# COLONIAL PIPELINE CO — Hazardous liquid — incident on 2016-08-13 **Citation:** PHMSA Report 20160298 **Type / status:** incident / historical **Agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration **Effective:** 2016-08-13 **Published:** 2016-09-14 Hazardous liquid incident in PORT ARTHUR, JEFFERSON County, TX. Reported cause: EQUIPMENT FAILURE. Reported consequences: 0 fatalities, 0 injuries, 71.8 REFINED AND/OR PETROLEUM PRODUCT (NON-HVL) WHICH IS A LIQUID AT AMBIENT CONDITIONS released, $241,000 reported property damage. Operator-reported incident data submitted to PHMSA, generally within 30 days. Records may be supplemented or corrected and do not represent final agency causal findings. PHMSA trend classification: significant incident, not serious. ## Document text Hazardous liquid incident in PORT ARTHUR, JEFFERSON County, TX. Reported cause: EQUIPMENT FAILURE. Reported consequences: 0 fatalities, 0 injuries, 71.8 REFINED AND/OR PETROLEUM PRODUCT (NON-HVL) WHICH IS A LIQUID AT AMBIENT CONDITIONS released, $241,000 reported property damage. Operator-reported incident data submitted to PHMSA, generally within 30 days. Records may be supplemented or corrected and do not represent final agency causal findings. Report number: 20160298. Operator ID: 2552. Reported incident date: 8/13/2016 10:42. Location detail: 138 Cause detail: FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT BODY (EXCEPT PUMP), TANK PLATE, OR OTHER MATERIAL Cause detail: AT 22:15 ON 8/13/16, THE COLONIAL HEBERT STATION OPERATOR RECEIVED A NOTIFICATION FROM THE ENTERPRISE TANK FARM OPERATOR OF A DIESEL FUEL RELEASE IN THE VICINITY OF COLONIAL'S NORTH PORT ARTHUR (NPA) STATION. NPA STATION IS LOCATED WITHIN THE ENTERPRISE TANK FARM FACILITY. THE OPERATOR NOTIFIED THE COLONIAL LEAD OPERATOR WHO DISPATCHED PERSONNEL TO NPA TO INVESTIGATE. INTERNAL NOTIFICATIONS WERE MADE AND ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL WERE DEPLOYED TO THE SITE TO ASSIST WITH THE INVESTIGATION. AT 00:10 ON 8/14/16 IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT COLONIAL'S NPA FACILITY WAS MOST LIKELY SOURCE OF THE PRODUCT RELEASE WHEN PRODUCT WAS OBSERVED IN ACCESS WELLS INSIDE THE STATION. RESPONSE ACTIVITIES WERE IMMEDIATELY INITIATED IN COOPERATION WITH LOCAL ENTERPRISE PERSONNEL AT 00:30. LINE 2PA HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN FOLLOWING A SCHEDULED OPERATION AT 12:33 ON 8/13/16 AND WAS STILL DOWN AT THE TIME OF DISCOVERY. HEAVY THUNDERSTORMS AND RAIN BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 17:00 AND 20:00 ON 8/13/16 HAD DROPPED A REPORTED 2.44 INCHES IN THE AREA. CLEANUP AND RECOVERY ACTIVITIES WERE INITIATED AT 01:50 WHEN OSROS ARRIVED ON SCENE AND BEGAN TO ESTABLISH CONTAINMENT ZONES AND PRODUCT RECOVERY POINTS. PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES WERE ALSO TAKEN TO PROTECT AREA DRAINAGE DITCHES AND A CANAL. THE NPA LINE 2 INJECTION VALVE WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS THE SOURCE OF THE RELEASE AT 18:15 ON 8/14/16. THE NPA LINE 2 INJECTION VALVE IS AN SPX/M&J 36 INCH COMPACT EXPANDING GATE VALVE, ANSI 300. THE VALVE CONSTRUCTION INCLUDES A 2 PIECE VALVE SLAB WITH A GUIDE RAIL ASSEMBLY THAT CONNECTS TO THE SLAB ON BOTH SIDES. THIS GUIDE RAIL ASSEMBLY TRAVELS ALONG A GUIDE PLUG ON EACH SIDE INSIDE THE VALVE BODY. THE GUIDE PLUG PROTRUDES INSIDE THE VALVE BODY AND IS AFFIXED TO THE SIDE OF THE VALVE BODY EXTERNALLY WITH A FLANGE AND SIX 0.5 INCH B7 STUDS AND NUTS. ON 8/14/2016, AT 18:15, THE STUDS ON ONE OF THE GUIDE PLUG FLANGE ASSEMBLIES WERE FOUND TO BE LOOSE. NO PRODUCT WAS OBSERVED COMING FROM THIS FLANGE ASSEMBLY WITH THE VALVE IN THE CLOSED POSITION. INITIAL REPAIR WAS CONSIDERED TO BE COMPLETED WHEN THE GUIDE PLUG FLANGE BOLTS WERE REPLACED ONE BY ONE AND TORQUED TO SPECIFICATION AS OF 21:45 ON 8/14/16. THE NRC NOTIFICATION WAS MADE AT 02:18 ON 8/14/2016 BASED ON A REASONABLE EXPECTATION THAT THE RESPONSE COSTS WOULD EXCEED $50,000. THE TEXAS STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE CENTER WAS NOTIFIED AT 04:53 ON 8/14/16 FOR TCEQ PURPOSES BASED ON A REASONABLE EXPECTATION THAT THE RELEASE VOLUME WOULD EXCEED 5 BARRELS IN A 24 HOUR PERIOD. THE TEXAS STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE CENTER WAS NOTIFIED AGAIN AT 09:18 ON 8/14/16 FOR TGLO AND TCEQ PURPOSES WHEN COLONIAL IDENTIFIED THE NEED TO DEPLOY DEFENSIVE BOOM IN THE LOCAL DRAINAGE DISTRICT 7 (DD7) CANAL ADJACENT TO THE ENTERPRISE TANK FARM. COURTESY CALLS WERE MADE TO PHMSA SOUTHERN REGION (CHRIS TAYLOR) AT 10:16 AND TO PHMSA SOUTHWEST REGION (MARY MCDANIEL) AT 10:16 ON 8/14/16 AS A FOLLOW UP TO THE NRC NOTIFICATION. UPDATE: DURING THE FUNCTION TEST FOLLOWING THE GUIDE PLUG REPLACEMENT, A MALFUNCTION OCCURRED INSIDE THE VALVE WHICH SHEARED THE BOLTS AND FORCED THE GUIDE PLUG OUT OF THE VALVE BODY, RESULTING IN A SEPARATE REPORTABLE PRODUCT RELEASE (REFERENCE 20160299-21695). A SUBSEQUENT REPAIR PLAN WAS DEVELOPED WHICH CONSISTED OF REPLACING ALL THE INTERNAL WORKINGS OF THE VALVE, NEW SLAB, GUIDE ARMS, GUIDE PLUGS, ETC. FINAL REPAIRS TO THE VALVE, VALVE BODY PRESSURE TEST AND OPEN/CLOSE FUNCTION TEST WERE COMPLETED AS OF 16:42 ON 8/17/16. LINE WAS RESTARTED AND RETURNED TO NORMAL OPERATION AS OF 18:38 ON 8/17/16. THE INCIDENT ANALYSIS REPORT, APPROVED ON 3/8/17, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: 1. THE ACTUATOR AND HYDRAULIC POWER SYSTEM WERE OVERSIZED (MISMATCHED) FOR THE VALVE, APPLYING EXCESSIVE THRUST WHEN CLOSING WHICH DAMAGED THE INTERNAL MECHANISMS OF THE VALVE. 2. THE VALVE WAS CLOSING AT A HIGHER RATE OF SPEED THAN RECOMMENDED BY THE MANUFACTURER'S ORIGINAL SPECIFICATION (15 SECONDS VERSUS 30 SECONDS TO TRANSITION). SUPP. UPDATE: E9 NO ISSUES PHMSA trend classification: significant incident, not serious. PHMSA standardized cause: EQUIPMENT FAILURE — FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT BODY. PHMSA indexed costs: $1,200,000 reported total cost, $597,052.711 in 1984 dollars, $1,470,357.075 in current-year dollars. PHMSA trend flags, standardized causes, and indexed costs are analytical fields added to operator-reported incident data. They do not represent final agency causal findings. ## Provenance - Official: Yes - Source: - Source ID: `phmsa-pipeline-incidents` - SHA-256: `805650aaa363720b4beaf90213fa9e3857006c8d6c23ac5e34d730c14b0393e3` - Retrieved: 2026-08-20T03:30:32.010Z - Exported: 2026-08-22T05:53:25.852Z - Document slug: `phmsa-incident-ee86973224515bbcf9316e22` ### Source metadata ```json { "recordKind": "pipeline_incident", "datasetType": "hazardous_liquid", "datasetLabel": "Hazardous liquid", "datasetPeriod": "January 2010 to present", "report": { "number": "20160298", "supplementalNumber": "22213", "type": "SUPPLEMENTAL FINAL", "receivedDate": "2016-09-14", "receivedDateRaw": "9/14/2016" }, "operator": { "id": "2552", "name": "COLONIAL PIPELINE CO" }, "incident": { "date": "2016-08-13", "dateRaw": "8/13/2016 10:42" }, "location": { "city": "PORT ARTHUR", "county": "JEFFERSON", "state": "TX", "postalCode": "77640", "latitude": 29.90848, "longitude": -94.01228, "type": "ORIGINATED ON OPERATOR-CONTROLLED PROPERTY, BUT THEN FLOWED OR MIGRATED OFF THE PROPERTY", "details": { "DESIGNATED_NAME": "138" }, "facilityName": "NORTH PORT ARTHUR INJECTION" }, "cause": { "category": "EQUIPMENT FAILURE", "details": { "CAUSE_DETAILS": "FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT BODY (EXCEPT PUMP), TANK PLATE, OR OTHER MATERIAL", "NARRATIVE": "AT 22:15 ON 8/13/16, THE COLONIAL HEBERT STATION OPERATOR RECEIVED A NOTIFICATION FROM THE ENTERPRISE TANK FARM OPERATOR OF A DIESEL FUEL RELEASE IN THE VICINITY OF COLONIAL'S NORTH PORT ARTHUR (NPA) STATION. NPA STATION IS LOCATED WITHIN THE ENTERPRISE TANK FARM FACILITY. THE OPERATOR NOTIFIED THE COLONIAL LEAD OPERATOR WHO DISPATCHED PERSONNEL TO NPA TO INVESTIGATE. INTERNAL NOTIFICATIONS WERE MADE AND ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL WERE DEPLOYED TO THE SITE TO ASSIST WITH THE INVESTIGATION. AT 00:10 ON 8/14/16 IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT COLONIAL'S NPA FACILITY WAS MOST LIKELY SOURCE OF THE PRODUCT RELEASE WHEN PRODUCT WAS OBSERVED IN ACCESS WELLS INSIDE THE STATION. RESPONSE ACTIVITIES WERE IMMEDIATELY INITIATED IN COOPERATION WITH LOCAL ENTERPRISE PERSONNEL AT 00:30. LINE 2PA HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN FOLLOWING A SCHEDULED OPERATION AT 12:33 ON 8/13/16 AND WAS STILL DOWN AT THE TIME OF DISCOVERY. HEAVY THUNDERSTORMS AND RAIN BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 17:00 AND 20:00 ON 8/13/16 HAD DROPPED A REPORTED 2.44 INCHES IN THE AREA. CLEANUP AND RECOVERY ACTIVITIES WERE INITIATED AT 01:50 WHEN OSROS ARRIVED ON SCENE AND BEGAN TO ESTABLISH CONTAINMENT ZONES AND PRODUCT RECOVERY POINTS. PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES WERE ALSO TAKEN TO PROTECT AREA DRAINAGE DITCHES AND A CANAL. THE NPA LINE 2 INJECTION VALVE WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS THE SOURCE OF THE RELEASE AT 18:15 ON 8/14/16. THE NPA LINE 2 INJECTION VALVE IS AN SPX/M&J 36 INCH COMPACT EXPANDING GATE VALVE, ANSI 300. THE VALVE CONSTRUCTION INCLUDES A 2 PIECE VALVE SLAB WITH A GUIDE RAIL ASSEMBLY THAT CONNECTS TO THE SLAB ON BOTH SIDES. THIS GUIDE RAIL ASSEMBLY TRAVELS ALONG A GUIDE PLUG ON EACH SIDE INSIDE THE VALVE BODY. THE GUIDE PLUG PROTRUDES INSIDE THE VALVE BODY AND IS AFFIXED TO THE SIDE OF THE VALVE BODY EXTERNALLY WITH A FLANGE AND SIX 0.5 INCH B7 STUDS AND NUTS. ON 8/14/2016, AT 18:15, THE STUDS ON ONE OF THE GUIDE PLUG FLANGE ASSEMBLIES WERE FOUND TO BE LOOSE. NO PRODUCT WAS OBSERVED COMING FROM THIS FLANGE ASSEMBLY WITH THE VALVE IN THE CLOSED POSITION. INITIAL REPAIR WAS CONSIDERED TO BE COMPLETED WHEN THE GUIDE PLUG FLANGE BOLTS WERE REPLACED ONE BY ONE AND TORQUED TO SPECIFICATION AS OF 21:45 ON 8/14/16. THE NRC NOTIFICATION WAS MADE AT 02:18 ON 8/14/2016 BASED ON A REASONABLE EXPECTATION THAT THE RESPONSE COSTS WOULD EXCEED $50,000. THE TEXAS STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE CENTER WAS NOTIFIED AT 04:53 ON 8/14/16 FOR TCEQ PURPOSES BASED ON A REASONABLE EXPECTATION THAT THE RELEASE VOLUME WOULD EXCEED 5 BARRELS IN A 24 HOUR PERIOD. THE TEXAS STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE CENTER WAS NOTIFIED AGAIN AT 09:18 ON 8/14/16 FOR TGLO AND TCEQ PURPOSES WHEN COLONIAL IDENTIFIED THE NEED TO DEPLOY DEFENSIVE BOOM IN THE LOCAL DRAINAGE DISTRICT 7 (DD7) CANAL ADJACENT TO THE ENTERPRISE TANK FARM. COURTESY CALLS WERE MADE TO PHMSA SOUTHERN REGION (CHRIS TAYLOR) AT 10:16 AND TO PHMSA SOUTHWEST REGION (MARY MCDANIEL) AT 10:16 ON 8/14/16 AS A FOLLOW UP TO THE NRC NOTIFICATION. UPDATE: DURING THE FUNCTION TEST FOLLOWING THE GUIDE PLUG REPLACEMENT, A MALFUNCTION OCCURRED INSIDE THE VALVE WHICH SHEARED THE BOLTS AND FORCED THE GUIDE PLUG OUT OF THE VALVE BODY, RESULTING IN A SEPARATE REPORTABLE PRODUCT RELEASE (REFERENCE 20160299-21695). A SUBSEQUENT REPAIR PLAN WAS DEVELOPED WHICH CONSISTED OF REPLACING ALL THE INTERNAL WORKINGS OF THE VALVE, NEW SLAB, GUIDE ARMS, GUIDE PLUGS, ETC. FINAL REPAIRS TO THE VALVE, VALVE BODY PRESSURE TEST AND OPEN/CLOSE FUNCTION TEST WERE COMPLETED AS OF 16:42 ON 8/17/16. LINE WAS RESTARTED AND RETURNED TO NORMAL OPERATION AS OF 18:38 ON 8/17/16. THE INCIDENT ANALYSIS REPORT, APPROVED ON 3/8/17, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: 1. THE ACTUATOR AND HYDRAULIC POWER SYSTEM WERE OVERSIZED (MISMATCHED) FOR THE VALVE, APPLYING EXCESSIVE THRUST WHEN CLOSING WHICH DAMAGED THE INTERNAL MECHANISMS OF THE VALVE. 2. THE VALVE WAS CLOSING AT A HIGHER RATE OF SPEED THAN RECOMMENDED BY THE MANUFACTURER'S ORIGINAL SPECIFICATION (15 SECONDS VERSUS 30 SECONDS TO TRANSITION). SUPP. UPDATE: E9 NO ISSUES" } }, "consequences": { "fatalities": 0, "injuries": 0, "commodity": "REFINED AND/OR PETROLEUM PRODUCT (NON-HVL) WHICH IS A LIQUID AT AMBIENT CONDITIONS", "release": "71.8", "propertyDamage": 241000, "estimatedOperatorCost": 0, "estimatedEmergencyCost": 500000, "estimatedEnvironmentalCost": 450000, "ignition": "NO", "explosion": "NO", "evacuated": 0, "raw": { "FATAL": "0", "INJURE": "0", "UNINTENTIONAL_RELEASE_BBLS": "71.8", "EST_COST_PROP_DAMAGE": "241000", "PRPTY": "1200000" } }, "provenance": { "viewId": "27nc-rsge", "viewUrl": "https://data.transportation.gov/api/views/27nc-rsge", "assetId": "1d547e17-2be1-4a32-9958-a1d5a946ade9", "archiveFilename": "Hazardous Liquid Accident Data - January 2010 to present.zip", "archiveSha256": "5aaa1a31834a0503acfdfc82172d9ff3483b480019cec1605ebb8e15d0040f0d", "memberPath": "accident_hazardous_liquid_jan2010_present.txt", "memberSha256": "2af519107224bbd22874e67c65f6aa526073a297b2b30104b711d071680488a4", "rowNumber": 3209, "rowSha256": "ed2148c7c1a6280ecb60c1d2cde48c736510587aa2f586d4b2ade8be7c902340" }, "caveat": "Operator-reported incident data submitted to PHMSA, generally within 30 days. Records may be supplemented or corrected and do not represent final agency causal findings.", "operatorReported": true, "finalAgencyFinding": false, "flaggedAnalysis": { "dataAsOf": "2026-07-31", "flags": { "fireFirst": null, "significant": true, "serious": false }, "standardizedCause": { "sevenCategory": "MATERIAL/WELD/EQUIP FAILURE", "sevenSubcategory": "FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT BODY", "eightCategory": "EQUIPMENT FAILURE", "eightSubcategory": "FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT BODY" }, "costs": { "reported": 1200000, "in1984Dollars": 597052.7111279052, "currentYearDollars": 1470357.0753825805 }, "caveat": "PHMSA trend flags, standardized causes, and indexed costs are analytical fields added to operator-reported incident data. They do not represent final agency causal findings.", "provenance": { "sourceUrl": "https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/data_statistics/pipeline/PHMSA_Pipeline_Safety_Flagged_Incidents.zip", "landingPageUrl": "https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-flagged-files", "catalogUrl": "https://data.transportation.gov/Pipelines-and-Hazmat/Pipeline-Incident-Flagged-Files/qdme-9bbm", "retrievalMode": "official_live", "archivedAt": null, "archiveSha256": "317e6a3e16d60b9b677efe391dc40258b5dd7ead83fb8bea74cb553cedfbbdec", "workbook": "hl2010toPresent.xlsx", "sheet": "hl2010toPresent", "rowNumber": 2633, "rowSha256": "bf605e7fa00618a03a4226af2dc314d3df36f485dc7869b5de3f45e7186e672b" } }, "jurisdiction": "US", "operatorName": "COLONIAL PIPELINE CO" } ```