. Also, the
culpability section should be changed to reflect that significant steps were taken to achieve
compliance. I do not agree with either argument. First, this was not simply a recordkeeping
issue. Sunoco remains unsure of what process Mustang or Sprint used to qualify Mr. Tolbert. At
the hearing, it hypothesized what might have happened, but was unable to produce any solid
evidence that this inspector was qualified according to established procedures. Second, I do not
see that significant steps were taken towards compliance. While Sunoco located Mr. Tolbert’s
resume, that is not evidence that it took significant steps to achieve compliance prior to Mr.
Tolbert’s participation in the inspection process. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and
considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $43,200 for violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.204.
Item 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $43,200 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(c)(13), for failing to follow its own procedures for periodically reviewing its work and
determining the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and maintenance, and
taking corrective action where deficiencies are found. Sunoco argued that the civil penalty
should be withdrawn or, in the alternative, reduced. In support of its argument for a reduction,
Sunoco argued that the culpability designation should be reduced due to the operator’s
significant steps toward compliance. I have reviewed the records23 and do not feel that these
21 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223; Revisions to Civil Penalty Amounts,
83 Fed. Reg. 60732, 60744 (Nov. 27, 2018).
22 Post-Hearing Brief, at 24.
23 Exhibit 1 includes assorted Work Permits. Exhibit 2 includes copies of an Inspection Checklists for LOTO.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
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records indicate that significant steps were taken. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and
considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $43,200 for violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13).
Item 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $72,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(e)(9), for failing to follow its own procedures to provide a post-accident review of
employee activities to determine whether its procedures were effective and taking corrective
action where deficiencies were found. Sunoco argued that the civil penalty should be withdrawn
or, in the alternative reduced. In its Post-Hearing Brief, Sunoco states that this alleged violation
is duplicative of Item 4. However, as I discuss above, Item 3 solely addresses Respondent’s
failure to complete a “Lessons Learned” Document, in violation of its own procedure.
Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess
Respondent a civil penalty of $72,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(e)(9).
Item 4: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $200,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(5), for failing to follow its own procedures for analyzing pipeline accidents
to determine their causes. Sunoco argued that the civil penalty should be withdrawn or, in the
alternative reduced. In support of its argument for a reduction, Sunoco states that the culpability
assignment on the civil penalty worksheet should be changed from “failed to take appropriate
action to comply with a requirement that was clearly applicable” to “took significant steps to
comply with a requirement but did not achieve compliance.”24 Given that Sunoco failed to
comply with its own procedure in multiple respects, I fail to see how “significant steps” were
taken towards compliance. It is therefore appropriate that the culpability assignment remain
unchanged. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I
assess Respondent a civil penalty of $200,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(5).
Item 5: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $368,600 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(6), for failing to prepare and follow its own procedure for minimizing the
potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) and the possibility of recurrence of
accidents analyzed under paragraph (c)(5). Sunoco argued that both the Item and associated civil
penalty should be withdrawn. In the alternative, Respondent contended that the gravity value for
“Number of Instances of Violation” should be changed from “3” to “1” because there was only
one instance of review rather than the three reflected in the Violation Report and Civil Penalty
Worksheet. The Regional Director’s written evaluation did not address this argument. In
addition, Respondent argues that this violation was not a casual factor in the accident, but rather
“minimally affected” pipeline safety. First, I cannot find evidence in the record supporting three
instances of violation. Therefore, I will reduce this number to one. As for the argument that
violation of Item 5 minimally affected pipeline safety, I find that there is sufficient evidence to
support the finding that Sunoco’s failure to follow its own procedure was casual to this accident.
Sunoco argues that the Wortham accident was unforeseeable and solely attributable to human
error. However, had Sunoco followed its procedure by completing its Lessons Learned
document, it could have identified and corrected the consistent failure to follow procedures that
led to both the 2009 and 2013 accidents. While these accidents are different in many respects,
the common thread is Sunoco’s failure to adequately complete the requisite analyses and lessons
24 OPS Civil Penalty Worksheet, at 1.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 22
learned. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I
assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $345,600 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(c)(6).
Item 6: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $257,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.505(b), for failing to have and follow a written qualification program with
provisions to ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are qualified.
As stated above, despite the contradiction in the OQ records and Sunoco’s own procedures, the
welders were within the 3 month grace period identified in the Respondent’s procedure.
Therefore, there was no violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b). Based upon the foregoing, I
withdraw the proposed penalty for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b).
Item 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $43,900 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.505(d) by failing to have and follow a written qualification program with provisions to
evaluate an individual if the operator has reason to believe that the individual’s performance of a
covered task contributed to an accident, as defined in Part 195. In its Post-Hearing Brief, Sunoco
did not request mitigation of the proposed civil penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the
record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $43,900 for
violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(d).
Item 8: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $37,800 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 199.105(b) for failing to conduct post-accident drug testing for each surviving covered
employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot
be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. Sunoco neither contested the
allegation nor presented any evidence or argument justifying elimination of the proposed
penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I
assess Respondent a civil penalty of $37,800 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b).
Item 9: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $37,800 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 199.225(a)(1), for failing to conduct post-accident alcohol testing for each surviving covered
employee for alcohol if that employee's performance of a covered function either contributed to
the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. Sunoco
neither contested the allegation nor presented any evidence or argument justifying elimination of
the proposed penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment
criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $37,800 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 199.225(a)(1).
Item 10: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $200,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3), for failing to include procedures for operating, maintaining, and
repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of Subpart F
(Operation and Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion Control). As I stated above, Sunoco
committed this violation by not having a written procedure for the isolation of vapors.
Nonetheless, there was an RP that, if incorporated into the Respondent’s procedures, would have
been sufficient. After reviewing the deposition testimony, it is clear that this RP was included in
the work contract and followed by the subcontractor. OPS did not address the Respondent’s
penalty argument in the written evaluation. Therefore, I am reducing the gravity assignment to a
records only violation. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 23
$76,300 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3).
Item 11: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $38,100 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3), for failing to follow its Hot Work procedure. In its Post-Hearing brief,
the Respondent argues that the number of instances found in the gravity section should be
reduced to 2 because this Item is duplicative of Item 12. Based on the withdrawal of Item 12,
this argument has been rendered moot. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered
the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $38,100 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(c)(3).
Item 12: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $38,800 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3), for failing to follow its Work Permit Procedure. As stated above, I am
withdrawing this Item. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment
criteria, I withdraw the civil penalty of $38,800 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3).
Item 13: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $77,700 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3), for failing to follow procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing
the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and
Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion Control). As stated above, I withdraw this Item.
Accordingly, I withdraw the civil penalty of $77,700 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3).
Item 14: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $38,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.505, for failing to have and follow a written qualification program, specifically OQ
procedures. Sunoco argues that Item 14 is duplicative of previous Items and should be
withdrawn. However, I read this allegation as a violation of a failure to follow procedures, and
not a duplication of the earlier items that were based on a failure to qualify personnel with the
exception of Item 14(c). Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the
assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $38,100 for violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.505.
Item 15: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $43,200 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. 195.505(a) for failing to have and follow a written qualification program, including a
provision to identify covered tasks. In its Post-Hearing brief, the Respondent argues that it was
not required to have a formal practice for installation and operation of vapor barriers. However,
as further explicated above in the discussion of this Item, having a procedure for the isolation of
vapors is standard for the industry. Furthermore, prior case precedent found this to be a covered
task.25 Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess
Respondent a civil penalty of $43,200 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(a).
In summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the
Items cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $1,019,200.
Payment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations (49
C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal
Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed
25 In re Marathon Pipe Line, LLC, PHMSA CPF No. 4-2010-5013 (Sept. 7, 2012).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 24
instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be
directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike
Monroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 79169.
The Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.
Failure to pay the $1,019,200 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual
rate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to
those same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if
payment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty
may result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district
court of the United States.
COMPLIANCE ORDER
I am withdrawing the Compliance Order in its entirety. The Regional Director’s
Recommendation states that a Consent Agreement is in effect that addresses the compliance
items sought in this Order.
Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final
Order to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of
Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address, no later than 20 days after receipt of service of the
Final Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a brief statement of the issue(s)
and meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a petition automatically
stays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the order, including any
corrective action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a
stay. If Respondent submits payment of the civil penalty, the Final Order becomes the final
administrative decision and the right to petition for reconsideration is waived.
The terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49
C.F.R. § 190.5.
November 8, 2019
___________________________________ __________________________
Alan K. Mayberry Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

420165022_Corrected Final Order_12092019_text.pdf

December 9, 2019
Mr. Kelcy L. Warren
Chief Executive Officer
Energy Transfer, LP
8111 Westchester Drive
Dallas, Texas 75225
Re: CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Dear Mr. Warren:
As you may know, PHMSA issued a Final Order to your subsidiary, Sunoco Logistics Partners,
LP, in the above-referenced case on November 8, 2019. As noted in my email to you on
December 3, this office recently discovered, due to a clerical error, that the order inadvertently
included two copies of page 13 and omitted page 14. Therefore, enclosed please find a corrected
final order that includes the missing page. There are no other changes from the original order.
As noted in the cover letter to you on November 8, the Final Order withdraws three allegations
of violation, makes other findings of violation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $1,019,200,
and withdraws the proposed compliance order. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the
Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid, as determined by the Director, Southwest
Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the corrected Final Order is effective
upon the date of mailing this letter by certified mail, as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. Please
note that due to PHMSA’s error, the deadline for filing a petition for reconsideration is hereby
extended until 20 days after your receipt of service of this letter.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
James M. Pates
Assistant Chief Counsel
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Mary McDaniel, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA
Mr. Todd Nardozzi, Senior Manager, DOT Compliance, Energy Transfer, LP, 1 Fluor
Daniel Drive, Building A Level 3, Sugar Land, Texas 77478
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP, ) CPF No. 4-2016-5022
a subsidiary of Energy Transfer, LP, )
)
)
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
From March to September 2015, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),
conducted an accident investigation of the facilities and records of Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP
(Respondent), in Wortham, Texas. Sunoco owned1 the West Texas Gulf Pipeline Company
(WTG), a 26-inch, 580-mile pipeline system that transports crude oil from Colorado City to
Longview, Texas, with additional delivery points along the Gulf Coast. On March 4, 2015,
following an information request from the public, OPS initiated an investigation into an accident
at Respondent’s Wortham facility in Texas. On or about February 19, 2013, vapors ignited while
welders were performing a pipeline modification, resulting in a serious injury.
As a result of the investigation, the Director, Southwest Region, OPS (Director), issued to
Respondent, by letter dated July 7, 2016, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty,
and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice
proposed finding that Sunoco committed violations of 49 C.F.R. Parts 195 and 199 and proposed
assessing a civil penalty of $1,539,800 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed
ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.
Sunoco responded to the Notice by letter dated August 4, 2016 (Response). Sunoco contested all
of the allegations, offered additional information in response to the Notice, and requested a
hearing. A hearing was subsequently held on March 28, 2017, in Houston, Texas, with an
attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. At the hearing, Respondent was
represented by counsel.
1 At the time of the accident, Sunoco owned WTG. On April 28, 2017, Energy Transfer Partners (ETP) and Sunoco
Logistics Partners merged. This pipeline is now fully owned by Energy Transfer Partners (ETP). See
https://ir.energytransfer.com/news-releases/news-release-details/sunoco-logistics-partners-and-energy-transfer-
partners-announce/. (last accessed October 1, 2019).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 2
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Parts 195 and 199, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.204, which states:
§ 195.204 Inspection–general.
Inspection must be provided to ensure that the installation of pipe or
pipeline systems is in accordance with the requirements of this subpart. Any
operator personnel used to perform the inspection must be trained and
qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected. An operator must not
use operator personnel to perform a required inspection if the operator
personnel performed the construction task requiring inspection. Nothing in
this section prohibits the operator from inspecting construction tasks with
operator personnel who are involved in other construction tasks.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.204 by failing to ensure that the
operator personnel, or third-party inspector, that it used to perform inspections was trained and
qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected. On the day of the accident, Respondent’s
third-party contractor, Sprint Pipeline Services (Sprint), was tying in a 50-foot section of pipe.
Mustang Engineering (Mustang) was overseeing the construction work as a third-party inspector.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Mr. Tolbert (Mustang employee) was performing
inspections on February 18-19, 2013, despite the fact that he was neither trained nor qualified in
the construction tasks being performed.
At the hearing, Sunoco acknowledged that it was unable to present any evidence that Mr. Tolbert
was qualified at the time of OPS’ accident investigation. However, Sunoco produced some
evidence in support of its contention that Mr. Tolbert was trained to the regulatory standard.
First, Sunoco noted that OPS’ investigator, Ms. Molly Atkins, had attached Mr. Tolbert’s 2010
resume to the Violation Report. This resume lists various qualifications. Second, Sunoco
pointed to a deposition transcript2 that discusses the general process that Mustang used to qualify
its inspectors. It argued that, even if it was not able to produce any direct evidence linking this
process to Mr. Tolbert, given the time frame of the inspection services (February 18-19, 2013),
Mr. Tolbert would have undergone a training and qualification process. Third, Respondent
stated that its contract with Mustang required them to ensure that its inspectors were
appropriately qualified.
OPS countered that Sunoco is ultimately responsible for ensuring that its personnel, including its
third-party contractors, are “trained and qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected.”
Sunoco provided no direct evidence that Mr. Tolbert was qualified to oversee the work being
performed on February 18-19, 2013. While the regulation does not require an operator to have a
specific qualification process, it must ensure that its personnel are “trained and qualified” to the
task by establishing a standardized process that itemizes the training and qualification process for
2Sunoco presented evidence throughout the hearing that was produced pursuant to a third-party civil litigation
related to the Wortham accident. This litigation will be referred to as “the Talbot litigation.”



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 3
different construction phases. Despite the fact that Sunoco was able to produce Mr. Tolbert’s
resume and provide evidence that it established an inspector vetting process around the time of
the accident, it has no direct evidence that Mustang (or Sunoco) followed any process to
establish Mr. Tolbert’s qualifications for the specific phases of work that he was overseeing on
February 18-19, 2013.3 In its Post-Hearing Brief, Sunoco focuses on the phase of construction
(demagnetization) that was occurring at the time of the accident. However, the Notice alleges,
and I agree, that Mr. Tolbert was required to be properly qualified for all of the phases of
construction that he was overseeing on February 18-19, 2013.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Sunoco failed to ensure that the
operator personnel used to perform inspections were trained and qualified in the phases of
construction to be inspected.
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(13) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator personnel to
determine the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and
maintenance and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13) by failing to follow its
own procedures for periodically reviewing its work and determining the effectiveness of the
procedures used in normal operation and maintenance and taking corrective action where
deficiencies are found. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to follow these
procedures at the Wortham facility: Hot Work Procedure HS-P-009, Lockout-Tagout Program
HS-P-005, and Overview of Work Permits Procedure HS-G-012. Each procedure required
Sunoco to conduct evaluations at certain intervals to ascertain whether Hot Work,
Lockout/Tagout (LOTO), and Work Permit procedures were being followed. During OPS’
3 “Mr. Herring: Right, he didn’t specifically mention Mr. Tolbert…What we have available is Mustang’s
representations of the process that they followed (Hearing Transcript, at 44).”



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 4
yearlong investigation4, Sunoco was unable to provide any records for the Wortham facility that
demonstrated it performed these evaluations.
At the hearing, Sunoco produced records that it claimed were discovered in paper form just prior
to the hearing. These included: (1) a collection of executed permits (Hearing Exhibit 1) and (2) a
collection of lockout-tagout inspection checklists (Hearing Exhibit 2). In the Regional Director’s
written evaluation of the response material submitted in the Post-Hearing Brief, the Director
noted that Exhibit 1 does not indicate whether the required audit occurred or include the required
review. After reviewing the documents submitted in these exhibits, the Director stated that each
form either lacked specific detail or was not signed by authorized representatives.
After conducting a review of these documents and Sunoco’s own procedures, I find that Sunoco
did not fully comply with any of these procedures. The Respondent argues that, as an unmanned
facility, Wortham was not required to comply with the annual evaluation requirements
enumerated in these three procedures. I do not agree. The procedures themselves do not include
an exception for unmanned facilities, and there is no question that the Wortham facility did not
conduct an evaluation of the Hot Work Procedure in 2013. In addition, as noted by the Director,
the evaluations that were submitted appear incomplete (unsigned).
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13) by failing to follow its own procedures for periodically reviewing its
work and determining the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and
maintenance and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(e) Emergencies. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include procedures for the following to provide safety when an
emergency condition occurs:
(1) ….
(9) Providing for a post accident review of employee activities to
determine whether the procedures were effective in each emergency and
taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
4 The investigation was initiated on March 4, 2015, and continued until issuance of the Notice on July 7, 2016.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 5
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(e)(9) by failing to follow its
own procedures to provide for a post-accident review of employee activities to determine
whether the procedures were effective in an emergency and taking corrective action where
deficiencies are found. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to conduct a review
following the Wortham accident to determine whether its procedures were effective or to take
any corrective action. Sunoco’s procedure OPER-PR-002 (Paragraph 4.3.3), Spill Reporting,
Root Cause Analysis and Documentation, required Sunoco to prepare a Serious Incident
Investigation Report (SII) following the Wortham accident. Pursuant to the SII, Sunoco was to
develop a “Lessons Learned” document that complies with § 195.402(e)(9), or “provide(s) for a
post-accident review of employee activities to determine whether the procedures were effective
in each emergency and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.” However, at the
time of OPS’ inspection, Mr. Todd Nardozzi, Compliance Manager, Sunoco, stated that Sunoco
had never completed a “Lessons Learned” document.5
At the hearing and in its Post-Hearing Brief, Sunoco acknowledged that it never developed a
“Lessons Learned” document and therefore failed to follow its own procedure.6 However, it
contended that Item 3 was duplicative of the allegation in Item 4 and relies on the same failure to
follow OPER-PR-002, or to prepare a complete and accurate Serious Incident Investigation
Report for the Wortham accident. I will discuss this argument further in the discussion of Item
4. However, this Item alleges, and I so find, that Sunoco failed to complete its Serious Incident
Investigation Report, an integral part of complying with the regulatory requirement to conduct a
post-accident review.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(e)(9) by failing to follow its own procedures to provide a post-accident review
of employee activities to determine whether its procedures were effective and taking corrective
action where deficiencies were found.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
5 Violation Report, at 22.
6 “Mr. Dunleavy: We have not located a lessons-learned (Transcript, at 76).”



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 6
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(5) Analyzing pipeline accidents to determine their causes.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(5) by failing to follow its
own procedures for analyzing pipeline accidents to determine their causes. Specifically, the
Notice alleged that the Respondent failed to perform a complete analysis into the cause of the
accident, as required by OPER-PR-002. This procedure comprises 11 pages and “defines the
process by which spills are reported and documented.” The Notice alleges that the operator
failed to comply in the following ways: (1) failure to provide complete and accurate photographs
from the accident scene, as required by OPER-PR-002, Section 4.2; and (2) failure to assemble
an investigation team composed of cross functional employees, as required by OPER-PR-002,
Paragraph 4.3.3. The Notice also alleges various failures to adequately evaluate the Project
Work Plan.
At the hearing, the Respondent did not contend that it abided by OPER-PR-002. However, it
stated that § 195.402(e)(9) and § 195.402(c)(5) required the same post-accident review and
therefore Sunoco’s collective failure to follow the procedure should constitute a single violation.
OPS argued that § 195.402(e)(9) and § 195.402(c)(5) required the completion of different
analyses. Item 3 focused on Sunoco’s failure to complete a Lessons Learned document that
would have put Sunoco into compliance with the required post-accident review (§ 195.402(e)(9))
when an emergency condition occurs (emphasis added). Item 4, however, (§ 195.402(c)(5))
focuses on Sunoco’s failure to analyze the cause of this accident pursuant to its manual for
maintenance and normal operations (emphasis added). In OPS’ view, Items 3 and 4 are
therefore properly the basis of two separate violations of two separate procedures required by
different parts of § 195.402.
Admittedly, Item 4 refers to Sunoco’s failure to complete the Lessons Learned document (Item
3) and how this failure also violates § 195.402(c)(5). Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932) requires a determination of whether there are two offenses or only one. 7 The
relevant test is to determine whether the multiple alleged violations “each require proof of any
additional fact or have their own ‘evidentiary basis.’”8 I find that there is a separate evidentiary
basis for Item 4 – apart from the failure to complete the Lessons Learned document.
The Violation Report details multiple instances where Sunoco failed to follow its own procedural
requirements. Simply because these actions are required by the same 11-page procedure that
also required the “Lessons Learned” document does not mean that Sunoco’s failure cannot form
the basis of separate violations. In this case, there are two separate acts, including: (1) failure to
provide complete and accurate photographs from the accident scene, as required by OPER-PR-
002, Section 4.2; and (2) failure to assemble an investigation team composed of cross functional
7 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
8 In re Colo. Interstate Gas, Final Order, CPF No. 5-2008-1005, 2009 WL 5538649, at **11-13 (D.O.T Nov. 23,
2009).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 7
employees, as required by OPER-PR-002, Paragraph 4.3.3. These acts are separate from the
“act” of failing to complete the Lessons Learned document.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(5) by failing to follow its own procedures for analyzing pipeline accidents to
determine their causes.
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(6) Minimizing the potential for hazards identified under paragraph
(c)(4) of this section and the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed
under paragraph (c)(5) of this section.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(6) by failing to prepare and
follow its own procedure for minimizing the potential for hazards identified under paragraph
(c)(4) and the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed under paragraph (c)(5).
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco’s procedure OPER-PR-002 (Paragraph 4.3.3), Spill
Reporting, Root Cause Analysis and Documentation, required Sunoco to take prompt remedial
action to minimize the possibility of accident recurrence. In 2009, Sunoco experienced an
accident on the West Texas Gulf Pipeline in Colorado City. In the Violation Report, OPS stated
that the circumstances of the 2009 Colorado City accident were similar in nature to the 2013
Wortham accident in the following ways: failure (1) to make required notice to the NRC; (2) to
timely submit a Form 7000-1; (3) to take corrective actions where deficiencies were found in
determining the effectiveness of procedures; (4) to perform annual audits of work processes; (5)
to prevent ignition of vapors; (6) to properly isolate or make safe for welding, cutting, and
associated hot work activities; and (7) to follow operating and maintenance procedures. On
account of the 2009 Colorado City accident, a Final Order was issued to Sunoco on August 1,
2012.9 It found that Sunoco, among other things, failed to follow its procedures and adequately
9 See In the Matter of Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP, Final Order, CPF No. 4-2010-5010 (Aug. 1, 2012). Decision
on Petition for Reconsideration (Dec. 31, 2012).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 8
investigate the accident.
At the hearing, Sunoco stated that the Colorado City and Wortham accidents were different in
nature and circumstance, despite the fact that both accidents involved a failure to follow
procedures during hot work,10 leading to a fire that caused injuries. Sunoco stated that the
Wortham accident happened solely due to human error, or the fact that its contractor personnel
failed to properly ground his equipment. In Colorado City, the explosion occurred when vapors
passed through a mud plug during welding, allowing the explosion to occur. In its view, there
was nothing in the 2009 Colorado City accident to learn from that would have prevented the
2013 Wortham accident because the contractor employee simply made a mistake in the latter
accident. Given these differences, the Respondent argued that OPS did not meet its burden of
proving that, even if Sunoco had identified the issues in Colorado City, that the Wortham
accident would not have occurred.11
This regulation does not require OPS to prove that the failures in Colorado City and Wortham
are identical, or even largely similar. It simply requires that, when an operator experiences a
failure, it take steps to minimize the potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) of
§ 195.402 and the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed under (c)(5) of § 195.402.
§ 195.402 (c)(4) requires that an operator’s manual for maintenance and normal operations
include a procedure for “Determining which pipeline facilities are located in areas that would
require an immediate response by the operator to prevent hazards to the public if the facilities
failed or malfunctioned.” Section 195.402 (c)(5) requires that an operator’s manual for
maintenance and normal operations include a procedure for “Analyzing pipeline accidents to
determine their causes.” Sunoco’s procedure OPER-PR-002 (Paragraph 4.3.3), Spill Reporting,
Root Cause Analysis and Documentation is the procedure that Sunoco implemented to fulfill the
regulatory requirements of § 195.402 (c)(5).
OPS argued that Sunoco’s failure to perform a root cause analysis following the 2009 accident
allowed the Wortham accident to occur because Sunoco failed to complete its Serious Incident
Investigation or its Lessons Learned document in order to properly minimize the potential for
future hazards, as required by § 195.402(c)(6). I agree. It is enough that OPS establish that
Sunoco failed to take any action, as required by OPER-PR-002, to produce a complete root cause
failure analysis following the Colorado City accident. If Sunoco had completed this analysis, it
could have argued that it fulfilled its obligation to minimize the potential for a future incident. It
is evident that Sunoco failed to take any action following the Colorado City accident to minimize
the potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) or the possibility of recurrence of
accidents analyzed under paragraph (c)(5).
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(6) by failing to prepare and follow its own procedure for minimizing the
10 Hot work is any work that involves burning, welding, using fire- or spark-producing tools, or that produces a
source of ignition. See https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/oilandgas/general safety/hot work welding html (last
accessed October 1, 2019).
11 Mr. Nordozzi (Senior Manager, DOT Compliance): “There wasn’t a failure of the mud plug itself like we saw in
Colorado City where the vapors passed by vapor barrier. So I think that’s the distinction between the two that we
are trying to illustrate.” (Transcript, at 74).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 9
potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) and the possibility of recurrence of
accidents analyzed under paragraph (c)(5).
Item 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b), which states:
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The program shall include provisions to:
(a) ….
(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks
are qualified;
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b) by failing to have and
follow a written qualification program with provisions to ensure through evaluation that
individuals performing covered tasks are qualified. Specifically, the Notice alleged that two
welders directly involved in the Wortham accident did not have proper qualifications.
At the hearing, Sunoco stated that its welders were properly qualified to weld despite the fact
that their ISNetworld records showed that their qualifications were expired. Sunoco’s written
Operator Qualification procedures, Section 5.3, detail requalification frequency and afford a
three-month grace period (beyond the standard 36 months). It is undisputed that both welders
were within the three-month grace period. OPS argued that ISNetworld, the record keeper for
Sunoco’s OQ records, does not permit a three-month grace period, and therefore both welders
were unqualified at the time of the accident.
Despite the contradiction between the procedures and the ISNetworld records, the Respondent
was not out of compliance, per its own procedures. Both welders were within the three-month
grace period. Based upon the foregoing, I hereby order that Item 6 be withdrawn.
Item 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(d):
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The program shall include provisions to:
(a) ….
(d) Evaluate an individual if the operator has reason to believe that the
individual's performance of a covered task contributed to an accident as
defined in Part 195;
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(d) by failing to have and
follow a written qualification program with provisions to evaluate an individual if the operator
has reason to believe that the individual’s performance of a covered task contributed to an
accident, as defined in Part 195. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco allowed Mr. Vern
Tolbert, Mr. Waymen Casey, and Mr. Danny Tant, all of whom were involved in the February
19 accident, to complete tie-in welds on February 20, 2013 (the day after the accident), without
conducting the requisite evaluation into their performance.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 10
At the hearing, Sunoco argued that this violation is duplicative of Item 6, relies on the same
regulatory provision, and involves the same qualification issues. As stated above, I withdrew
Item 6, rendering the duplication issue moot.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.505(d) by failing to have and follow a written qualification program with
provisions to evaluate an individual if the operator has reason to believe that the individual’s
performance of a covered task contributed to an accident, as defined in Part 195.
Item 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b), which states:
§ 199.105 Drug tests required.
Each operator shall conduct the following drug tests for the presence of
a prohibited drug:
(a) ….
(b) Post-accident testing. As soon as possible but no later than 32 hours
after an accident, an operator must drug test each surviving covered
employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to
the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to
the accident. An operator may decide not to test under this paragraph but
such a decision must be based on specific information that the covered
employee's performance had no role in the cause(s) or severity of the
accident.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b) by failing to conduct post-
accident drug testing for each surviving covered employee whose performance of a covered
function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing
factor to the accident. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco reported on PHMSA Form
7000-1 that it did not conduct any testing on employees or contractors following the Wortham
accident. Sunoco also did not justify its decision not to test based on specific information that
the covered employee’s performance had no role in the cause or severity of the Wortham
accident.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation.
Accordingly, based upon a review of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 199.105(b) by failing to conduct post-accident drug testing for each surviving covered
employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot
be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident.
Item 9: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.225, which states in
relevant part:
§ 199.225 Alcohol tests required.
Each operator must conduct the following types of alcohol tests for the
presence of alcohol:
(a) Post-accident.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 11
(1) As soon as practicable following an accident, each operator must test
each surviving covered employee for alcohol if that employee's
performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or
cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident.
The decision not to administer a test under this section must be based on
specific information that the covered employee's performance had no role
in the cause(s) or severity of the accident.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.225(a)(1) by failing to conduct
post-accident alcohol testing for each surviving covered employee for alcohol if that employee's
performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely
discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco
did not perform any post-accident alcohol testing following the Wortham accident or justify the
decision not to conduct testing.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 199.225(a)(1) by failing to conduct post-accident alcohol testing for each surviving
covered employee for alcohol if that employee's performance of a covered function either
contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the
accident.
Item 10: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance
with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to include
procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each
of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 12
Control). Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco did not have a procedure for the
installation and operation of bentonite mud plugs that were installed on this Project.
At the hearing, Sunoco presented a recommended practice (RP)12 that it contended met the
regulatory requirement for two reasons. First, Sunoco asserted that the RP was compulsory, as it
was included in its contract with the subcontractor performing the work and the contractor
treated the RP as a procedure. In addition, the Respondent pointed to deposition testimony in
which the subcontractor discussed the RP and verified that it was followed.
OPS declined to treat the RP as a procedure and maintains that Item 10 should be upheld as a
violation. During the hearing, I questioned Respondent’s counsel about whether and how an RP
constitutes a procedure. I am not convinced that, simply because the RP was presented to the
contractor as compulsory for this project, Respondent achieved regulatory compliance. Sunoco
must have a procedure (not an RP) that is prepared and followed for its pipeline system. Even if
I accept that the RP was compulsory for this project, that does not meet the regulatory
requirement, which requires that there be a procedure for Sunoco’s pipeline system as a whole.
In its Post-Hearing brief, Sunoco also argues that it was not required to have a procedure for the
installation of mud plugs. I disagree. At the hearing, both parties agreed that operators must
have a procedure to isolate hot zones from potential vapors and that mud plugs are one way to
achieve such isolation. During the hearing, the Regional Director stated: “[E]very operator, I
would think – feel free to contradict me – would have a way of isolating work areas from the
product. That’s a common thing. Mr. Dresh (Sunoco, Director of Integrity Projects): I agree a
hundred percent with that statement…”13 It is not necessary for every operator to have a
procedure for the installation of mud plugs. However, once Sunoco determined that it would use
mud plugs as an isolation device, it was required to have a procedure. Since I find that the RP
was not a procedure for the purposes of determining compliance with § 195.402(c)(3), I find that
Respondent did not achieve regulatory compliance.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to include procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing
the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and
Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion Control).
Item 11: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
12 Fire Clay mudpack RP dated 5/30/08.
13 Transcript, at 133.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 13
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance
with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to follow
procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each
of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion
Control). Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to follow seven items in its Hot
Work Procedure HS-P-009 during the work performed at Wortham from 2012-2013 (Items
11(a)-(g)). These items alleged that the Respondent:
(a) Did not ensure that Hot Work permits were issued for all time frames and applicable
activities related to cutting, removing and replacing a 50-foot section of pipe between
February 18 and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated Wortham facility as required
by Section 3.0;
(b) Delegated the responsibility to issue Hot Work permits to the Contract Inspector who was
not trained or qualified in evaluating the hazards, air monitoring, fire prevention, and
monitoring, or issuing Hot Work Permits in accordance with the SPLP Hot Work
procedure;
(c) Failed to coordinate corrective measures with Health, Environment, and Safety (HES)
personnel to address the deficiencies in the Work Permit system;
(d) Did not provide a copy of the HS-P-009 procedure to its contractor or contractor
personnel or ensure they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the
procedure to enable them to adhere to the SPLP Hot Work Permit Procedures;
(e) Failed to ensure that continuous atmospheric monitoring, or monitoring frequently
enough to detect hazardous vapors was occurring in the area where the Hot Work was
being performed on the removal and replacement of the 50-foot section of pipe between
February 18 and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated Wortham facility;
(f) Failed to ensure that a trained fire watch was assigned during all times that Hot Work was
being performed on the removal and replacement of the 50-foot section of pipe between
February 18 and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated Wortham facility; and
(g) Failed to perform an adequate evaluation of the Hot Work/Work Permit procedures or
observation of active tasks to identify that failures of its processes were occurring.
The Respondent presented evidence that contradicted the specific allegations set forth in the
Notice, or 11(b) - (g). The majority of Respondent’s supporting evidence is deposition testimony
from the Talbot litigation between Sunoco and an injured third-party contractor. This litigation



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 14
produced deposition testimony14 that the Respondent is using here for the purposes of rebutting
this (and other) allegations. I will note here that this accident occurred in 2013, the Talbot
litigation was initiated in March 2014, and OPS began its investigation in March 2015. The
Violation Report states that OPS interviewed Mr. Thomas Bushong (former Sunoco employee
and initial on-site Incident Commander) and Mr. Danny Tant (Sprint welder involved in the
accident). Both stated that there was no fire watch at the site or continuous monitoring for
vapors at the time of the accident. 15 The Respondent states that the deposition testimony is
sufficient to rebut these allegations. However, I am affording higher evidentiary value to the
specific statements of the individuals who were present at the time of the accident and were
interviewed by OPS. There was no reason for Mr. Bushong or Mr. Tant to dissemble during
OPS’ investigation – and I find this testimony more credible than the deposition testimony relied
upon by the Respondent, which was given during civil litigation where the Respondent was
defending itself against claims of negligence.
There was no specific rebuttal of the allegation included in 11(a), that Hot Work permits were
not issued for all time frames and for all applicable activities. Therefore, I find that Respondent
violated 11(a). As for 11(b), that the Respondent delegated the responsibility to issue Hot Work
permits to Mr. Tolbert, who was not trained or qualified, I found in Item 1 that Mr. Tolbert was
not properly qualified. Therefore, the Respondent did delegate this responsibility to an
unqualified person. 11(c) alleged that the Respondent failed to coordinate corrective measures
with HES. In its Post-Hearing Brief, Respondent alludes to the fact that “if there were
deficiencies to address it would have been evaluated and addressed as part of that process (the
566 inspections Sunoco conducted in year 2012). This is insufficient to rebut the specific
allegation found in 11(c) regarding the coordination with HES. 11(d) alleges that Sunoco did not
provide a copy of the HS-P-009 procedure to its contractor or contractor personnel or ensure they
were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the procedure to enable them to adhere to
the SPLP Hot Work Permit Procedures. The Respondent rebuts this allegation by referring to
deposition testimony that states that all procedures were provided to the contractors pursuant to
their onboarding. As I have discussed above, I find that the testimony and evidence in the
Violation Report is more persuasive since it was obtained from the contractor personnel directly
involved in this accident. I also find that the Respondent failed to ensure that continuous
atmospheric monitoring, or monitoring frequently enough to detect hazardous vapors was
occurring in the area where the Hot Work was being performed on the removal and replacement
of the 50-foot section of pipe between February 18 and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated
Wortham facility (11(e)). I find that the Respondent failed to ensure that trained fire watch was
assigned during all times that Hot Work was being performed on the removal and replacement of
the 50-foot section of pipe between February 18 and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated
Wortham facility (11(f)). Lastly, notwithstanding the Respondent’s submittal, I find that there is
no direct evidence that it performed an adequate evaluation of the Hot Work and Work Permit
14 Mr. Gust (Mustang corporate representative) stated that “Mustang affirmatively marketed to Sunoco . . . that
Mustang is familiar with all applicable federal, state, and local permit requirements, project specifications and
applicable codes.” Transcript, at 44. Mr. Waymond Casey (Superintendent, Sprint Pipeline) stated that “Sprint went
through and physically inspected the locations of the events. We know that there was monitoring going on and that
they had, at least preliminarily, tests for any vapors that were passing around the mud plug.” Transcript, at 85.
15 Violation Report, at 80.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 15
procedures or observed active tasks to identify that failures of its processes were occurring. The
Violation Report includes persuasive testimony from both employees and contractors that were
present at the time of the accident that the foregoing procedures actions were not taken.
The Respondent also argued that, because of the overlap between the requirements of the work
permit and the hot work permit, that Items 11 and 12 should constitute one violation.16 After
reviewing both permits, I acknowledge that the work permit and the hot work permit are one
document, albeit with different requirements. Nonetheless, as pointed out by OPS in its written
evaluation, “they are two distinct procedures with a variety of procedural differences between
them.”17 Below, I address this argument in greater detail.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to follow its Hot Work Procedure.
Item 12: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance
with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to follow
procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each
of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion
Control). Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to follow nine separate items (12 (a)
– (i)) in its work permit issuance procedure, HS-G-012. These items alleged that the
16 “To the extent that the allegations for Alleged Violation 11 are the same as Alleged Violation …and are not
withdrawn as requested due to PHMSA’s failure to meet its burden of proof, then, consistent with Blockburger and
Colorado Interstate Gas Company, they should be withdrawn from Alleged Violation 11 because they allege facts
duplicative of those already found in Alleged Violations 1, 2, or 12.” Operator Post Hearing Brief, at 22.
17 Regional Recommendation, at 9.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 16
Respondent:
(a) Did not ensure Work Permits were issued for all time frames and applicable activities
related to cutting, removing and replacing a 50-foot section of pipe between February 18
and February 20, 2013, at the SPLP operated Wortham facility as required by Section 3.0
General Requirements;
(b) Failed to designate a Qualified Person to issue and monitor the Work Permit as required
by Section 5.0 Procedure/Process;
(c) Failed to coordinate corrective measures with HES to address the deficiencies in the
Work Permit system identified after the 2010 accident;
(d) Did not provide a copy of the HS-G-012 procedure to its contractor or contractor
personnel or ensure they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the
procedure to enable them to adhere to the SPLP Hot Work Permit Procedures;
(e) Did not ensure that the Work Permits described and authorized the specific work planned
by employees or contractors. The description of the work, “Shut Down Work Continue-
Cold Cut, Welding, Bolting Up” was so general in nature it did not allow a proper hazard
evaluation or identify all of the tasks to be performed for the timeframe in which the
accident occurred;
(f) Failed to ensure that the Work Permit addressed the LOTO Program HS-P-005, and did
not provide a copy of the procedure to the personnel performing the work at the time of
the accident;
(g) Failed to ensure that the Work Permit, as issued, correctly identified the hazards. The
Work Permit 418311 issued on February 19, 2013, clearly indicated that the Equipment
Status was “Drained, Depressured, Safe to Open, Contains Oil, LO/TO” by the checked
boxes. There was no indication of the actual condition of the piping;
(h) Failed to perform an adequate evaluation of the Work Permit procedures of observation
of active tasks to identify that these failure of its processes were occurring; and
(i) Failed to maintain the Work Permit records in accordance with its procedure.
Sunoco contested 12 (a), (b), (c), (d), (h) and (i), largely through deposition testimony from the
Talbot litigation. It is difficult to ascertain OPS’ position on the specific factual evidence
presented at the hearing because it is not explicitly addressed in the Region Recommendation. In
addition, the specific factual allegations involved in this Item are repeated in Item 11, casting
significant doubt on whether there are two offenses or only one.18 The Respondent has proffered
enough evidence in support of its contention that the same acts and omissions are involved.
Therefore, I find that Items 11 and 12 have the same evidentiary bases. Accordingly, both Items
should constitute one violation.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I withdraw this allegation of violation.
Item 13: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in
relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance and
18 See, In the matter of Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 2009 WL 5538649, CPF No. 5-2008-1005 (Nov. 23, 2009).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
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emergencies
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be
prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) ….
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance
with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3) by failing to follow its
procedure for operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each
of the requirements of this Subpart and Subpart H of this part. Specifically, the Notice alleged
that Sunoco failed to follow twelve provisions in its procedure, Lockout/Tagout Program HS-P-
005. These items alleged that the Respondent:
(a) Failed to perform an annual audit or compliance verification after an accident that
involved a failure of the LOTO Program at the Wortham facility;
(b) Failed to identify and control the energy source that resulted in serious injury to a welder
during the project activities;
(c) Failed to provide a copy of the HS-P-005 procedure to its contractor or contractor
personnel or ensure they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the
procedure to enable them to adhere to the LOTO Program procedures;
(d) Failed to identify the specific steps for shutting down, isolating, blocking, and securing
the system(s) or the specific requirements for testing the system(s) to assure that all
energy sources had been completely controlled;
(e) Failed to establish a clear understanding of the LOTO boundaries of the facility, leading
to confusion on how to ensure flow was maintained during the facility shutdown;
(f) Failed to ensure that the ECP matched the Work Plan, as detailed in the Stand Alone WP;
(g) Failed to enter the LOTO Form Number on the Work Permit in the blank space next to
the LO/TO checkbox as required by the LOTO Procedure, for the Work Permit issued for
2-19-2013;
(h) Failed to maintain the LOTO records in accordance with its procedure;
(i) Failed to demonstrate verification of LOTO was performed over multiple shifts between
February 17, 2013, and February 22, 2013, by failing to document the transfer of
ownership, or complete the Verification of Equipment Isolation on the ECP;
(j) Failed to ensure that the contractors understood and complied with the restrictions of the
company’s ECP, as required by the LOTO procedure. The SPLP supervisor of the
department overseeing the work (Engineering – Capital Projects) was tasked with this
duty;



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
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(k) Failed to insert a blank or blind in the line if working on a pressurized system where
valve leaks may re-pressurize the line. SPLP allowed the use of mud plugs for which it
did not have a formal procedure; and
(l) Failed to inform all “affected employees, and all other employees working in or entering
the work area, that LOTO is to be performed.”
At the hearing, Sunoco presented testimony in support of its compliance with Items 13(b), (d) –
(j), and (l). It also introduced a diagram to show that the failure to lock out or tag out valves did
not cause this accident. In addition, the Respondent argued that 13(a), (c), and (k) were
duplicative of other allegations of violation.
After reviewing the evidence, I am withdrawing 13(a) – (l) because the Recommendation does
not address the Respondent’s arguments. I find that there is insufficient evidence to support the
allegations contained in this Item.
Item 14: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505, which in relevant
part:
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505 by failing to have and follow a
written qualification program. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to follow eight
separate provisions of its written Operator Qualification plan. Those provisions are failure to
ensure that:
(a) Its’ contractors were aware of what tasks were covered tasks and that covered tasks may
only be performed by persons qualified under the program;
(b) Its’ construction project manager was aware of the requirements for covered tasks on the
Wortham Project;
(c) A copy of the HS-P-005 procedure was provided to its contractor or contractor personnel
to ensure that they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the procedure to
enable them to adhere to the Operator Qualification Program procedures;
(d) Records were kept for employees performing covered tasks on the Wortham project,
specifically the welder injured and the contractor inspector;
(e) Records were entered into ISNetworld by its contractors having employees performing
covered tasks on the Wortham project, specifically for the welder that was injured and the
contractor inspector;
(f) Qualifications of personnel involved in the accident were suspended, even though this
was identified as an action in the Serious Incident Investigation to be completed;
(g) Section 16.0 of its OQ Program to evaluate individuals performing covered tasks and
maintain compliance records was followed; and
(h) Section 17.0 of its OQ Program was followed by failing to review and modify the OQ
Program, as necessary after the 2009 accident, and again after the 2013 accident to ensure
compliance with the Program.
At the hearing, Sunoco stated that it objected to the fact that this violation relied on the “exact



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 19
same facts … that should be considered duplicative. … [and that] 14 is essentially a summary of
the previous items.”19 Each of the preceding eight failures constitute separate violations of the
operator qualification regulations. However, I do agree that 14(c) is duplicative and therefore
withdraw it. In its Post Hearing Brief, the Respondent did not refute the factual allegations
contained in this Item but reiterated its argument that these allegations are duplicative of
previous Items. However, I have withdrawn Items 6, 12, and 13, which moots the Respondent’s
arguments regarding duplication. Therefore, I find that, with the exception of 14(c), I find that
Respondent failed to follow the remaining seven provisions, all required by its written Operator
Qualification plan.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.505 by failing to have and follow a written qualification program.
Item 15: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505, which in relevant
part:
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The program shall include provisions to:
(a) Identify covered tasks;
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(a) by failing to have and
follow a written qualification program, including a provision to identify covered tasks.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Sunoco failed to include the installation and operation of
bentonite mud plugs as a covered task in its written OQ plan.
At the hearing, Sunoco objected to this item as duplicative of Item 6 (failure to ensure through
evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are qualified; § 195.505(b)), Item 7 (failure
to evaluate an individual if an operator has reason to believe that an individual’s performance of
a covered task contributed to an accident; § 195.505(d)), and Item 14 (failure to have and follow
its written Operator Qualification Program; § 195.505). There is no validity to this argument.
Item 620 alleged that Sunoco failed to qualify individuals performing covered tasks; Item 7
alleged that Sunoco failed, after the accident, to evaluate an individual performing covered tasks;
and Item 14 alleged eight separate violations of Sunoco’s written qualification program. This
Item alleges that Sunoco failed, pursuant to § 195.505(a), to identify the isolation of vapors using
mud plugs as a covered task, in its written Operator Qualification Plan, during 2012-2013. As I
discussed in Item 10, Sunoco was required to include a procedure for the installation of mud
plugs once it determined that it would use mud plugs as an isolation device.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.505(a) by failing to have and follow a written qualification program, including a
provision to identify covered tasks.
These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement
19 Transcript, at 171 (2-10).
20 Item 6 has been withdrawn.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 20
action taken against Respondent.
ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed
$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any
related series of violations.21 In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.
§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,
circumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the
degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that
the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent
in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the
economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent
damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil
penalty of $1,539,800 for the violations cited above.
Item 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $43,200 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.204, for failing to ensure that any operator personnel used to perform an inspection be
trained and qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected. In its Post-Hearing Brief22
,
Sunoco argued that the civil penalty should be withdrawn or, in the alternative, reduced. In
support of its argument for a reduction, the Respondent contended that the nature and gravity
designations should be changed to reflect that this was solely a recordkeeping issue. Also, the
culpability section should be changed to reflect that significant steps were taken to achieve
compliance. I do not agree with either argument. First, this was not simply a recordkeeping
issue. Sunoco remains unsure of what process Mustang or Sprint used to qualify Mr. Tolbert. At
the hearing, it hypothesized what might have happened, but was unable to produce any solid
evidence that this inspector was qualified according to established procedures. Second, I do not
see that significant steps were taken towards compliance. While Sunoco located Mr. Tolbert’s
resume, that is not evidence that it took significant steps to achieve compliance prior to Mr.
Tolbert’s participation in the inspection process. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and
considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $43,200 for violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.204.
Item 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $43,200 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(c)(13), for failing to follow its own procedures for periodically reviewing its work and
determining the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and maintenance, and
taking corrective action where deficiencies are found. Sunoco argued that the civil penalty
should be withdrawn or, in the alternative, reduced. In support of its argument for a reduction,
Sunoco argued that the culpability designation should be reduced due to the operator’s
significant steps toward compliance. I have reviewed the records23 and do not feel that these
21 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223; Revisions to Civil Penalty Amounts,
83 Fed. Reg. 60732, 60744 (Nov. 27, 2018).
22 Post-Hearing Brief, at 24.
23 Exhibit 1 includes assorted Work Permits. Exhibit 2 includes copies of an Inspection Checklists for LOTO.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 21
records indicate that significant steps were taken. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and
considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $43,200 for violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13).
Item 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $72,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(e)(9), for failing to follow its own procedures to provide a post-accident review of
employee activities to determine whether its procedures were effective and taking corrective
action where deficiencies were found. Sunoco argued that the civil penalty should be withdrawn
or, in the alternative reduced. In its Post-Hearing Brief, Sunoco states that this alleged violation
is duplicative of Item 4. However, as I discuss above, Item 3 solely addresses Respondent’s
failure to complete a “Lessons Learned” Document, in violation of its own procedure.
Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess
Respondent a civil penalty of $72,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(e)(9).
Item 4: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $200,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(5), for failing to follow its own procedures for analyzing pipeline accidents
to determine their causes. Sunoco argued that the civil penalty should be withdrawn or, in the
alternative reduced. In support of its argument for a reduction, Sunoco states that the culpability
assignment on the civil penalty worksheet should be changed from “failed to take appropriate
action to comply with a requirement that was clearly applicable” to “took significant steps to
comply with a requirement but did not achieve compliance.”24 Given that Sunoco failed to
comply with its own procedure in multiple respects, I fail to see how “significant steps” were
taken towards compliance. It is therefore appropriate that the culpability assignment remain
unchanged. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I
assess Respondent a civil penalty of $200,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(5).
Item 5: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $368,600 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(6), for failing to prepare and follow its own procedure for minimizing the
potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) and the possibility of recurrence of
accidents analyzed under paragraph (c)(5). Sunoco argued that both the Item and associated civil
penalty should be withdrawn. In the alternative, Respondent contended that the gravity value for
“Number of Instances of Violation” should be changed from “3” to “1” because there was only
one instance of review rather than the three reflected in the Violation Report and Civil Penalty
Worksheet. The Regional Director’s written evaluation did not address this argument. In
addition, Respondent argues that this violation was not a casual factor in the accident, but rather
“minimally affected” pipeline safety. First, I cannot find evidence in the record supporting three
instances of violation. Therefore, I will reduce this number to one. As for the argument that
violation of Item 5 minimally affected pipeline safety, I find that there is sufficient evidence to
support the finding that Sunoco’s failure to follow its own procedure was casual to this accident.
Sunoco argues that the Wortham accident was unforeseeable and solely attributable to human
error. However, had Sunoco followed its procedure by completing its Lessons Learned
document, it could have identified and corrected the consistent failure to follow procedures that
led to both the 2009 and 2013 accidents. While these accidents are different in many respects,
the common thread is Sunoco’s failure to adequately complete the requisite analyses and lessons
24 OPS Civil Penalty Worksheet, at 1.



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 22
learned. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I
assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $345,600 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(c)(6).
Item 6: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $257,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.505(b), for failing to have and follow a written qualification program with
provisions to ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are qualified.
As stated above, despite the contradiction in the OQ records and Sunoco’s own procedures, the
welders were within the 3 month grace period identified in the Respondent’s procedure.
Therefore, there was no violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b). Based upon the foregoing, I
withdraw the proposed penalty for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b).
Item 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $43,900 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.505(d) by failing to have and follow a written qualification program with provisions to
evaluate an individual if the operator has reason to believe that the individual’s performance of a
covered task contributed to an accident, as defined in Part 195. In its Post-Hearing Brief, Sunoco
did not request mitigation of the proposed civil penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the
record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $43,900 for
violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(d).
Item 8: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $37,800 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 199.105(b) for failing to conduct post-accident drug testing for each surviving covered
employee whose performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot
be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. Sunoco neither contested the
allegation nor presented any evidence or argument justifying elimination of the proposed
penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I
assess Respondent a civil penalty of $37,800 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b).
Item 9: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $37,800 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 199.225(a)(1), for failing to conduct post-accident alcohol testing for each surviving covered
employee for alcohol if that employee's performance of a covered function either contributed to
the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. Sunoco
neither contested the allegation nor presented any evidence or argument justifying elimination of
the proposed penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment
criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $37,800 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 199.225(a)(1).
Item 10: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $200,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3), for failing to include procedures for operating, maintaining, and
repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of Subpart F
(Operation and Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion Control). As I stated above, Sunoco
committed this violation by not having a written procedure for the isolation of vapors.
Nonetheless, there was an RP that, if incorporated into the Respondent’s procedures, would have
been sufficient. After reviewing the deposition testimony, it is clear that this RP was included in
the work contract and followed by the subcontractor. OPS did not address the Respondent’s
penalty argument in the written evaluation. Therefore, I am reducing the gravity assignment to a
records only violation. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 23
$76,300 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3).
Item 11: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $38,100 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3), for failing to follow its Hot Work procedure. In its Post-Hearing brief,
the Respondent argues that the number of instances found in the gravity section should be
reduced to 2 because this Item is duplicative of Item 12. Based on the withdrawal of Item 12,
this argument has been rendered moot. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered
the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $38,100 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(c)(3).
Item 12: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $38,800 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3), for failing to follow its Work Permit Procedure. As stated above, I am
withdrawing this Item. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment
criteria, I withdraw the civil penalty of $38,800 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3).
Item 13: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $77,700 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3), for failing to follow procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing
the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of Subpart F (Operation and
Maintenance) and Subpart H (Corrosion Control). As stated above, I withdraw this Item.
Accordingly, I withdraw the civil penalty of $77,700 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(3).
Item 14: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $38,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.505, for failing to have and follow a written qualification program, specifically OQ
procedures. Sunoco argues that Item 14 is duplicative of previous Items and should be
withdrawn. However, I read this allegation as a violation of a failure to follow procedures, and
not a duplication of the earlier items that were based on a failure to qualify personnel with the
exception of Item 14(c). Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the
assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $38,100 for violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.505.
Item 15: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $43,200 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. 195.505(a) for failing to have and follow a written qualification program, including a
provision to identify covered tasks. In its Post-Hearing brief, the Respondent argues that it was
not required to have a formal practice for installation and operation of vapor barriers. However,
as further explicated above in the discussion of this Item, having a procedure for the isolation of
vapors is standard for the industry. Furthermore, prior case precedent found this to be a covered
task.25 Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess
Respondent a civil penalty of $43,200 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(a).
In summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the
Items cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $1,019,200.
Payment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations (49
C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal
Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed
25 In re Marathon Pipe Line, LLC, PHMSA CPF No. 4-2010-5013 (Sept. 7, 2012).



CPF No. 4-2016-5022
Page 24
instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be
directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike
Monroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 79169.
The Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.
Failure to pay the $1,019,200 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual
rate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to
those same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if
payment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty
may result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district
court of the United States.
COMPLIANCE ORDER
I am withdrawing the Compliance Order in its entirety. The Regional Director’s
Recommendation states that a Consent Agreement is in effect that addresses the compliance
items sought in this Order.
Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final
Order to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of
Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address, no later than 20 days after receipt of service of the
Final Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a brief statement of the issue(s)
and meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a petition automatically
stays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the order, including any
corrective action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a
stay. If Respondent submits payment of the civil penalty, the Final Order becomes the final
administrative decision and the right to petition for reconsideration is waived.
The terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49
C.F.R. § 190.5.
November 8, 2019
___________________________________ __________________________
Alan K. Mayberry Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

420165022_NOPV PCP PCO_07072016_text.pdf

NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION
PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY
and
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
July 7, 2016
Mr. Michael Hennigan
President and CEO
Sunoco Logistics Partners L.P.
3807 West Chester Pike
Newtown Square, PA 19073
CPF 4-2016-5022
Dear Mr. Hennigan:
On March 4, 2015, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA), Southwest Region
Office of Pipeline Safety (SW Region, OPS) received an information request for an alleged event at a
West Texas Gulf Pipeline Company, OPID #22442 facility, which is operated by Sunoco Pipeline L. P.
(SPLP). The alleged accident was described as having occurred while SPLP and its contractors were
performing pipeline modifications at the Wortham, TX facility (the Project) and having resulted in a
release of crude oil, ignition of the crude oil and a serious injury requiring in-patient hospitalization, on
or about February 19, 2013 (the Accident).
Based on the information request, PHMSA, SW Region initiated an investigation into the alleged
accident.
As a result of the investigation and inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations
of the Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the
probable violations are:



1. §195.204 Inspection—general.
Inspection must be provided to ensure the installation of pipe or pipeline systems in
accordance with the requirements of this subpart. No person may be used to perform
inspections unless that person has been trained and is qualified in the phase of construction
to be inspected.
SPLP failed to provide inspection and use a qualified and trained inspector to oversee maintenance
related activities that were performed in February 2013 at the Wortham Station, specifically as it
pertained to the tie-in of the 50-foot section of pipe.
Neither SPLP, nor the inspector’s employer could provide training records to demonstrate qualifications.
SPLP delegated responsibilities to the inspector for the Project, for which SPLP did not confirm the
inspector had adequate training or experience.
2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and
handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals
not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared
before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be
kept at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of
this section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during
maintenance and normal operations:
(13) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator personnel to
determine the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and
maintenance and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
SPLP did not perform, nor could it provide documentation to demonstrate that it had reviewed the
maintenance and normal operations procedures for effectiveness that were in use on February 19, 2013.
The operator’s Hot Work Procedure HS-P-009, Lockout-Tagout Program HS-P-005, and Overview of
Work Permits Procedure HS-G-012 require annual evaluations at each facility to observe the activities
involving the procedures to ensure the requirements of the procedures are correct and being followed,
including an audit of the various types of permits in use at the facility. There were no records showing
the applicable audits had been performed at the Wortham Facility for 2012, and 2013.
3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
2



(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and
handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals
not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared
before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be
kept at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.
(e) Emergencies. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section must include
procedures for the following to provide safety when an emergency condition occurs:
(9) Providing for a post accident review of employee activities to determine
whether the procedures were effective in each emergency and taking
corrective action where deficiencies are found.
SPLP failed to perform a post-accident review of the employee activities to determine whether the
procedures were effective in this emergency, and therefore took no corrective action for the accident that
occurred on February 19, 2013, at the Wortham Station.
SPLP completed a Serious Incident Investigation Report, SII Report, indicating that a “Lessons Learned”
document would be developed. SPLP stated that it had not been completed. SPLP indicated that a
review was not completed and no revisions were made to the procedures related to its emergency
response processes, as well as the work tasks being performed that had applicable post accident
requirements including: the Operator Qualification Plan, procedures for contractor oversight and project
management, or the safety aspects related to the work tasks being performed when the accident occurred.
This is a repeat violation of CPF 4-2010-5010, Item 6.
4. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and
handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals
not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared
before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be
kept at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this
section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and
normal operations:
(5) Analyzing pipeline accidents to determine their causes.
3



SPLP failed to perform an analysis that determined the cause(s) of this accident in accordance with their
Operating Procedure OPER-PR-002, Spill Reporting, Root Cause Analysis and Documentation. The SII
Report for the accident that occurred on February 19, 2013 as provided to PHMSA was incomplete and
inconclusive.
The SII Report was incomplete in that it did not properly consider or evaluate the adequacy of the Project
Work Plan, identification of the relevant OQ Tasks, or the following SPLP Procedures; Training and
Qualifications of all personnel (OQ Plan), Lockout/Tagout Procedures, Isolation of Energy Procedures,
Preparation of Work Plans, Hot Work, Work Permits, Welding Procedures, Mud Plug Procedures,
Accident Reporting, Post Accident Drug and Alcohol Testing, Construction Specifications, Construction
Inspection Qualification and Training Requirements, Control Room Records and SCADA Logs, Spill
Reporting, Root Cause Analysis and Documentation, Project Drawings and P&IDs. In addition,
photographs from the scene were undocumented and provided conflicting and incomplete images of the
accident and evidence. All of these documents were applicable and required by SPLP’s Procedure
OPER-PR-002 Section 4.2.
The Investigation Team was not comprised of a group of cross functional employees as required by
SPLP’s Procedure OPER-PR-002 paragraph 4.3.3. None of the members of the Investigation Team had
Operations and Maintenance roles or experience that would have been necessary to evaluate the accident
events and causes and perform the Root Cause Analysis. There was no facility knowledge represented
by the team. Members of the Inspection Team had a role in the Accident, or the Project and may not
have been objective in the performance of their duties. The recommended team members for the
Investigation Team in the SPLP Procedure OPER-PR-002, Table 6 were not utilized, specifically the
Control Center, Field Supervision and Field Staff.
5. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and
handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals
not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared
before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be
kept at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this
section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and
normal operations:
(6) Minimizing the potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) of this
section and the possibility of recurrence of accidents analyzed under paragraph
(c)(5) of this section.
4



SPLP failed to follow OPER-PR-002, Spill Reporting, Root Cause Analysis and Documentation to take
prompt remedial action to minimize the possibility of recurrence of accidents. The procedure states
section 2.6 that the objective of the Root Cause Analysis is “to learn, communicate and prevent
recurrence.” SPLP experienced a failure in 2009 and failed to take prompt remedial action to minimize
the possibility of recurrence which resulted in an accident similar in nature in February 2013.
On June 17, 2009, SPLP experienced an accident on the West Texas Gulf Pipeline at its Colorado City,
TX Station during maintenance projects that were being performed to make station piping modifications.
SPLP performed an investigation of the 2009 accident and provided PHMSA a copy of its July 6, 2009
Investigation Report.
In both the 2009 and 2013 accidents, SPLP stated that the cause of the accident was “failure to follow
procedures.” PHMSA’s investigation determined that there were inadequate procedures and work plans
that contributed to the accident, as well as a lack of training and qualification of the employees
performing the procedures. Failure to identify the root cause of the 2009 accident allowed the recurrence
of the same type of accident in 2013.
6. §195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The program shall
include provisions to:
(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are
qualified;
SPLP failed to ensure that the individuals performing the covered tasks at the Project location were
qualified by failing to verify operator qualification records for its welders and inspector and other
contract personnel prior to performing covered tasks.
Specifically for the welders, one had no OQ qualifications, and the other welder involved in the welding
at the time of the accident had previously been qualified, but all of his qualifications for covered tasks
lapsed in January 2013. The contract inspector had no current OQ qualification documentation for any
tasks.
7. §195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The program shall
include provisions to:
(d) Evaluate an individual if the operator has reason to believe that the individual's
performance of a covered task contributed to an accident as defined in Part 195;
5



SPLP failed to evaluate the performance of any of the individuals performing covered tasks at the time
of the Accident to determine if their performance of a covered task contributed to the accident on
February 19, 2013. SPLP did not ensure that employees were evaluated prior to allowing them to resume
the performance of covered tasks after the accident occurred on February 19, 2013. Personnel involved
in the accident were used to complete the tie-in welds on February 20, 2013, even though the individuals’
performance was believed to have contributed to the accident, or had not been ruled out by an
investigation at that time.
8. §199.105 Drug tests required.
b) Post-accident testing. As soon as possible but no later than 32 hours after an accident,
an operator shall drug test each employee whose performance either contributed to the
accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. An
operator may decide not to test under this paragraph but such a decision must be based on
the best information available immediately after the accident that the employee's
performance could not have contributed to the accident or that, because of the time between
that performance and the accident, it is not likely that a drug test would reveal whether the
performance was affected by drug use.
SPLP failed to ensure that its employees and contractor personnel were post-accident drug tested and
could produce no records for testing of any personnel involved in the accident, nor did they provide
justification that ruled out their contribution to the accident. The PHMSA Form 7000-1 submitted by
SPLP stated that no employees or contractors were tested after the accident.
9. §199.225 Alcohol tests required.
Each operator shall conduct the following types of alcohol tests for the presence of alcohol:
(a) Post-accident. (1) As soon as practicable following an accident, each operator shall test
each surviving covered employee for alcohol if that employee's performance of a covered
function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a
contributing factor to the accident. The decision not to administer a test under this section
shall be based on the operator's determination, using the best available information at the
time of the determination, that the covered employee's performance could not have
contributed to the accident.
SPLP failed to ensure that its employees and contractor personnel were post-accident alcohol tested and
could produce no records for testing of any personnel involved in the accident, nor did they provide
justification that ruled out their contribution to the accident. The PHMSA Form 7000-1 submitted by
SPLP stated that no employees or contractors were tested after the accident.
6



10. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and
handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals
not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared
before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be
kept at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this
section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and
normal operations:
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of
the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
The operator failed to have a formal written procedure for installation and operation of vapor barriers,
including mudpacks or bentonite mud plugs, or similarly constructed vapor barriers for the work that
occurred inside the Wortham Station in February 2013. During the PHMSA accident investigation,
SPLP submitted a Fire Clay Mud Pack Recommended Practice dated 5/30/08 (RP), but did not have a
SPLP procedure for the installation and operation of bentonite (or equal) mud plugs such as the ones
installed on this Project.
11. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and
handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals
not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared
before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be
kept at locations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this
section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and
normal operations:
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of
the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
7



SPLP failed to follow seven items in its Hot Work Procedure HS-P-009 during the work performed at
the Wortham Station from the fall of 2012 through post accident March 2013 in the following manner:
a. SPLP did not ensure that Hot Work permits were issued for all time frames and applicable
activities related to cutting, removing and replacing a 50-foot section of pipe between February 18 and
February 20, 2013 at the SPLP operated Wortham facility as required by Section 3.0,
b. SPLP delegated the responsibility to issue Hot Work permits to the Contract Inspector who
was not trained or qualified in evaluating the hazards, air monitoring, fire prevention and monitoring, or
issuing Hot Work Permits in accordance with the SPLP Hot Work procedure,
c. Sunoco Logistics Management has failed to coordinate corrective measures with HES to
address the deficiencies in the Work Permit system,
d. SPLP did not provide a copy of the HS-P-009 procedure to its contractor or contractor
personnel or ensure they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the procedure to enable
them to adhere to the SPLP Hot Work Permit Procedures,
e. SPLP failed to ensure that continuous atmospheric monitoring, or monitoring frequently
enough to detect hazardous vapors was occurring in the area where the Hot Work was being performed
on the removal and replacement of the 50-foot section of pipe between February 18 and February 20,
2013 at the SPLP operated Wortham facility,
f. SPLP failed to ensure that a trained fire watch was assigned during all times that Hot Work
was being performed on the removal and replacement of the 50-foot section of pipe between February
18 and February 20, 2013 at the SPLP operated Wortham facility,
g. SPLP failed to perform an adequate evaluation of the Hot Work/Work Permit procedures or
observation of active tasks to identify that these failures of its processes were occurring.
SPLP failed to follow its Hot Work Procedures in multiple aspects, resulting in an unsafe condition and
a serious injury to an individual performing Hot Work.
12. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of written
procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal
operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months,
but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that
the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system
commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and maintenance
activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and normal
operations:
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the
requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
8



SPLP failed to follow nine aspects of its procedures for issuing Work Permits, addressed by Overview
of Work Permits Procedures Document HS-G-012 in the following manner:
a. SPLP did not ensure Work Permits were issued for all time frames and applicable activities
related to cutting, removing and replacing a 50-foot section of pipe between February 18 and February
20, 2013 at the SPLP operated Wortham facility as required by Section 3.0 General Requirements;
b. SPLP failed to designate a Qualified Person to issue and monitor the Work Permit as required
by Section 5.0 Procedure/Process;
c. Sunoco Logistics Management has failed to coordinate corrective measures with HES to
address the deficiencies in the Work Permit system identified after the 2010 accident,
d. SPLP did not provide a copy of the HS-G-012 procedure to its contractor or contractor
personnel or ensure they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the procedure to enable
them to adhere to the SPLP Hot Work Permit Procedures;
e. SPLP did not ensure that the Work Permits described and authorized the specific work planned
by employees or contractors. The description of the work, “Shut Down Work Continue – Cold Cut,
Welding, Bolting Up” was so general in nature it did not allow a proper hazard evaluation or identify all
of the tasks to be performed for the timeframe in which the accident occurred.
f. SPLP failed to ensure that the Work Permit addressed the LOTO Program HS-P-005, and did
not provide a copy of the procedure to the personnel performing the work at the time of the accident,
g. SPLP failed to ensure that the Work Permit, as issued, correctly identified the hazards. The
Work Permit 418311 issued on February 19, 2013, clearly indicated that the Equipment Status was
“Drained, Depressured, Safe to Open, Contains Oil, LO/TO” by the checked boxes. There was no
indication of the actual condition of the piping,
h. SPLP failed to perform an adequate evaluation of the Work Permit procedures or observation
of active tasks to identify that these failures of its processes were occurring,
i. SPLP failed to maintain the Work Permit records in accordance with its procedure.
SPLP failed to follow its Overview of Work Permit Procedures in multiple aspects, resulting in an unsafe
condition and a serious injury to an individual performing an associated task.
13. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of written
procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal
operations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months,
but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that
the manual is effective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system
commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and maintenance
activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and normal
operations:
9



(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the
requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
SPLP failed to follow twelve provisions of its Lockout/Tagout Program covered by Procedure HS-P-
005 in the following manner:
a. Failing to perform an annual audit or compliance verification at Wortham after an accident
that involved a failure of the LOTO Program occurred at the Wortham facility,
b. Failing to identify and control the energy source that resulted in serious injury to a welder
during the project activities,
c. Failing to provide a copy of the HS-P-005 procedure to its contractor or contractor personnel
or ensure they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the procedure to enable them to
adhere to the SPLP Lockout/Tagout Program Procedures;
d. The Energy Control Procedure (ECP) required by the LOTO Program failed to identify the
specific steps for shutting down, isolating, blocking and securing the system(s) or the specific
requirements for testing the system to assure that all energy sources had been completely controlled,
e. Failing to establish a clear understanding of the LOTO boundaries at the facility. Employees
at the job site were unaware that the 24-inch SPLP pipeline was flowing into the 20-inch WTG pipeline
to maintain flow to Longview and Mid-Valley Pipeline. The Work Plan and project description indicated
that the entire facility was to be isolated, where in fact; the valves were locked open to ensure flow to
Longview was maintained during the facility shutdown.
f. SPLP failed to ensure that the ECP matched the Work Plan, as detailed in the Stand Alone WP
#SLCC-020913-WORT-PJR. The Work Plan stated that the work was planned during a system wide
shutdown of the WTG System, yet the 20-inch WTG line continued to flow to Longview from the 24-
inch SPLP pipeline supplying it through the Wortham Station, through valves designated to be closed
and LOTO – specifically Closure of valve MOV 618, 616, and 619. Instead – these three valves were
locked open to ensure flow to the 20-inch WTG line from the 24-inch WTG line, as further confirmed
by the SCADA data for the shutdown timeframe, and the Operations Summary for 2-17-13 wherein it
was indicated that the valves had to be locked open to allow flow because there would be no power at
the station during the shutdown in an entry time of 0548. The Operations Summary for 2-17-2013
indicated the valves were locked open at 0557 on February 18, 2013.
g. Failing to enter the LOTO Form Number on the Work Permit in the blank space next to the
LO/TO checkbox as required by the LOTO Procedure, for the Work Permit issued for 2-19-2013,
h. Failing to maintain the LOTO records in accordance with its procedure,
i. Failing to demonstrate verification of LOTO was performed over multiple shifts between 2-
17-2013 and 2-22-2013 by failing to document the transfer of ownership, or complete the Verification
of Equipment Isolation on the ECP.
j. In accordance with the LOTO procedure, the SPLP supervisor of the department overseeing
the work (Engineering – Capital Projects) must ensure that the contractors understand and comply with
the restrictions of the company’s ECP. SPLP failed to ensure that this occurred,
k. Appendix HS-P-005-1 to the SPLP LOTO Program required the insertion of a blank or blind
in the line if working on a pressurized system where valve leaks may re-pressurize the line. SPLP
allowed the use of mud plugs for which it did not have a formal procedure, and was not consistent with
10



its LOTO Program. The General LOTO Guide stated that “If you are unsure of the hazard, or
uncomfortable determining how to control the energy source(s) talk with your supervisor,” which the
Sprint Pipeline Services Foreman conveyed to the SPLP Construction Manager, as stated in the SPLP
SII Report. No other actions were taken on the day of the accident to address these concerns,
l. Appendix HS-P-005-1 to the SPLP LOTO Program required SPLP to inform all “affected
employees, and all other employees working in or entering the work area, that LOTO is to be performed.
Instruct these employees that they must not attempt to start equipment that has been locked/tagged out,
and that locks/tags must not be bypassed or removed,” however there were multiple attempts to operate
valves immediately prior to the accident as documented in the SCADA data for 2-19-2013. There was
no indication that the Pipeline Control Center personnel had reviewed or signed off on the ECP, even
though they were responsible for monitoring some of the valves in the ECP.
SPLP failed to follow its Lockout/Tagout Procedures in multiple aspects, resulting in an unsafe condition
and a serious injury to an individual performing an associated task.
This is a repeat violation of Lockout/Tagout Procedures covered by CPF 4-2010-5010, Item 3.
14. §195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
SPLP failed to follow eight provisions of its written Operator Qualification Program in the following
manner:
a. SPLP failed to ensure that its contractors were aware of what tasks are [Covered Tasks] CTs
and that CTs may only be performed by persons qualified under [the SPLP] program,
b. SPLP failed to ensure that its Construction Project Manager was aware of the requirements for
CTs on the Wortham Project,
c. Failing to provide a copy of the HS-P-005 procedure to its contractor or contractor personnel
or ensure they were familiar with or trained on the requirements of the procedure to enable them to
adhere to the SPLP Operator Qualification Program Procedures;
d. SPLP failed to ensure that records were kept for employees performing covered tasks on the
Wortham project, specifically the welder that was injured, and the Contract Inspector,
e. SPLP failed to ensure that records were entered into ISNetworld by its contractors having
employees performing covered tasks on the Wortham project, specifically for the welder that was
injured, and the Contract Inspector,
f. SPLP failed to suspend qualifications of personnel involved in the accident, even though this
was identified as an action in the Serious Incident Investigation to be completed.
g. SPLP failed to follow Section 16.0 of its OQ Program to evaluate individuals performing
covered tasks and maintain compliance records.
h. SPLP failed to follow Section 17.0 of its OQ Program by failing to review and modify the OQ
Program, as necessary after the 2009 accident, and again after the 2013 accident to ensure compliance
with the Program.
11



15. §195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The program shall
include provisions to:
(a) Identify covered tasks;
SPLP failed to include the installation and operation of bentonite mud plugs as a vapor barrier as a
covered task in its written OQ Plan for work performed in the Wortham Station in 2012 - 2013.
Proposed Civil Penalty
Under 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $200,000 per
violation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for a related series of violations.
For violations occurring prior to January 4, 2012, the maximum penalty may not exceed $100,000 per
violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $1,000,000 for a related series of violations.
The Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and supporting documentation involved in the
above probable violation(s) and has recommended that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of
$1,539,800 as follows:
Item number
PENALTY
1
$43,200
2
$43,200
3
$72,000
4
$200,000
$368,600
6
$257,000
$43,900
8
$37,800
9
$37,800
10
$200,000
11
$38,100
12
$38,800
13
$77,700
14
$38,500
15
$43,200
Proposed Compliance Order
With respect to Items 1, 4, 6, and 15, pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, PHMSA proposes to
ssue a Compliance Order to SPLP. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclose
nd made a part of this Notice
12



Response to this Notice
Enclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in
Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. All material you
submit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly available. If you believe that any
portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along
with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions
you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the
redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond
within 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations
in this Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in
this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 4-2016-5022 and for each document you
submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Sincerely,
R. M. Seeley
Director, Southwest Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
cc via e-mail: DRChalson@sunocologistics.com,
TGNardozzi@sunocologistics.com,
LEJensen@sunocologistics.com
Enclosures: Proposed Compliance Order
Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings
13



PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
Pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) proposes to issue to Sunoco Pipeline L. P. (SPLP) a Compliance Order incorporating the
following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of SPLP with the pipeline safety regulations:
1. In regard to Item Number 1 of the Notice pertaining to SPLP’s failure to use a person that
was trained and qualified in the phase of construction to be inspected, SPLP shall develop
procedures that:
a. Address the prerequisite experience, training and qualifications for personnel
performing construction inspection,
b. Identify the roles and responsibilities of the company and inspection personnel
with respect to safety and adherence to company procedures when inspection is occurring
within a facility that has previously been placed in service to ensure the hazards associated
with the presence of hazardous liquids and associated vapors are controlled appropriately,
including but not limited to:
i. the coordination of SPLP Project personnel and contractors with SPLP
Operations and Maintenance personnel,
ii. the evaluation of inspection resource requirements and span of control
for the inspection of construction activities to ensure that the activities taking
place on any project have adequate inspection resources to ensure the
requirements of 195.204 are met in a safe manner,
iv. the formal communication of all applicable company procedures and
requirements to contractor employees working inside existing facilities,
iii. the Delegation of Authority of SPLP functions to personnel performing
inspection where construction is occurring inside existing facilities that contain,
or have contained hazardous liquids that would otherwise normally be performed
by qualified SPLP employees (such as Hot Work/Work Permits and LOTO).
c. Address the recordkeeping requirements to demonstrate adherence to the
processes developed under this item.
2. In regard to Item Number 4 of the Notice pertaining to SPLP’s failure to perform an
analysis that determined the cause(s) of this accident, SPLP shall obtain a third party to
perform a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) of the accident. In performing the RCA, SPLP
shall:
a. Submit a qualifications and experience statement for the third party
organization and personnel SPLP proposes to perform the RCA for PHMSA’s
review and concurrence.
b. Complete the RCA within 120 days of the Final Order and submit to PHMSA
any written reports, whether draft or final, at the same time such reports are
submitted to SPLP by the third party performing the RCA.
14



3. 4. 5. c. Implement the recommendations and corrective actions identified in the RCA.
The actions shall be identified in an action plan to be submitted with a proposed
timeline for implementation and submitted to PHMSA for concurrence of the
actions and the timing of the implementation.
In regard to Item Number 6 of the Notice pertaining to SPLP’s failure to ensure that
individuals performing covered tasks are qualified, SPLP shall develop a process wherein
all contract and project personnel are aware of the requirements for OQ covered tasks as
applicable, and carry out training to all company personnel responsible for project
management and contracting of companies providing construction or other services that
perform covered tasks. SPLP shall design the training content and submit to PHMSA for
concurrence within 30 days of the Final Order. The training shall be completed within
60 days of receiving concurrence from PHMSA on the training content.
With respect to Item Number 15 of the Notice pertaining to SPLP’s failure to have a
covered task for the installation and operation of vapor barriers in its OQ Plan, SPLP
shall:
a. Submit to PHMSA within 30 days of the Final Order, a copy of the new Covered
Task Listing addressing all Operations and Maintenance tasks in SPLP’s OQ Plan
for review.
b. Submit to PHMSA within 60 days of PHMSA’s acceptance of the Covered
Task Listing in Item 4a, documentation demonstrating the training of all project
and operating personnel on the changes to the Covered Tasks Listing of its OQ
Plan.
It is requested (not mandated) that SPLP maintain documentation of the safety
improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total
to R.M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: 1) total
cost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and
2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline
infrastructure.
15

## Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/420165022>
- Source ID: `phmsa-enforcement`
- SHA-256: `66d2bb245a1ed8f78e48913d1c0ea22623190e6a5e0f9331b7cddd22a6aaa80a`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T04:44:44.458Z
- Exported: 2026-08-22T10:07:47.346Z
- Document slug: `phmsa-enforcement-420165022`

### Source metadata

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