# National Propane Gas Association — Hazardous Materials Safety Interpretation

**Citation:** 24-0112  
**Type / status:** guidance / guidance  
**Agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  
**Effective:** Not stated  
**Published:** 2025-08-12

24-0112 response to National Propane Gas Association concerning 173.315.

## Document text

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1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20590
U.S. Department
of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety
Administration
August 12, 2025
Benjamin A.F. Nussdorf
General Counsel/Vice President, Regulatory & Industry Affairs
National Propane Gas Association
1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 1075
Washington, DC 20036
Reference No. 24-0112
Dear Mr. Nussdorf:
This letter is in response to your November 18, 2024 email requesting clarification of the
Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-180) applicable to emergency
discharge control equipment for liquefied compressed gas in cargo tank motor vehicles
(CTMVs). Regarding metered service, it is your understanding that the phrase “shut off all
motive and auxiliary power equipment” located in § 173.315(n)(3) of the HMR refers only to
shutting down the equipment used for product transfer to prevent uncontrolled or accidental
discharge of hazardous material and the vehicle engine. Specifically, you ask whether this
language in § 173.315(n)(3) is meant to only shut off product transfer equipment and the
vehicle’s engine but not to shut off all electrical power on the vehicle.
Your understanding is correct. As provided by § 173.315(n)(3), the phrase “all motive and
auxiliary power equipment” refers only to the vehicle’s engine and the equipment that is directly
responsible for operating the vehicles product transfer system—not all electrical power to the
vehicle. The intent of the regulation is to close the internal self-closing stop valve and shut off all
motive and auxiliary power equipment upon activation to prevent uncontrolled or accidental
discharge of hazardous materials and eliminate potential sources of ignition.

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I hope this information is helpful. Please contact us if we can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
Dirk DerKinderen
Chief, Standards Development Branch
Standards and Rulemaking Division

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Horne
24-0112
From: Patrick, Eamonn (PHMSA)
To: Dodd, Alice (PHMSA)
Cc: Andrews, Steven (PHMSA); Wolcott, Alexander (PHMSA)
Subject: FW: NPGA Request: Letter of Interpretation for Remote Power Shut Off Regulations
Date: Monday, November 18, 2024 1:02:42 PM
Attachments: image001.png
PHMSA-RSPA-1997-2133-0122_content.pdf
PHMSA-RSPA-1997-2133-0215_attachment_1 RSPA Guidance.pdf
PHMSA-RSPA-2133-168 - Remtron.pdf
RSPA Attachment A.pdf
RSPA Attachment B.pdf
RSPA Attachment C.pdf
NPGA Request for Letter of Interpretation - Remote Power Shut Off.pdf
Good afternoon Alice,
Please check this in as a LOI. The request is the attachment titled “NPGA Request for Letter of
Interpretation – Remote Power Shut Off.” The other attachments are reference materials to provide
context and information for the request. The person assigned can reach out to Steven and/or me for
further background on this issue.
Thanks!
-Eamonn
From: Benjamin Nussdorf <bnussdorf@npga.org>
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2024 12:57 PM
To: Patrick, Eamonn (PHMSA) <eamonn.patrick@dot.gov>; Andrews, Steven (PHMSA)
<steven.andrews@dot.gov>; Wolcott, Alexander (PHMSA) <alexander.wolcott@dot.gov>
Subject: NPGA Request: Letter of Interpretation for Remote Power Shut Off Regulations
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the Department of Transportation (DOT). Do
not click on links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content
is safe.
Dear Mr. Patrick, Mr. Andrews, and Mr. Wolcott:
Thank you for your engagement with NPGA and its members regarding the Remote Power Shut Off
Regulations. Attached, please find our request for a letter of interpretation and supporting materials.
Thank you for your consideration and review.
Sincerely,
Benjamin Nussdorf
Benjamin A.F. Nussdorf
General Counsel/Vice President, Regulatory & Industry Affairs
NATIONAL PROPANE GAS ASSOCIATION
1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW

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Suite 1075
Washington, DC 20036 USA
202 355 1321 PHONE
202 365 2638 CELL
202 466 7205 FAX
bnussdorf@npga.org
www.npga.org

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November 18, 2024
Eamonn Patrick
Steven Andrews
Alexander Walcott
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
United States Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Ave. SE
Washington, DC 20590
Re: Remote Power Shut Off Discussions
Dear Mr. Patrick, Mr. Walcott, and Mr. Andrews:
The National Propane Gas Association (NPGA) respectfully submits this request in response to our
meetings of July 29th and September 30th, 2024. In those meetings, which included NPGA, PHMSA, the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), the State of North Carolina, BASE Engineering,
and Mississippi Tank, PHMSA requested information on the preamble of the prior rulemaking, analysis
from BASE Engineering on system operations, and information from Mississippi Tank on the prior
negotiated rulemaking. The aim of this request is to provide justification for a letter of interpretation (LOI)
from the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) which will clarify and refine the
understanding of the remote shut off regulations in HMR-225 and what they intend to encompass.
NPGA is the national trade association of the propane industry with a membership of about 2,300
companies, and 36 state and regional associations that represent members in all 50 states. Membership in
NPGA includes retail marketers of propane gas who deliver the fuel to the end user, propane producers,
transporters and wholesalers, and manufacturers and distributors of equipment, containers, and appliances.
Propane gas fuels millions of installations nationwide for home and commercial heating and cooking, in
agriculture, industrial processing, and as a clean air alternative engine fuel for both over-the-road vehicles
and industrial lift trucks. Roughly 75% of NPGA’s members have fewer than 100 employees, and are
considered small businesses.
Preamble:
NPGA staff has evaluated the documents relevant to the remote shut off section of the Hazardous Materials
Regulations (HMR) and offers the following for your consideration. Principally, the regulatory evaluation
established that use of a radio frequency transmitter communication with receiver equipment on board the
vehicle capable of closing the stop valve met the requirements of “immediately activate the internal self-
closing stop valve to shut down all motive and auxiliary power equipment,” in order to prevent unauthorized
or uncontrolled release (See RSPA Attachment A at Page 12). PHMSA noted in the Federal Register that
the elimination of unauthorized or uncontrolled discharge by actuating the remote means of automatic
closure of the internal self-closing stop valve, rather than the deenergizing entire vehicle, was the primary
objective.1
NPGA has been consistent in prior rulemakings to cover this problem. Included in its engagement are initial
comments on the HMR (See RSPA Attachment B). NPGA, and the propane industry as a whole, have never
advocated or supported the contention that the entire vehicle lose power because, as noted on the July 29th
call, such an action would represent an unacceptable safety risk to the operator and the public.
1 See e.g. PHMSA-RSPA-97-2133-0122 at 8-10, 13, noting the intent to disengage power to the discharge system.

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Further, PHMSA’s own regulatory actions in this field have focused on the need to stop the flow of product
remotely in the sake of safety, rather than the shutdown of the entire vehicle. (See RSPA Attachment C, at
Page 9-10). In that document, PHMSA stresses the focus is the ability of the operator to engage or disengage
the motor vehicle PTO or other mechanical, electrical, or hydraulic means used to energize the pump and
other components of a cargo tank motor vehicle’s discharge system. PHMSA did not stress the need to
shut down all power to the vehicle. In all situations and in all potential explanations, RSPA rules with
respect to remote shut down have focused on shutting down the components and the power to the discharge
system, rather than the vehicle itself.
In PHMSA’s documents in this docket, RSPA 97-2133 (HM-225), PHMSA noted the need to “ensure an
acceptable level of safety for delivery of liquefied compressed gases.”2 These regulations evidence
PHMSA’s intent to regulate emergency discharge controls,3 rather than regulate all power to the vehicle.
PHMSA’s questions and documents on this issue focus principally on discharge, rather than eliminating all
power to the vehicle.4 PHMSA notes elsewhere that the rules have been essentially unchanged since 1941,
focusing on controls for excess flow valves and internal self-closing stop valves; while regulations in the
1990s provided for secondary remote controls and for fusible links, allowing the internal valves to close
automatically in the case of a cargo tank being involved in a fire.56 Without question, PHMSA has intended
to have the remote shut off portion of the HMR apply to valve and discharge equipment since their
inception, rather than apply to the entire vehicle.
Auxiliary Power Equipment:
The intent of the regulation is clear through examination of the HMR as a whole. “A cargo tank motor
vehicle must have an off-truck remote means to close the internal self-closing stop valve and shut off all
motive and auxiliary power equipment upon activation by a qualified person…”7 The aim of this regulation
is to stop the flow of product in an emergency situation, not to shut down all electric power to the vehicle,
which would result in an unacceptable and unprecedented safety concern to the driver and to public safety.
Other parts of the same regulation specifically focus on the need to stop the flow of product in an emergency
situation.8 While the operative portion of the regulation is not precisely worded, taken as a whole, the
remote shut off portion of the HMR’s goal is to stop the flow of product by means of a remote shut down
to the product’s valves and mechanical power to the pump.
Further, while not defined in the hazardous materials section, an “auxiliary power unit” is defined elsewhere
in the regulations. It is possible that the omission of defining auxiliary power equipment in this section is
simply an oversight, but the regulations taken as a whole do provide a definition of auxiliary power unit.
9
NPGA requests that PHMSA clearly state in LOI that these available definitions of auxiliary power unit
apply to the remote power shut off regulations, and that auxiliary power unit and auxiliary power equipment
have the same definition in the HMR.
2 62 Fed. Reg. 44059 (Aug. 18, 1997).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 44060.
5 62 Fed. Reg. 44038 (Aug. 18, 1997).
6 See also PHMSA-RSPA-97-2133-168 at 2-4, 6, 13, noting REMTRON’s presentation identifying the immediate
closure of an emergency shut down device by way of closing the internal valve and stopping the discharge process
through disengagement of the pump inclusive of engine shut down.
7 49 CFR 173.315(n)(1).
8 49 CFR 173.315(n)(2).
9 49 CFR 535.4; 40 CFR 1037.801. NPGA notes that the definition here applies to an auxiliary power unit, rather
than auxiliary power equipment, though the two terms are distinct without a difference in practice and as applied in
40 CFR 1037.801.
2

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Safety:
A supplemental justification for a LOI to clarify that this rule only applies to auxiliary power equipment is
to ensure safety. PHMSA generally, and the HMR regulations specifically, are designed to ensure the
highest level of safety. Should PHMSA or state enforcement authorities interpret this rule to apply to all
power on a vehicle, a number of safety considerations will arise. In dark or low-light situations, all power
could be shut off to a hazardous materials delivery vehicle, which presents an elevated safety concern when
seeing and avoiding the vehicle on the side of a road may prove challenging. Shutting off all power presents
a potential issue for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, as it would increase the safety risk
to the driver. Shutting off all power presents a potential issue for the National Transportation Safety Board,
as it would increase the potential for vehicle collisions and incidents when all lights are shut off. Shutting
off all power presents a potential issue for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), as
it would not provide an equivalent level of safety to FMCSA’s own regulations. Finally, if all power is shut
down to the vehicle, it would detrimentally impact the functionality of the off-truck remote as well.
Generally speaking, providing the rule with the broad interpretation taken by a lone inspector in North
Carolina would result in serious safety concerns for the workers, the public, and for a variety of government
agencies.
Further, during a delivery, bobtails are oftentimes parked on roadways, or in areas with varying degrees of
traffic. As the truck is delivering, safety beacons are often deployed to warn others of the operation,
protecting the parked truck and its operator. In winter months, during inclement weather (blowing snow or
rain), or after dark, these flashers are often a key piece of safety equipment. By cutting power to these lights,
the operator may be subject to potential tripping hazards, as well as low visibility in uneven, or slippery
ground conditions. Cutting all power on the truck removes this protection, and creates an unacceptable level
of risk to the operator’s and the public’s safety.
History:
An important consideration for the LOI is that for twenty-five years, PHMSA and state enforcement
authorities have interpreted this rule to only apply to power equipment, rather than all vehicle power,
without discussion or debate. While a single inspector’s mistaken interpretation has encouraged this LOI,
the overwhelming pattern and practice of the application of this rule is without equivocation or doubt.10
PHMSA’s intent is evident and clear through decades of focused enforcement of this rule, and clarifying
the intent and applicable enforcement would prevent future confusion or misinterpretation.
For PHMSA to take the position that the “off truck remote means to close the internal valve and shut off
all motive and auxiliary power equipment”, as written in 49 CFR 173.315(n)(3) is inclusive of electrical
energy that has no bearing on the operation or function of the transfer system, would be a significant
departure from RSPA records and the way the regulations have been interpreted for the last 25 years. This
new interpretation would require compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) because this
change does not rise to the level of an emergency nature and would be required to publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking pursuant to the APA.
Conclusion
NPGA and its members respectfully request PHMSA to issue a letter of interpretation stating that PHMSA’s
use of the terms “all motive and auxiliary power equipment” refers only to the equipment that is directly
responsible for operating the vehicles transfer system, as required to actuate or open the vehicles internal
10 See also PHMSA-RSPA-97-2133-215 at 1-2, noting how an internal valve shut down process would provide
compliance with the regulations.
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self-closing stop valve or operate the vehicles pump or product transfer equipment, and not all electrical
power to the vehicle. Further, NPGA and its members respectfully request that PHMSA state that the intent
of the regulation is to prevent uncontrolled or accidental discharge of hazardous materials. Thank you for
your consideration of these comments. Please contact NPGA if you have any questions or concerns.
Respectfully Submitted,
_________________________
Benjamin Nussdorf
Vice President, Regulatory & Industry Affairs
National Propane Gas Association
1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 1075
Washington, DC 20036
bnussdorf@npga.org
4

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Billing Code 491 0-60-P
97oEc -5 PH 3: 19
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
DOCKET SECflOH
RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION
49 CFR Part 171
49 CFR Part 171
3 5 P A 4 7 - bz 133- ;z 22
3 5 P A 4 7 - bz 133- ;z 22
[Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HA4-225)]
[Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HA4-225)]
RIN 2137-AC97
Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed Gas Service;
Response to Petitions for Reconsideration; Editorial Revisions; and Rules Clarification
AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; response to petitions for reconsideration; editorial revisions; and rules
clarification.
SUMMARY: On August 18,1997, RSPA published a final rule adopting certain safety standards
applicable to cargo tank motor vehicles in liquefied compressed gas service. In response to petitions
for reconsideration filed by Farmland Industries, Inc. (Farmland), The Fertilizer Institute (TFI), and
AmeriGas Propane, L.P. (AmeriGas), RSPA is revising a requirement concerning the daily pressure
testing of transfer hoses on these cargo tank motor vehicles, and the agency is revising 0 171 S(a)
for consistency with 0 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i) by removing a hose rupture (k, incomplete separation)
as a condition that causes the intemal self-closing stop valve to function. This action grants certain
petitions for reconsideration of the final rule pertaining to effective and practical standards to assure
the integrity of transfer hoses used in unloading operations. Also, in this final rule, RSPA is granting
the request by Farmland and TFI to extend the expiration date of the final rule for four months, to
July 1 , 1999. RSPA is denying the request by AmeriGas for an immediate stay of the provisions of
3 171 S(a)(l)(iii) and the AmeriGas request for reconsideration of: (1) the provision in 0 171.5(c)
.

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setting forth an expiration date for the final rule; and (2) RSPA’s interpretation of the attendance
._
requirements in 0 l77.&34(i) that a qualified person must always maintain an unobstructed view of
the cargo tank. Additionally, this action makes editorial revisions and clarifies certain provisions
adopted in the final rule.
DATES: This final rule is effective [Insert Date of publication in the Federal Register].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ronald Kirkpatrick, Office of Hazardous
Materials Technology, RSPA, Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, S. W., Washington,
DC 20590-0001, telephone (202) 366-4545, or Nancy Machado, Ofice of the Chief Counsel, RSPA,
Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20590-0001, telephone
(202) 366-4400.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On August 18,1997, RSPA published a final rule under Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HM-
225) [62 FR 440381. The final rule revised and extended requirements published in an interim final
rule (IFR) on February 19,1997, concerning the operation of cargo tank motor vehicles (CTMVs)
in certain liquefied compressed gas service. The fmal rule requires a specific marking on affected
CTMVs and requires motor carriers to comply with additional operational controls intended to
compensate for the failure of passive emergency discharge control systems to function as required
by the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 17 1 - 1 80). The operational controls
specified in the final rule provide an alternative to compliance with 5 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i) and are
intended to ensure an acceptable level of safety while the industry and govemment continue to work
to develop an emergency discharge control system that effectively stops the discharge of hazardous
2

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materials from a cargo tank if any attached hose or piping is separated.
Petitions for rewnsideration of the August 18, 1997 final rule were filed by The National
Propane Gas Association (NPGA), Farmland Industries, Inc. (Farmland), The Fertilizer Institute
(TFI) and jointly by Ferrellgas, L.P., Suburban Propane, L.P., AmeriGas Propane, L.P. (AmeriGas),
Agway Petroleum Corporation, Cornerstone Propane Partners, L.P., and National Propane, L.P. On
September 26, 1997, Ferrellgas, L.P., Suburban Propane, L.P., Agway Petroleum Corporation,
Cornerstone Propane Partners, L.P., and National Propane, L.P. withdrew their names from the
jointly-filed petition for reconsideration. Petitioner AmeriGas, however, continues to seek relief
through the September 17, 1997 petition for reconsideration. On October 2, 1 997, NPGA withdrew
its petition for reconsideration. On November 5,1997, National Private Truck Council (NPTC) filed
a petition for reconsideration. Although the petition was filed by NPTC after the close of the petition
period, and RSPA has not accepted the petition, all NPTC’s issues have been considered since NPTC
raised issues identical to those raised by other petitioners.
Petitioners Farmland and TFI seek reconsideration of two provisions of the August 18, 1997
final rule. Specifically, they request reconsideration of the requirement in 0 171.5(a)( l)(i) that a
transfer hose be subjected to full transfer pressure before commencing the first transfer each day.
They also ask RSPA to reconsider the expiration date of the August 18,1997 final rule; they request
a four-month extension of the expiration date to July 1, 1999.
AmeriGas seeks: (1) reconsideration and an immediate stay of the requirement in
0 171.5(a)( l)(iii) that the qualified person unloading a CTMY promptly activate the internal self-
closing stop valve and promptly shut down all motive and auxiliary power in the event of an
unintentional release of lading to the environment during transfer; (2) immediate withdrawal of
3

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RSPA’s interpretation of its long-standing attendance requirements in $ 177.834(i) pending further
rulemaking after notice and comment; (3) withdrawal of the expiration date in $ 171.5(c); (4)
deletion of the word “rupture” as it appears in $ 171.5(a); and (5) withdrawal of the requirement in
$ 171.5(a)(l)(i) that the transfer hose be subjected to full transfer pressure before commencing the
first transfer each day.
11. Petitions Granted.
A. Daily uressure testing of transfer hoses. In $ 171.5(a)(l)(i), RSPA required that a
transfer hose be subject to full transfer pressure before the first unloading of product each day. This
provision applied to all CTMVs operating under the terms of the temporary regulation specified in
\
$ 171.5.
Petitioners assert that, because most large CTMVs (“transports,” typically used for bulk plant
deliveries) do not have a separate back-to-tank product bypass line, energizing the pump when the
receiving tank‘s liquid shutoff valve is closed may damage the pump vanes, result in failure of the
shaft seals and other components, and place high torsional loads on the power take-off (PTO) drive
shaft.
In addition, petitioners state that no additional safety measures are needed for small CTMVs
(“bobtails,” typically used for local deliveries) because they are generally equipped with a separate
back-to-tank product bypass valve. Petitioners state that, in the process of preparing lines for
product transfer from a small CTMV, the full length of transfer hose is charged to pump discharge
pressure, thereby providing an opportunity to prove the integrity of the transfer system prior to each
delivery.
Recognizing the merit of the petitioners’ comments regarding the transfer hose pressure
4

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standard adopted in the final rule, RSPA published an advisory guidance that communicated the
agency’s agreement w&th the petitioners’ claim that some cargo tank pumping systems are not
capable of safely pumping against a closed product valve without being damaged
(62 FR 49171; September 19, 1997) . Therefore, 3 171.5(a)(l)(i) is revised to allow an operator to
determine the leakproofhess of a discharge system (including hose) by requiring that the pressure
in the discharge system reach at least equilibrium with the pressure inside the cargo tank prior to
transfer. After the operator verifies leakproofhess of the discharge system, delivery may commence.
RSPA is also amending 3 171.5(a)( l)(i) by removing the wording “and equipment” from
the third sentence to clarify that only the piping, hose and hose fittings must be tested daily. There
is no requirement to test the entire cargo tank on a daily basis.
B. Hose separation versus hose rupture. Petitioner AmeriGas notes RSPA’s use of the
word “rupture[d]” in 3 171.5(a) with respect to comparable requirements in 3 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i)
concerning operation of the internal self-closing stop valve. The petitioner states that the word
“rupture[d]” is more commonly used to denote a “leak or partial failure” rather than an actual
separation, thus creating an undesirable potential for confusion. Therefore, AmeriGas requests that
the word “rupture[d]” be stricken from the regulatory language.
RSPA agrees that the word “ruptured” could be construed as adding new meaning to
requirements pertaining to the emergency operation of the internal self-closing stop valve that was
not intended in the development of the final rule. Therefore, 3 171.5(a) is amended by removing the
wording “ruptured or ” to make this provision consistent with requirements in 3 178.337-1 l(a)( l)(i).
fC). March 1.1999 expiration date of the temporary final rule. Petitioners TFI and Farmland
request that RSPA reconsider the March 1 , 1999 expiration date of 0 171.5. The petitioners request
5

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a four-month extension of the alternative requirements in tj 171.5 -- until July 1, 1999 -- to avoid
expiration of the requixments at the beginning of the fertilizer industry’s peak delivery season.
RSPA is granting a request by TFI and Farmland to extend the expiration date until July 1,
1999. This decision is based on RSPA’s understanding that industry will continue to make good
faith efforts in developing an emergency discharge control system that offers an equal or higher level
of safety as that in longstanding provisions in 0 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i).
111. Petitions Denied.
A. Prompt activation of the internal self-closinp stop valve. In its petition, AmeriGas
contends that it is impossible to achieve immediate full compliance with the requirement in
0 171.5(a)(l)(iii) that a qualified person unloading a small CTMV promptly activate the intemal self-
closing stop valve and promptly shut down all motive and auxiliary power equipment if there is an
unintentional release of lading to the environment during transfer. AmeriGas claims this rule
constitutes a new operator attendance requirement that can only be satisfied by using remote-
controlled equipment that is not currently in service on more than an experimental basis and that
such equipment cannot be put into service in less than a matter of months.
In the February 1997 emergency interim final rule (IFR), RSPA first adopted additional
requirements for the person who attends the unloading of a CTMV to be within arm’s reach of a
means for closure (emergency shut-down device) of the internal self-closing stop valve or other
device that will immediately stop the discharge of product from the cargo tank [62 FR 7643,
February 19, 19971. Use of an “electro-mechanical” device as a means of closure was discussed in
that rule. Based on comments to the IFR, RSPA revised 0 171.5(a)(l)(iii)(C), in the August final
rule, to set forth three ways to achieve prompt stoppage of lading discharge from the cargo tank by:
6

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(1) complying with the requirements in $ 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i); (2) using a qualified person positioned
within arm’s reach of-the mechanical means of closure of the internal self-closing stop valve
throughout the unloading operation, except during the short period necessary to engage or disengage
the motor vehicle PTO or other mechanical, electrical, or hydraulic means used to energize the pump
and other components of a cargo tank’s discharge system; or (3) using a remote-controlled system
that is capable of stopping the transfer of lading by use of a transmitter carried by a qualified person
unloading the cargo tank.
RSPA notes that the NPGA special task force, organized in part to develop plans to provide
for continued safe operation of existing propane cargo tanks, concentrated much of its efforts on
development of remote-controlled devices that may be activated by the person attending an
unloading operation [comments of Mr. McHenry, NPGA, June 23, 1997 public meeting]. A
representative of the NPGA special task force reported progress on the development of remote-
controlled devices at a June 23, 1997 public meeting [comments of Mr. McHenry, NPGA].
Petitioner AmeriGas also provided a report on its progress in developing an effective, low-cost
remote-controlled system using radio fkequency technology [comments of Mr. McEnroe, AmenGas,
June 23, 1997 public meeting transcript, pages 5,45,56, and 571. AmeriGas provided RSPA with
an update on its progress in a November 13, 1997 meeting. The NPGA’s July 24, 1997 petition for
rulemaking (P-1346) calls for RSPA to adopt a new provision in 3 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(iii) for a variety
of systems that are capable of closing the internal liquid discharge valve by remote means.
The public record contains favorable accounts by several propane dealers who have installed
remote-controlled systems on their fleets of CTMVs [comments of Mr. Schuler, REMTRON, June
23, 1997 public meeting transcript, pages 59 and 60; comments of Mr. Stillwaggon, H.R. Weaver
7

<<<PAGE 16>>>

Co.; and comments of Mi. McEnroe, AmeriGas, September 30, 1997 public meeting transcript,
pages 42 and 6 1, respestively].
Industry representatives have stated that they have had good results with using radio-
frequency, remote-controlled systems [comments of Mr. McEnroe, AmeriGas, public meeting
transcript, June 23, 1997, page 46; Dr. Coady, Hick’s Gas, June 23, 1997 public meeting transcript,
pages 92 and 1021. A representative of Hicks Gas, one of the larger independent marketers of
propane, stated that his company has been developing and refining remote-control shutdown systems
on some of its trucks for the past three years [comments of Dr. Coady, Hick’s Gas, June 23, 1997
public meeting transcript, page 921.
D&g two public meetings (June 23,1997 and September 30,1997) industry representatives
presented information on radio frequency, remote-controlled systems, some with basic features and
others with more sophisticated applications, that can be used on most CTMVs. Additionally, they
represented that the installation instructions for these systems are simple enough that a fleet
mechanic who has a working knowledge of a vehicle’s air and electrical systems generally has the
experience and tools necessary to install and proof-test a system within a period of two or three
hours.
The advantage of a remote-controlled device has been demonstrated during an incident
involving a propane release on November 3, 1997 near Udina, Illinois. The driver, using a remote-
controlled device, promptly activated closure of the intemal self-closing stop valve without ignition
of the propane.
RSPA does not agree that operators of CTMVs have no practical means of compliance. The
public record contains information that some operators began installing remote-controlled systems
8

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shortly after issuance of the February 19,1997 interim final rule. In addition, the Federal Highway
Administration’s (FHWA) compliance policy emphasizes increased awareness about the rule and
its safety benefits, as opposed to immediate enforcement. If a company shows good faith efforts
to comply with the provisions of 3 171.5, FHWA’s policy is to not pursue civil penalty enforcement
actions.
Therefore, based on the above information, this part of the AmeriGas petition for
reconsideration of the final rule is denied.
RSPA believes there is a need to clarify that while the first sentence of 171.5(a)(l)(iii)(C)
allows use of a remote-controlled system to promptly activate the internal self-closing stop valve in
\
the event of an unintentional discharge, the second sentence provides limited relief from the
attendance requirements in 3 177.834(i)(3). Specifically, 3 177.834(i)(3) requires a qualified person
who is attending the unloading of a cargo tank to be awake, have an unobstructed view of the cargo
tank, and be within 25 feet of the cargo tank at all times during unloading. Therefore, the second
sentence in 3 171 .S(a)(l)(iii)(C) is revised to clarify that where a remote-controlled system is used,
the attendance requirements in 177.834(i)(3) are satisfied when the qualified person attending is
awake, is carrying a transmitter that can activate the closure of the internal self-closing stop valve,
remains within the operating range of the transmitter, and maintains an unobstructed view of the
cargo tank when the internal self-closing stop valve is open.
Also, 3 17 1.5(a)( l)(iii)(B) is revised to clarify that a qualified person must be positioned
within arm’s reach of a mechanical means of closure for the internal self-closing stop valve gr&
when this valve is open, except for the short duration necessary to engage or disengage the motor
vehicle PTO or other mechanical, electrical or hydraulic means used to energize the pump and other
9

<<<PAGE 18>>>

components of a cargo tank motor vehicle’s discharge system. All of these functions occur at or
immediately adjacent to the cargo tank in proximity to a means for closure of the internal self-
closing stop valve.
B. RSPA has not developed a “new interpretation” of its long-standing attendance
requirement in
177.834(i). In its petition, AmeriGas states that, in the August 18, 1997 final rule,
RSPA announced a new interpretation of the long-standing attendance requirements set forth at
Q 177.834(i). AmeriGas contends that this interpretation should be withdrawn because it: (1) is
inconsistent with the regulatory language; (2) was announced without notice or opportunity to
comment, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (MA) (see 5 U.S.C. 553); and (3) is
inconsistent with normal industry practice that has been “accepted for decades without question.”
AmeriGas’s arguments are invalid because RSPA’s position with regard to the meaning of
Q 177.834(i) is consistent with the regulatory history and plain language of that requirement.
Furthermore, the public was given notice of the rulemaking that gave rise to the attendance
requirements and an opportunity to comment. Indeed, comments to that rulemaking reflect that
industry understood that restrictions on the person attending the unloading of hazardous materials
from CTMVs were being proposed. Additional notice and an opportunity to comment are, therefore,
not required under the APA. Finally, there is no validity to the assertion that, for decades, the
Department has accepted widespread industry non-compliance with the attendance requirements.
For these reasons, AmeriGas’s petition for reconsideration of RSPA’s position regarding the Q
177.834(i) attendance requirements is denied.
1. RSPA’s position is consistent with the regulatory history and plain language of the
attendance requirements in 6 177.834Ci). AmeriGas argues in favor of an industry interpretation
10

<<<PAGE 19>>>

that compliance with 0 177.834(i) can be achieved by having a single operator remain in proximity
to, and maintain an unobstructed view of, any part of the delivery hose.
The position that RSPA has taken with regard to the meaning of the attendance requirements
in 49 CFR 177.834(i) is not only consistent with the plain language of the regulation but the
regulatory history of the regulation as well. Section 177.834(i) states:
(2) Unloading. A motor carrier who transports hazardous materials by a cargo tank must
ensure that the cargo tank is attended by a qualified person at all times during unloading. . . .
(3) A person "attends" the loading or unloading of a cargo tank if, throughout the process,
he is awake, has an unobstructed view of the cargo tank, and is within 7.62 meters (25 feet) of the
cargo tank.
..
( 5 ) A delivery hose, when attached to the cargo tank, is considered a part of the vehicle
(Emphasis added.)
RSPA's position consistently has been that the plain language of 0 177.834(i) requires an
attendant to maintain an unobstructed view of the cargo tank and be within 25 feet of the cargo tank
during the unloading process.' Contrary to AmeriGas's assertion, the term "cargo tank" means the
cargo tank itself and does not mean the hose or CTMV. The language of 9 177.834(i)(5) plainly
states that the hose is part of the vehicle not the cargo tank.
RSPA's position is supported by National Fire Protection Association publication "Standard for the Storage
and Handling of Liquefied Compressed Gases" (NFPA 581, reported as adopted by 49 of 50 states. Section 4-2.3.3
requires, during unloading into storage containers, that "the shutoff valves on both the truck and the container are readily
accessible."
11

<<<PAGE 20>>>

AmeriGas contends that there is support for industry's interpretation of the tj 177.834(i)(3)
requirements in the regulatory history of these requirements. Specifically, AmeriGas relies on
language that appeared in a republication of 49 CFR Parts 71-90 by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) on December 29, 1964 (29 FR 18652). (The ICC regulated hazardous materials
transportation by highway and rail prior to 1967, the year the Department of Transportation (DOT)
was established). The regulatory text AmeriGas relies on reads, 'Vnder no circumstances shall a
tank motor vehicle be left unattended during the loading or unloading process. For the purpose of
this part, the delivery hose, when attached to the motor vehicle, shall be deemed a part thereof."
(December 29, 1964; 29 FR 18801). RSPA believes this regulatory language makes it clear that a
CTMV operator must attend the CTMV and any delivery hose attached to the motor vehicle during
loading and unloading. The intent of this provision was to ensure that the operator took
responsibility for the entire delivery system which, for purposes of Part 77, included not only the
motor vehicle itself but also the delivery hose when attached to the motor vehicle. However, the
1964 language in 3 77.834(i) was not specific as to what actions constituted "attendance."
Realizing that the word "attendance" was vague and that there was industry confusion
regarding what was required under the attendance regulation, the Hazardous Materials Regulations
Board (the Board), the predecessor to RSPA's Office of the Associate Administrator for Hazardous
Materials Safety, initiated a rulemaking in Docket HM-110 to clarify the attendance requirement.
Language in the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) and the final rule in Docket HM- 1 10 serves
as the basis for RSPA's interpretation of the current attendance requirement. Specifically, in the
preamble to the HM- 1 10 NPRM, the Board stated:
The Board has found that several dangerous incidents have occurred during the
12

<<<PAGE 21>>>

loading or unloading of tank motor vehicles which could have been avoided, if there
had been someone near the cargo tank to take corrective action or precautionary
action. The Board feels that there may be some confusion as to the intent of the term
“attendancell as it is used in § 177.834(i). (Emphasis added).
~
38 Fed. Reg. 22901, August 27,1973.
Based on this concern, the Board proposed to revise the regulation to include a requirement
that an operator remain within 25 feet of the cargo tank motor vehicle. The Board also proposed to
delete the limiting language “for the purpose of this part” fiom the hose provision of the attendance
requirements, thereby making the delivery hose part of the tank motor vehicle not only for loading
and unloading purposes, but for other regulatory purposes as well (e.g., incident reporting).
Specifically, the Board proposed to revise the attendance requirements in 9 177.834(i) to state:
(1) A tank motor vehicle is attended when the person in charge of the vehicle is
awake and not in a sleeper berth, and is within 25 feet of the tank motor vehicle and
has it within his unobstructed field of view. . . . (3) The delivery hose, when attached
to the tank motor vehicle, is a part of the vehicle.
- Id. at 22902.
In its January 11, 1973 comments to the Board’s proposed revision to 3 177.834(i), the
National LP-Gas Association (NLPGA) (now NPGA) proposed to revise the language to reinsert the
limiting language “for the purpose of this part” with regard to the hose provision of the attendance
requirements. Specifically, the NLPGA proposed to revise 177.834(i)(3) to read “For the purposes
of this part the delivery hose, when attached to the tank motor vehicle, is a part of the vehicle.” In
explaining the proposed reinsertion of limiting words “for the purposes of this part,” the NLPGA
stated: “We have no objection to a requirement that the motor vehicle operator or motor vehicle
attendant be exuected to attend the unloadin? hose as well as the vehicle since in most cases he will
provide the hose and will have connected it to the unloading equipment. We don’t feel the delivery
13

<<<PAGE 22>>>

hose should be considered as a part of the motor vehicle.” (Emphasis added). Industry’s comments
on the HM-110 NPRMindicate that industry fully understood that the Board proposed to require an
attendant to remain within 25 feet of the cargo tank motor vehicle and hose, and maintain an
unobstructed view of the cargo tank motor vehicle and hose. It is apparent from the NLPGA’s
comments to the proposed changes to 0 177.834(i) that it understood the Board’s concerns and its
intent.
In the HM-110 final rule, the language that currently appears at 0 177.834(i)(3), other than
the addition of metric conversion of 25 feet, was adopted by the Board. Section 177.834(i)(3)
currently reads, “A person ‘attends’ the loading or unloading of a cargo tank if, throughout the
process, he is awake, has an unobstructed view of the cargo tank, and is within 7.62 meters (25 feet)
of the cargo tank.” Section 177.834(i)(5) currently reads, “A delivery hose, when attached to the
cargo tank, is considered a part of the vehicle.” In the final rule, the Board adopted the language in
0 177.834(i)(3) that refers to the “cargo tank” and not the “tank motor vehicle,” as proposed in the
NPRM. The language in 0 177.834(i)(5), however, continues to refer to the hose as part of the
vehicle. The final rule requires a qualified person attending the loading or unloading of a cargo tank
to remain within 25 feet of the cargo tank, maintain an unobstructed view of the cargo tank, and to
attend the hose to the same extent that the qualified person attends to the cargo tank motor vehicle
under the HMR.
AmeriGas also cites Shell Oil Company’s October 26, 1973 comments to the Board’s
proposed revision of the attendance requirements in Docket HM-110 as support for its interpretation
of the attendance requirements and evidence that the agency was aware of the industry’s
interpretation of the attendance requirements. Specifically, AmeriGas points to Shell Oil’s
14

<<<PAGE 23>>>

comment that “Section 177.834(i)(l) requiring an attendant within 25 feet of the tank motor vehicle
.-
- or its hose is over restrictive in cases where tight fill connections are used which are now in the
majority.” (Emphasis added.) AmeriGas places great weight on the fact that Shell used the word
“or” rather than “and” to describe the proposed requirements. AmeriGas states that the word “or”
put DOT on notice that the proposed language was being interpreted to allow an operator to comply
with the attendance requirements by remaining within 25 feet of any part of the hose and maintaining
an unobstructed view of any part of the hose.
AmeriGas, however, did not recognize or discuss the next sentence in Shell’s comments
which reads, “This restriction prohibits performance of other duties and would unnecessarily
increase delivery costs.” (Emphasis added). AmeriGas’s interpretation of the attendance
requirements would allow an operator to be within 25 feet of and have an unobstructed view of, any
part of the CTMV including, any part of its hose. Under AmeriGas’s interpretation, there is virtually
no restriction on an operator’s ability to perform other duties -- an operator can be virtually anywhere
between the cargo tank motor vehicle and the receiving tank -- and a single operator can always
satisfy the industry interpretation of the attendance requirements. The preceding regulatory history
indicates that the Board intended to restrict the movement of the person unloading a cargo tank by
requiring the operator to remain within 25 feet of the cargo tank and maintain an unobstructed view
of the cargo tank, resulting in a limitation on the attendant’s ability to perform other duties or
activities. The type of precautionary action the Board contemplated when it initiated HM-110 cannot
be taken if a cargo tank attendant is more than 25 feet away fiom the cargo tank, out of sight behind
a building or other obstruction, or both. This sentence indicates that Shell understood that the Board
was proposing new restrictions on unloading operations.
15

<<<PAGE 24>>>

RSPA squarely rejected industry's interpretation of the attendance requirements during public
.-
meetings and workshops, in written correspondence2, and in the preamble to the August 18, 1997
final rule.3 Specifically, the preamble to the final rule states:
RSPA rejects the industry's interpretation of the long-standing operator attendance
rules in 3 177.834(i)(3) that a single operator satisfies requirements for an
unobstructed view of the cargo tank, and is within 25 feet of the cargo tank, merely
by being in proximity to, and having an unobstructed view of, any part of the
delivery hose, which may be 100 feet or more away from the cargo tank motor
vehicle, during the unloading (transfer) operation. The rule clearly requires an
operator be in a position from which the earliest signs of problems that may occur
during the unloading operation are readily detectable, thereby permitting an operator
to promptly take corrective measures, including moving the cargo tank, actuating the
remote means of automatic closure of the internal self-closing stop valve, or other
action, as appropriate. RSPA contends the rule requires that an operator always be
within 25 feet of the cargo tank. Simply being within 25 feet of any one of the cargo
tank motor vehicle's appurtenances or auxiliary equipment does not constitute
compliance.
62 Fed. Reg. at 44044.
Because RSPA's position is consistent with the regulatory history and plain language of 49
CFR 177.834(i), petitioner's request that RSPA withdraw its interpretation is denied.
2. Additional notice and comment are not required under the APA. AmeriGas alleges that
RSPA's "new interpretation" was announced without notice or opportunity to comment, in violation
of the M A .
Section 553 of the APA requires that Federal agencies give the public an opportunity to
See October 3, 1997 letter to Barton Day, Esq., counsel for Ferrellgas, L.P., Suburban Propane, L.P.,
AmeriGas Propane L.P., Agway Petroleum Corporation, Comerstone Propane Partners, L.P., and National Propane, L.P.
(item no. 188 in RSPA docket 97-2 133).
Because of industry's concerns about the attendance requirements, RSPA indicated in a June 9, 1997 notice
[62 FR 3 13631 that it would initiate a new rulemaking to review and possibly revise the attendance and other regulatory
requirements (see Docket No. RSPA-97-2718).
16

<<<PAGE 25>>>

participate in the rulemaking process by giving notice, in the Federal Register, of either the terms
.-
or substance of a proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved, and an
opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments. As discussed above, the Board realized that
the word “attendance” was vague, as used in the original ICC attendance regulations, and that there
was industry confusion regarding what was required. Consequently the Board issued an NPRM, in
docket HM- 1 10, proposing to clarify the attendance requirements. In issuing the NPRM, the Board
specifically noted that there had been several dangerous incidents during the loading or unloading
of cargo tank motor vehicles that the Board felt could have been avoided had someone been near the
cargo tank to take corrective or precautionary action.
The Board’s clearly specified reasons for undertaking the HM-110 rulemaking, in conjunction
with the proposed regulatory language, NLPGA’s and Shell Oil’s comments on that language, and \
the language of the final regulatory requirements all demonstrate that: (1) the public was given
notice of the Board’s intent to require an operator to be near the cargo tank during unloading, and
an opportunity to comment; and (2) RSPA’s position on the 0 177.834(i) attendance requirement is
long-standing and reflects industry understanding of the requirements at the time they were proposed
and adopted. Therefore, RSPA’s statements concerning the attendance requirements in 0 177.834(i)
do not in any way change the regulations or constitute rulemaking. Consequently, further notice
and comment under the APA is not necessary.
3. DOT was not aware of widespread non-compliance. AmeriGas claims that in the decades
before -- and 22 years since -- the attendance requirements in 3 177.834(i) were adopted, small
CTMVs typically carried delivery hoses of 100 feet or more in length and were attended during at
least a substantial portion of the unloading process from the position of the customer tank.
17

<<<PAGE 26>>>

AmeriGas states that these vehicles have operated openly and have been inspected by DOT officials
on hundreds of occasions over the years without any suggestion that the routine operation of these
vehicles under the industry’s interpretation of 9 177.834(i)(3) was improper. AmeriGas thus asserts
that DOT has accepted for decades without question industry’s long-standing practice of not
remaining within 25 feet of the cargo tank and not maintaining an unobstructed view of it.
Although, FHWA inspectors occasionally inspect small CTMVs at roadside inspection
facilities, they do not inspect the hose to determine its length as part of their routine inspection
procedures. Neither the HMR nor the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 49 U.S.C. Parts
350-399, restrict hose length. Additionally, neither FHWA nor RSPA inspectors routinely inspect
small CTMV unloading operations. Thus, the Department was not aware that small CTMV
deliveries of propane were being made in violation of the HMR. The fact that FHWA inspectors
may have observed small CTMVs with hose lengths in excess of 100 feet does not support the
argument that DOT knew that deliveries were being made in violation of the HMR.
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) publication “Standard for the Storage and
Handling of Liquefied Compressed Gases” (NFPA 5 8 ) reported by NFPA as adopted by 49 of 50
states (with Texas preparing to adopt NFPA 58 next year), has unloading requirements that are
consistent with and provide support to the HMR requirement that a qualified person maintain an
unobstructed view of the cargo tank, and be in a position to promptly effect emergency procedures
should there be a line separation or other problem requiring immediate attention. Specifically, at
Section 4-2.1.1, NFPA 58 states:
Transfer operations shall be conducted by qualified personnel meeting the provisions
of Section 1-5. At least one qualified person shall remain in attendance at the
transfer operation fiom the time connections are made until the transfer is completed,
18

<<<PAGE 27>>>

shutoff valves are closed, and lines are disconnected. (Emphasis added).
In addition, Section 4-23.3 of NFPA-58 requires:
Cargo vehicles (see Section 6-3) unloading into storage containers shall be at least
10 feet (3.0 m) from the container and so positioned that the shutoff valves on both
the truck and the container are readily accessible. (Emphasis added).
The fourth edition of the LP Gases Handbook, published by the NFPA interprets Section 4-
2.3.3 as follows:
". . . The unloading cargo vehicle should be a distance from the container
receiving the product so that if something happens at either point, the other will not be involved to
the extent that it would be if it were in close proximity. Also, it is important to have the cargo
vehicle so located that it is easy to get to the valves on both the truck and the container so that they
can quickly be shut off if there is an emergency need to do so. . . . '' NFPA recognizes the
importance of attending both the receiving tank and the cargo tank. RSPA believes that both warrant
attention during unloading and that it is important to position these tanks so that this safety objective
is achievable.
The importance of having a qualified person in a position to promptly effect closure of the
internal valve and to shut down all motive and auxiliary power has been re-affirmed by two recent
unloading incidents that resulted in the death of one operator and injury to These incidents
4Theodore C. Lemoff, ed., LP-GASES Handbook, 4th ed. (Quincy: National Fire Protection Association, 1995),
p. 307.
Wtial reports from the Fire Marshall of Burke County, North Carolina indicate that on September 23, 1997,
in Morganton, North Carolina, a Piedmont Natural Gas operator was at the receiving tank (approximately 80 feet from
the cargo tank motor vehicle) when the hose nozzle became clogged with a foreign object believed to be part of the
meter, thus preventing the operator from closing the nozzle when the customer tank became full. Consequently, the
receiving tank overfilled and propane continued to flow from the hose at fill pressure when the operator disconnected
the hose fiom the receiving tank. The operator began to approach the cargo tank motor vehicle in order to manually shut
the internal self-closing stop valve, but there was an explosion and fire before he could take emergency action. The
operator received second- and third-degree burns over most of his body and died shortly thereafter.
19

<<<PAGE 28>>>

did not involve the separation of hose or piping, which emergency discharge control system
requirements are meant?o address, but were the result of equipment failures, which the attendance
requirements in $ 177.834(i) are meant to address. The CTMV was the suspected source of ignition
in both of these incidents. Based on initial reports, had a qualified person been in attendance within
25 feet of the CTMV, he would have had a better chance of closing the internal self-closing stop
valve prior to ignition.
Therefore, based on the above information, RSPA denies that part of AmeriGas’s petition
for reconsideration concerning the attendance requirements. The attendance requirement is intended
to address a number of potentially serious threats to safety that may arise during the course of
unloading, including failure of a parking brake to prevent movement of a motor vehicle; equipment
failures (u., pump leaks and leaks at a hose reel); and entry into the vicinity of the motor vehicle
by persons who are carrying smoking materials. In all such instances, the qualified person attending
the unloading operation must be aware of potential and actual threats to safety and be prepared to
implement emergency procedures intended to minimize or eliminate those threats.
C. Need for additional operational controls. AmeriGas states that RSPA’s centra1 basis for
the interim requirements imposed under the August rule is that there is a need to address safety
concerns that exist due to the inability of the emergency discharge control system currently in service
on “bobtail vehicles” in compressed gas service to function in accordance with the HMR as specified
On June 6, 1997, in Fayetteville, North Carolina, an AmeriGas operator stopped product transfer and was in
the process of disconnecting the transfer hose fiom the receiving tank when he observed white fog escaping from under
the truck. He immediately dropped the transfer hose and ran toward the truck (approximately 60 feet) to activate the
engine kill switch and the emergency internal self-closing stop valve. When he was within 10 to 12 feet of the truck,
the escaped gas vapors ignited, causing second degree burns to the operator’s face and right thigh.
20

<<<PAGE 29>>>

under 0 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i). The petitioner then states that the record does not demonstrate the need
for new requirements lbecause the record does not include even a single documented incident
involving the failure of the emergency discharge control system on a bobtail vehicle. Further, the
petitioner states that the risk of such an event is extraordinarily remote and that there is no safety
threat sufficient to warrant the imposition of burdensome interim operator attendance requirements
for bobtails. Finally, the petitioner claims that RSPA’s decision to impose burdensome interim
operator attendance requirements for small C W s reflects a disregard of the evidence before it and
arbitrarily fails to consider less burdensome regulatory alternatives.
In response, RSPA’s underlying purpose of alternative operational controls adopted in the
current requirements is to assure that persons who are dependent upon propane, anhydrous ammonia,
and other liquefied compressed gases continue to receive those essential materials in a manner that
does not impose unacceptable threats to public health and safety. The challenge was to develop rules
for approximately 25,000 pump-equipped cargo tank motor vehicles (estimated to comprise the
universe of specification MC-330, MC-33 1, and related non-specification cargo tanks) that industry
determined may not conform to the long-standing requirements in § 178.337-ll(a)(l)(i) for an
emergency discharge control system (see emergency exemption applications filed by Mississippi
Tank, National Tank Truck Carriers, NPGA and TFI; December 1996).
In developing the temporary alternative requirements, RSPA first determined there must be
an effective means of providing for prompt closure of the internal self-closing stop valve under
emergency conditions until industry could develop a system that provides a level of safety equal to
that provided by 0 178.337-1 1. The risks posed by an uncontrolled release of propane from a cargo
tank motor vehicle are so great that, while RSPA sought to minimize the cost of compliance with
21

<<<PAGE 30>>>

the alternative requirements, safety was RSPA’s primary concern. Additional training and hose
.-
testing requirements adopted in 0 171.5 may reduce the risks of a release, but such measures do not
provide a means of stopping the flow of propane once a release occurs.
The petitioner relies on a small number of incidents cited in the public docket to support its
contention that the safety concern with regard to small CTMVs is minuscule. However, RSPA notes
that: (1) industry is not required to report to DOT the occurrence of propane incidents or accidents
that occur in intrastate commerce -- which encompasses the vast majority of small CTMV deliveries;
and (2) the small number of incidents in the record are not representative of the entire universe of
incidents of which RSPA is aware. Federal hazardous materials transportation law at 49 U.S.C.
5 103 directs the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe regulations for the safe transportation of
a hazardous material when the Secretary determines that transporting a material in commerce in a
particular amount and form may pose an unreasonable risk to health and safety or property. In
developing safety regulations, RSPA must consider potential hazards posed by a material and may
not base its regulatory decisions solely on the number of reported incidents.
For the reasons discussed above, RSPA denies this element of the petitioner’s request for
reconsideration of the final rule.
D. March 1.1999 expiration date of the temporaq final rule. AmeriGas states that the legal
effect of the expiration clause in the final rule is to require operators of small C T W s to have in
place passive emergency discharge control systems that will meet RSPA’s requirements under
fj 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i) by March 1, 1999. AmeriGas requests that the expiration date specified in
3 17 1 S(c) be stricken pending completion of the rulemaking proceeding under Docket RSPA-97-
271 8 (HM-225A) that addresses long-term compliance issues.
22

<<<PAGE 31>>>

On August 18,1997, RSPA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM)
.*
in Docket HM-225A f62 FR 44059) requesting comments regarding jurisdiction, emergency
discharge controls, qualification and use of delivery hoses, and attendance requirements. The
questions posed in the ANPRM are indicative of the range of options RSPA is considering, this
includes various retrofit schedules for installation of new equipment. RSPA is mindful of industry’s
concerns and will take them into consideration in formulating a long-term compliance plan under
HM-225A. Additionally, affected parties may choose to install systems that meet the current
requirements in 0 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i). For these reasons, RSPA denies AmeriGas’s request for
reconsideration of that part of the final rule concerning the expiration date of 3 171.5.
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This final rule is not considered a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866 and was not reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. This rule
is not considered significant under the regulatory policies and procedures of the Department of
Transportation (44 FR 1 1034; February 26,1979). This rule revises a safety standard for verifying
the integrity of transfer hoses on cargo tank motor vehicles in liquefied compressed gas service and
makes other minor, non-substantive changes.
The final rule published on August 18, 1997, was a significant regulatory action under
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and was reviewed by the Ofice of Management and Budget.
The rule also was considered significant under the Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the
Department of Transportation (44 FR 1 1034).
RSPA did not prepare a regulatory evaluation for this final rule addressing the issue of
23

<<<PAGE 32>>>

revising the transfer hose pressure requirement. However, a final regulatory evaluation was prepared
in support of the finakrule published on August 18, 1997. The final regulatory evaluation is
available for review in the public docket.
B. Executive Order 126 12
This final rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and criteria contained in
Executive Order 126 12 (“Federalism”). The Federal hazardous materials transportation law, 49
U.S.C. 5101-5127, contains an express preemption provision (49 U.S.C. 512541)) that preempts
State, local, and Indian tribe requirements on certain covered subjects. Covered subjects are:
(1) The designation, description, and classification of hazardous materials;
\
(2) The packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and placarding of hazardous
materials;
(3) The preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents related to hazardous materials
and requirements related to the number, contents, and placement of those documents;
(4) The written notification, recording, and reporting of the unintentional release in
transportation of hazardous material; or
(5) The design, manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance, recondition, repair, or
testing of a packaging or container represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in
transporting hazardous material.
This rule addresses covered subject item (5) above and preempts State, local, and Indian tribe
requirements not meeting the “substantively the same” standard. Federal hazardous materials
transportation law provides at 3 5 125(b)(2) that, if DOT issues a regulation concerning any of the
covered subjects, DOT must determine and publish in the Federal Register the effective date of
24

<<<PAGE 33>>>

'
Federal preemption. The effective date may not be earlier than the 90th day following the date of
issuance of the final rule and not later than two years after the date of issuance. RSPA has
determined that the effective date of Federal preemption for these requirements will be (insert date
90 days fi-om the date of publication in the Federal Register). Thus, RSPA lacks discretion in this
area, and preparation of a federalism assessment is not warranted.
C. Regulatory Flexibility &t
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (Act), as amended, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, directs agencies to
consider the potential impact of regulations on small business and other small entities. The Act,
however, applies only to rules for which an agency is required to publish a notice of proposed
rulemaking pursuant to 5 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (MA), 5 U.S.C. 553. 5
U.S.C. 603(a) and 604(a). Because of the emergency nature of the final rule published on August
18,1997, RSPA was authorized under sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) of the APA to forego notice
and comment and to issue the final rule with an immediate effective date. Nevertheless, RSPA was
concerned about the effect the final rule would have on small businesses and, in preparing
preliminary and final regulatory evaluations under Executive Order 12866, analyzed the impact of
the interim final rule and final rule on all affected parties, including small businesses. Consequently,
RSPA is not required under the Act to do a regulatory flexibility analysis for this final rule.
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
This rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995. It does not result in costs of $100 million or more to either State, local, or tribal governments,
in the aggregate, or to the private sector, and is the least burdensome alternative that achieves the
objective of the rule.
25

<<<PAGE 34>>>

E. PaDenvork Reduction Act
This rule doesmot impose any new information collection burdens. The information
collection and recordkeeping requirements contained in the final rule were submitted for renewal to
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act
\
of 1995. The requirement has been approved under OMB Control Number 2137-0595.
F. Regulation Identifier Number
A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory action listed in the
Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the
Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. The RIN number contained in the heading of
this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the Unified Agenda.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 171
Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste, Imports, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR part 171 is amended as follows:
PART 171--GENERAL INFORMATION, REGULATIONS,
AND DEFINITIONS
1. The authority citation for Part 171 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127,49 CFR 1.53
26

<<<PAGE 35>>>

•
2. In § 171.5, paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(iii)(B)and (a)(1)(iii)(C)(3) are revised to read as
follows:
§ 171.5 Temporary regulation; liquefied compressed gases in cargo tank motor vehicles.
(a)
*
*
*
(1)
*
*
*
(i) Before initiating each transfer from a cargo tank motor vehicle to a receiving system, the person
performing the function shall determine that each component of the discharge system (including
hose is of sound quality and free of leaks and that connections are secure. This determination shall
be made after the pressure in the discharge system has reached no less than equilibrium with the
pressure in the cargo tank.
*
*
*
*
*
(iii)
*
*
*
(B) A qualified person positioned within arm's reach of a mechanical means of closure of the
internal self-closing stop valve at all times the internal self-closing stop valve is open; except, that
person may be away from the mechanical means only for the short duration necessary to engage or
disengage the motor vehicle power take-off or other mechanical, electrical, or hydraulic means used
to energize the pump and other components of the cargo tank motor vehicle's discharge system; or
(C)
*
*
*
(3) Is awake throughout the unloading process, and has an unobstructed view of the cargo tank at
all times that the internal self-closing stop valve is open.
*
*
*
*
*
27

<<<PAGE 36>>>

5 171.5 [Amended]
2. In addition, irr 171.5 the following changes are made:
a. In paragraph (a), in the second sentence , “ruptured or” is removed.
b. In paragraph (a)(l)(ii), in the third sentence, “and equipment” is removed.
c. In paragraph (c), the date “March 1, 1999” is revised to read “July 1, 1999.
, 1997 , under authority delegated in 49 CFR part 1.
Research and Special Programs Administration
28

<<<PAGE 37>>>

& _hlPCA
National PROPANE GAS Association
File: 285.07.27
Dockets Office
US Department of Transportation
Room PL-401
400 Seventh Street, SW
Washington, DC 20590-0001
Re: Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquefied
Compressed Gas Service; interim Final Rule
HM-225
Dear Sir/Madam:
The National Propane Gas Association (NPGA) presents the enclosed responses to
the various questions published for public review and comment in the preamble to
the subject rulemaking published in the February 19, 1997 Federal Register.
These comments are a supplement to the written statement filed at the public
meeting DOT held on this rulemaking on March 20, 1997.
NPGA is the national trade association of the LP-gas (principally propane) industry
with a membership of about 3,500, including 37 affiliated state and regional
associations representing members in all 50 states. Although the single largest
group of NPGA members are retail marketers of propane gas, the membership
includes propane producers, transporters and wholesalers, as well as
manufacturers and distributors of associated equipment, containers and
appliances. Propane gas is used in over 18 million installations nationwide for
home and commercial heating and cooking, in agriculture, in industrial processing,
and as a clean air alternative engine fuel for both over-the-road vehicles and
industrial lift trucks.
NPGA shares with DOT a commitment to safety regarding the operation of MC-
330 and MC-331 cargo tanks, as well as the non-specification cargo tank motor

<<<PAGE 38>>>

vehicles operating under authorization provided in § 173.315(k). We do not agree
with DOT, however, that emergency flow control requires a passive system that
will shut down product flow from the cargo tank motor vehicle in the event of
separation of the transfer hose or piping. The propane industry operating
experience and safety record demonstrates that a 100% passive system may not
be achievable and that the industry has compensated for this through redundant,
manually actuated (automatic) procedures which have served the industry and the
public well. Indeed, the record of the DOT Workshop on this rule held on April
16, 1997, clearly shows that this belief is held by many within the propane
industry, within the ammonia industry, and even seems to be shared by some
DOT staff and their outside contractors. As is more fully explained in our
attached response to DOT’s questions in this rulemaking, we believe that not only
an equivalent level of safety but even a greater level of safety can be achieved
through means other than a 100% passive system which DOT has thus far
maintained is necessary.
Several approaches to remote control systems utilizing devices such as radio
frequency transmissions similar to garage door openers are in the final stages of
development. We believe these systems will improve significantly the level of
control the vehicle operator has over the delivery to the consumer’s tank, thus
providing a greater level of safety. Not only do these systems provide greater
control, but they also can be tested as frequently as a company, or its employees,
desire. Furthermore, they provide an added benefit, and hence greater safety, in
that they can be activated in response to the smallest leak and not just when
there is a complete rupture of the system which even DOT admits is required for
activation of a 100% passive system.
An additional safetv feature of electronic svstems is that, unlike currently available passive svstems, thev can be tested without releasina product. Passive systems,
& whi h cannot be tes increased risk of
iniurv or propertv damaae. While we are awaiting further testing before endorsing
any particular system or approach, we believe that they hold great promise as a
solution which will meet industry and DOT safety imperatives, as well as providing
a cost effective answer to the concerns precipitated by the Sanford, NC, incident.
During the April 16 Workshop, representatives from The Fertilizer Institute
presented a statement which outlined their activities in response to this
rulemaking. These activities include a Hose Management Program, an industry
awareness and training program, an investigation into the installation of a brake
interlock feature on existing and new cargo tanks, and a contract with Penn State
University’s Transportation Institute to evaluate the delivery system to determine
whether modifications may provide an equivalent level of safety to a fully passive
excess flow valve which operates over all possible temperature and pressure

<<<PAGE 39>>>

ranges.
NPGA applauds TFl’s efforts in all of these areas. While we cannot embrace all
the aspects of their Hose Management Program without further study and
discussion among our industry members, we see elements of it as positive steps
in the right direction. The accident data which we have and which was reported
to DOT during the April 16 Workshop by Mr. Mike Merrill of Suburban Propane
Corp., Whippany, NJ, clearly shows that hose failures are the predominant cause
of the incidents which have occurred. As regards the industry awareness/training
program, NPGA has undertaken an aggressive awareness program since the report
of the Sanford, N.C. incident. We also plan to discuss with TFI the scope of the
Penn State study as we believe it may complement the work presently underway
by members of the NPGA Special Presidential Task Force on Cargo Tanks.
Our tests and studies to date have led us to believe that an across-the-board
solution to all problems may not be realistic. The circumstances under which
bobtails and highway transports operate are totally different and may require
different equipment or operational controls. Furthermore, there may be sufficient
differences among products carried in specification tanks to warrant different
approaches based on each product’s unique characteristics. We encourage DOT
to keep an open mind to these differences as we go forward and develop long
term solutions.
In our response to Question 6 n Section VIII Rulemakina Analvsis and Notices, we
recommend completion of any necessary retrofit of existing propane cargo tank
vehicles over a 5-year period, or 20 percent of a fleet’s vehicles per year. During
this period, virtually every propane cargo tank vehicle will automatically be in shop
for either chassis change-over or the required quinquennial requalification for
continued service. There have been at least two other instances we are aware of
where compliance with a new requirement was accomplished under a 5-year
schedule and one instance where compliance was achieved oper a period of
approximately three and one half years:
1. 2. 3. Requirement for testing and inspection of MC-330 and MC-331 cargo tanks.
Relief valve testing or replacement on MC-330 and MC-331 cargo tanks.
Manways on cargo tanks (approximately 3.5 years.)
If DOT follows existing precedent and allows a 5-year retrofit cycle, it should also
allow bobtails to operate under a reasonable regulatory framework on an interim
basis until such time as the entire fleet is retrofitted over the five years.
In summary, NPGA has filed a Petition for Reconsideration of that portion of the
Interim Final Rule known as the “attendance requirements” (49 CFR

<<<PAGE 40>>>

§ 171.5(a)(l )(iii)) which impose an onerous, expensive and unnecessary burden on
the propane industry that is unsupported by any documentation in the file. Our
petition also included a Petition for Rulemaking to amend this portion of the
Interim Final Rule should DOT deny our Petition for Reconsideration. With the
exception of the attendance requirements, the propane gas industry can operate
under the other parts of the Interim Final Rule on an provisional basis. Our
comments and answers to the questions posed by DOT are intended to address
the DOT’s request for guidance on long-term solutions and on the costs and
benefits of various alternatives.
We would be glad to discuss the enclosed responses to the respective question
presented in the preamble to HM-225 further at your convenience. For ease of
identification, the text of each question is shown in italics, while the NPGA
response is shown in straight type.
Sincerely,
&Y / /
W. H. Butterbaugh, CAE
Director, Regulatory Affairs
cc: D. N. Myers
R. R. Roldan
Bruce Swiecicki

<<<PAGE 41>>>

Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HM-225); RIN 2137-AC97
Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed Gas
Service; Interim Final Rule
A. Questions presented by DOT in: Section VII. Request for Comments
1. NPGA has suggested the development of a “deadman” or a remote valve
actuation system, possibly using a lanyard. Automobiles are commonly
equipped with remote transmitter devices that fit on key rings to unlock
doors or open trunk lids from 50 feet away. If such a manually activated
device were used to close internal self-closing stop valves, would it provide
a level of safety equivalent to the requirement for a passive automatic shut-
down system required by § 178.337- 1 l/a)(l)li)?
NPGA: NPGA believes the development of a remote actuation system
would create an increased level of safety, compared to passive systems.
NPGA believes that “passive ” and “automatic” are two different concepts.
In our view, “passive” encompasses those devices that would operate
entirely without any human action, whereas “automatic” would include
systems which, when activated, alwavs will operate as intended. An
example of such an automatic system would be ones that presently comply
with 9178.337-I 1 (a)(2)(i) or (a)(2)(ii).
In the lo-year operating period 1986-l 995 (discussed in more detail
elsewhere in this response), in almost 20 million highway transport
transfers (loading and unloading) and in about 333 million bobtail transfers
(loading and unloading), there has been perhaps one incident where the
transfer hose Seoarated from the vehicle piping. In all these transfers, there
has only been a single incident in which a “passive” system, if operated as
intended, would have prevented uncontrolled loss of propane. This level of
safety and record of operating experience does not justify a totallv oassive
flow control on the transfer hose and piping on a cargo tank motor vehicle
in liquefied petroleum gas service.
Over this lo-year period, there were 9 reported incidents with the bobtail
tank trucks where there was a small failure of the hose, a “split” if you will,
that resulted in a controllable release of product that, according to all
reports, was controlled by the operator by actuating the automatic closure
mechanism on the internal valve.

<<<PAGE 42>>>

2
2. What types of devices can provide the passive automatic shut-down
function required by § 178.337- 11 (a)( l/(l)?
NPGA: NPGA believes that “passive ” and “automatic” are two different
concepts. In our view, “passive” encompasses those devices that would
operate entirely without any human action, whereas “automatic” would
include systems which, when activated, always will operate as intended.
Paragraph 178.337-l 1 (a)(l)(l) states “Each internal self-closing stop valve
and excess flow valve must automatically close if any of its attachments
are sheared off or if any attached hoses or piping are separated.” The
Regulations do not require a “passive” automatic shut-down function. We
believe that an electronic remote device meets the requirement of
9178.337-I l(a)(l)(l). Such remote control devices work on the same
principle as a wireless garage door opener, except that upon activation by
the driver/operator, the control device can initiate automatic closing of the
internal stop valve and shut down the vehicle engine.
In NPGA’s view, there is no need for a passive shutdown system based on
the record of DOT incident reports over the cited 1 O-year period. There
was only one known incident during this period where a passive system
was needed; this period involved the handling of over 89 billion gallons of
propane heating fuel in some 333,000,OOO bobtail deliveries. The incidents
that did occur were all controlled by the driver manually exercising the
automatic closure of the internal stop flow valve. To our knowledge, only
two incidents, including Sanford, have occurred in 10 million transport
deliveries over an 11 -year period and those incidents were caused by an
improper preparation of the transfer hose assembly and failure to detect a
defective hose or hose assembly. There is no question that remote
electronic activation of automatic closure of the internal valve in the cargo
tank and shutdown of the engine will provide an increased level of safety
and control over failures of the sort that have occurred in the IO-year
history cited by DOT as the basis for the Interim Final Rule.
In the course of discussing if passive control systems were indeed justified,
DOT has cited the possibility of the driver having a heart attack and being
unable to activate a remote control system in the event of a separation of
the transfer hose from the plant or vehicle piping. Yet, one of the purposes
of the biennial physical required by the FHWA Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations is to identify drivers whose medical condition might be such as
to interfere with their ability to perform the necessary functions associated

<<<PAGE 43>>>

3. 3
with driving and operating a covered vehicle. Thus, the DOT assertion is
mere speculation, disregards existing regulations designed to guard against
any such eventuality, and is therefore unsupported by the facts.
The following systems are under development by the NPGA Special
Presidential Task Force on Cargo Tanks that have very strong possibilities
for compliance with the emergency flow protection performance
requirement in the MC-331 specification. We also know that there are
several other systems that have been or are being developed independent of
the task force activity.
. Remotely operated radio frequency device
b Pressure differential regulator in-line systems
. Evaluation of RegO/Flomatic valve
b Cable system
. Acoustic emission system
b Differential pressure system
What tests are appropriate at the time of manufacture or assembly and at
the time of requalification to ensure that the product discharge system will
close as required by § 178.337- 1 l(al(ll(J)?
NPGA: Included in NPGA’s development of control systems that will
provide the level of performance required by the provisions of § 178.337-
1 1 (a)( l)(l) is the development of test protocols for use in evaluating the
respective systems under consideration. We believe we will be in a position
to share recommended protocols following the next meeting of the task
force on May 7-8, 1997 in Arlington, Texas. Since that meeting falls after
the April 21 DOT deadline for submittal of written statements regarding the
Interim Final Rule, NPGA will file a supplement to this statement after this
Task Force meeting to provide the information requested in this question.
The NPGA task force has been directing its primary attention to
development of emergency flow control systems that will achieve
compliance with the present provisions of § 178.337-l 1 (a)( l)(l). Our
studies are not far enough along to be able to reliably respond with system

<<<PAGE 44>>>

4. 5. 6. cost information for the long-term provisions.
In view of the fact that specification MC-330 and MC-33 1 cargo tank motor
vehicles are authorized for a broad range of hazardous materials, is it
possible to design an emergency discharge control system that functions
effectively with all liquefied compressed gases under all conditions normal
to transportation? If not, should the manufacturer’s certification required
under § 178.337- 18 specify the materials and conditions that are
acceptable for carriage in, or unloading of, the cargo tank?
NPGA: At this time, we are not certain whether an “across-the-board”
emergency discharge control system can be developed for cargo tank motor
vehicles that will function effectively with all ladings. NPGA is endeavoring
to maintain close liaison with the associations representing other ladings so
that they can make the necessary determinations when and where
appropriate and develop other control systems as may be needed. With
respect to the second question, we believe a lading certification would be
entirely appropriate.
Do manufacturers and assemblers of cargo tank motor vehicles provide
operational and maintenance instructions to operators on the use of the
cargo tank motor vehicles they supply? If so, provide examples of such
information to RSPA.
NPGA: We are not certain, but believe that some do.
Provide any information available on other interstate or intrastate incidents
involving the failure of emergent y control systems on cargo tanks
authorized to transport liquefied compressed gases.
NPGA: NPGA has no mechanism for accurately tracking hazardous materials
incidents; however, we do receive, from time to time, anecdotal information
from our member companies. On this basis, we are aware of only one
other incident involving the failure of emergency control systems on cargo
tanks transporting liquefied petroleum gases.
It should be noted that six of the seven incidents referenced in the
Background segment in the Preamble to the Interim Rule are transportation
incidents and did not occur during propane transfers involving the cargo
tank motor vehicle. The seventh, incorrectly identified as a 1973 incident,
involved the unloading of a derailed tank car and has no bearing on this

<<<PAGE 45>>>

5
7. 8. matter. Nine unnamed propane incidents are cited in the safety alert DOT
published in the December 13, 1996, Federal Register as involving propane
transfers. However, there is no clear indication that any of these incidents
involved separation of the hose from the transfer coupling; rather, the
subject incidents contained very strong indications that although the
respective incident involved a break in the hose, closure of the internal
valve by the vehicle driver/operator controlled the incident.
Are hoses used to transfer product from large transport cargo tank motor
vehicles permanently attached or carried on the vehicles or supplied by the
customer at the point of delivery?
NPGA: On most highway transport cargo tank motor vehicles (typically
9,000-l 2,000 gallons water capacity), transfer hoses are carried on the
vehicle in protective tubes, but they are not attached to the cargo tank
during transit. Both the original loading point and the destination unloading
point often have transfer hoses or other piping arrangements for lading
transfer so that the transfer hose carried on board the transport is not used
during every transfer. For the smaller chassis-mounted cargo tank motor
vehicles, commonly called bobtails in the propane industry, (less than 3,500
gallons water capacity), the unloading hose is carried on the vehicle in a
hose reel and is used for every delivery. These latter vehicles do not carry
transfer hose for use in loading the vehicle -- such hose is always provided
by the loading facility.
RSPA is concerned that this problem may highlight a deficient y in the
training programs for Design Certifying Engineers and those persons
certifying cargo tanks as meeting the requirements of the HMR. In addition,
carrier function-specific training programs also may not be providing
sufficient training in the specification requirements for these cargo tanks.
What training is provided to those individuals who are responsible for
certifying, operating, testing and repairing these cargo tank motor vehicles?
NPGA: We understand that the respective member company training
programs comply with the provisions of § 172.700, et. seq. for training,
testing, and certification of hazmat employees according to their respective
job responsibilities and functions.
B. Questions presented by DOT in: Notices. B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Section VIII. Rulemakina Analyses and

<<<PAGE 46>>>

1.
2.
6
Are RSPA Is estimates as to number of businesses affected by this rule, and
the percentage of these which are small businesses, consistent with
industry estimates? Are other estimates available as to the numbers of
businesses and small businesses in each sector of business addressed by
this rule (i.e., gas distributor, cargo tank manufacturer, cargo tank
assembler) and numbers of cargo tank motor vehicles? Are there other
business sectors affected? Are some geographic areas affected more than
others (please identify) ?
NPGA: NPGA believes § 171.5 will have the greatest impact on the local
bulk plant distributor segment of our industry and that RSPA’s estimate of
6,800 affected businesses is substantially correct. We also concur with the
estimate that 90% or more of affected companies are small businesses as
defined by the Small Business Administration’s size definitions.
Rural areas without alternative means of energy sources will be the most
impacted by this rulemaking. Costs to the propane marketers will increase
because of required retrofit of present cargo tank motor vehicles. The
increased operating costs will affect costs paid by consumers. Many rural
customers will experience financial difficulty if their energy prices increase.
NPGA estimates the potential increased cost to the residential consumer to
be between $50 and $100 per year. This figure is conservatively based on
a potential increase in fuel costs of 7 cents per gallon as projected by a
regional survey of propane marketers (conducted soley for the purpose of
determining the effects of this Rule.)
In addition, it is important to note that one of the major uses of propane is
in agricultural applications. Applying the 7 cents per gallon figure to the
total number of gallons used in 1994 in the agricultural sector, we can
conclude that agri-businesses in the U.S. will suffer an impact of $98.3
million dollars per year as a result of the Interim Final Rule.
Are there alternatives to this rule which accomplish RSPA ‘s objectives,
while imposing less of an impact on small businesses? What are those
alternatives?
NPGA: NPGA believes RSPA’s objectives for the Interim Rule to be the
maintenance of appropriate levels of safety during cargo tank truck
unloading while industry develops new emergency flow control technology
to comply with the intent of § 178.337-l 1 (a)( l)(i). We believe there are

<<<PAGE 47>>>

3. 7
procedural alternatives to 5 171.5 which will accomplish RSPA’s objectives.
NPGA believes that appropriate levels of safety can be maintained through
increased training, industry awareness, hose testing, and safety inspections
which are taking place at this moment. At the same time, NPGA is
concerned that § 171.5 should not create additional potentially hazardous
situations. Such a potential hazard is the provision for the operator to
remain within arm’s reach of the discharge system and have an
unobstructed view (hereinafter referred to as the “attendance requirement”)
as stated in the Interim Final Rule. We do not believe RSPA fully considered
the potential hazards to employee safety of the attendance requirement.
We have petitioned for its deletion as an operational requirement, and
renew that petition here.
The primary control for closure of the internal valve on a propane bobtail is
usually located immediately adjacent to the hose reel; the emergency
closure station is typically located at the left front corner of the cargo tank
motor vehicle. In the event of hose rupture, the truck operator could be
immediately exposed to released lading and/or whipping of the hose. The
attendance requirement thus requires the operator to be in harm’s way.
Common practice in the industry is for the driver/operator to be at the
consumer tank to prevent possible over-filling of the tank. Good safety
practices also require the driver to be able to move freely between tank and
truck to respond to unexpected situations as they occur.
It is important to recognize that the incident in Sanford, N.C. was caused
by: (I) failure to properly prepare a transfer hose assembly; and, (2) the
failure to recognize an improperly prepared transfer hose assembly.
Increased awareness and training for those hazmat employees that prepare
such hose assemblies and for those hazmat employees that connect the
assemblies to effect a product transfer will significantly increase safety in
LPG transfer operations.
In what manner could differing compliance or reporting requirements be
implemented for small businesses to take into account the resources
a vailable to small businesses? In what manner could compliance or
reporting requirements be clarified, consolidated or simplified for such small
businesses?
NPGA: NPGA suggests revision of the Interim Rule to delete the attendance
requirement for marketers of all sizes. Our request is based on the fact that

<<<PAGE 48>>>

8
4. the attendance requirement poses a significant safety hazard and does not
materially increase the level of safety already established in other provisions
of the Interim Final Rule. The pressure test required by the Interim Final
Rule [ref: §171.5(a)(l)(ii)], in combination with the inspection of the hose
when used as required by NFPA 58, provides an effective and responsive
system for precluding the circumstances that caused the Sanford incident.
What are the direct and indirect costs of compliance with the rule
calculated both as absolute costs and as a percentage of revenue of the
regulated small business?
NPGA: Following the publication of the subject rule, the NPGA conducted
an analysis of the economic impact of the two-man attendance provision.
A geographically balanced sample of both multi-state marketers and smaller
independent marketers was asked to estimate the costs associated with (1)
employee recruitment, (2) function specific training, (3) salary, and (4)
employee benefits.
The results of this survey place the total cost of compliance to the industry
(using 1995 sales data) at approximately $660 million’. This figure
represents a potential increased cost to the consumer of 7 cents per gallon
with only a direct cost pass-through. A typical customer who uses 900
gallons of propane each year could expect to pay an additional $63 if this
compliance tax were passed on to the consumer, or $504,000,000 to the 8
million residential customers of the industry.
This estimated impact of $660 million is based on two attendants and
would double if DOT chose to literally enforce the rule as it is currently
written. Approximately half of the piping on a bobtail delivery truck is
underneath the cargo tank between the chassis and the frame rails. This
portion of the piping would not be in view by someone positioned beside
the vehicle as would be the case with the remainder of the piping system
that is in the open on the rear or side deck of the vehicle. Thus, to comply
literally with the provisions of the Rule, one attendant must be under the
truck, a second attendant must be at the remote control on the internal
valve to have all the discharge system in view during the transfer operation,
while a third individual is serving the consumer tank.
From 1986-l 995, 307 million deliveries were made involving more than 89
‘Estimate based on 1995 retail sales volume of 9,429,570,000 gallons multiplied by S.07 =
$660,069,900.

<<<PAGE 49>>>

9
billion gallons of propane. For this period, DOT has identified only 9
instances (excluding Sanford) where the performance of the excess flow
valve contributed to the discharge of product. That is one instance for
everv 9 billion aallons of oroduct transferred: and one instance for everv 30
million deliveries. DOT further acknowledaes that the release of Product in
each of these instances was far less than that which occurred at Sanford.
5.
NPGA strongly objects to the imposition of a regulatory tax in excess of one
half billion dollars given the safety record of the industry and the
effectiveness of less costly alternatives. The Government’s Preliminary
Regulatory Evaluation for the Interim Final Rule filed in Docket No. HM-225
on March 19, 1997, placed the aggregate cost to the propane industry for a
second operator to comply with the additional attendance requirement at
$237,017,143 annually. Whether using NPGA’s estimate of $660 million or
DOT’s estimate of almost $240 million, this compliance burden borders on
absurd given the proven safety record of this industry.
Furthermore, the Government’s own analysis of the aggregate total costs to
society from releases of propane as a result of a decision not to implement
any changes or new regulatory requirements is between $322,192 and
$1,520,705 annually. Thus, according to DOT, complete Government
inaction (e.g., no Interim Final Rule) on the issue of emergency discharge
control systems on cargo tank motor vehicles would result in an annual
total cost below $1.5 million. There is absolutely no justifiable basis for a
rule which will cost industry between $240 million and $660 million
compared to a cost to society from Government inaction of between
$322,000 and $1.5 million.
Finally, because of the unsuitability of lanyards, NPGA disputes RSPA’s cost
estimate of $1,324 per operating unit. Using a lanyard to close a valve from
a delivery truck has been determined impractical and will not perform as
originally envisioned when the concept was postulated in the application for
a DOT Exemption that NPGA filed on December 18, 1997 and which was
later denied by DOT. Bobtail delivery trucks carry up to 150 feet of transfer
hose, which is deployed at a variety of angles and is often pulled behind a
house or other out-building, such that the driver/operator is momentarily out
of sight of the truck. Given the length of hose pull, no lanyard arrangement
will give the driver immediate tension to be able close the internal valve,
merely by pulling the lanyard.
What are the direct and indirect costs of completing paperwork or record
keeping requirements, again both as absolute costs and as a percentage of

<<<PAGE 50>>>

6. 7. IO
revenue?
NPGA: Typically, small business owners do not have extra employees on
staff to handle government paperwork and reporting tasks. At this time,
we estimate the additional costs of record-keeping and administration to be
approximately $2,000 per year for each cargo tank vehicle in service.
These costs include additional record-keeping for training all current hazmat
staff, labeling for vehicles and annotation of all current vehicle inspection
records, as well as interviewing, hiring and filling out necessary employment
information on all net new hires for each delivery unit.
What is the effect of this rule, if any, on the competitive position of small
entities in relation to larger entities?
NPGA: The Interim Rule will have serious and possibly overwhelming
effects on gas distributors of all sizes. Small business distributors will be
disproportionately affected for the following reasons:
a)
Rarely does a distributor, regardless of size, have extra personnel that
could be easily assigned to accompany the driver on the daily delivery
route. Typically, all employees of the distributor are fully utilized in
the day-to-day operations. To comply with the Interim Rule at the
very least will double operator costs for the distributor.
b)
The small distributor generally must hire outside experts (approx.
$500 per day, plus expenses and training materials) to provide
training for his employees. By contrast, large distributors are often
capable of providing in-house training. The use of outside trainers is
considerably more costly than in-house (company) training.
cl
Paperwork required for reporting and documentation will fall on the
owner/operator of the small business, adding to his already heavy
work load.
d)
It is not yet known what impact the Interim Rule may have with
regard to increased insurance costs, however, the small distributor
pays proportionately higher insurance costs than the large distributor
due to economies of scale.
What is the effect of this rule on the small entity/s cash flow and liquidity?
NPGA: Cash flows for propane distributors will be severely impacted by

<<<PAGE 51>>>

8. 9. 10. 11
§ 171.5. The Interim Rule will reduce cash flow immediately due to
increased labor costs that will not be self-supporting without a cost pass-
through to consumers. Some distributors may be unable to continue to
operate given the increased staffing needed for compliance. The propane
industry is now exiting its peak winter delivery season with receivables at
an all-time hiah. Forcing distributors to add new delivery staff during a
time of reduced sales will result in increased operating cash shortfalls.
What is the effect of this rule on the ability of a small entity to remain in
the market 7
NPGA: Smaller gas distributors generally have less access to lines of credit,
loans, and other sources of capital to cover operating losses brought on by
9171.5.
What is the availability and cost to the small entity for professional
assistance to meet regulatory requirements?
NPGA: Certified professional trainers and consultants are available to the
industry at a cost of approximately $500 per day, plus expenses and
training materials. A distributor must also absorb the loss of all revenue that
would have been generated by an employee attending a training course.
Hidden costs may also result from loss of business a distributor might
sustain because of being short of manpower, or not being able to keep up
with delivery schedules.
Are there any Federal rules that duplicate, overlap or conflict with this rule?
NPGA: NPGA knows of no specific Federal rules which directly duplicate or
overlap with 0 171.5. However, the Interim Rule may conflict with certain
workplace safety requirements by mandating that delivery drivers remain in
arm’s reach of the internal valve shut-off control. Current truck design on
most vehicles has the primary internal valve control lever located
immediately adjacent to the delivery hose reel. In case of hose rupture or
separation, the driver will immediately be subject to sudden release of hose
contents and possible violent whipping of the hose. Requiring the driver to
be at the valve control places him in harm’s way, and therefore may violate
OSHA standards for a safe workplace.
Further, the Interim Rule conflicts with § 177.834(i)(3) because that
paragraph requires a driver to have an unobstructed few of the cargo tank
and be within 7.2 meters (25 feet) of the cargo tank. Section 177.834(i)(5)

<<<PAGE 52>>>

12
provides that when the transfer hose is connected to the cargo tank, it is
considered to be part of the vehicle. Thus, when the driver is within 25
feet of any portion of the transfer hose and has an unobstructed view of
that portion of the transfer hose, he is in compliance with these two
paragraphs. The Interim Rule however, requires the driver to have an
unobstructed view of the discharge system (entire), not just a portion of the
system.

<<<PAGE 53>>>

- 04/‘09/97 NO. 358 DQ2
United j5tstcs j5cnate
COMMITTEE ON APPROPAIATIONS
WASHINGTON. DC 20510-6025
April 9, 1997
‘The Monarable Rodney E. Slatar
Secretary of Transportation
U.S. Department of Transportation
300 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590
Dear Secretary Slater:
I am writing to bring to your attention my ccyncems about a ponion of the Emergency lntcrirn
Final Rule on Cargo ‘Tank NUtor Vehicles in L.iquefied Compressed Gas Service prnmulgated o/l
February 17, 1997 by the ICesearch and Special Programs Ariminisnation (RSYA), and to uryc
you to give immediate attention and consideration to the Petition For Reconsideration filed
before RSPA by the National Propane Ga.. Association (NPGA) on March 2 1, 1997.
While 1 applaud RSPA for taking swift action to protect the generd public hm accidental
releases of propane in light of the accident in Sanford, North Carolina in September 1996,l am
deeply concerned that the Interim Final Rule places an overly burdensome and unwarranted
requirement on the propane industry, Specifically, I am concerned about the new requirement
that propane deliveries be attended by two or more attendants instead of one attendant.
The Interim Final Rule (62 FR 7638) requires that “[t]he person who attends the unloading of a
cargo tank motor vehicle must have an unobstructed view of the discharge system and be within
arm’s reach of a means for closure (emergency shut-down device) of the interrial self-closing
stop valve or other device that will immediately stop the discharge of product from the cargo
tank.” Because one person cannot‘comply with this new iequirement, the Interim Final Rule
effectively mandates that two or more attendants travel to and be present during the unloading of
propane gas from a cargo tank motor vehicle.
The additional attendant requirement in the Interim Final Rule will result in enormous costs to
the propane gas induetiy, 90 percent of which are small businesses. RSPA estimates these costs
at a minimum of $237 million, and the NPGA estimates the costs at $660 million. In Alabama, a
state which is heavily dependent upon propane and where the vast majority of propatle dealers
are small businessmen, the impact will be’devastating. Potentially, this interim rule could drive
some propane dealers out of business and will place an onerous burden on others. In addition,
the Interim Final Rule will dramatically increase the cost of propane to consumers.
04/09/97 WED 15:ll [TX/RX NO 64061

<<<PAGE 54>>>

* 04/09/97 lS:27 NO. 358 083
The Honorable Rodney E. Slater
April 7, 1997 -page 2
I intend to submit a series of hearing questions to RSPA concerning the liquetied compressed
gas service interim rule and excess flow valve failure. Ensuring that delivery tanks and trucks
have reliable emergency shut-off equipment is an important component in the safe ttmsport and
delivery of propanr: gas. I understand that several promising technologies for improved excess
tlow valves and remote shut-off systems are currently being explored. However, any new safety
equipment would need to be installed on the national fleet of delivery tanks and trucks over time,
in an efficient and orderly way.
ln the meantime, I support a proactive safety program featuring increased employee training,
systems inspections, equipment testing, and driver vigilance. These “low-tech” measures will
likely result in greater safety and consumer protection, and can be instituted immediately. I
strongly urge you to reconsider the additional attendant requirement in the Interim Final Rule, as
specifically described in the NPGA’s Petition for Reconsideration.
Thank you for your immediate attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Richard C. Shelby
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Ttansportation and Related Agencies
04/09/97 WED 15:ll [TX/RX NO 64061

<<<PAGE 55>>>

REGULATORY EVALUATION
DOCKET RSPA-97-2133 (HM-225) - 2- /
CARGO TANK MOTOR VEHICLES
IN
LIQUEFIED COMPRESSED GAS SERVICE
JULY 1997

<<<PAGE 56>>>

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
BACKGROUND
On September 8, 1996, almost 40,000 gallons of propane were released during a delivery at a
bulk storage facility in Sanford, North Carolina. During the unloading of a specification MC 33 1
cargo tank motor vehicle into two 30,000-gallon storage tanks, the discharge hose from the cargo
tank separated at its hose coupling at the storage tank inlet connection. Most of the cargo tank’s
9,800 gallons and over 30,000 gallons from the storage tanks were released during this incident.
The driver became aware of the system failure when the hose began to violently oscillate while
releasing liquid propane. He immediately shut down the engine, stopping the discharge pump,
but he could not access the remote closure control to close the internal stop valve. The excess
flow feature of the emergency discharge control system did not function, and propane continued
to be released from the system. Additionally, the back flow check valve on the storage tank
system did not function and propane was released from the storage tanks. In light of the large
quantity of propane released, the incident could have resulted in a catastrophic loss of life and
extensive property damage if the gas had reached an ignition source. Fortunately, there was no
fire.
Although this particular incident involved a large bulk “transport” truck delivering to a
distribution facility, over the past seven years nine similar instances of propane release have been
reported that involved local deliveries by small cargo tank motor vehic1es.l In each instance, the
amount of propane released was much less than at Sanford. However, fires resulted in the
majority of these incidents, and several persons were injured. From a review of the incident
reports, it appears the excess flow feature of the emergency discharge control systems frequently
failed to function when there was a hose rupture. In most cases, leakage was only stopped by use
of the remote emergency shut-down operator to close the internal stop valve.
Based on the preliminary information from the Sanford incident and a review of the other
incidents identified in Appendix A, RSPA published an advisory notice in the Federal Register
on December 13, 1996 (61 FR 65480). This notice alerted persons involved in the design,
manufacture, assembly, maintenance or transportation of hazardous materials in MC 330 and MC
33 1 cargo tank motor vehicles of this problem with the excess flow feature of the emergency
discharge control systems and reminded them that these tanks and their components must
conform to the H&dous Materials Regulations (49 CFR Parts 17 1-1 80; HMR). Shortly
thereafter, RSPA received applications for emergency exemptions from both the National
Propane Gas Association (NPGA) and the Mississippi Tank Company that revealed the problem
is more extensive than originally believed. Additionally, The Fertilizer Institute(TF1) and
These small vehicles are known as “bobtails” &d have a nominal capacity of less than 3,500 gallons, as
contrasted with the typical 10,500 gallon nominal capacity of transports.
1

<<<PAGE 57>>>

National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.(NTTC) submitted applications to become party to the
exemptions, if granted.
In attempting to determine why the excess flow feature of the emergency discharge control
system failed, the Mississippi Tank Company, a manufacturer of specification MC 33 1 cargo
tank motor vehicles, developed preliminary information that suggests there is reason to suspect
the problem is common to nearly all cargo tank motor vehicles used in liquefied compressed gas
service within the United States. This problem may exist also in nonspecification cargo tank
motor vehicles authorized in 0 173.3 15(k).
In its application for exemption, the National Propane Gas Association identifies the problem as
follows:
49 CFR 178.337-1 I(a)(l)(i) requires each internal self-closing stop valve and excess flow
valve to automatically close if any of its attachments are sheared off or if any attached
hose or piping is separated. 49 CFR 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(v) expands on the requirements for
properly sizing excess flow valves regarding branching or other restrictions and the
addition of additional smaller capacity excess flow valves, where required.
Mississippi Tank Company recently conducted tests in an effort to determine why the
excess flow feature of the internal valve in the transport cargo tank outlet flange in the
Sanford, North Carolina incident did not fimction as intended by the MC-33 1
specification requirements. The Mississippi Tank tests clearly show that the internal stop
flow valves available for use with flange mounted pumps will not always close
automatically under conditions simulating the situation where the hoses or piping might
be sheared off or separated from the pump. Mississippi Tank has also determined that
there are no such internal valves presently available that will provide the protection .
required by §§178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i) and (a)(l)(v).
Principal among the conclusions reached from the Mississippi Tank tests is that the
internal valve equipped with the 400 gpm spring (which operates the excess flow feature
to provide automatic closure) would close dependably with tank pressures as low as 65
psig but that the excess flow feature would not operate at tank pressures lower than 65
psig.
After evaluating the situation and the NPGA and Mississippi Tank Company emergency
exemption applications, RSPA found that the situation does constitute an emergency with broad
applicability to many persons and far reaching safety and economic impacts. At the time it was
considering whether to grant or deny the applications for emergency exemption, RSPA also was
not aware of any readily available, off-the-shelf equipment that could provide a functioning
excess flow feature on cargo tanks without removal of pumps and other restrictions.
The applicants proposed an outreach effort to inform tank users of the Sanford incident and the
2

<<<PAGE 58>>>

safety issues related to product transfer operations, and a research and development program to
design a system which will provide greater safety in product transfer operations. During
evaluation of the Sanford incident, it became evident that the level of safety called for in the
HMR is not being achieved by emergency discharge control equipment designed, tested,
produced, and certified by and for manufacturers and assemblers of these cargo tank motor
vehicles. Specifically, these tanks do not meet the requirement for automatic closure of internal
self-closing stop valves and excess flow valves in the event of separation of hoses or piping. The
requirements of 5 178.337-1 1 are intended to ensure an essential level of safety in event of an
emergency during unloading operations. However, the level of safety provided by the immediate
steps proposed by NPGA was not equivalent to the level of safety provided by 5 178.337-
1 l(a)( l)(i). The NPGA, instead, proposed requirements regarding driver training, testing and
inspection of equipment, and driver attendance during unloading operations (see paragraph 27 of
the NPGA application). These proposed requirements are effectively the same as regulatory
standards currently set forth in the HMR.
In the Mississippi Tank application, it was suggested that “a warning statement andor special
operating instructions” could be required, but no details were offered on how that would achieve
a level of safety equivalent to that provided by the existing regulatory requirements in 9 178.337-
1 l(a)( l)(i). Thus, neither application proposed procedures that would compensate for the
absence of excess flow features that function reliably and in a passive manner. Because the
applications did not provide for an equivalent level of safety, as required by 0 107.1 13(0(2)(ii),
of the HMR, they were denied by the Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety.
ASSESSMENT OF CERTAIN INCIDENT REPORTS
In considering the need for a regulatory approach that adequately addresses this problem, RSPA
conducted a search of its Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIS) database to
identify other incidents of hose rupture or failure of the delivery system that occurred during the
unloading of cargo tank motor vehicles. The search covered incidents occurring during the period
January 1, 1990 through December 3 1, 1996 involving vehicles loaded with hazardous materials
authorized by 9 173.3 15 Le., liquefied compressed gases (specifically, liquefied petroleum gases
(including propane), anhydrous ammonia, and chlorine). RSPA’s initial search of the HMIS
database resulted in the identification of thirty-two (32) incident reports conforming to those
criteria. Subsequently, RSPA determined that two of the incidents invoIving propane were
incorrectly reported and they were removed from consideration in this regulatory evaluation. The
following table suniinarizes the volumes of gas released, the numbers of personal injuries and of
evacuations, plus the value of property (including cargo) damage, that was reported to the HMIS
for these incidents.
3

<<<PAGE 59>>>

Summary of HMIS Incidents
Certain Liquefied Compressed Gases Released During Unloading Operation
(1 990-1 996)
Material
No. Amount Released Areas Total
Reports (Gallons) Deaths Injuries Evacuated Damages
Low High Avg Major Minor
Liquefied
Petroleum
Gas (LPG)
Anhydrous
Ammonia
Chlorine
14 5 40006 34113 0 2 2 6 $931,263
15
0.25 5000 869 0 3 35 6 $23,507
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 $20
It is important to note that during the period covered by RSPA’s search of the HMIS database,
motor carriers that operated only in intrastate transportation of propane and other liquefied
petroleum gases were not subject to reporting requirements in $9 17 1.15 and 17 1.16 concerning
incidents involving an unintentional release of the material. Thus, our identification of incidents
is not comprehensive, especially considering that a large segment of the total number of propane
gas dealers comprises small businesses that serve customers in close proximity (perhaps a 50
mile radius) of their principal place of business.
In its assessment of these thirty (30) incidents, RSPA determined that upon rupture of a hose, or
failure of another component of the delivery system:
1) In 53% of the events ( 1 6 of 30), either the excess flow valve functioned as intended, or
the operator was near enough to the vehicle to -ediately actuate the emergency shut-
off mechanism of the internal stop valve.
In 3 of these 16 events, the internal stop valve failed to seat properly after being closed,
and an average of 553 gallons was released (525,533 and 600 gallons).
’ This incident involved the simultaneous release of approximately 30,200 gallons from two storage tanks.
The amount released from the cargo tank was 9,800 gallons.
When the amount (30,200 gallons) released from the bulk storage tanks in the Sanford, NC incident is
removed from consideration, the average release from cargo tank motor vehicles is 1,253 gallons.
4

<<<PAGE 60>>>

2) 3) In the 13 incidents where either the excess flow or internal stop valves functioned as
intended, the average amount released was 10.2 gallons.
In 17% of the events (5 of 30), the excess flow valve did not function properly but the
operator, or another person, was in the vicinity of the vehicle and shortly thereafter (&
not immediately) was able to trigger the emergency shut-off mechanism, thereby stopping
the release. On average, the amount released was 174 gallons.
In 30% of the events, (9 of 30), the excess flow valve did not function properly and the
operator was unable, due to serious injury or otherwise, to trigger the emergency shut-off
mechanism. On average, the amount released from cargo tanks was 3,103 gallons4.
Among these incidents is the one at Sanford, NC referred to in footnote # I to the table, Summary of HMIS
Incidents. With inclusion of the 30,200 gallons simultaneously released from storage tanks during this incident, the
average release from all sources for the nine events would be 6,459 gallons.
5

<<<PAGE 61>>>

DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES
ALTERNATIVE 1. Do nothing.
RSPA believes that to take no action in the face of the demonstrated inadequacy of current
excess flow valve installations on liquefied compressed gas cargo tank motor vehicles is not a
viable alternative in that in the immediate hture it would expose the public to unacceptable risks
of injury and property damage during unloading of these vehicles. Since publication of the
interim final rule, RSPA received indications fiom public meetings and other sources of contact
with industry that passive emergency discharge control systems effectively meeting HMR
requirements are being developed and are expected to be commercially available after
approximately one year. However, the lack of such devices off-the-shelf at the present time
precludes retrofitting as a means of protection fiom these potential hazards in the meantime.
Furthermore, if RSPA were to adopt a “do nothing” approach, it could be misinterpreted by some
affected persons as the Federal government’s implied consent to tank manufacturers, assemblers
and motor carriers that they may continue their operations, even though they may be knowingly
and willfully in violation of the HMR. If, on the other hand, any affected persons were to
recognize the seriousness of the problem and voluntarily suspended their business operations
while their equipment is modified to conform with current requirements, some households and
businesses that rely on propane and other liquefied compressed gases could be exposed to
unacceptable threats to their safety and economic well-being because of the non-availability of
these essential materials.
While this approach by definition imposes no costs of compliance, it also by definition burdens
the public with probable costs of injury and property damage, plus costs of evacuation measures
taken to protect people fiom firther injury, that might have been avoided by altemative
government action. Such costs are estimated below in connection with evaluation of the
economic benefits of the final rule (Alternative 3).
6

<<<PAGE 62>>>

ALTERNATIVE 2. Temporarily withdraw requirement for passive emergency discharge
control system until a technical solution to the problem is developed.
This alternative has the effect of declaring that because currently used product transfer systems
do not perform as intended the requirement is antiquated and no person should be penalized for
failure to comply. Because this alternative fails to include any requirement designed to prevent
and contain the unintentional release of a hazardous material it effectively relies on the
manufacturers, assemblers, and operators of these cargo tank motor vehicles to independently, or
collectively, develop safety systems or controls they believe are adequate. Prior to publication by
RSPA, on February 19, 1997, of the interim final rule, there was little indication that industry
was modifying its equipment or implementing new procedures designed to minimize the
potential threat that currently exists. Thus, RSPA was forced to conclude that the industry did not
contemplate implementation, on its own initiative, of any additional measures that assure safety
during the unloading operation.
Federal hazardous materials transportation law mandates that the Secretary of Transportation
shall prescribe regulations for the safe transportation of hazardous materials. In light of its recent
discovery of this flaw in the product retention system, RSPA must act to remedy this
transportation safety problem as soon as possible. To withdraw the current requirement without
providing an alternate means of assuring product containment would be irresponsible and
contrary to the statutory mandate.
The lack of compliance costs, coupled with the effective burden on the public in terms of
potentially avoidable costs stemming from unintentional releases may be considered to be the
same as for Alternative 1.
7

<<<PAGE 63>>>

ALTERNATIVE 3. Temporarily suspend requirement for passive emergency discharge
control system until a technical solution to the problem is available; require compliance
with rules for increased inspection and testing of delivery hoses; and require compliance
with additional operational controls during transfer operations.
This alternative, which RSPA has adopted as the final rule, acknowledges the across-the-board
problem that exists in emergency discharge control systems currently used on cargo tank motor
vehicles intended to contain liquefied compressed gases. However, unlike Alternative 2, it
applies additional requirements designed to compensate for the inoperability of the emergency
discharge control system.
Of the three alternatives, only Alternative 3 permits RSPA to meet its statutory mandate to
prescribe regulations for the safe transportation of hazardous materials in commerce.
Costs to Society Per Gallon of Propane Spilled
In its assessment of the fourteen (14) incidents involving liquefied petroleum gadpropane, RSPA
determined that upon rupture of a hose, or failure of another component of the product delivery
system,:
In 43% of the events (6 of 14), either the excess flow valve functioned as intended, or the
operator was near enough to the emergency shut-off mechanism to immed iately stop the
release. On average, the amount released was 23 gallons5.
In 2 1% of the events (3 of 14), the excess flow valve did not function properly but the
operator, or another person, was in the vicinity of the vehicle and shortly thereafter (but
not immed iately) was able to trigger the emergency shut-off mechanism, thereby stopping
the release. On average, the amount released was 143 gallons.
In 36% of the events, (5 of 14), the excess flow valve did not function properly and the
operator was unable, due to serious injury or otherwise, to trigger the emergency shut-off
mechanism. On average, the amount released was 3,28 1 gallons6.
One incident involved a release of 600 gallons. The excessive quantity released is
attributed to failure of the intemal valve to seat properly. When this incident is considered, the
average release is 1 19 gallons.
One incident involved the simultaneous release of approximately 30,200 gallons from
two storage tanks. The amount released from the cargo tank motor vehicle was 9,800 gallons.
When the quantity released from the storage tank is considered also, the average release is 9,32 1
gallons.
8

<<<PAGE 64>>>

In this evaluation, RSPA considered also the following data provided by the National Propane
Gas Association and other sources, as noted:
On an annual basis, 18 billion gallons of propane are unloaded from cargo tank motor
vehicles. Half of this volume is handled in large bulk transports (nominal capacity of
10,500 gallons) and unloaded at retail dealer facilities and other bulk plants. The other
half of this volume is handled in smaller cargo tank motor vehicles (nominal capacity less
than 3,500 gallons) called bobtails that deliver product at private residences and other
locations.’
Approximately 25,000 cargo tank motor vehicles appear not to conform to current
requirements for emergency flow control. This consists of 6,000 transports and 18,000
bobtails operated by propane wholesalers and retailers, plus another 1,000 transports
operated by for-hire carriers.*
Within the NPGA membership, there are 3,200 small, independent businesses operating
about 3,400 bulk plants (local retail facilities). Another 3,400 bulk plants are operated by
17 multi-state marketing companies that are members of the NPGA. NPGA estimates its
members sell over 85% of the propane used as a residential heating fuel.9
For the purposes of analysis, the socio-economic value associated with a life is $2.7
million, the average major injury is $506,250, and the average minor injury is $5,400.1°
The total reported losses are $93 1,263; an average of $66,5 19 per incident, or $1 33,038
per year.
An ordered evacuation resulting from a release of LPG is conservatively estimated, on
average, to impose costs in the amount of $50,000. It is quite plausible to project
evacuation-related costs that significantly exceed this figure. For example, should an
incident occur in a light industrial area comprised of a number of small businesses that
employ 200 persons, the cost in lost wages alone may easily exceed $20,000 in a eight-
’ NPGA application for emergency exemption dated December 18, 1996; p2-3,9.
* Telephoneconversations between RSPA staff and h4r. W.H. Butterbaugh of the NPGA
and Mr. Cliff Harvison of the National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.
NPGA application for emergency exemption dated December 18, 1996; p8.
lo Treatment of Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing Economic Evaluations, U.S. DOT
(OST-C and OST-P) memorandum dated January 8, 1993 and update memorandum dated March
15, 1994. In this analysis RSPA equates a minor injury to the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS)
level 1 (minor) and uses the fraction 0.0020 of the current value of life. For a major injury, RSPA
uses AIS level 4 (severe) and uses the fraction 0.1 875 of the current value of life.
9

<<<PAGE 65>>>

hour period. In addition, lost sales or the prohibited use of capital investments during that
same period may be several times greater than the value of lost wages. In other plausible
scenarios that include facilities like a hospital or school, the costs may easily increase by
several orders of magnitude.
RSPA used the following expression to estimate the annual cost to society (in terms of injuries,
property damage, and evacuations) per gallon of liquefied petroleum gas unintentionally released
during unloading from cargo tank motor vehicles:
TC-LPG = Annual Cost to Society Per Gallon of LPG Released
TC-LPG = [a+ (b*c) + (d* c*e) + (f*c*g) + (h*i)] / m
Where:
a = Average annual reported property losses; HMIS (1990-96)
$133,038
b = Average annual number of reported deaths; HMIS (1990-96)
0
c = Economic value of a life
$2,700,000
d = Average annual number of reported major injuries; HMIS (1990-96)
0.2857
e = Abbreviated injury scale (AIS) value of a major injury
0.1875
f = Average annual number of reported minor injuries; HMIS (1990-96)
0.2857
g = Abbreviated injury scale (AIS) value of a minor injury
0.0020
h = Average cost of an ordered evacuation
$50,000
i = Average annual number of ordered evacuations
0.8571
m = Average annual number of gallons released during unloading!'
2,506
TL-LPG=[a+ (b*c) + (d* c*e) + (f*c*g) + (h*i)]/ m= $128.52
NOTE: This is RSPA's most conservative estimate. If adjusted for underreporting of the number
of incidents (by a factor of 2), and underestimation of property damage (by a factor of 10),
indicated by the Office of Technology Assessment report "Transportation of Hazardous
Materials" July 1986, as being closer to the actual number of incidents and their associated
damages, the cost per gallon released during unloading rises to $606.31.
From these calculations, RSPA determined the aggregate annualized costs to society associated
with these releases of propane range from a low of $322,071 ($128.52 x 2506 gallons) to a high
of $3,038,826 ($606.31 x 5012 gallons).
1996 in the 14 incidents considered in this evaluation, minus the 30,200 gallon release from the fixed storage tank in
"This number was derived by calculating the total number of gallons of propane released between 1990-
the Sanford, NC incident.
10

<<<PAGE 66>>>

Compliance Costs of the Final Rule (Alternative 3)
New compliance requirements imposed under this alternative are:
Prior to each transfer, inspection of the discharge system (i.e., all hose and hose fittings
and other equipment arranged in the configuration to be employed during transfer
operations), to assure it is of sound quality, free of leaks, and that connections are secure.
Pressure testing of new or repaired hoses, or a modified hose assembly, prior to its first
use.
In event of an unintentional release during transfer, the person attending the transfer
being able to immediately activate the internal self-closing stop valve to shut down all
motive and auxiliary power equipment, either by:
- the person’s being positioned within arm’s reach of the mechanical means of
closure throughout the unloading operation, except for momentary periods
necessary to operate the power take-off or other means of energizing the discharge
system,
- the person’s carrying a radio frequency transmitter communicating with receiver
equipment on board the vehicle capable of closing the stop valve, or
- some other equally effective system.
Development by each motor carrier of a comprehensive emergency procedure, its
maintenance on each motor vehicle, and the training of each vehicle operator in its
provisions.
Marking of each cargo tank to indicate that it must be operated in accordance with these
special provisions.
Annotation of the currently filed certificate of compliance for each cargo tank with a
statement that its emergency excess flow control performance is not established.
Expected compliance costs of this alternative, and its benefits in terms of future costs of
unintended discharge that may be expected to be avoided due to the choice of this alternative
rather than alternatives 2 or 3, are estimated below.
RSPA believes that the principal compliance cost of the final rule will be generated by operators
of small (bobtail) tank vehicles, which are mostly used for local retail propane delivery, installing
1 1

<<<PAGE 67>>>

a radio frequency system as the most practical way of fulfilling the rule's requirement for
immediate stop valve closure capability. It is expected that operators of the larger transport
vehicles will be able to fulfill this requirement without added expense, since these vehicles
normally deliver product over short distances into large receiving commercial or industrial
receiving tanks and thus the driver can maintain proper surveillance of the transfer and still be in
a position to reach, if necessary, one of the two manual shut-offs that are required on these size
vehicles.
Approximately 25,000 cargo tank motor vehicles appear not to conform to current requirements
for emergency flow control and thus affected by this rule. Among these, there are believed to be
about 1000 transports operated by for-hire carriers and about 6000 transports plus 18,000
bobtails operated by propane wholesalers and retailers.'* Propane-canying transports are also
used to deliver anhydrous ammonia to distributors during the high season for this primarily
agricultural material, which is complementary to the season for use of propane for space
heating. l 3
Almost all, about %YO, of bobtails are believed to be equipped with compressed-air systems to
actuate brakes and other components of the motor vehicle. The present internal stop valves on
some air-equipped bobtails are designed to open when the pump is started and close when it is
shut off. On almost all others, this valve closes when the compressed air holding it open is bled
off. In the former case, a radio frequency emergency system requires only a motor shut-off
switch on the truck to be actuated by the transmitter; in the latter a solenoid installation would be
necessary, also. RSPA believes that all parts necessary for either type of system are readily
available from commercial sources and estimates that $250 to $500 per vehicle would cover the
cost of any such installations on most bobtails.
At $250 to $500 each, the estimated immediate, one-time cost for radio frequency shut-off
system installation on (to be conservative) all of the approximately 18,000 bobtails believed to be
in use ranges from $4.5 million to $9.0 million.
RSPA considers that the requirements for pre-transfer inspection of the delivery system and for
pressure testing any new or modified hoses used will not impose on delivery operations any
significant additional labor or equipment costs since they do not require activities that go beyond
current normal and prudent practice.
l 2 Telephone conversations between RSPA staff and Mr. W.H. Butterbaugh of the NPGA and Mr. Cliff Harvison of
the National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.
l 3 While a very few bobtails are known to have been acquired principally for making industrial deliveries of
anhydrous ammonia in certain restricted locations,, their number -- believed to be under fifty for the entire U.S. -- is
not considered significant enough to justify altering the figure of approximately 18,000 bobtails that is used here for
purposes of compliance cost estimation. (Per Mr. Carl Hendrix, National Fleet Manager, LaRoche Industries)
12

<<<PAGE 68>>>

The requirements for marking (presumably using a pressure- sensitive vinyl material) on the
cargo tank that it is being operated in accordance with special provision and annotating the
inspection report with a statement that excess flow valve performance is not established, while
obviously not current practice, are not considered to impose any significant measurable
compliance cost.
The preparation of comprehensive emergency procedures is estimated to cost each firm operating
cargo tanks subject to this rule $62, with no significant additional cost to place a copy on each
cargo tank vehicle. The latest available Census of Retail Trade and Census of Wholesale Trade
of the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992) list 2,634 retailers, 409 “merchant wholesalers” and 15
“manufacturers’ sales branches” categorized as liquefied petroleum gas dealers. The NPGA’s
application for emergency exemption dated December 18, 1996, noted over 3,200 propane
dealers in their membership (mostly small independent businesses but including 17 multi-state
marketing companies). While large propane marketers may operate 200 individual distribution
facilities, as contrasted with the single location of many small dealers, it is considered reasonable
to assume that an individual firm need prepare only one set of emergency procedures in order to
cover however many locations from which it operates vehicles subject to this rule.
Applying this $62 figure to a conservatively high estimate of individual 3300 propane dealers
operating the estimated 24,000 bobtails and transports (see above), plus another 300 motor
carriers estimated to be operating the estimated 1000 transports in for-hire service, yields an
estimated total one-time cost for emergency procedure preparation of $223,200.
The information-collection-related requirement is being separately reviewed in a request that
RSPA submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for approval.
13

<<<PAGE 69>>>

Significance of Final Rule Compliance Costs in Terms of Impact on Total Cost of Delivered
Propane
Since the principal compliance costs of this rule are expected to be for the equipping with radio
frequency shut-off devices of bobtails used for delivering propane, to a great extent to private
residences where it is consumed as fuel, it seems appropriate to assess the relative importance of
the costs thereby imposed on bobtail-delivered propane buyers in general and residential
consumers in particular.
The NPGA has estimated that approximately 18 billion gallons of propane are unloaded annually
from cargo tank motor vehicles, with about half this volume being unloaded from transports at
retail dealer and other bulk facilities and the other half from bobtails at private residences and
other locations that receive smaller quantities. l 4 Even if the aggregate one-time expenditure of
$4.5 million to $9.0 million estimated above for radio fiequency system installation on bobtails
is treated as if it had value for only one year into the future, it amounts to only .05 to . 10 of one
cent for each the estimated nine billion annual bobtail-delivered gallons. Likewise, the aggregate
expenditure estimated above for emergency procedures documentation for propane dealers,
$223,200, amounts to only another .002 of one cent per bobtail-delivered gallon even when
compared in its entirety only to that gallonage that reaches its final buyer by bobtail. (This
propane has typically been brought to a local distribution facility by a transport, but some
highway deliveries of large quantities to industrial or commercial buyers are made directly by
transports.)
This estimated total of $0.00052 to $0.00102 per gallon is obviously quite small in relation to the
most recent (1 995) national average delivered price per gallon of propane to residential
consumers, $0.865 (excluding taxes). Latest available figures (1993) from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration’s publication Household EnerPJv ConsumDt ion and Expenditures,
which are based on household surveys, show an annual average of 5 13 gallons for liquefied
petroleum gas-consuming households. The $0.00052 to $0.00102 cents per gallon would amount
to a one-year burden of $0.27 to $0.52 on 5 13 gallons.
A third way of looking at the significance of compliance cost in terms of the consumption of the
product involved would be to compare the $4.68 million to $9.18 million estimated aggregate
cost to the latest available estimate, fiom this same Energy Information Administration source, of
overall household spending on liquefied petroleum gas. For 1993 this was $3.89 billion.
l 4 NPGA application for emergency exemption dated December 18, 1996; p2-3,9. Note that the latest figures
available from the American Petroleum Institute’s publication Sales of Natural Gas Liauids and Liauefied Refmerv
Gases (1995) show 5.5 million gallons of liquefied petroleum gas purchased by residential and commercial
customers, of which the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that residential alone accounts for
approximately 85%, or 4.7 billion gallons.
14

<<<PAGE 70>>>

Significance of Estimated Cost of Compliance with the Final Rule in Terms of Impact on
Regulated Cargo Tank Operators
As noted above, most of the compliance cost burden of this rule is expected to fall on propane
dealers, and RSPA expects these costs to be passed on to customers. A total one-time
expenditure of $4.7 million to $9.2 million is estimated here as being required of these dealers
(the entire $4.5 million to $9.0 million for radio frequency device installation on bobtails plus the
$223,200 for documentation of emergency procedures estimated as applying to such dealers).
This expenditure is very small in relation to the revenue from sales of liquefied petroleum gas by
dealers to final users, without even counting those sales that may be made directly to industrial,
agricultural or commercial customers by merchant wholesalers or gas producers. The latest
available (1 992) Census of Retail Trade showed sales of liquefied petroleum gas by retail dealers
alone to amount to $4.87 billion.
Of course, a large part of the revenue of liquefied petroleum gas dealers goes to purchase the gas
and any other material resold. However, the $4.7 million to $9.2 million estimated above still
appears relatively small when compared only to the margin between operating expenses and
revenues net of the cost of such purchases and appears to add relatively little to a year’s worth of
outlays made by these dealers for capital equipment.
The US. Bureau of the Census has provided RSPA with 1992 sample-survey based estimates of
these quantities that are normally not published in such industry-specific detail since they have
been subjected to only limited review. They were only available combined with those for fewer
than 300 miscellaneous types of fuel dealers that could not be classified as “he1 oil” vendors, but
this minor category accounted for only 1.3% of combined sales according to the 1992 Census of
Retail Trade. 98.7% pro-rates of the estimated operating margin and of the estimated annual
capital expenditure (other than for land) amounted to $499 million and $191 million,
respectively, for retail liquefied petroleum gas dealers.
Another way of putting these estimated compliance costs in perspective is to express their major
component, the equipping of bobtails with radio frequency devices, as an average expenditure
per retail liquefied petroleum gas business location. Using the 5393 such locations in existence
during an entire year that were shown in the 1992 Census of Retail Trade, this yields an average
of under $800 per location.
Impact of this Rule on Small Businesses
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 USC 601 -61 1) is concerned with identifying the economic
impact of regulatory actions on small businesses and other small entities. It requires a final rule
to be accompanied by a final regulatory flexibility analysis, consisting of a statement of the need
for the rule, a summary of public comments received on regulatory flexibility issues and agency
responses to them, a description of alternatives to the rule consistent with the regulatory statutes
15

<<<PAGE 71>>>

but imposing less economic burden on small entities, and a statement of why such alternatives
were not chosen.
Unless alternative definitions have been established by the agency in consultation with the Small
Business Administration, the definition of “small business” has the same meaning as under the
Small Business Act. Therefore, since no such special definition has been established, RSPA
employs the thresholds published (in 13 CFR 12 1.20 1 ) of 100 employees for wholesale trade in
general and $5,000,000 annual sales for retail trade in general. As noted above, liquefied
petroleum gas dealers constitute the principal type of business on which significant compliance
costs will be imposed by this rule, in particular for equipment on retail-type delivery vehicles.
Using the Small Business Administration definitions and the latest (1 992) available Census of
Retail Trade, it appears that over 95% of retail liquefied petroleum gas dealers must be
considered small businesses for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. They accounted in
the 1992 Census for over 50% of business locations and almost 43% of annual sales.
Unpublished 1992 Census of Wholesale Trade figures provided to RSPA by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census indicate that over 95% of merchant wholesalers of liquefied petroleum gas also must
be considered small businesses; they accounted for approximately 40% of business locations and
over 50% of annual sales.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act suggests that it may be possible to establish exceptions and
differing compliance standards for small business and still meet the objectives of the applicable
regulatory statutes. However, given the importance of small business, as defined for purposes of
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, in liquefied petroleum gas distribution and especially in its retail
sector, where improved emergency shut-off equipment is necessary to assure adequate safety
during delivery operations, RSPA believes that it would not be possible to establish such
differing standards and still accomplish the objectives of Federal hazardous materials
transportation law (49 U.S.C. 5 101 et seq. RSPA further believes that the discussion in the
preliminary regulatory evaluation and in the February 19, 1997 Federal Register publication of
the interim final rule as to the need for regulatory action, issues raised by the public and the
consideration of alternatives open to the government apply to small as well as large businesses in
the affected industries.
While certain regulatory actions may affect the competitive situation of an industry by imposing
relatively greater burdens on small-scale than on large-scale enterprises, RSPA does not believe
that this will be the case with the rule. The principal types of compliance expenditure effectively
required by the rule, radio frequency emergency shut-off system installation, is imposed on each
vehicle, whether operated within a large or a small fleet. While there is undoubtedly some
administrative efficiency advantage to a large firm in being able to make a single set of
arrangements for such installations on a large number of vehicles at a time, the imposing of the
requirement contemplates use of commercially-available equipment, without any need for the
sort of extensive custom development work that only a large firm could afford. While the only
other compliance expenditure that is believed to be significant in the aggregate, that for
16

<<<PAGE 72>>>

documentation of emergency procedures, has been projected here on a per-firm rather than a per-
vehicle or per-location basis, the average of $62 estimated for each such preparation does not
appear high enough to significantly affect the economics of small-scale as contrasted with large-
scale distribution of the affected commodities.
#
17

<<<PAGE 73>>>

APPENDIX
U S . DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INFORMATION SYSTEM
SPECIFIED LIST OF LIQUEFIED COMPRESSED GAS BULK HIGHWAY INCIDENTS
Date: 03/15/90
Carrier: STAR GAS CORP
Incident Location: RINGTOWN, PA
Commodity Name: LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
Amount Released: 12 GAL
$ Damages: 356
Major Injuries: 1
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING A PROPANE DELIVERY, THE DELIVERY HOSE RUPTURED
CAUSING A RELEASE OF LIQUID PROPANE. THE PROPANE WAS TURNED OFF AT THE TRUCK, BUT BEFORE THE
PROPANE THAT HAD BEEN RELEASED COULD DISSIPATE, IT IGNITED A ND STARTED A FIRE. (SOURCE OF
IGNITION IS UNKNOWN). EMPLOYEE ATTEMPTED TO EXTINGUISH THE FIRE WITH THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER UNTIL
IT WAS EXHAUSTED. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE FIRE COMPANY TO EXTINGUISH THE FIRE, THE EMPLOYEE WAS TAKEN
TO THE LOCAL MEDICAL CENTER FOR TREATMENT AND THEN RELEASED.
Releaee Category: I
Date: 06/26/90
Carrier: KELLEY JACK B INC
Incident Location: WATERLOO, IA
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 4375 GAL
$ Damages: 12500
Major Injuries: 1
Minor Injuries: 26
Narrative Description: CARRIER WAS UNLOADING PRODUCT INTO A RAIL CAR BEING USED AS TEMPORARY
STORAGE. FILL LINE FROM CARGO TANK TO RAIL CAR RUPTURED. PRODUCT WAS VENTED TO ATMOSPHERE. AREA
WAS EVACUATED AS NECESSARY.
Release Category: 111
Date: 09/11/90
Carrier: LAROCHE INDUSTRIES INC
Incident Location: GAINESVILLE, GA
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 2.5 GAL
$ Damages: 725
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: THE LAROCHE TRUCK WAS PUMPING OUT THE SYSTEM AT GRESS FOODS IN
GAINESVILLE. GA. A NEW GOODALL HOSE THAT HAD BEEN INSTALLED APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS AGO, STARTED
TO LEAK. THE DRIVER-HAD EWZRYONE IN THE AREA TO EVACUATE THE AREA UNTIL HE COULD CLOSE ALL VALVES
AND DRAIN THIS HOSE. BIGHT PEOPLE HAD TO MOVE FOR ABOUT TWENTY MINUTES WITH NO INJURIES.
Releaee Category: I

<<<PAGE 74>>>

Date: 10/02/90
Carrier: MATLACK INC
Incident Location: BRIGHTON, CO
Commodity Name: LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
Amount Released: 50 GAL
$ Damages: 100
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: DURING UNLOADING INTO STORAGE, THE FACILITY PRODUCT HOSE RUPTURED,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF COMMODITY INTO ATMOSPHERE. HOSE REPLACED AND UNLOADING CONTINUED WITHOUT
FURTHER INCIDENT.
Release Category: I1
Date: 02/18/91
Carrier: ARROW TRANSPORTATION CO
Incident Location: TACOMA, WA
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 2.5 GAL
$ Damages: 50
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 1
Narrative Description: WHILE UNLOADING, LIQUID HOSE LINE RUPTURED. INTERNAL VALVES IMMEDIATELY
SHUT. ONLY PRODUCT IN HOSE WAS RELEASED. DRIVER TREATED & RELEASED FOR INHALATION OF VAPOR.
Release Category: I
Date: 04/08/91
Carrier: GRAMMAR INDUSTRIES INC
Incident Location: BAKER, IL
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 0 . 2 5 GAL
$ Damages: 0
Major Injuries: 1
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: TRANSFERRING A LOAD OF ANHYDROUS AMMONIA FROM A TANK TRAILER TO A STORAGE
TANK, A HOSE BROKE AND WAS REPAIRED WITHOUT INCIDENT, BUT AFTER REPLACING HOSE THE DRIVER FORGOT
TO CLOSE A BLEED OF VALVE WHEN TRANSFER WAS RESTARTED THE LINE BLEW SPLASHING LIQUID ONTO HIS
NECK, SHOULDER AND HEAD. HE WAS WEARING PROPER SAFETY EQUIPMENT INCLUDING GLOVES AND GOGGLES AND
WAS IMMEDIATELY PUT INTO A WATER TANK TO FLUSH THE SKIN AND EYES.
Release Category: I
Date: 03/04/91
Carrier: VIRGINIA PROPANE INC
Incident Location: FREDERICKSBURG, VA
Commodity Name: PROPANE
Amount Released: 30 GAL
$ Damages: 711016
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE DRIVER WAS REFILLING A PROPANE FORKLIFT
CYLINDER. THE ACME SECTION ON FILLER VALVE BROKE AND WEDGED IN THE FILLER VALVE ON HOSE THUS
ALLOWING AN UNRESTRICTED FLOW OF GAS WHICH IMMEDIATELY ACTIVATED THE EXCESS INTERNAL FLOW VALVE
ON TRUCK (SHUTPINQ DOWN). THE AMOUNT OF GAS ESCAPED WAS THE CONTENT OF THE HOSE AND PIPES TO
INTERNAL VALVE. THE EXPLOSION AND FIRE OCCURRED WHEN GAS ENTERED THE BUILDING AND IGNITED BY SOME
SOURCE. THE HOSE, METER AND VALVES WERE DESTROYED BY THE FIRE. TRUCK WAS MOVED NACUATED AND
TOWED TO OFFICE COMPOUND FOR SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS.
Release Category: I
2

<<<PAGE 75>>>

Date: 11/26/91
Carrier: KENAN TRANSPORT CO INC
Incident Location: TITUSVILLE, FL
Commodity Name: PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED
Amount Released: 180 GAL
$ Damages: 100
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: KENAN TRANSPORT COMPANY DRIVER WAS UNLOADING PRODUCT. PUMP FAILED
RELEASING APPROXIMATELY 1 - 2% OF PRODUCT INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. NO FURTHER REMEDIAL ACTION WAS
REQUIRED.
Release Category: I1
Date: 04/14/92
Carrier: PROPANE TRANSPORT INC
Incident Location: SHELBY, OH
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 533 GAL
$ Damages: 400
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: WHILE ATTEMPTING TO UNLOAD PRODUCT AT CUSTOMER LOCATION, THE FRONT PUMP
SEAL FAILED, ALLOWING PRODUCT TO ESCAPE. DURING REPAIRS TO THE TRAILER IT WAS DISCOVERED THE
INTERNAL VALVE WAS NOT CLOSING PROPERLY. THE SEALING FLANGE HAD RUSTED, HOLDING INTERNAL VALVE
OPEN APPROXIMATELY 1/16 OF AN INCH. BOTH INTERNAL VALVE AND PUMP SEAL HAVE BEEN REPAIRED OHIO EPA
REPORT NUMBER - 9204-70-1359 NATIONAL RESPONSE NUMBER - 114481
Release Category: I
Date: 06/24/92
Carrier: WAYNE TRANSPORTS INC
Incident Location: CAMBRIDGE, MN
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 6 GAL
$ Damagell: 0
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Deecription: WHILE DRIVER WAS UNLOADING, HOSE OPENED UP. HOSE HAD SLIGHT LEAK 4 INCHES
FROM CONSIGNEE'S CONNECTION. WE HAVE SINCE PRESSURE TESTED ALL OF OUR HOSES.
Release Category: I
Date: 06/05/92
Carrier: GROENDYKE TRANSPORT INC
Incident Location: ADAMS, OK
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 1800 GAL
$ Damages: 600
Major Injuries: 1
Minor Injuria.: 2
Narrative Description: #1 HOOKED HOSE TO CUSTOMER'S TANK. OPENED VALVES. STATIONERY HOSE BURST.
#1 CLOSED VALVES. #l- BREATHED IN VAPORS. WAS TAKEN TO HOSPITAL, TREATED AND RELEASED. VAPORS
TRAVELED TO NEARBY TRAILER WHERE TWO TEENAGE GIRLS LIVED. THEY WENT TO THE DOCTOR, WERE TREATED
AND RELEASED. FIRE DEPARTMENT WASHED DOWN.
Release Category: 111
3

<<<PAGE 76>>>

Date: 09/09/92
Carrier: PETROLANE GAS SERVICE INC
Incident Location: MILWAUKEE, WI
Commodity Name: PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED
Amount Released: 1255 GAL
.$ Damages: 424
Major Injuriecr: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: DELIVERING TO A BULK CUSTOMER, SHUT OFF VALVE AS THE AMOUNT WAS DELIVERED.
WHEN SHUT OFF, HOSE RUPTURED CAUSING A SPILLAGE OF APPROX 1255 GALLONS. WERE ABLE TO STOP LEAK BY
USING EMERGENCY SHUT OFF AND HOSE SHUT OFF VALVE.
Release Category: I11
Date: 09/17/92
Carrier: ARROW TRANSPORTATION CO
Incident Location: KEIZER, OR
Commodity Name: CHLORINE
Amount Released: 1 GAL
.$ Damages: 20
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: DRIVER WAS UNLOADING A N D SOME CHLORINE SLIPPED OUT FROM A VALVE.
Release Category: I
Date: 10/22/92
Carrier: LAROCHE INDUSTRIES INC
Incident Location: MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 87.5 GAL
$ Damages: 0
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: AT ABOUT 11:QQ - OCTOBER 22,1992 A PUMP SHAFT ON AN ANHYDROUS AMMONIA
DELIVERY TRUCK BROKE, DISCHARGING ANHYDROUS AMMONIA VAPOR TO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE INTERNAL VALVE,
DESIGNATED TO ISOLATE THE PUMP FROM THE TANK CONTENTS FAILED TO CLOSE COMPLETELY ALLOWING THE
TANK CONTENTS TO DISCHARGE. APPROXIMATELY 700 LBS OF ANHYDROUS AMMONIA WAS DISCHARGED OVER AN
EIGHT HOUR PERIOD. THE UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE TOOK PLACE AT SPECTRA-PHYSICS IN MOUNTAIN VIEW,
CA. THE OPERATOR HAD JUST FINISHED PUMPING OFF AMMONIA TO THE CUSTOMERS TANK WHEN THE PUMP
FAILED.
Release Category: I1
Date: 04/19/93
Carrier: PETROLANE Q F B PARTNERSHIP
Incident Location: DERRY, NH
Commodity Name: PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED
Amount Releaaed: 1850 GAL
$ Damages: 165060 ~
Major Injuria#: 0
Minor Injuria.: 1
Narrative D 0 8 C r i p t h m : FLEX HOSE FAILED AFTER A ROUTINE DELIVERY. ESCAPED VAPOR IGNITED SETTING
VEHICLE, HOME AND SURROUNDING FIELDS ON FIRE. IGNITION SOURCE IS UNKNOWN.
Release Category: IEI
4

<<<PAGE 77>>>

Date: 05/22/93
Carrier: AGLAND INC
Incident Location: GILCREST, CO
Commodity Nama: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 351.25 GAL
$ Damagem: 588
Major Injuriee: 0
Minor Injuries: 3
Narrative Description: THE HOSE RUPTURED WHILE THE CARGO TANK WAS BEING UNLOADED. EMPLOYEES
APPROACHED THE VALVE FROM UPWIND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THE AMMONIA CLOUD DISPERSED IN THE AIR SO
CLEANUP ACTIVITY WAS NOT NEEDED. FIRE DEPARTMENT WAS CONTACTED AND THREE PERSONS WERE SENT TO THE
HOSPITAL FOR PRECAUTION AND WERE RELEASED 1 HOUR LATER. THE HOSE ON THE CARGO TANK HAS BEEN
REPLACED. THE USE OF VEHICLE SAFETY CHECKLISTS IS BEING RE-EMPHASIZED.
Release Category: 111
Date: 03/31/94
Carrier: LAROCHE INDUSTRIES INC
Incident Location: KANSAS CITY, KS
Commodity Nue: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 3.75 GAL
$ Damagee: 6
Major Injuriee: 0
Minor Injuriee: 0
Narrative Daecription: THE DRIVER AT THE LAROCHE CUSTOMER SERVICE CENTER IN KANSAS CITY, KS WAS
CIRCULATING NH3 ON TRAILER S51. DURING THE PROCEDURE, THE DRIVER HEARD A HISSING SOUND AND
INVESTIGATED IT. HE DISCOVERED 3 BULGES IN THE 2 " UNLOADING HOSE. HE IMMEDIATELY SHUT DOWN THE
PUMP AND ISOLATED THE HOSE. AFTER BLEEDING DOWN THE HOSE IT WAS REMOVED AND SENT TO GOODALL FOR
INSPECTION. A NEW HOSE WAS INSTALLED. APPROXIMATELY 30 POUNDS OF NH3 WAS RELEASED.
Release Category: I
Data: 03/15/94
Carrier: LAROCHE INDUSTRIES INC
Incident Location: LOS ANGELES, CA
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 0.03 GAL
$ Damages: 0
Major Injuriee: 0
Minor Injuriam: 0
Narrative Description: DRIVER WAS APPROXIMATELY 50% THROUGH THE ANHYDROUS AMMONIA UNLOADING
PROCESS (50% EMPTY) WEN THE PUMP SHAFT BROKE. THE PUMP BEGAN TO LEAK AT THE SHAFT SEAL ON THE
SHAFT INLET SIDE OF THE PUMP. BREAK WAS INTERNAL TO THE PUMP. PUMP WAS LOCATED BENEATH THE CARGO
TANK PUMP SHUT DOWN. NO EXPOSURE TO ANYONE.
Release Category: I
Date: 11/25/94
Carrier: FERRELL GAS INC
Incident Location: LOUISVILLE, KY
Commodity Name: PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED
Amount Raleaaadr 50 GAL
$' Damagaa: 4477
. Major Injurimar 0
Minor Injuriaaa 0
Narrativa Dmctiption: WHILE UNLOADING PRODUCT-PUMP SEAL FAILED CAUSING APPROXIMATELY 50 GALLONS
OF PROPANE TO BE RELEASED (EMERGE" SHUT OFF SYSTEM WORKED AS DESIGNED) RESULTING IN FIRE.
Release Category: I
5

<<<PAGE 78>>>

Date: 02/10/95
Carrier: SUBURBAN PROPANE GAS CORP
Incident Location: HONESDALE, PA
Commodity Name: PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED
Amount Released: 5 GAL
$ Damages: 1328
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: OUR DRIVER WAS AT THE REAR OF HIS TRUCK PREPARING TO FILL A CUSTOMER TANK
WHEN THE PUMP SEAL FAILED. HE IMMEDIATELY ACTIVATED THE EMERGENCY SHUT-OFF. HE THEN GRABBED THE
ON-BOARD FIRE EXTINGUISHER IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISSIPATE THE RESULTING VAPOR CLOUD. THE DRIVER
SUFFERED A MINOR FREEZE BURN TO HIS LEFT WRIST AND THE INHALATION OF THE DRY CHEMICAL FUMES FROM
THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER. THERE WAS NO OTHER REPORTED INJURIES, APPROXIMATELY 25 HOMES AND 1
BUSINESS WERE EVACUATED FOR 5 HOURS. WE DEEMED THE SCENE SAFE WELL WITHIN 1 HOUR HOWEVER LOCAL
OFFICIALS WHO WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH PROPANE RESISTED OUR EFFORTS TO REMOVE OUR VEHICLE.
Release Category: I
Date: 02/16/95
Carrier: PETROLANE TRANSPORT
Incident Location: FISHERSVILLE, VA
Commodity Name: PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED
Amount Released: 1.63 GAL
$ Damages: 102
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 1
Narrative Description: DURING UNLOADING PROCEDURE, DELIVERY HOSE FAILURE, EXPELLING APPROXIMATELY
131 LBS. OF LIQUID PRODUCT. FLOW STOPPED BY DRIVER CLOSING SHUT-OFF VALVE IN PLUMBING PRIOR TO
DELIVERY HOSE. DRIVER SUSTAINED MINOR FROST BURN TO LEFT SIDE OF UPPER BACK.
Release Category: I
Date: 02/07/95
Carrier: MARTIN GAS TRANSPORT INC
Incident Location: OCHLOCKNEE, GA
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 525 GAL
$ Damages: 3332
Major Injuriea: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: TRANSPORT UNLOADING WHEN REAR SEAL ON TRANSPORT PUMP RUPTURED, CREATING A
LEAK, INTERNAL EMERGENCY VALVE WOULD NOT SEAL COMPLETELY.
Release Category: 1
Date: 04/28/95
Carrier: TANNER IND INC
Incident Location: VAN WERT, OH
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Releamd: 2.19 GAL
$ Damages: 6
Major 1njurie.r 0
Minor Injurie8: 0
Narrative Dm8criptioa: OUR DRIVER WAS BEGINNING TO MAKE A DELIVERY TO AEROQUIP COR, IN VANWERT,
OH ON 4/28/95. PRIOR TO MAKING THE DELIVERY A SEAL ON HIS HOSE REEL BLEW AND THE AMMONIA IN HIS
1" HOSE WAS RELEASED TO THE ATMOSPHERE. HE HAS ABOUT 7 5 ' OF 1" HOSE AND THIS WAS ESTIMATED TO BE
17.5 POUNDS OF AMMONIA. THERE WERE NO INJURIES OR EVACUATIONS. OUR DRIVER IMMEDIATELY HIT HIS
REMOTE SHUT OFFS (WITHIN 2-3 SECONDS) AND THEN PUT ON HIS FULL FACE GAS MASK AND CLOSED THE
LIQUID VALVE INSIDE HIS TRAILER'S CABINET. THIS LIQUID VALVE IS FROM
THE BOTTOM OF HIS PUMP TO HIS HOSE REEL.
Release Category: I
Date: 07/05/95
6

<<<PAGE 79>>>

Carrier: AMERIGAS PROPANE
Incident Location: WOBURN, MA
Commodity Name: PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED
Amount Relearred: 2 0 0 GAL
$ Damages: 90
Major Injuries: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: DURING UNLOADING PROCEDURE AND AFTER UNLOADING 72 GALLONS INTO AN ASME
ABOVEGROUND STATIONARY CONTAINER AT A CONSUMER SITE, REAR SEAL OF UNLOADING PUMP FAILED. DRIVER
CLOSED EMERGENCY SWITCHES, EVACUATED AREA AND CONTACTED FIRE DEPT. WATER SPRAY USED TO ASSIST IN
THE DISPERSEMENT OF LIQUID PRODUCT. VEHICLE TOWED TO STATE PATROL STORAGE LOT. INCIDENT SITE
SECURED AT 1 6 3 0 HOURS. TELEPHONIC REPORT ON 7 - 5 - 9 5 TO PETTY OFFICER MCLAUGHLIN. ASSIGNED REPORT
NUMBER 2 9 8 5 6 3 .
Release Category: I1
Date: 0 8 / 1 6 / 9 5
Carrier: AMERIGAS PROPANE
Incident Location: ASHTON, ID
Commodity Name: PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED
Amount Released: 2000 GAL
$ Damages: 2 7 0 0 0
Major Injuries: 1
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: DRIVER PREPARING TO UNLOAD. LEAK DEVELOPED IN PIPING SYSTEM. WHILE DRIVER
ATTEMPTED TO SHUT-DOWN ENGINE, FLASH FIRE OCCURRED. DRIVER BURNED ON ARMS, FACE, CHEST, AND BACK
(2ND DEGREE). AIR LIFTED TO BURN CENTER IN UTAH. RELEASED ON 8 - 2 0 - 9 5 . PRODUCT IN CARGO TANK
ALLOWED TO BURN-OFF. PRESENTLY BEING INVESTIGATED BY NATIONAL TRANSPORTED SAFETY BOARD.
Release Category: I11
Date: 1 1 / 2 5 / 9 5
Carrier: NASH FUELS TRANSPORT INC
Incident Location: HIGGINSVILLE, MO
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 3 5 0 GAL
$ Damages: 0
Major Injurierr: 0
Minor Injuries: 1
Narrative Description: OUR VEHICLE WAS UNLOADING AT THE MFA PLANT IN HIGGINSVILLE MO. WHEN THE
HOSE RUPTURED. OUR DRIVER DID ALL NECESSARY SAFETY MEASURES TO GET IT SHUT OFF AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONDED NO HOSPITALIZED INJURIES AND NO PROPERTY DAMAGE.
Release Category: I1
Date: 0 5 / 2 9 / 9 6
Carrier: ELLIS WILBUR CO
Incident Location: WALLA WALLA, WA
Commodity Name: AMMONIA ANHYDROUS
Amount Released: 5000 GAL
$ Damages: 5300
Major Injuria#: 0
Minor Injuriomr 2
Narrative Demcription: DURING THE UNLOADING PROCESS, A METAL HOSE FITTING ON THE
LOADING/UNLOADINC? PUMP BROKE FOR UNKNOWN REASONS. ABOUT 4 0 , 0 0 0 POUNDS OF ANHYDROUS AMMONIA WAS
RELEASED. THE LOCAL FIRE, POLICE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TEAM WERE NOTIFIED. THE LOCAL EMERGENCY
PLANNING COMMISSION, WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY AND THE WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT
OF EMERGENCY PLANNING WERE ALSO ON SCENE TO MANAGE THE INCIDENT. A PORTABLE QUANTITY OF ANHYDROUS
AMMONIA WAS RELEASED. THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE CENTER WAS NOTIFIED, RESPONSE NUMBER
3 4 4 3 4 9 . WE DO NOT KNOW THE CAUSE OF THE HOSE FITTING FAILURE AND HAVE NO RECOMMENDATIONS.
Release Category: I11
Date: 0 3 / 1 4 / 9 6
Carrier: FERRELL GAS INC
7

<<<PAGE 80>>>

Incident Location: SISTER BAY, WI
Commodity Nama: PROPANE
Amount Ralaamad: 1500 GAL
$ Damagam: 740
Major Injuria.: 0
Minor Injuria.: 0
Narrative Demcription: OUR LOCATION AT SISTER BAY HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED A CONTAMINATED LOAD OF
PROPANE. WE HAD THE STORAGE TANK CLEANED AS A RESULT OF THE CONTAMINATION. AP'PARENTLY THE UNION
ON THE IN LET PIPING FROM THE TRANSPORT RISER TO THE 30,000 GAL STORAGE TANK HAD NOT BEEN
TIGHTENED BACK UP AFTER CLEANING. A TRANSPORT HAD BEGUN UNLOADING PRODUCT, WHEN DOING SO THE PIPE
VIBRATES SOMEWHAT WITH THE PUMPING PROCESS. THE UNION CAME LOOSE AND A LIQUID PROPANE RELEASE
OCCURRED. SISTER BAY FIRE DEPT RESPONDED. NO ACTION WAS NECESSARY. NO PROPERTY DAMAGE OR INJURY
OCCURRED. THE PROPANE EVAPORATED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE.
Release Catagory: I11
Date: 08/16/96
Carrier: AMERIGAS PROPANE
Incident Location: DANIELSVILLE, GA
Commodity Nama: PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED
Amount Raleamad: 600 GAL
$ Damagam: 270
Major Injuriam: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Doscription: THE CARGO TANK TRUCK DRIVER WAS MAKING A LOCAL DELIVERY OF PROPANE WHEN HE
OBSERVED A WHITE FOG COMING OUT OF THE PUMP. HE IMMEDIATELY RAN TO THE TRUCK AND ACTIVATED THE
EMERGENCY REMOTE. THE ISC VALVE WOULD NOT TOTALLY CLOSE INTEFNALLY, AND ALLOWED CONTINUAL LEAKAGE
THROUGH A MECHANICAL SEAL IN THE PUMP. THE LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT WAS NOTIFIED AND THEY DISPATCHED
FOUR TRUCKS TO THE SCENE TO SAFETY DISPERSE THE LEAKING GAS TO THE ATMOSPHERE. AS AN ADDITIONAL
PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, APPROXIMATELY 50 PEOPLE WERE EVACUATED WITHIN 'A MILE RADIUS WHILE THE
LEAKING PROPANE PRODUCT WAS BEING DISPERSED.
Relaasa Catagory: I
Date: 09/08/96
Carrier: STERLING TRANSPORT
Incidant Location: SANFORD, NC
Commodity Nama: PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED
Amount Ralaasad: 40000 GAL
$ Damage.: 20200
Major Injuriem: 0
Minor Injuries: 0
Narrative Description: DURING UNLOADING THE OFF-LOADING HOSE FROM THE TRANSPORT CAME LOOSE FROM THE
COUPLING WHICH W A S ATTACHED TO THE PIPING AT THE BULKHEAD.
Release Category: 111
#
8

<<<PAGE 81>>>

RADIO REMOTE CONTROL AND TELEMtY SYSTEMS
June 71,1997 75%@-9%0?~33-.
.
Nancy E. Machado, RM: 8407
Office of the Chief Counsel, DC&l 0
Research and Special Programs Administration
Department of Transportation
400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590-0001
Subject: Ref: Considerations for Using Radio Control for Safety Shut-Off
Petitions for Reconsideration of Interim Final Rule: Cargo Tank
Motor Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed Gas Sewice
Dear Ms. Machado,
Per our conversation, attached are two sets of information on the Radio Control
Safety Shut-Off system Remtron has proposed to the propane industry.
PIease contact me at (800) 3284570 if you require any additional information. I
am looking forward to meeting you at the upcoming June 23rd meeting.
Sincerely,
Jdhn Schufer
hsiness Development Manager
js061 ‘ l7a.doc
REMTRON, INC, 1916 W. MISSION RD, ESCONDIDO, CA 92029-l 114 l TEL (760) 737-7800 l FAX (760) 737-7810

<<<PAGE 82>>>

RADIO REMOTE CONTROL AND TELEMETRY SYSTEMS
May 5,1997
Considerations for Using Radio Control for Safety Shut-Off
BACKGROUND
Accidents durfng the transfer of flammable materials, such as pipane, is of increasing concern to
organi&ions involved in safety. Current designs of mechanical excess flow valves have not been as
reliable over varying conditions as is tzuiy needed. Remote control transmitters are being considered as
. the activation medium for the safety systems. The Department of Transportation has recently issued
DOT 49 CFR Part 171, “ Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed Gas
Service; Interim Final Rule” requiring the operator transferring the product (propane) be within arm’ s
reach of a means for dosure (emergency shutdown device) of the internal self-closing stop valve or
other device that will immediately stop the discharge of product from the cargo tank.” This paper
examines various types of radio control technologies and makes specific recommendations.
TYPES OF RADIO CONTROLS
A wide variety of radio controls are produced for today’ s commercial and industrial markets. They range
in scope from toys that cost less than $50 to professional units costing over $15,000. There is obviously
a great deal of difference in quality and capabilities among designs. :
Modulation - Amplitude (AM) and Frequency (FM) are the most common types of modulation used for
radio controls. AM is much less expensive to manufacture, however it is more susceptible to
interference. AM is used mostly for toys and garage door openers. If designed properly, FM systems
reject most interference which can prevent a signal from being reliably decoded. Some inexpensive
systems do not have the necessary gain and fittering to take advantage of the FM characteristics and are
little or no better than equivalent AM systems.
Frequencv and Licensing - Radio controls are manufactured for licensed or unlicensed operation.
Licensed operation is typically used for transmitters that must communicate over large distances.
Unlicensed operation, in designated frequency bands, can be used if the system is designed and tested
to meet the low power requirements of FCC part 15 regulations.
Noise and Interference - Radio noise and interference are generated fmm many sources including
computers, motors, switches, solar flares and general background noise. These noises can interfere with
the ability of a radio control system to receive a signal, thereby reducing the effective operating range.
This noise is more predominant at lower frequencies (50 MHz) than higher frequencies (900 MHz).
Sicrnalincr Techniques - There are a great variety of signaling techniques used for radio controls, however
almost all modem systems will use some sort of digital modulation. Most simple radio controls use a
simple form of digital signaling with limited addresses and commands with no error checking.
Intermittent vs. Maintained Link Transmission - Most systems are intermittent, non fail-safe designs. That
is, a signal is sent on@ when a button is pressed and there is no additional criteria .to as’ su6the signal
was received. More sophisticated systems use a maintained link transmission technique, or in other
words these systems maintain an Radio Frequency (RF) Link between the transmitter and receiver, to
assure the radio control system is totally active during use. The absence or loss of the RF signal will
prevent the system equipment from being used or will shut down the system safely in the event the
transmitter becomes out of range of the receiver. Because of this feature, systems using a maintained
link transmission are used as safety shutdowns because they assure the operator cannot be out of radio
range when the equipment is in.operation.
-
REMTRON, INC, 1916 W. MISSION RD, ESCONDIDO, CA 92029-I 114 l TEL (760) 737-7800 l FAX (760) 737-7610

<<<PAGE 83>>>

HUMAN FACTORS
The practicality of a radio control system must consider the owners of the trucks and the operators
attitudes. If a radio controi iS not necessary for the Operation, the operators will find it a nuisance and
leave it in the truck. The owners of an operation must be careful of their costs and wiIl probably find any
purely safety system another burden to their operation. It would be desirable to offer additional benefits
akq with a system that will enhance rather than detract from his operation. The cost of the radio
remote control system can be further justiied if used for additional functions through out daily deliveries
with the bobtail. Examples include pump control, PTO, clutch, throttle control, hose reel control, and
control of computer registers with preset gallon capacity.
RECOMMENDATiONS
A radi6 control system (RCS) for the emergency shut down of a internal valve and engine on a product
transfer operation should have as a minimum the following characteristics.
a. The RCS shatl use a maintained link transmission technique between the transmitter and receiver
during the product transfer operation. In the event the RF link is broken either by an out of range
condition or system failure, the RCS system shall fail safely and dose the internal valve and shut-down
the engine.
b. The RCS must be of fail-safe design such that product transfer cannot be accomplished without the
safety system in operation.
c. The RCS transmitter shall have a clearly identified “ Emergency Stop” button.
Gili immediately close the internal valve and shutdown the engine.
m-
Activating the ESTOP
d. The RCS must be able to demonstrate reliabfe operation in a wide variety of electrical/electronic
environments including proximity to airports, TV and Radio stations, Power stations and other areas that
may be encountered during the delivery of fuels.
e. The RCS must be encoded such that no false commands will occur, either from another RCS system
in the area or from within the system.
f. The operating range of the RCS should be matched to the type of use such that sufficient range is
achieved under ail expected operating conditions but that there is not a great excess of range.
g. The RCS shall include a device (belt clip, bett holster, shoulder strap, harness, etc.) to position the
transmitter within arm’ s reach of the operator.
h. Other factors that should be considered should indude
l Battery life and low battery warning.
l Safety Requirements of NFPA 58, Standard for the Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum
Gases, paragraph 3-7.2 Electrical Equipment.
9 Electronic Dead-Man feature.
l Ease of canying, operating and durability of the transmitter.
l
‘ Unlicensed or appropriate licensed radio frequency band.
l Additional features and controls to enhance system and improve productivity.
QUALIFICATION -
John Schooiey, President of Remtron, inc., has over thirty years experience in radio control and
communications systems. Applications include state of the art military systems, modem industrial
controls and commercial systems. Remtron, Inc. designs and manufactures a several lines of radio
control systems including:
l Fail safe systems for the Army robotics research
l Remote control and safety systems for Electric Utility trucks
l Radio Controls for commercial wheel chair lifts
l Radio Controls for Cranes and other industrial applications
l Specialized controls for entertainment (Disney, Universal Studios, etc.)

<<<PAGE 84>>>

WI0 REMOTE CONTROL AND TELEMEIRY SYSTEMS
May 5,1997
RADIO REMOTE CONTROL LPG ESTOP CONTROLLER
(preliminary information) --
Overbiew:
The Remtron radio remote control system provides two benefits to the user. In
everyday operation, the radio remote control system will allow the operator to pump
LPG propane in a safe, efficient manner. In the event of an emergency situation, the
remote control system wilt also serve as an Emergency Shut-Down Device and close
the internal valve (belly valve) and shut-off the vehicle’ s engine in compliance with
DOT CFR Part 171.
Remote Control System Features:
l 902 to 928 MHz, license free operation with up to 300 foot range. :
l 87 Frequencies plus over 65,000 address codes.
l In excess of 7 30 hours transmitter battery life from 2 AA alkaline batteries
l Microprocessor based and programmable.
m Rugged transmitter with internal antenna (see catalog 21 CO2497)
l The remote control system can also control the propane pump, PTO, clutch, throttle
(fast idle), hose reel and work in conjunction with computer registers with preset
gallon capacity.
l Receiver includes a terminal strip and remote antenna
l Includes a leather transmitter holster.
Remote Control Safety Features:
. l Maintained ti& Transmission - A radio/RF link is maintained during the product
transfer operation.
l The system will shut down safely in the event the operator is outside of radio range,
receives severe radio interference, the receiver or transmitter malfunctions or
receiver of transmitter power is lost.
l Intrinsically safe 21 TlO based transmitter (UL 913 approval pending).
l The transmitter is attached to the operatots waist via a belt to assure the
emergency shut-down device is within arms reach.
l The system wili shut down safely in the event the operator pushes EST6P’ kon or -
turns off the transmitter power.
Installation
The proposed system must be installed by a competent deafer familiar with propane
tank trucks and NFPA 58. In addition to the radio receiver and antenna, the installer
must also install a transfer switch. The transfer switch, labeled “ pump enabled” and
“ pump disable” , should be located in an area accessible to the operator. The transfer
switch disconnects the engine kill, throttle controi, clutch and internal valve from the
REMTRON, INC, 1916 W. MISSION RD, ESCONDIDO, CA 92029-l 114. TEL (760) 737-7800 l FAX (760) 737-7810
_. . ..- -.__
_. _- -- -
--
_ _- - -. --_

<<<PAGE 85>>>

remote COrltd System during the times the pump is not in use (such as when fie
vehicle is being driven). When the transfer switch is in the “pump en&l&’ mode,
Remtron recommends that a warning light also be activated or feature added to the
truck to prevent it from being driven.
a
The Remtron’ s Radio Remote Control system is designed to be fail-safe. Once the
‘ pump enabled” switch position is selected, the receiver must be powered for the pump
to operate and the engine to continue running. Within the receiver, current is removed
from the receiver relay cOI’ IS to shut-down the engine and close the internal valve. If the
internal valve shut-down is via a pneumatic cylinder, the system should be designed
such that the absence of air pressure will close the internal valve. Remtron’ s
Application Engineers are available to provide design assistance.
Normal Operation:
Once installed, the system with optional pump and fast idle control will work in the
fof lowing manner.
1. The operator arrives at the customer’ s site, leaves the engine running and presses
the transmitter ‘ power on” button.
2. The transfer switch is then moved to the ‘ pump enable” position.
3. The operator reels out the hose and makes the necessary connections to the tank.
The transmitter “ pump on” and ‘ pump or buttons are used to control the pump and
engine fast idle.
4. When pumping is complete, the operator reels in the hose and moves the transfer
switch to the ‘ pump disable” position.
5. The operator turns off the transmitter with the ‘ radio off button and drives to the
next site.
Budgetary Pricing:
The remote control system wili consist of a 2lT10 based transmitter with leather
holster, shoulder strap, receiver with up to 8 Form-C relays, rubber duck antenna and a
9 foot remote antenna kit. The receiver will be configured to accept a 12 VDC,
negative ground source. The prototype system will utiiize a standard non-intrinsically
safe 21 Tl 0 transmitter.
Budgetary Production Pricing: $1 ,OOO.OO to $1,250.00 per system (dealer)
Availability: August 1997
Prototype System.
Availability:
$1 ,ooo.oo
June 1997
For More Information:
The information in this document is preliminary and subject to change.
John Schuler, Business Development Manager
Rem&on, Inc.
1916 West Mission Road
Escondido, CA 92029-l 114
Phone: (800) 328-5570
Fax (760) 737-7810
JGSchuler@aol.com 23CO6

<<<PAGE 86>>>

.
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: ‘ Cofisidefations ~f&Usin~ Radio
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. . : . .
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valve or other device tlia’ t: willimrgediately stop
. .
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<<<PAGE 87>>>

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l Radio remote controls &&ld’ b& integrated “ .I
into the design of the yehicle.
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qualified companies witi an in depth “’ “ I
knowledge of NFfA 58. ‘ + ::..:.
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l what happens if the transmi&is.outside of -@+
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&May 7,1997 Remron.hc. . .
--

<<<PAGE 88>>>

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<<<PAGE 89>>>

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<<<PAGE 90>>>

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. . . .
May 7.1997 Remcron. hc.
. *_--
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---
.

<<<PAGE 91>>>

.-
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..
....
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........
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.........
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..............
lntenittent vs. ~~~f~~ed Link
. . . . . . . . . . .
‘ I’ rm~~&on..
...............................
........ ..-.........................:.::.::.::::..
. .
... ......... . ......
...................................... .......
. . . . :::>- .....
,-
., : . .._
. . . . . : __ ::: : :.i.::: Intermittent Maintained Link
. signal is ‘ && $ &g ‘ :I:.;i;...<~h&s a link
. :...
between ~&‘
~~
:_, a TXbutton is .pushed.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“~&:~e~, .
.
. ,:.::i 34
l No criteria to assure the ..’ ‘. ,dMul3 use+
‘
. . .
&&I was received. .
_.. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
0 .
ce of :sm ~11 “..:....
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May 7.1997 Remmon,Inc .: :. ‘ .
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Radio Range Pattern
I May 7.1997 Rearon. Inc. Not to Scale
I
.
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<<<PAGE 92>>>

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. .
Radio Remote C&k11 Shut-off
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Inurnal Vdvc shut-OtT 1
The Ractio Gmrol System CM aiso control the F&p. PTO, Clutch. Idle S p&i-and HOST Reel.
May 7.1997 Rauma.Iw.
c
..: .
.:
::
. .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Radio Control Syst&i'(kCS)
Recommendations.. . . . __ Sz
l R.CS shall use a maintained link
transmission techniqlre be&veen: tie TX and
RX during the product transfer op&~t&. :ti
In the event the RF link iS brokeneither by
an out of range condition or systemfailure,
s
the RCS shallfail safefj and close the
:g&
internal valve and shut-down” the.:c.ngine.
..:..:. :
-.
._
LMay 7.1997 Remron. hc.
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<<<PAGE 93>>>

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... .........
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...... ...... 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... ........... ............
........
......
Radioi ,Con,trol ..Sys~~~':;(Rcs)
...
. .
.............. . .. '1 .......... Recomen&gGons ::.:::.: :::.::: :::.
..: .......... ..............
...... ................................... . .. . ....... ........... :::i;:;ii$&
;
._.:_,.. t.. TheXCS ,must be of fail-safe design such
. . : . . . . . . .
‘ && product’ .~~~~i:.E~b~be:i::~~~i, ::::::.....
: .: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
“..‘ ~:..::”
ticcofiplished without,,the RCS in operatloti: .: ..+ is.
.
* The RCS transmitter sh&iai&-a: ckgly
. . . . .
identified emergency stop button. _...._
Activating fie ESTOP &&~&i&y
. . .
.
close the intern&l valve and sh&down the
. . . .
::..
engine.
.
. . . ‘ T..
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.
. . .
AMaY 7.1997
Ranuon.&c.
. .
. . . . I
. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Radio Control Systeti (RCS)
l The RCS must be able to demonstrate
reliable operation in a wide.varie&-sf :“” . ._
electrical/electronic environments including
proximity to airports, m andxadio : stations,
. .
‘:_ .__
power stations, and other areas tha t m&y be
encountered during the deEvery of product.
e :_ . ..:.
. . . . . .:__. . . .
.
.
. .
. . :..
May 7.1997 Remron. nc.
.-
..- .
-__-
-
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<<<PAGE 94>>>

.
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. . .
. . . . .:: :‘
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. . . .
.
.
. ..-.......
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
Radio &n&o1 ..Sys&fi (RCS)
- Recommendations:::.:::::::.:..:: : :.
. . . .:. . . . . . . . .::: :::;::- :.::::: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~.......~
~
_. : .ne. RCS must be encoded such that no false
.__ .i . . .
commands &ill 6&1& ‘ &hWfrom:,~.other RCS
. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .._. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
system in the area or from within the system:‘ :.
i:&.,
l The. operating range o&?RCS sh@I be
matched to the type.,qf use such that $fficient
range is. achieved und&ll expected opera&g ‘ !.:. ~~~
conditions but that there is n&-great excess .:::
..
’
of range. i::
. . .
. .
1May 7,1597 Remron. Inc.
. . .::. _’
. .:’
.
Radio. Control System (Ik!$
Recommendations .
.. : :% . .
l The RCS shall include a device (belt clip,
holster, shoulder strap, lkmess.;.etc..) to
position the transmitter within arm’ s rehch . . -:a
of the operator.
i:.&
. . b$
. .:
:,..
.May 7.1997 Remron. Inc.

<<<PAGE 95>>>

-
._
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.
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . ..__.
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . , . . . . .
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. . . . . . . . . . . .
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.: .:::: . . ,.:.:::. .
. . . . . : . . . . ..I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .._.... . . . . ,.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..m
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..__ ._.._.
* Battery life&d low battery wiriiing.’
..
‘ $&& .~&<~tihments ~f:~A. 58
. . . . . . . . ..T.......
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
l E&e of carrying and operating he TX. .
. . .
““
.
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’
.
.
.
* Unlicensed or appropriate 1icerue.d. . .
. . .
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frequency band. _.
. . . . .
.
:. . . :
l Electronic dead-man feah=e. . . :‘ +a
..:..
. . . .
. .
l Add’ 1 features & controls to erh&xe
.‘.
system and improve productivity. “S.-~:
May 7.1997 Rcmmon. Iac.
:.
. . . . . . . . .
. . .
. . . .:.: ::“”
. ..:. : ..
.: :
.‘ .::““’
..‘ .
Remtron’ s Proposed System
._:. l Intrinsically safe version of .21TlO t&mitter. . . . ., .,.. _...: !,,,I ‘ :::: : ‘.
. .
: ::g#
.. Receiver with up to 8 Form-C relays mounted in
vehicle cab, 12 VDC power. .Ability to intetiace with
. .
pneumatic solenoid valves. >&
l Cab roof mounted antennawith 9 foot coa.x cable.
.
l Installation by Bobtail truck deaIers/manufa&rers.
l 3 models ranging from $1000 to $1250 (dealer cost,
plus installation). q.$
.‘_.
l Prototypes available June 1997. ’ ‘: : :..
l Production units August 1997.
*May 7.1997 Rcmuoo. Inc.

<<<PAGE 96>>>

5
CORPORATE MISSION - -- -
Remtron, Inc. is a leading manu&tunx of industrial radio remote controls for rugged equipment used in
material handling and commercial industries.
The company’ s mission is to provide the highest quality remote controls using the latest technology to
meet our customers’ needs, and m provide the best suppott for their operations.
These objectives ate accomplished by a team of dedicated employees and representatives. Remtron con-
tinuously invests in technology improvements and peKOMCf to ensure that we maintain and nurture this
position. We believe in conducting business with honesty and the highest ethicai standards.
HISTORY
PRODUCTS . ,.
Starting in 1984 Romtron combined
100 SQ& Two to eight commands.
aerospace tcctlnplogy with comtncr-
he 800 Series models offer a reii-
cial experience to dcveiop advanced
tbie and economical Fh4 radio
radio remote control systems for
emote control system for hoists,
industrial applications. Five years
;ates and pumps, or where a temotc
later. Remtron joined with UC
)witch is desired.
Controls to focus specifically on
-Series: M i c r o p r o c e s s o r s
overhead crane and locomotive
vt integrqd in the transmitters and
applications, leveraging that compa-
ny’ s strong ties with Motorola, Inc.
and experience with crane controls.
Today, UC Controls is whoily
owned by Remtron and all products
are marketed under the Remtron
name.
Growing at an average tate of more
than 30 % per year. you can now
find Remtron products in many
diverse industrial and commercial
applications. including hoists.
monorails, pumps, conveyors.
doors. valves, gates and lighting.
new rugged packaging. Randor
packet transmissi.on allbws virtual1
an unlimited number of units in
common area without interference.
Designed to deliver a new level a
convenience and reliability for stec
and paper mills. warehouses. min
ing, transportation. construction
manufacturing, and other industria
applications+the new products ar
FCC license-free and offer enhance1
I month, some as long as I year.
l AdditionaI f&urus include easy
instaIIation. maintenance designed
for the factory electrician and a
full two yem warranty.
CUSTOMER SUPPORT
Repeat customers are the best testi-
mony to Remtron’ s dedication to
customer support. Tramed field
technicians and in-house customer
service personnel are always avail-
able to problem solve and quickly
respond to customer questions.
FACILITIES
Engineering. production clnd sales
ire integrated under one roof Jt
Remtron’ s 25,000 square fr. facility
In Escondido. CA. The engineering
staff is supported by state-of-the-art
Jesign and teat equipment. Vinually
111 manufacturing is performed in-
louse. allowing tight controls on
quality and workmanship. .
RCT 1200, 21T35 (900 MHz Tmnsmitter) and RCT1002
n
xeivers to provide a powerful. fuli-
cc
~tured system capable of controi-
Ii
ng overhead cranes and locomo-
ti
ves. These systems also use digital
I:
M radio technology. Many sophis-
ti
cated safety features are engi-
n
ccred into Advanced Series mod-
e
is. including safety interlocks and
e
rror checking. Push-to-operate
(I
FTO) features are standard.
T
‘ elemetrv Products: Standard and
MARKETS SERVED
Remtron designs and manufactures
a full range of radio iemote controls.
The company sejcrves a wide base of
customers looking for ways to
improve convenience and efficiency
in their operations. Typical applica-
tion solutions include control of
overhead cranes. locomotives in
yard switching applications. and
simple on/off control of conveyors.
pumps and gates.
C
ustom systems are ~vailablc for
II
:mote control and measurement of
Y
naiog and discrete signals. Systems
m
rc used in SCADA and process
0
ontrol applications.
T
ECHNOLOGY
II
I May of 1996. Remtron introduced
Ik
IC first of sevcnl 900 MHz controi
?
fstems for industriai material ban-
dl
ling applications. These products
Cl
mploy the latest 900 MHz frequen-
c:
y-agile technology. coupled with
user benetits exceeding other remon
controls available to the market.
. g5 Frequencies plus a l6-bit SCCU-
rity code. ail field programmable,
provide unlimited use of systems
in a common factory area and
minimize spares requirements.
l Handheld transmitters feature
patented. easy-to-use rubber rock-
er and push button switches whict
last more than 1.000.000 opera-
tions without failure and are field
replaceable. Jam-proof tubber
keypad is seaIed against liquids
and dirt, md resists oils and
chemicals.
l Heavy duty cases with built-in
antennas are designed to with-
stand the rigors of the toughest
factory environment.
l Extended battery life plus the con-
vience of common AA batteries
lowers the cost and eases the main-
tenance of operating the systems.
Battery life on most models rxcee&
-.
2 1 TlO 900 MHz Transmitter I
I9 I6 W. Mission Rd.
tiondido. CA 92029
Tel (800) 3284570
3x (619) 737-7810

<<<PAGE 97>>>

New 900 MHz
Command Pro
License-Free Operation
Small Crane Control Systems
21T1A1

<<<PAGE 98>>>

Built to perform and survive in the tough environments
of stee1 and manufacturing plants, REMTRON’ s new
Command Pro product line sets a new
standard for ruggedness and reliability.
Yet inside the Command Pro you’ ll find
a sophisticated electronic system that
provides a higher level of responsive-
ness, versatility and above all, SAFETY.
This blend of state-of-the-art electronics
technology and rugged packaging
delivers an easy to install, low mainte-
nance system that you can rely on, day in
and day out.
*...
. . .
. .
I
. .
.
., -.
.
comm~$Pr6 COMMAND PRO Advantages
l 902 - 928 MHz license-free opemtion
with 300 ft, range
l 85 frequencies plus 16 bit address for safety in
large applications. Never repeats a code
l Microprocessor-based with 16 bit CRC to ensure
error-free operation
l Redundant circuit interlocks and
active ESTOP for safe operation
l Full two year warranty
l Efficient circuits and packet mode
transmission for extra long
battery life
l Simple diagnostics, two piece
terminal strips and field
programable for easy maintenance
-
. .
._ _
Step up to 900 MHz FCC license-free operation
This special FCC band allows more
power at higher data rates than other
license-free bands. The high frequency
makes your system virtually immune to
factory electronic noise. Maximum
filtering, wide band digital signailing
and robust designs allow REMTRON’ s
900 MHz systems to work reliably near
cellular telephones, cordless teIephones
and other high frequency communica-
tion devices.

<<<PAGE 99>>>

Tr::ns;mitiw Fsturzs
’ Inreml lnrenn3 yewts brezlqe
@ Switches rxed 3c I million opentions
a L:athe: hotsre: for added protection
l Tzsr LED provides u;lnsmitter md battery status
8 hw gower consumption for long battery life
Typical one to two months on two AX batteries
8 .inceeci sse made from ~av3nced COftlpOSiteS
hoids up co induscriai demands
* kun-proof. Seid-teplxetible rubber membrane
.\b .
‘ -ypad is se&d agtinst liquids ;Ind dirt
Battery life [@.I
Antenna
Swifches
Visual Diagnostics
Operating Temperufufe
FCC license Requirements
Dimensions - 2 I T? 0
Dimensions - 2 7 T7 4
Weight [with holster) - 2 I T7 0
Weight (wih holster] - 2 J II4
I
I30 hours from hwo AA akahe htieries
Infernal circuif bocrd I
Patented rubber rocker; 7 million cycle fated
Sekfest LED inchfor
-20’ to 16O.F f-29’ fo 77 ‘ C)
Meets FCC fart I5 for license-free opefuiion
6.5” x 2.75” x 7.0”
8.0” x 2.75” x 7.0”’
9 ounces
I T ounces

<<<PAGE 100>>>

e -.
.
Increased Production
l Less downtime for repairs
l Operators have keedom of movement - righnrig and contro1 Lower Operating Cost
l Significantly lower maintenance
cost than pendants and festoon
C&k
Ioads hm any positionl Less downtime for repairs
improved Safety
a Operator is free to walk
around @stacks
l Operator has improved visibility
l Operator cannot contact control
voltages
l Receiver offers improved safety
features over pendant systems
; ’
Programmable Setups
l 85 frequencies, over 65,000
addre&es ”
.- . . .
l Setup i&omx&& is stored with
a simple fieId programming box
or menu-driven PC program.
NO more dip switches to fuss with!

<<<PAGE 101>>>

Receiver Mounting Dimensions
2IR10
- 4.12
Crane
Control
Receiver
CHul
- IO.50
Receiver Features
:-
))I-
• Smail NEMA 12 package, easy to insiall
• Compatibie vich tepped or FD seems
• E:craviner" maintenance de exto est
Cencuit
Access
Transter Switc
Radic/Pancan:
d tenna
insteiletier end Serrice
fantry serice are sappor
:.:
must insure put rur com wilder come
2O RECEVER SPRCH CARONS TE
Dearering Fracuency
PC=.:20 At=. 35 recuencies
- cercing longe
-c = :CC =
- cerating lamcerature
Rescense Time
cù milisacenes
inciasure
menace Cennecier Termincis
Curcur Reicys
: ciece recaracie. use with 1S c BANG
O cius " mericcis. id. Ame E :SC VAC
¡curce incur icitage •
• HE CEC /AC. enose. 50/al ==

<<<PAGE 102>>>

w
. . .
REMTRON:
In business since 1984, REMTRON has become a leading manufacturer of industrial radio
controls used in the material handling and commercial industries. Unlike many suppliers in this
business, REMTRON is a specialist in sophisticated RF technology. The company’ s early
heritage of experience designing military application products, prior to focusing on commerical
industrid applications, has resulted in the most advanced and reliable control systems available.
The company% goals are: =
1. To provide the highest quality remote controls using the latest technology
to meet customer’ s needs.
2. To provide the best customer support in the industry.
These objectives are accomplished by a team of dedicated employees and saIes representatives.
REMTRON continuousIy invests in technology improvements and personnel to accomplish our
goals. We believe in conducting business honestly, with the highest ethical standards.
Mwlcets sewed:
REMTRON designs and manufactures a full range of radio controls for a wide base of industrial
applications indudiug: overhead cranes, conveyors, gatks, doors, automatic guided vebicfes
(AGV’ s), pumps and more.
Customer SupporE
Repeat customers are the best testimony to REMTRON’ s dedication to customer support. When
needed, highly qualified factory service personnel provide expert repairs and fast turnaround.
Facilities:
Engineering, production, customer setice and sales are integrated under one roof at our 25,000
square ft. facility in Escondido, CA. Our engineering staff is supported by state-of-the-art design
and test equipment. Viiy all manufacturing is performed in-house, ahowing tight controls on
quality and workmanship.

<<<PAGE 103>>>

CK‘GOTNK2. N97
Page 1
HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S
CARGO TANK MOTOR VEHICLE (CTMV) UNLOADING REQUIREMENTS
BASIC REQUIREMENT: TJ//
A CTMV that is used to transport LPG, propane, or other liquefied compressed gasses must have a
working automatic excess flow control system. During unloading, the tank must be attended by a
qualified person who has an unobstructed view of the tank and is within 25 feet of the tank.
ALTERNATIVE REQUIREMENTS:
If the CTMV does not have a working excess flow control system, you must comply with one of the following
alternatives, in addition to the attendance requirement:
(1) You must have a qualified person positioned within arm’s reach of a manual means of shutting down the
flow from the tank. This person must be present during the entire unloading process, except for the time
necessary to start or stop the delivery pump, or
(2) You must use a fully operational remote-controlled system capable of stopping the flow of product when
a vehicle attendant activates the system using a transmitter.
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS:
If you choose one of the alternative requirements, you must also do each of the following:
Determine, at the beginning of each day, that each component of the discharge system is of sound
quality and is free of leaks, and that all connections are secure,
Pressure test each new or repaired transfer hose or modified hose assembly prior to unloading for the
first time with that equipment,
Provide a comprehensive written emergency operating procedure for all transfer operations and train all
employees who perform unloading functions in those procedures,
Appropriately mark the CTMV when it is operated under these provisions, and
Provide function-specific training for employees regarding the alternative and additional requirements,
and maintain records of this training.
FURTHER INFORMATION:
Basic requirements are found in 49 CFR 177.834 (attendance) and 178.337-1 1 (excess flow); alternative
requirements are found in 49 CFR 171.5, as published in the Federal Register
[62 FR 44037, August 18,19971.
USDOT Contacts: Ron Kirkpatrick, Engineer (202) 366-4545, Nancy Machado, Attorney
(202) 366-4400, or Jennifer Karim, Regulations Specialist (202) 366-8553

<<<PAGE 104>>>

CKSO TNK2. N97 Page 2
The following suppliers have represented to the Department that they have equipment available that will
satisfy the requirements of 49 CFR 171.5 and/or 178.337-11.
Radio Control Systems
AmeriGas Propane, L.P. (system designer) c/o Denzel Hubbard, (404 -763-8235)
Vandal Alert Vehicle Security Systems, Inc., 3545 Harbor Gateway S., Ste. 101, Costa Mesa, CA 92626 (714
549 22 18) (component manufacturer)
McTier Supply Company, P.O. Box 761, Lake Forest, IL 60045 (800-323-3870) (system developer)
Rocket Supply Corporation, 202 N State Route 54, Roberts, IL 60962 (217-395-2281) (system developer)
REMTRON Inc., 1916 W. Mission Rd., Escondido, CA 92029-1 114 (800-328-5570)
Passive Systems
A-B Products (system designer), 1012 Ridgeway Dr., Liberty, MO 64068 (816 -942-0121)
Tri-State Tank, Inc. (tank assembler), 636 Adams, Kansas City, KS 66105 (913-342-7448)
Daniel Meyer, Thermogas Co., (71 5 -879-5692) (system designer)
Apollo Industries, Inc., RR2 Box 278A, North End Drive, North Clarendon, VT 05759 (802-446-3466 ext 16)
(System developer)

<<<PAGE 105>>>

Monday
August 18, 1997
Part II
Department of
Transportation
Research and Special Programs
Administration
_ _ _ ~ - ~ ~ ~- ~
49 CFR Part 171, et al.
Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor
Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed Gas
Service; Revisions and Response to
Petitions for Reconsideration; Final Rule
Hazardous Materials: Safety Standards for
Unloading Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in
Liquefied Compressed Gas Service;
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking;
Proposed Rule
44037

<<<PAGE 106>>>

44038 Federal Register / Vol. 62. No. 159 I Monday, August 18, 1997 I Rules and Regulations
_ _ --pp_--- - ___-_-___
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
EFFECTIVE DATE: August 16, 1997.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Research and Special Programs
Administration
Ronald Kirkpatrick, Office of Hazardous
Materials Technology, RSPA.
Department of Transportation, 400
49 CFR Part 171
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington. DC
[Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HM-22511
RIN 2137-AC97
20590-0001, telephone (202) 366-4545,
or Nancy Machado. Office of the Chief
Counsel. RSPA, Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street.
Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank
Motor Vehicles in Liquefied
Compressed Gas Service; Revisions
and Response to Petitions for
Reconsideration
S.W.. Washington, DC 20590-0001,
telephone (202) 366-4400.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
AGENCY: Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; response to petitions
for reconsideration
_-___ -p
SUMMARY: RSPA is revising and
extending requirements issued in an
interim final rule (IFR) on February 19,
1997. Revisions are being made to
address commenten' concerns
particularly in the area of operator
attendance requirements and to improve
safety. The rule adopts temporary
requirements for cargo tank motor
vehicles in certain liquefied compressed
gas service. It requires a specific
marking on affected cargo tank motor
vehicles and requires motor carriers to
comply with additional operational
controls intended to compensate for the
inability of passive emergency discharge
control systems to function as required
by the Hazardous Materials Regulations.
The interim operational controls
specified in this rule will improve safety
while the industry and government
continue to work to develop a system
that effectively stops the discharge of
hazardous materials from a cargo tank if
there is a failure of a transfer hose or
piping.
These operational controls are
necessary because a substantial portion
of the industry failed to comply with an
important excess flow requirement,
which has been in place since 1941, and
has failed to comply with the IFR.
Because of this widespread non-
compliance, RSPA also published in
today's Federal Register an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM) soliciting data to serve as a
basis for future rulemaking. This
advance notice addresses a number of
other issues, including the ability of
industry to meet a possible 1-, 2- or 3-
year retrofit schedule; standards for the
qualification, testing and use of hoses
used in unloading; safety procedures for
persons performing unloading
operations; and, whether the Federal
government should continue to regulate
in this area.
A. Overview
Among the liquefied compressed
gases most commonly transported
throughout the nation in DOT
specification cargo tank motor vehicles
are petroleum gases, anhydrous
ammonia and chlorine. The risk of
personal injury due to accidental
releases is high for each of these, and,
in the case of propane, the additional
threat of fire and explosion must be
considered. When liquid propane is
released into the atmosphere, it quickly
vaporizes into the gaseous form which
is its normal state at atmospheric
pressure. This happens very rapidly,
and in the process, the propane
combines readily with air to form fuel-
air mixtures which are ignitable over a
range of 2.2 to 9.5 percent by volume.
If an ignition source is present in the
vicinity of a highly flammable mixture.
the vapor cloud ignites and burns very
rapidly (characterized by some experts
as "explosively").
Since September 8, 1996, renewed
attention was focused on the dangers of
propane when more than 35.000 gallons
were released during delivery to a bulk
storage facility in Sanford, North
Carolina. Fortunately, ignition did not
occur. This incident led to the issuance
of a safety advisory notice on December
13, 1996 (61 FR 65480). and an interim
final rule (IFR) on February 19. 1997 (62
FR 7638). However, concerns over
controlling the unintended release of
hazardous materials have been
expressed for decades.
B. Emergency Discharge Controls
Operations involving the transfer of
liquid and gaseous hazardous materials
to, from, or between bulk packagings,
such as cargo tank motor vehicles, are
recognized as posing a significant threat
to life and property in transportation.
For that reason, the Hazardous Materials
Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171-
180) place special emphasis on
emergency discharge controls, including
requirements for excess flow valves and
internal self-closing stop valves that
- _____
_- - -
close automatically upon sensing a line
separation. Additionally, the HMR
require a mechanical and/or thermal
means of activating the internal self-
closing stop valve. The effectiveness of
these properly installed and maintained
safety appliances in safeguarding life
and property at the critical moment of
an unintentional release of extremely
hazardous materials is well
demonstrated and has historically been
widely recognized by representatives of
industry, emergency response
organizations, and other affected parties.
In the case of specification MC 330
and MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicles
authorized for the transportation of
certain liquefied compressed gases,
Federal requirements for emergency
discharge controls first appeared as
regulations issued by the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) on
November 8, 1941, in Docket 3666.
Requirements applicable to
specification MC 320 cargo tank motor
vehicles and ICC specification MC-7.6-
S-1.2 have been modified slightly by
RSPA over the years, but essential
elements of the regulations pertaining to
excess flow.valves and internal self-
closing stop valves are unchanged. This
rule applies also to provisions for
secondary remote controls and for
fusible links, which cause the internal
valve to close automatically in case a
cargo tank is involved in a fire. Again,
related requirements in the HMR today
share the same essential elements as
those originally ordered over fifty years
ago. Section 178.337-8(a) states "* * *
each opening in a cargo tank intended
for use in transporting compressed gas
(except carbon dioxide, refrigerated
liquid) must be-(i) closed with a plug,
cap or bolted flange; (ii) protected with
an excess flow valve on product
discharge openings or protected with a
check valve on product inlet openings;
or (iii) fitted with an internal self-
closing stop valve as specified in
5 178.337-1 1 (a)." Currently, most
specification MC 330 and MC 331 cargo
tank motor vehicles are fitted with an
internal self-closing stop valve which
incorporates an excess flow feature.
However, the requirement in S 178.337-
1 1 (a) (1) (i), that "each self-closing stop
valve and excess flow valve must
automatically close if any of its
attachments are sheared off or if any
attached hoses or piping are separated."
can be met by manufacturers and
operators of specification MC 330 and
MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicles using
internal self-closing stop valves which
have no excess flow feature. The key
requirement is that the discharge valve
must automatically close if any of its

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Federal Register / Vol. 62, NO. 159 / Monday, August 18. 1997 / Rules and Regulations 44039
~_ ~ -~ ______
attachments are sheared off or if any
ineffective in controlling gas loss due to a
0 On February 9. 1972, in Tewksbury.
attached hoses or piping are separated.
variety of conditions and to the inherent
Massachusetts, while an MC 330 bulk
limitations of these valves * * * An excess
Any other equipment, such as a system
transport was unloading 8500 gallons of
which measures a differential in
flow valve is not designed to close and thus
propane into two 60,000 gallon storage
may not provide protection, if any of the
pressure, a pressure drop. or a hose or
following conditions are present: (1) The
tanks at a Lowell Gas terminal, a second
piping separation, which automatically
piping system restrictions (due to pipe length,
bulk transport backed into piping at the
closes the internal self-closing stop
branches, reduction in pipe size. or number
bulkhead of the unloading terminal
valve on the cargo tank and stops the
o f other valves) decrease the flow rate to less
causing a propane leak. Ignition
discharge of product in the event of the
than the valve's closing flow * *
(Emphasis
occurred. In the ensuing fire, one of the
separation or rupture of a hose or piping
added).
transports exploded. Two persons were
may be used to meet the emergency
This information demonstrates that
killed and 2 1 others were injured.
discharge control system performance
the industry has been aware, since at
Property damage included both
requirement specified in S 178.337-
least 1978, that excess flow valves are
transports, a large portion of the
1 l(a)(l)(i).
not designed to function where piping
operating facility and surrounding
Unloading With a Liquid Pump System
system restrictions (e.g., pumps)
woodland.
decrease the flow rate to less than the
On March 9. 1972. near Lynchburg,
While it seems that the HMR's
excess flow valve's closing flow. Also,
Virginia, an MC 33 1 bulk transport
longstanding requirements should be
the industry has information regarding
overturned and slid into a rock
well understood and fully complied
"many" incidents involving hose and
embankment. The impact ruptured the
with by the affected industries,
transfer separation and other transfer
tank's shell, releasing about 4000
unfortunately that is not the case.
system accidents, but this information
gallons of liquid propane. Ignition
Instead, efforts undertaken by the
has not been shared with RSPA despite
occurred. Two persons were killed and
affected industries to achieve increased
numerous requests.
five others were injured. There was
efficiency in the unloading of hazardous
property damage to a farmhouse,
materials by the installation of pumps
Pressure Unloading
outbuildings and about 12 acres of
on specification MC 330 and MC 33 1
Unloading systems that employ
woodland.
cargo tank motor vehicles prevent
pressure rather than a pump to unload,
On April 29. 1975, near Eagle Pass,
emergency discharge control systems
such as a gas compressor mounted on
Texas, an MC 330 bulk transport struck
from operating properly under all
specification MC 330 and MC 331 cargo
a concrete headwall and ruptured
temperatures and pressures routinely
tank motor vehicles should not be
releasing more than 8000 gallons of
encountered during normal conditions
affected by the problem identified with
liquefied petroleum gas. The ensuing
of transportation. The installation of
unloading of liquefied compressed gases
fire and explosion killed 16 persons,
pumps on specification MC 330 and MC
by use of pumps, provided the operating
injured 5 1 others and destroyed 5 1
331 cargo tank motor vehicles has been
pressure of the compressor, the flow rate
vehicles.
accompanied by the industry's
of product through valves, piping and
On December 23. 1988, ininstallation of internal self-closing stop
hose, and the setting of the emergency
Memphis, Tennessee, an MC 330 bulk
valves with an emergency feature
feature conform to requirements in
transport struck a bridge abutment and
designed to function at a flow rating
S 178.337- 1 1 (a) (1) (v). Vehicles
ruptured releasing 9388 gallons of
well above the discharge capacity of the
unloaded by pressure and conforming to
liquefied propane gas. The ensuing fire
pump. This assures transfer of product
the requirements of S 178.337-1 l(a)(l)
and explosion killed eight persons and
without interruption by inadvertent
are not subject to the temporary
injured eight others.
functioning of the emergency discharge
regulations specified in S 171.5.
On November 29, 1989. in Neptune
control system. As presently found in
Beach, Florida, while propane was
C. History of Major Incidents
most product discharge system
being delivered to storage tanks at the
configurations, a pump functions as a
The hazards associated with the
Neptune Beach Elementary School, an
regulator in the product discharge line
transportation of liquefied petroleum
unintentional release of propane
so as to eliminate any possibility that
gas have been demonstrated repeatedly
ignited. In the resulting explosion and
the emergency discharge control system
on U.S. highways. Based on information
fire, the driver was badly burned and
will function in event of a line
contained in the Hazardous Materials
subsequently died.
separation. Also, it has been pointed out
Information System, propane releases
On July 27. 1994, in White Plains,
by Mississippi Tank Company that even
are a leading cause of death in
New York. an MC 33 1 bulk transport
on cargo tank discharge systems not
hazardous material transportation. A
struck a column of an overpass and
fitted with pumps, the emergency
summary of major incidents over the
ruptured, releasing 9200 gallons of
discharge control system on most LPG
years is presented below. Most of these
propane. Ignition occurred. The driver
vehicles would fail to properly operate
incidents were the result of collisions
was killed, 23 persons were injured and
under all temperatures and pressures
rather than due to unintended release of
an area within a radius of 400 feet was
routineIy encountered during normal
lading during transfer operations.
engulfed in fire.
conditions of transportation. The
However, each incident demonstrates
On September 8, 1996, in Sanford,
National Propane Cas Association
the potential for grave consequences
North Carolina, during delivery of
(NPGA) in 1978 and 1990, issued
which result when liquefied petroleum
propane to a bulk storage facility by an
bulletins NPGA # 1 13-78 and NPGA
gases are spilled and ignition occurs.
MC 331 bulk transport, more than
#113-90, which state:
On July 25, 1962, in Berlin, New
35,000 gallons of propane were released.
York. an MC 330 bulk transport
The discharge hose separated from its
Excess flow check valves have been of help
ruptured releasing about 6900 gallons of
hose coupling at the delivery end of the
in limiting gas loss in many incidents
involving breakage of hoses and transfer
liquid propane. Ignition occurred. Ten
hose. Most of the transport's 9800
piping. Thus, they do provide a useful saFety
persons were killed and 17 others were
gallons of propane and more than
function in LP-gas systems. However, there
injured. Property damage included total
30,000 gallons from the storage tanks
have also been transfer system accidents
destruction of 18 buildings,and 11
were released. If this quantity of
where excess flow valves have been
vehicles.
released propane ignited, local

<<<PAGE 108>>>

44040 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 159 / Monday, August 18, 1997 / Rules and Regulations
~ ~ ~~ ~ __________
authorities estimated that about 125
transportation of hazardous materials in
emergency response personnel could
MC 330 and MC 331 cargo tank motor
have been injured or killed.
vehicles of the problem with emergency
On June 3, 1997. in Caro. Michigan,
discharge control systems and reminded
while unloading propane into a storage
them that these tanks and their
tank at an industrial facility, the
components must conform to the HMR.
delivery hose of an MC 331 transport
At the same time, FHWA issued and
ruptured. The ensuing fire and a series
distributed 16,000 copies of a Safety
of explosions seriously burned the
Alert Bulletin on this issue.
driver, destroyed four vehicles and
E. Emergency Exemption Applications
extensively damaged the facility. Initial
estimates of property damage are at least
On December 2, 1996. and December
$2.0 million.
18, 1996, RSPA received applications
Two additional examples of serious
for emergency exemptions from the
accidents involving shipments of liquid
Mississippi Tank Company and the
petroleum gas are noteworthy. In what
NPGA, respectively, indicating the
many consider the world’s most serious
problem with cargo tank motor vehicle
incident involving a motor vehicle
emergency discharge systems was more
transporting liquid petroleum gas, on
extensive than originally believed.
July 11, 1978, an overfilled cargo tank
Additionally, The Fertilizer Institute
passing near a campground in Spain
(TFI) and National Tank Truck Carriers,
exploded and burned. About 200
Inc. (NTTC) submitted applications to
persons were killed and 120 were badly
become party to these exemptions. In
burned. And, although no motor
support of its exemption application.
vehicles were involved, another major
the Mississippi Tank Company, a
accident occurred on February 22, 1973,
manufacturer of specification MC 331
in Waverly, Tennessee, when a 30,000
cargo tank motor vehicles, provided
gallon railroad tank car exploded and
preliminary information that there is
burned. Sixteen persons were killed, 43
reason to suspect the problem is
others were injured and $1.8 million of
common to nearly all cargo tank motor
property damage resulted.
vehicles used in liquefied compressed
The history of major accidents in the
gas service within the US. This problem
‘transportation of anhydrous ammonia is
is also thought to exist in the non-
similar to that involving the
specification cargo tanks authorized in
transportation of liquefied petroleum
§ 173.315(k).
gases. Pulmonary injuries are more
In their requests for emergency
significant with ammonia while fire
exemption, the applicants asked the
damage is more significant with
agency to issue an exemption to allow
liquefied petroleum gases. An example
the continued use of existing cargo tank
of a major accident involving the release
motor vehicles and the conditional
of ammonia is an incident that occurred
operation of newly constructed cargo
May 11, 1976, in Houston, Texas. The
tank motor vehicles while a long-term
driver of an MC 33 1 transport lost
solution to the problem is developed.
control while negotiating an interstate
NPGA suggested that long-term
exit ramp. The cargo tank motor vehicle
solutions might include pneumatic or
overturned and fell from the overpass
mechanical “deadman” devices,
onto a major artery some 15 feet below.
possibly combined with a lanyard for
The cargo tank ruptured, releasing its
remote activation, or the use of a
entire cargo of 7500 gallons of
differential pressure valve.
anhydrous ammonia. The driver was
NPGA proposed that the emergency
killed in the crash. An additional five
exemption require: (1) Compliance with
persons were killed and 78 others were
applicable provisions of the HMR other
hospitalized, all due to inhalation of
than §§ 173.315(n), 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i)
ammonia. Another 100 persons were
and 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(v); (2) an outreach
treated for less severe injuries.
effort by NPGA to notify members of the
Favorable wind conditions prevented
Sanford, North Carolina incident and
the vapor cloud from reaching a nearby
related, identified concerns; (3) transfer
elementary school.
hose inspection before continued use
and new hose inspection as required
D. RSPA Safety Advisory Notice and
under the HMR; (4) compliance with
Federal High way Administration
applicable provisions of the National
(FHWA) Safety Alert Bulletin
Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Based on preliminary information
pamphlet NFPA 58, Storage and
from the Sanford incident, RSPA
Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases,
published an advisory notice in the
1995 edition; (5) continual driver
Federal Register on December 13, 1996
attendance and control of the loading/
(61 FR 65480). That notice alerted
unloading operations; and (6) driver
persons involved in the design,
training. Mississippi Tank Company
manufacture, assembly, maintenance or
proposed that the emergency exemption
______---___ - -
require a warning statement and/or
special operating instructions.
Both applicants stressed the urgent
need for an expedited response from
RSPA. Mississippi Tank indicated that
an emergency exemption was needed
“to allow the continued use of existing
equipment and to allow badly needed
new equipment to continue to be made
available to the industry.” In the section
of its application entitled “Treatment as
an Emergency Exemption.” NPGA
indicated that the propane industry was
in the midst of the winter heating
season, that over 80 percent of the 7-9
billion gallons of propane delivered
annually was to be used as a residential
heating fuel, and that all of the existing
cargo tanks were needed to deliver the
heating fuel for residential and
agricultural purposes. In further support
of its argument that an emergency
existed, NPGA also stated that “the
ability to be able to operate propane
bobtails and highway transports has so
many impacts and is so pervasive as to
be almost incalculable from an
economic impact viewpoint.” NPGA
concluded its application by stating that
“a true emergency exists for handling
this Exemption request in an expedited
manner * * *”
After evaluating the facts before it,
and the NPGA’s and Mississippi Tank
Company’s emergency exemption
applications, RSPA agreed that an
emergency existed. However, the agency
denied the applications for emergency
exemption on January 13, 1997, because
they failed to provide for an equivalent
level of safety as required by 5 5 1 17 of
the Federal hazardous materials
transportation law, 49 U.S.C. 5 5 1 17,
and 49 CFR 107.1 13(f)(2). Also, RSPA
found that the issues addressed in the
applications have serious safety and
economic implications for a broad range
of persons, including a significant
number of regulated entities facing a
possible interruption in transportation
services because of widespread non-
conformance with the HMR’s
requirement for a passive emergency
discharge control system. Consequently,
RSPA believed that the issues raised by
the applicants were better addressed
through the rulemaking process. See 49
CFR 107.1 13(i). Thus, RSPA published
the IFR because of the emergency
situation described by NPGA and
Mississippi Tank Company in their
applications for emergency exemption,
and the applicants’ requests for
expedited relief.
F. The Interim Final Rule
The IFR was issued to enhance safetyof product transfer operations while
allowing for the continued

<<<PAGE 109>>>

Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 159 / Monday, August 18, 1997 / Rules and Regulations ~
transportation of liquefied compressed
gases (principally propane, other
liquefied petroleum gases and
anhydrous ammonia). The IFR was
made effective for a six-month period,
until August 15, 1997, to allow industry
time to develop at least an interim
solution to the problem with emergency
discharge control systems. RSPA and
the FHWA believed that, without the
authorization for continued operation
provided by the IFR, persons who
depend on propane and other liquefied
compressed gases for residential,
industrial, and agricultural purposes, as
well as cargo tank motor vehicle
operators and manufacturers, would be
severely impacted by service
interruptions in these industries.
Because there are no acceptable
alternatives for distributing these
materials to most residences and
facilities served by cargo tank motor
vehicles, RSPA and FHWA believed the
IFR was necessary to avoid other
potentially serious safety and economic
consequences that might have resulted
from an inability to secure these
essential materials.
In order to enhance the level of safety
during transfer operations using current
equipment, the IFR specified special
conditions for continued operations in
new 5 171.5. These conditions offered
an alternate means of compliance with
existing emergency discharge controls
required by 5 178.337- 1 1. Those
conditions included:
Paragraph (a) (1). Use provisions
under which MC 330, MC 331, and non-
specification cargo tank motor vehicles
authorized under S 173.315(k) may be
operated and unloaded.
Paragraph (a) (1) (i). A requirement to
verify the integrity of components
making up the cargo tank motor
vehicle's discharge system before
initiating any transfer.
Paragraph (a) (1) (ii). A requirement
that prior to using a new or repaired
transfer hose or a modified hose
assembly, the hose must be pressure
tested at no less than 80 percent of the
design pressure or maximum allowable
working pressure (MAWP) marked on
the cargo tank.
Paragraph (a) (1) (iii). A requirement
that a qualified person in attendance of
the cargo tank motor vehicle during the
unloading operation must have the
capability to manually activate the
emergency discharge control system to
stop the release of the hazardous
material from the cargo tank.
Paragraph (a) (1) (iv). A requirement
that in event of an unintentional release
of lading, the internal self-closing stop
valve be activated and all motive and
44041
~~~ ~~
auxiliary power equipment be shut
industrial applications. Similarly,
down.
several manufacturers have developed
Paragraph (a) (l)(v). A requirement for
other promising radio remote control
the development, and maintenance on
systems aimed at this problem; some of
the cargo tank motor vehicle, of
these have been demonstrated and are
comprehensive emergency operating
currently being marketed by equipment
procedures for all transfer operations.
suppliers serving the propane industry.
Paragraph (a)(l)(vi). A requirement
Additionally, some manufacturers
that each manufacturer, assembler,
have demonstrated systems capable of
retester. motor carrier and other hazmat
automatically closing discharge valves
employer provide training to its hazmat
in the event of separation of hoses or
employees so that they may properly
piping. The range of conditions under
perform the new function-specific
which these systems can be counted on
requirements in S 17 1.5.
to offer reliable operation for liquefied
Paragraph (a)@). Conditions for
compressed gases has not been
continued qualification of existing in-
determined as yet, and additional field
service cargo tank motor vehicles.
testing is called for, but the
Paragraph (a) (3). Requirements for
accomplishments to date are
new vehicles, including a special entry
encouraging.
on the Certificate of Compliance
During the two public meetings and
required by S 178.337-18.
two public workshops, RSPA and
Paragraph (b). A requirement for a
industry explored possible long- and
specific marking to be displayed on
short-term solutions to enhance the
each cargo tank motor vehicle operating
safety of product transfer operations.
under S 171.5.
RSPA also worked with the Volpe
Paragraph (c). An August 15. 1997
National Transportation Systems Center
expiration date for this temporary
to identify off-the-shelf technology that
regulation.
might offer possible solutions, and TFI
The IFR, and a subsequent notice in
engaged the Pennsylvania
the Federal Register, advised of two
Transportation Institute to conduct
public meetings and two public
related research. Also, RSPA and FHWA
workshops scheduled to gather
staff participated in several industry-
information and allow comment on the
sponsored meetings and witnessed the
IFR requirements. In the IFR, RSPA also
demonstration of new technologies
solicited comments and data on the
being developed to enhance safety
costs and effectiveness of alternate
during the unloading of hazardous
means of achieving a level of safety for
materials from MC 330 and MC 33 1
the long-term comparable to that
cargo tank motor vehicles. As a result of
provided by current requirements.
these joint efforts. industry developed
Finally, RSPA solicited comments on
and tested at least two passive systems
the costs and benefits of the interim
and several remote control systems
measures adopted under the IFR.
using radio signals, all of which show
As the investigation of the Sanford
great promise. Several operators have
incident proceeded, it became apparent
installed these devices on a limited
that certain assumptions made both by
number of cargo tank motor vehicles in
RSPA and FHWA and by parts of the
order to test them in actual operation.
industry were invalid regarding the
C. Petitions for Reconsideration
emergency discharge control systems.
These systems were previously thought
On March 2 1, 1997, RSPA received ato conform to requirements of
petition for reconsideration of the IFR
5 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i) established under
from the NPGA. on behalf of its
Docket HM-183 [54 FR 24982; June 12.
members, and a petition for
19891. Both the NPGA and TFI quickly
reconsideration jointly filed by
set up special task forces to deal with
Ferrellgas. L.P.. Suburban Propane, L.P..
the shortcomings of existing product
AmeriGas Propane, L.P., Agway
delivery systems.
Petroleum Corporation and Cornerstone
Since mid-December 1996, and u: .le
Propane Partners, L.P. (Those petitions
maintaining close liaison with RSPA
are attached, in their entirety. as
and FHWA, much has been
Appendices A and B, respectively.)
accomplished by industry. For example,
Petitioners specifically requested that
off-the-shelf radio remote control and
RSPA reconsider the additional
telemetry equipment has been identified
which, with relatively simple
attendance requirement in S 171.5(a)(l)(iii), which they contend
modifications, may be used to stop the
effectively mandates that two or more
delivery of product from a distance
attendants travel to and be present
while meeting requirements for
during the unloading of propane gas
"unobstructed view" in S 177.834(i)(3)
from a cargo tank motor vehicle. They
of the HMR. This equipment has been
assert that the high cost of compliance
in use for many years in various
with the additional requirement is not

<<<PAGE 110>>>

44042 Federal Register I Vol. 62, No. 159 1 Monday, August 18, 1997 I Rules and Regulations
~
supported by the safety record for
propane gas delivery. and they provided
some cost and safety data to support
their views.
A significant number of commenters
to the IFR raised issues regarding cost
and safety identical to those raised by
petitioners. Numerous commenters
cited compliance cost estimates that
they considered excessive, based on
their assertion that they have long
operated cargo tank motor vehicles
without experiencing problems with the
currently installed emergency discharge
control systems. These same issues were
among the topics raised by participants
in the two public meetings and the two
public workshops conducted by RSPA.
In its petition, NPGA also asked for an
immediate stay of the additional
attendance requirement pending a
decision on its petition. Ignoring
statements made in its emergency
exemption application, NPGA’s request
for a stay was based on its assertion that
an emergency did not exist and,
therefore, that RSPA was not justified in
foregoing notice and comment before
immediately imposing new
requirements. NPGA further argued that
because RSPA should have issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
prior to imposing new requirements, the
agency should have done a full
economic analysis of the effect of the
new requirements on small businesses,
as required under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
In order not to prejudge the additional
attendance requirement issue before all
interested parties had an opportunity to
comment on the IFR requirements,
RSPA did not respond to the petitions
for reconsideration prior to the close of
the IFR comment period. Also, because
of the fast-approaching expiration date
of the IFR. the need to take further
regulatory action to ensure an
acceptable level of safety during the
transportation, including unloading, of
liquefied compressed gases, and the
identical nature of the issues raised by
petitioners and commenters alike, RSPA
found that it was impractical to make a
decision on the petitions for
reconsideration prior to issuance of this
final rule. On June 9. 1997, RSPA
published a notice in the Federal
Register (62 FR 31363) announcing its
intent to defer a decision on the
petitions for reconsideration of the IFR
and to hold a second public meeting at
industry’s request. RSPA indicated that
it would address the issues raised by
petitioners and commenters regarding
the IFR requirements in a final rule that
it intended to issue prior to the
expiration date of the IFR. RSPA also
indicated in that notice that after
publication of the final rule, it intended
to issue an NPRM to address broader
issues raised during the course of this
rulemaking. including the
“unobstructed view’’ requirement in
5 177.834(i) and the need for hose
management program requirements.
A significant basis for RSPA’s finding
that an emergency exists is NPGA’s and
Mississippi Tank Company’s assertions
of the urgent need for propane as a fuel
for heating homes and agricultural
facilities, as well as the potentially
serious adverse financial impacts on
propane marketers, propane producers,
common carriers, vehicle assemblers
and equipment manufacturers. As RSPA
noted in the IFR, “After evaluating the
situation and the NPGA and Mississippi
Tank Company emergency exemption
applications, RSPA finds that this
situation constitutes an emergency with
broad applicability to many persons and
far reaching safety and economic
impacts.” (62 FR at 7644). Indeed,
NPCA stated that the operation of the
affected cargo tank motor vehicles has
impacts “almost incalculable from an
economic standpoint,” and that an
interruption of service by the industry
would pose safety risks to the large
number of people in rural areas who
depend on propane as fuel for heating
and cooking. The finding by RSPA that
an economic and safety emergency
exists led the agency to issue the IFR in
order to provide industry with an
immediate means of compliance with
the HMR, thereby avoiding an
interruption of service and the resulting
economic and safety impacts described
by the petitioners.
Because RSPA did not issue an NPRM
in this rulemaking. it was not required
under the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 5
U.S.C. 601-612. to do a full regulatory
flexibility analysis regarding the impact
of the IFR on small entities.
As RSPA stated in the IFR:
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (Act), as
amended, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, directs agencies
to consider the potential impact of
regulations on small business and other small
entities. The Act, however, applies only to
rules for which an agency is required to
publish a notice of proposed rulemaking
pursuant to S 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553. See 5
U.S.C. 603(a) and 604(a). Because of the
emergency nature of this rule, RSPA is
authorized under §553(b)(B) and § 553 (d)(3)
of the APA to forego notice and comment and
to issue this rule as an interim final rule with
an immediate effective date. Consequently,
RSPA is not required under the Act to do a
regulatory flexibility analysis in this
rulemaking.
Specifically, S 553(b)(B) and S 553(d)(3) of
the APA authorize agencies to dispense with
certain procedures for rules, including notice
and comment, when they find “good cause”
to do so. “Good cause” includes a finding
that following notice-and-comment
procedures would be “impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.” Section 553(d) (3) allows an agency,
upon a finding of good cause, to make a rule
effective immediately. “Good cause” has
been held to include situations where
immediate action is necessary to reduce or
avoid health hazards or other imminent harm
to persons or property, or where inaction
would lead to serious dislocation in
government programs or the marketplace.
Nevertheless, RSPA is concerned with theeffect this rule may have on small business.
Consequently, in preparing a preliminary
regulatory evaluation under Executive Order
12866, RSPA has analyzed, based on
information currently available to the agency,
the impact of this rule on all affected parties,
including small businesses. The preliminary
regulatory evaluation is available for review
in the public docket (62 FR 7646).
In the IFR. RSPA also asked a series
of questions intended to elicit
economic, safety and technical data for
use in the preparation of a final
regulatory evaluation. A discussion of
the economic impacts of this rule
appears below and in the final
regulatory evaluation that is available in
the public docket.
11. Issues and Comments
RSPA received over 90 comments on
the provisions specified in the IFR.
These comments were from Members of
Congress, trade associations, marketers,
carriers, and State and local agencies.
All comments, including late
submissions and comments made at the
meetings and workshops, were
considered by RSPA to the extent
practicable. Most commenters stated
that they could comply with the
provisions of the IFR, except for those
provisions requiring the person
attending the unloading to have an
unobstructed view of the discharge
system, and be within arm’s reach of a
means for closure of the internal self-
closing stop valve or other device that
will immediately stop the discharge of
product from the cargo tank. (See
5 171,5(a)(l)(iii)). While the affected
industries expressed their interest in
working with RSPA to develop systems
and procedures that assure safe
unloading of hazardous materials from
the MC 330 and MC 331 cargo tank
motor vehicles in every circumstance,
the propane industry adamantly
opposes these particular elements of the
IFR which it characterizes as being
neither practicable, reasonable, nor in
the public interest. Specifically, the
NPGA estimated annual costs of $660
million to its member companies in
order to comply with the attendance
requirement in the IFR. This cost

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Federal Register I Vol. 62, No. 159 I Monday, August 18, 1997 I Rules and Regulations ~~ ~ ~ ~ __--_____
estimate is attributed largely to the
NPGA’s understanding that a literal
interpretation of the rule effectively
requires at least two, and possibly three,
operators for each unloading operation.
NPGA explained that, in addition to the
current operator who attends to the
delivery of propane at the receiving
tank, a second operator would be
required to be under the truck to
observe the piping and a third operator
would be required at the remote control
on the internal valve in order to have all
the discharge system in view during the
transfer operation. If a third operator
were actually required, as hypothesized,
the NPGA contends the cost of
compliance would double to $1.32
billion.
The $660 million estimate of annual
costs calculated by NPGA results from
a misreading of the rule. In the preamble
to the IFR, RSPA set forth several
options for complying with “the
unobstructed view“ and “arm’s reach”
requirements. In that discussion, RSPA
stated “(u)ntil an automatic flow control
system is developed, this may require
two operator attenGnts on a cargo tank
motor vehicle or the use of a lanyard,
electro-mechanical. or other device or
system to remotely stop the flow of
product.” (62 FR at 7643).
The cost of various alternatives was
analyzed by RSPA in the preliminary
regulatory evaluation prepared in
support of the IFR. Where two operators
would be required, RSPA estimated
additional annual costs in the amount of
$237 million. RSPA recognized the cost
estimate as being so great as to
effectively eliminate the two-person
method of compliance from
consideration as a feasible alternative.
RSPA subsequently assessed the
NPGA’s suggested use of a lanyard and
that resulted in the significantly lower
estimate of costs of compliance of $12.5
million. Therefore, the lanyard system
and equally efficient means of achieving
compliance with the IFR were
determined by RSPA to be among the
common-sense approaches that could be
taken by industry to permit its
continued operation of the non-
conformin cargo tank motor vehicles.
The NP8A then contrasted its
extremely high estimate of costs to
comply with the arm’s reach and
unobstructed view provisions of the IFR
with the comparatively low estimate of
$322.192 to $1.5 million in annual
benefits to society calculated by RSPA
in the preliminary regulatory
evaluation. RSPA calculated those
benefits on the basis of sixteen actual
incidents contained in the Hazardous
Materials Information Reporting System
database that occurred between 1990-
1996. The approach taken by RSPA was
an attempt to determine the average cost
of each gallon of propane
unintentionally released to the
environment so it might be used to
compare the estimated cost-per-gallon
price increase attributed to the IFR that
likely would be passed on to the
ultimate consumer of propane. The
costs to society of each gallon of
propane spilled was estimated in a
range of $115.98 to $547.41, or $0.00164
per gallon of propane unloaded from
cargo tank motor vehicles. When RSPA
compared these costs to the calculated
additional costs of compliance, the
decision to apply temporary operational
controls contained in the IFR was fully
justified and quite reasonable. When
RSPA considered further the potential
threats to life and property posed by
plausible accident scenarios, such as the
possible consequences that may have
occurred in Sanford, NC, had the spilled
propane ignited, the reasonableness of
the temporary rules became even more
apparent.
Numerous comments submitted by
small propane dealers serving
agricultural interests in the midwestern
United States cited an estimate of
approximately $2.500 per vehicle to
replace non-performing (defective)
emergency discharge control systems
with a fully operational passive shut-off
system. They claimed this cost is
excessive and unnecessary, especially
considering that none of those
commenters had ever experienced a
failure of the emergency discharge
control system to function properly.
Related comments suggested that these
small businesses accepted in good faith
claims made by equipment
manufacturers that their cargo tank
motor vehicles met all technical
requirements of the HMR. Furthermore,
those commenters claimed they should
not be penalized for equipment
deficiencies that they could not
reasonably be expected to identify
through an independent evaluation.
Some conclude by suggesting that RSPA
should require persons that completed
the certificate of compliance for each
cargo tank motor vehicle to bear the cost
of a retrofit, following the example of
the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration in ordering automobile
manufacturers to correct identified
safety defects.
RSPA does not agree with the
commenters’ reasoning that, because it
was only recently determined that most
of the affected cargo tank motor vehicles
do not conform to a long-standing safety
requirement, the agency should accept
the status quo as the officiJly
recognized standard for safety. As
44043
~ _ _ _ _ _ ~~ ~
indicated earlier in this preamble. the
need for and value of fully operational
emergency discharge controls is
undisputed. Actual threats to life and
property posed during the unloading of
liquefied compressed gases demand that
RSPA require compliance with a
performance standard that appears to be
reasonably achievable through
technological innovations that are now
undergoing field tests.
A. Barriers to Compliance
A number of motor carriers noted
practical barriers to their full
compliance with requirements in the
interim final rule. One problem
concerns the regulatory requirement
that the operator be within arm’s reach
of a means for closure of the internal
self-closing stop valve while operational
necessity sometimes calls for the
operator to enter the vehicle’s cab in
order to engage the power take-off for
the pump. For large capacity trailers,
(e.g., those with a nominal capacity of
10,500 gallons), those controls are
normally accessible only from the
vehicle operator’s position in the truck
tractor. A few operators reported that
while most bobtail trucks have the
controls mounted on the rear deck of the
vehicle, unloading controls for some
bobtail trucks also are located in the
vehicle cab. Thus, these operators
claimed the need for two operators.
With respect to retail deliveries of
propane to residential and industrial
customers. numerous commenters noted
that the operator is most frequently
located at the delivery end of the hose
which may be 100 feet, or farther, from
the vehicle. Additionally, these
commenters noted that it is not unusual
for the receiving tank to be located in a
position that prohibits the operator from
having an unobstructed view of the
cargo tank motor vehicle, as required by
S 177.834(i)(3). The commenters state
that, in their opinion, because
S 177.834(i)(5) specifies that the delivery
hose when attached to the cargo tank is
considered part of the vehicle, the
operator in these circumstances is in
compliance with S 177.834(i)(3). Also,
where the receiving tank and the cargo
tank motor vehicle are in positions
which do not allow for a direct line of
sight, these carriers believe that
compliance is possible by having the
operator assume a position within 25
feet of the hose at the corner of the
house, or other structure, from which
point both cargo tank and receiving tank
may be observed. The impediment to
compliance in these cases is that, for
relatively short periods when the
operator is connecting/disconnecting
the hose to the receiving tank, it IS

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44044 Federal Register I Vol. 62, No. 159 I Monday, August 18, 1997 I Rules and Regulations
~ - -- ~- __-_ ~-
impossible to observe the cargo tank. To
that makes compliance by a single
Peculiarities in the siting of receiving
avoid the high costs of compliance
operator difficult or impossible.
tanks, accessibility of a cargo tank motor
associated with hiring and training a
In order to assure that temporary
vehicle to the vicinity of the receiving
second operator to assist in these
operational safety controls specified in
tank, permanent structures, including
frequently occurring situations, the
5 171.5 may be reasonably complied
high fences, walls, and the like, create
commenters petitioned for relief from
with by the operating motor carriers,
scenarios that need to be addressed
the requirements of S 171.5(a)(l)(iii) by
RSPA is revising the rule by providing
separately.
requesting the following amendment:
that the person in attendance of the
When a bobtail truck is used solely to
cargo tank may be away from the
service receiving tanks that are located
In addition to the attendance requirements
mechanical means for closure of the
in S 177.834(i) of this subchapter, the person
within 25 feet of the cargo tank and the
who attends the unloading of a cargo tank
,
internal self-closing stop valve for the
operator has a direct line of sight. RSPA
vehicle must, except as necessary to facilitate
short period necessary to engage or
is confident that compliance with the
the unloading of product or to enable that
disengage the motor vehicle power take-
temporary rule may be accomplished by
person to monitor the receiving tank, remain
off or other mechanical, electrical, or
one operator and without incurring
within arm's reach of a remote means of
hydraulic means used to energize the
additional costs for the application of a
automatic closure (emergency shut-down
pump and other components of the
lanyard, electro-mechanical. or other
device) of the internal self-closing stop valve.
discharge system. RSPA believes this
device or system to remotely stop the
See Ferrellgas et al. Petition for
provision allows for a single operator to
flow of product.
Reconsideration of Interim Final Rule
perform necessary unloading functions,
Another scenario common to bobtail(Appendix B).
while also reducing potential threats to
operations involves the delivery of
safety by requiring the operator to
propane to a receiving tank which
RSPA rejects the industry's
quickly assume a position within arm's
provides for an unobstructed view of the
interpretation of the long-standing
reach of the emergency discharge
cargo tank, but is at a distance greater
operator attendance rules in
control mechanism. With this revision,
than 25 feet from the cargo tank. In this
177.834(i)(3) that a single operator
RSPA is satisfied that compliance with
situation, a single operator conceivably
satisfies requirements for an
the temporary rule may be
could comply with the temporary
unobstructed view of the cargo tank,
accomplished by one operator and
operational controls in the same manner
and is within 25 feet of the cargo tank.
without requiring the additional use of
as discussed above for transports.
merely by being in proximity to, and
a lanyard, electro-mechanical, or other
However, the need to closely observe
having an unobstructed view of. any
device or system to remotely stop the
the receiving tank takes the operator
part of the delivery hose, which may be
flow of product. Thus, under this final
more than 25 feet from the cargo tank
100 feet or more away from the cargo
rule, operators of transports may avoid
motor vehicle and effectively mandates
tank motor vehicle, during the
the costs associated with equipping the
installation of a remote control system
unloading (transfer) operation. The rule
cargo tanks with devices or systems that
or other system that allows the operator
clearly requires an operator be in a
provide an alternative means of
to promptly activate the emergency
position from which the earliest signs of
compliance with the HMR. This
discharge controls. Installation of a
problems that may occur during the
provision is responsive to concerns
remote control system allows the motor
unloading operation are readily
raised by petitioners representing the
carrier to avoid high labor costs
detectable, thereby permitting an
propane industry. See Appendices A
identified by the industry that would
operator to promptly take corrective
and B.
otherwise be incurred when a second
measures, including moving the cargo
operator is employed to achieve
tank, actuating the remote means of
C. Bobtails (Local Delivery Trucks)
compliance with these temporary
automatic closure of the internal self-
Issues raised by commenters
regulations. Data provided by the
closing stop valve, or other action, as
concerning general applicability of
industry concerning radio-controlled
appropriate. RSPA contends the rule
requirements in S 177.834(i) pertaining
systems that are capable of stopping the
requires that an operator always be
to operator attendance during the
engine and, in turn, shutting-down the
within 25 feet of the cargo tank. Simply
unloading of cargo tank motor vehicles
operation of the pump, thereby allowing
being within 25 feet of any one of the
relate to a larger number of motor
the internal self-closing stop valve to
cargo tank motor vehicle's
carriers and specification cargo tanks
revert to its fail-safe position, indicate
appurtenances or auxiliary equipment
than those addressed in this final rule.
that most bobtail cargo tanks could be
does not constitute compliance.
Therefore, the attendance issue is
so equipped at a unit cost of
B. Transports
addressed only to the extent it bears on
ap roximately $250 to $500.
temporary operational controls set-out
&ill another frequently reported
Compliance with the long-standing
in this rule. In an ANPRM published i s
unloading scenario involves situations
attendance requirements is rather easily
today's Federal Register RSPA
where the receiving tank is more than
achieved by a single operator in most
addresses those broader issues with
25 feet from the cargo tank motor
instances involving the unloading of
respect to liquefied compressed gases
vehicle and the operator's view is
"transports" at bulk plants, similarly
transported in specification MC 330, MC
obstructed by a structure, a natural
configured industrial facilities,
331 and certain non-specification cargo
formation, foliage, or some other barrier.
neighborhood gasoline service stations,
tank motor vehicles. That rulemaking
RSPA understands further that many
and other delivery sites which generally
proposal specifically solicits
residential deliveries of propane fall
provide for use of transfer hoses that do
participation by emergency responders
into this unloading scenario. This
not exceed 20 feet in length. It is the
and other affected persons whose
situation is of greatest concern to RSPA
provision in the IFR, requiring the
concerns were not made known during
because the possibility exists that a
operator to be within arm's reach of a
the course of this rulemaking action.
failure of a discharge valve, pump seal,
means for closure of the internal self-
RSPA is revising the IFR attendance
hose reel swivel joint, or hose during
closing stop valve or other device that
requirements to address economic
unloading (transfer) may not be
will immediately stop the discharge of
concerns raised by petitioners on behalf
immediately detected. Should that
product from the cargo tank at all times,
of operators of bobtail trucks.
occur, a dangerous quantity of propane

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Federal Register I Vol. 62, No. 159 I Monday, August 18, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 44045
~ - ____ _ _
could be released to the environment,
ammonia service, including the
E. Decisions on Petitions for
possibly ignite, and result in serious
emergency-shut-off valve, are sufficient
Reconsideration
injuries, extensive property damage, or
to provide an equivalent level of safety
Based on the above information and
both.
to a fully passive excess flow valve, and
discussions, NPGA’s March 2 1, 1997
In the unloading scenario described
may be one possible long-term solution
petition for reconsideration of the
above, when a single operator attends to
to the problem at hand. NPGA supports
“arm‘s reach” requirement contained in
the unloading operation, that person is
TFI’s position and believes that
the February 19. 1997 IFR is denied.
required by this final rule to take
enhanced hose testing, training and
Based on the same information and
additional safety precautions. Before
inspection procedures would provide an
discussions. the March 2 1, 1997 petition
commencing the transfer of product,
equivalent level of safety inasmuch as
for reconsideration of the IFR filed by
@e., opening the internal valve). the
the majority of product discharges are
Ferrellgas. er a1 (joint petitioners) is
operator must assume a position near
the result of hose ruptures rather than
granted in part and denied in part.
the cargo tank motor vehicle that is
complete separations which excess flow
Specifically, as requested by the joint
within arm’s reach of the emergency
valves are intended to address.
petitioners, this final rule authorizes the
discharge controls. Alternatively, if the
person attending the unloading of a
operator has a remote control system, or
The HMR address two unintentional
cargo tank motor vehicle to step away
other device, that has a capability to
release scenarios, specifically: (1) Total
from the mechanical means of closure of
immediately close the internal valve,
hose or piping rupture or separation;
the internal self-closing stop valve for
the operator must assume a position that
and (2) partial hose or piping rupture,
the short duration necessary to engage
assures an unobstructed view of the
separation, or leak. Commenters
or disengage the motor vehicle power
cargo tank. In either event, a transfer of
correctly note that the passive
take-off or other mechanical, electrical,
product may be affected only at such
emergency discharge control
or hydraulic means used to energize the
times as the operator has an
requirement in
1 78.337- 1 1 (a) (1) (i) is
pump and other components of the
unobstructed view of the cargo tank.
meant to protect against the
discharge system on the cargo tank. It
RSPA believes this final rule clearly
unintentional discharge of liquefied
does not, however, authorize that
provides motor carriers with the ability
compressed gases where there is a total
person to step away from the means of
for a single operator to safely unload
hose or piping rupture or separation.
immediate closure of the internal self-
liquefied compressed gases transported
Such events have potentially large
closing stop valve for any other reason.
in specification MC 330 and MC 33 1
consequences and high probability of
cargo tank motor vehicles in most
111. Provisions of the Final Rule
circumstances and at a minimal cost for
incapacitating the operator to the extent
installation, maintenance, and training
that person cannot perform emergency
A. Section 171.5
in the use of remote control systems, or
procedures. For partial hose or piping
Paragraph 17 1.5 (a) (1) sets forth use
other devices, that permit the operator
rupture, separation, or leak, operator-
provisions under which MC 330, MC
to promptly stop the flow of product in
dependent countermeasures are the
331 and non-specification cargo tank
the event of an unintentional release to
primary safety measure. The operator-
motor vehicles authorized under
the environment. The temporary rules
attendance requirements for unloading
173.315(k) may be operated and
permit motor carriers to continue until
operations in 177.834(i)(2) ensure that
unloaded. Also, this paragraph makes
March 1. 1999, their use of cargo tank
the person attending an unloading
clear that
171.5 does not apply to
motor vehicles that do not conform to
operation is alert, can see the cargo tank
cargo tank motor vehicles used to
S 178.337-1 1 for the transportation of
during the unloading operation and is
transport carbon dioxide.
hazardous materials that are essential to
close enough to the cargo tank to reach
Paragraph 171.5(a)(l)(i) requires that,home, agriculture, and industry.
the emergency shut-off system in the
before each transfer of product is
Prior to March 1, 1999, RSPA
event of an emergency. The training
initiated from a cargo tank motor
anticipates the industry will have
requirements in 5 172.700 are intended
vehicle, the person performing the
perfected passive shut-off systems that
to ensure that the person attending the
unloading function should verify that
allow motor carriers to bring their cargo
unloading operation is aware of safety
each component of the discharge system
tank motor vehicles into compliance
procedures and is familiar with the
is of sound quality, is free of leaks, and
with requirements of S 178.337-1 1.
HMR in general and the requirements
that all connections are secure. Also, the
D. Need for Passive System
that apply specifically to the functions
transfer hose must be subjected to full
Requirements
the employee performs. Where a partial
transfer pressure prior to the first
hose or piping rupture, separation, or
unloading of product each day.
Several commenters question whether
leak occurs, only the operator-
Paragraph 17 1.5 (a) (1) (ii) requires that,
the emergency discharge requirement in
dependent countermeasures come into
before the transfer of product is initiated
5 178.337- 1 1 is necessary. IC1
from a cargo tank motor vehicle using a
Technology and Barrett Transportation
Play.
new or repaired transfer hose, or a
Compliance state that RSPA is placing
With issuance of this final rule and
modified hose assembly for the first
too much emphasis on a passive
the ANPRM, RSPA is reviewing and
time, the hose assembly must be
automatic shut-down device. They
addressing existing HMR requirements,
subjected to a specified pressure test.
believe that knowing the cause of
including the passive system
This paragraph also provides that a hose
accidents and focusing on prevention is
requirement in S 178.337-1 1. RSPA also
or associated equipment that shows
better than trying to mitigate the
is considering the need for a hose
signs of leakage, significant bulging or
incident once it occurs.
management program and other
other defects may not be used. Where
TFI believes that a hose management
measures that address the problem of
hoses are used to transfer liquefied
program, along with industry awareness
hose ruptures. RSPA will review these
compressed gases, a procedure must be
training programs, possible
requirements from a codbenefit
instituted to ensure that hose assemblies
requirements for brake interlock
perspective, especially in light of new
are maintained at a level of integrity
systems, and improvements to the
technologies that are available now or
suited to each hazardous material. An
delivery system of cargo tanks in
will shortly be available.
acceptable procedure for maintenance,

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44046 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 159 / Monday, August 18, 1997 / Rules and Regulations
testing and inspection of hoses is
outlined in publication RMA/IP-11-2.
“Manual for Maintenance, Testing and
Inspection of Hose”, 1989 edition,
published by the Rubber Manufacturers
Association.
Paragraph 171.5(a)(l) (iii) requires
that, in the event of an unintentional
release of lading to the environment
during transfer, the person attending the
unloading operation must promptly
activate the internal self-closing stop
valve and shut down all motive and
auxiliary power equipment. This
paragraph clarifies that prompt
activation can be accomplished in at
least three ways, specifically: (1)
Through compliance with the
requirements in S 178.337-1 l(a)(l)(i);
(2) through the use of a qualified person
positioned within arm’s reach of the
mechanical means of closure throughout
the unloading operation, except during
the short period of time necessary to
engage or disengage the motor vehicle
power take-off or other mechanical,
electrical, or hydraulic means used to
energize the pump and other
components of a cargo tank‘s discharge
system: or (3) through the use of a fully
operational radio-controlled system that
is capable of stopping the transfer of
lading by use of a transmitter carried by
a qualified person unloading the cargo
tank.
This paragraph also provides that
where a radio-controlled system is used
as a means of promptly activating the
internal self-closing stop valve, the
attendance requirements of
5 177.834(i)(3) are satisfied when the
qualified person unloading the cargo
tank: (1) Carries a radio transmitter that
will activate the closure of the internal
self-closing stop valve; (2) remains
within the operating range of the
transmitter: and (3) has an unobstructed
view of the cargo tank motor vehicle at
all times when its internal stop-valve is
open. Paragraph 171,5(a)(l)(iv) states that
cargo tank motor vehicles that meet the
emergency discharge system
requirements in S 178.337-1 1 (a)(l)(i)
may be operated under the provisions of
§ 171,5(a)(l). Paragraph 17 1.5 (a) (1) (v) requires that
a comprehensive written emergency
operating procedure be developed by
persons conducting transfer operations,
that the written procedures be
prominently displayed on or in each
affected cargo tank motor vehicle, and
that hazmat employees who perform
unloading functions be trained in those
procedures. Paragraph 17 1.5(a) (1) (vi) requires that
cargo tank manufacturers, assemblers,
retesters, motor carriers, and other
-~~~ ~
hazmat employers subject to § 171.5
train their employees to perform the
new function-specific requirements in
171.5 and maintain records of this
training as required under S 172.704 (d).
As a general provision, this requirement
already exists. Section 172.702 of the
HMR requires that a hazmat employer
ensure that each of its hazmat
employees is trained in accordance with
Subpart H of Part 172. The training
requirements apply to persons who
manufacture, maintain, and test cargo
tanks, and to persons who operate cargo
tanks. Testing, and a “certification that
the hazmat employee has been trained
and tested.” is required by the
regulation and Federal hazmat law.
RSPA views emergency discharge
controls and their operation to be
essential to cargo tank safety and to be
a significant element in the training
program of any involved hazmat
employer. Also, there are the driver
training requirements in S 177.816 that
include special requirements for
operators of cargo tanks with a specific
reference to training on the operation of
emergency control features.
Paragraph 171.5(a)(2). regarding the
continuing qualification of a cargo tank
motor vehicle, allows existing in-service
cargo tank motor vehicles that do not
meet the requirements of S 178.337-
1 1 (a) (1) (i) to continue in operation if the
Certificate of Compliance and
inspection report required under
180.417(b) contain the following
statement: “Emergency excess flow
control performance not established for
this unit.” ’
Paragraph 171.5(a)(3), regarding new
cargo tank motor vehicles
manufactured, marked and certified
prior to March 1, 1999, states that those
vehicles may be marked and certified as
conforming to specification MC 331 if
they meet all of the specification
requirements, with the exception of the
emergency excess flow control function,
and the following statement appears on
the certification document, “Emergency
excess flow control performance not
established for this unit.“
Paragraph 171.5(b) specifies the
marking that must be displayed on -
cargo tank used or represented for use
under 5 171.5.
Paragraph 17 1.5 (c) states that
requirements specified in
17 1.5 are
applicable from August 16, 1997,
through March 1, 1999.
B. Immediate Compliance
This final rule is an alternative to
existing requirements. Industry may
choose to comply with the requirements
in 5 178.337-11, tracing back to 1941, or
with provisions in S 171.5. However,
because segments of industry are in
non-compliance with requirements in
178.337.1 1 (a) (1) (v) and the attendance
requirements in § 177.834 (i) (3), a
serious threat to the public safety
continues to exist and must be
addressed without delay. Furthermore,
continued non-compliance with the
above-stated requirements poses a
serious economic threat to industry in
that MC 330 and MC 331 cargo tank
motor vehicles that do not conform to
the HMR may not be used to transport
hazardous materials. As stated by NPCA
in its application for exemption, the
impacts of continued operation of these
vehicles are “so many” and “so
pervasive as to be almost incalculable
from an economic impact viewpoint.”
Based on the above, and the fact that the
final rule requirements are refinements
of the IFR requirements that have been
in effect since February 19, 1997, good
cause exists for making this rule
immediately effective upon expiration
of the IFR.
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notice
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This final rule is considered a
significant regulatory action under
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866
and was reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget. The rule is
considered significant under the
Regulatory Policies and Procedures of
the Department of Transportation (44 FR
11034). The preliminary regulatory evaluation
prepared in support of the interim final
rule published on February 19, 1997,
was reexamined and modified to
remove certain incidents that were not
appropriate to issues considered in this
rulemaking, and to consider economic
cost data submitted to the docket by
commenters. The final regulatory
evaluation is available for review in the
public docket.
Most of the compliance cost burden of
this rule is expected to fall on propane
dealers, and RSPA expects these costs to
be passed on to cugtomers. A total one-
time expenditure of $4.7 million to $9.2
million is estimated as being required of
these dealers. This expenditure is very
small in relation to the revenue from
sales of liquefied petroleum gas by
dealers to final users, without even
counting those sales that may be made
directly to industrial, agricultural or
commercial customers by merchant
wholesalers or gas producers. The latest
available (1 992) Census of Retail Trade
showed annual sales of liquefied
petroleum gas by retail dealers alone to
amount to $4.87 billion. The $4.7

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Federal Register / Vol. 62. NO. 159 / Monday, August 18. 1997 / Rules and Regulations 44047
- ~ ~-~ ~ -~
~ ~~
~~~ ~~
million to $9.2 million estimated above
is relatively small when compared only
to the margin between operating
expenses and revenues net of the cost of
such purchases and appears to add
relatively little to a year’s worth of
outlays made by these dealers for capital
equipment.
The US. Bureau of the Census has
provided RSPA with 1992 sample-
survey-based estimates of these
quantities that are normally not
published in such industry-specific
detail since they have been subjected to
only limited review. They were only
available combined with those for fewer
than 300 miscellaneous types of fuel
dealers that could not be classified as
“fuel oil” vendors, but this minor
category accounted for only 1.3% of
combined sales according to the 1992
Census ofRetail Trade. 98.7% of the^
estimated operating margin and of the
estimated annual capital expenditure
(other than for land) amounted to $499
million and $191 million, respectively,
for retail liquefied petroleum gas
dealers.
Another way of putting these
estimated compliance costs in
perspective is to express their major
component, the equipping of bobtails
with radio frequency devices, as an
average expenditure per retail liquefied
petroleum gas business location. Using
the 5393 such locations in existence
during an entire year that were shown
in the 1992 Census of Retail Trade.
yields an average of under $800 per
location.
These essentially one-time-only costs
of $4.7 million to $9.2 million (or
annualized costs of $3.13 million to
$6.14 million, when amortized over the
18 months this temporary regulation
will be in effect) compare favorably with
estimated annual benefits to society, in
terms of reduced injuries, evacuations.
and property damages, ranging from a
low of $322,071 to a high of $3 million.
The low end of this range is based upon
data contained in fourteen unloading
incidents reported to RSPA during the
past seven years. The high end of the
range considers those same incidents
but then adjusts for a ten-fold estimate
of under reporting of economic losses
and a two-fold estimate of under
reporting of the actual number of
incidents, based upon the Office of
Technology Assessment report
“Transportation of Hazardous
Materials” (July 1986). In event the
requirements specified in this revised
final rule were to prevent a major
release of propane potentially
threatening the life of four or more
persons, the rule would yield a net
benefit to society.
B. Executive Order 12612
This final rule has been analyzed in
accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order
126 12 (“Federalism”). The Federal
hazardous materials transportation law.
49 U.S.C. 5101-5127, contains an
express preemption provision (49 U.S.C.
5125(b)) that preempts State, local, and
Indian tribe requirements on certain
covered subjects. Covered subjects are:
(1) The designation, description, and
classification of hazardous materials;
(2) The packing, repacking, handling,
labeling, marking, and placarding of
hazardous materials:
(3) The preparation, execution, and
use of shipping documents related to
hazardous materials and requirements
related to the number, contents, and
placement of those documents:
(4) The written notification,
recording, and reporting of the
unintentional release in transportation
of hazardous material; or
(5) The design, manufacture,
fabrication, marking, maintenance,
recondition, repair, or testing of a
packaging or container represented,
marked, certified, or sold as qualified
for use in transporting hazardous
material.
This interim final rule addresses
covered subject item (5) above and
preempts State, local, and Indian tribe
requirefnents not meeting the
“substantively the same” standard.
Federal hazardous materials
transportation law provides at
§5125(b)(2) that, if DOT issues a
regulation concerning any of the
covered subjects, DOT must determine
and publish in the Federal Register the
effective date of Federal preemption.
The effective date may not be earlier
than the 90th day following the date of
issuance of the final rule and not later
than two years after the date of issuance.
RSPA has determined that the effective
date of Federal preemption for these
requirements will be November 17,
1997. Thus, RSPA lacks discretion in
this area, and preparation of a
federalism assessment is not warranted.
is authorized under sections 553(b) (B)
and 553(d) (3) of the APA to forego
notice and comment and to issue this
final rule with an immediate effective
date. Consequently, RSPA is not
required under the Act to do a
regulatory flexibility analysis in this
rulemaking.
Specifically, under sections 553(b) (B)
and 553(d) (3), APA authorizes agencies
to dispense with certain procedures for
rules, including notice and comment,
when they find “good cause” to do so.
“Good cause” includes a finding that
following notice-and-comment
procedures would be “impracticable.
unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.” Section 553(d) (3) allows an
agency, upon a finding of good cause, to
make a rule effective immediately.
“Good cause” has been held to include
situations where immediate action is
necessary to reduce or avoid health
hazards or other imminent harm to
persons or property, or where inaction
would lead to serious dislocation in
government programs or the
marketplace.
Nevertheless, RSPA is concerned withthe effect this rule may have on small
business. Consequently, in preparing a
regulatory evaluation under Executive
Order 12866, RSPA analyzed, based on
information currently available to the
agency, the impact of this rule on all
affected parties, including small
businesses. The regulatory evaluation is
available for review in the public
docket.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act is
concerned with identifying the
economic impact of regulatory actions
on small businesses and other small
entities. It requires a final rule to be
accompanied by a final regulatory
flexibility analysis, consisting of a
statement of the need for the rule, a
summary of public comments received
on regulatory flexibility issues and
agency responses to them, a description
of alternatives to the rule consistent
with the regulatory statutes but
imposing less economic burden on
small entities, and a statement of why
such alternatives were not chosen.
Unless alternative definitions have been
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (Act),
as amended, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, directs
agencies to consider the potential
impact of regulations on small business
and other small entities. The Act,
however, applies only to rules for which
an agency is required to publish a notice
of proposed rulemaking pursuant to
section 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. 553. See
5 U.S.C. 603(a) and 604(a). Because of
the emergency nature of this rule, RSPA
established by the agency in
consultation with the Small Business
Administration, the definition of “small
business” has the same meaning as
under the Small Business Act. Because
no special definition has been
established, RSPA employs the
thresholds published (in 13 CFR
12 1.20 1) of 100 employees for wholesale
trade in general and $5,000.000 annual
sales for retail trade in general. As noted
above, liquefied petroleum gas dealers
constitute the principal type of business

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44048 Federal Register I Vol. 62, No. 159 I Monday, August 18, 1997 I Rules and Regulations
~ _ - - _-- _. -
on which significant compliance costs
for extensive custom development work
F. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
will be imposed by this rule, in
that only a large firm could afford.
A regulation identifier number (RIN)
particular for equipment on retail-type
While the only other compliance
is assigned to each regulatory action
delivery vehicles. Using the Small
expenditure that is believed to be
listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal
Business Administration definitions and
significant in the aggregate. that for
Regulations. The Regulatory Information
the latest (1992) available Census of
documentation of emergency
Service Center publishes the Unified
Retail Trade, it appears that over 95%
procedures, has been projected here on
Agenda in April and October of each
of retail liquefied petroleum gas dealers
a per-firm rather than a per-vehicle or
year. The RIN number contained in the
must be considered small businesses for
per-location basis, the average of $62
heading of this document can be used
purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility
estimated for each preparation does not
to cross-reference this action with the
Act. They accounted in the 1992 Census
appear high enough to significantly
Unified Agenda.
for over 50% of business locations and
affect the economics of small-scale as
almost 43% of annual sales.
contrasted with large-scale distribution
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 171
Unpublished 1992 Census of Wholesale
of the affected commodities.
Exports, Hazardous materials
Trade figures provided to RSPA by the
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
transportation, Hazardous waste,
U.S. Bureau of the Census indicate that
Imports, Reporting and recordkeeping
over 95% of merchant wholesalers of
liquefied petroleum gas also must be
considered small businesses; they
accounted for approximately 40% of
business locations and over 50% of
annual sales.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act
suggests that it may be possible to
establish exceptions and differing
compliance standards for small business
and still meet the objectives of the
applicable regulatory statutes. However,
given the importance of small business
in liquefied petroleum gas distribution,
especially in its retail sector where
improved emergency shut-off
equipment is necessary to assure
adequate safety during delivery
operations, RSPA believes that it would
not be possible to establish differing
standards and still accomplish the
objectives of Federal hazardous
materials transportation law (49 U.S.C.
5 101 et seq.). RSPA further believes that
the discussion in the regulatory
evaluation and in the February 19. 1997
Federal Register publication of the
interim final rule, as to the need for
regulatory action, issues raised by the
public and the consideration of
alternatives open to the government,
apply to small as well as large
businesses in the affected industries.
While certain regulatory actions may
affect the competitive situation of an
industry by imposing relatively greater
burdens on small-scale than on large-
scale enterprises, RSPA does not believe
that this will be the case with this rule.
The principal types of compliance
expenditure effectively required by the
rule, radio frequency emergency shut-off
system installation, is imposed on each
vehicle, whether operated within a large
or a small fleet. While there is
undoubtedly some administrative
efficiency advantage to a large firm in
being able to make a single set of
arrangements for such installations on a
large number of vehicles at a time,
imposition of the requirement
contemplates use of commercially-
available equipment, without any need
This rule does not impose unfunded
mandates under the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does
not result in costs of $100 million or
more to either State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate. or to the
private sector, and is the least
burdensome alternative that achieves
the objective of the rule.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The information collection and
recordkeeping requirements contained
in this final rule have been submitted
for renewal to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) under the provisions
of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
The requirement is currently approved
under OMB Control Number 2137-0595.
Section 1320.8(d), Title 5. Code of
Federal Regulations requires that RSPA
provide interested members of the
public and affected agencies an
opportunity to comment on information
collection and recordkeeping requests.
RSPA estimates that the total
information collection and
recordkeeping burden in this final rule
is 18,573 hours, at a cost of $422,660,
for the development and maintenance of
the comprehensive emergency operating
procedure. These figures are based in
RSPA's belief that standardized
emergency operating procedures can be
developed for use by a majority of
industry members, thus reducing
substantially the burden hours and cost
to individual industry members of
compliance with the emergency
operating procedures requirement.
Requests for a copy of this information
collection should be directed to Deborah
Boothe, Office of Hazardous Materials
Standards (DHM-10). Research and
Special Programs Administration, Room
8102,400 Seventh Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Telephone (202) 366-8553. Under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. no
person is required to respond to an
information collection unless it displays
a valid OMB control number.
requirements.
In consideration of the foregoing, 49
CFR part 17 1 is amended as follows:
PART 1714ENERAL INFORMATION,
REGULATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS
1. The authority citation for Part 171
is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127; 49 CFR
1.53.
follows:
2. Section 171.5 is added to read as
g 171.5 Temporav regulation; liquefied
compressed gases In cargo tank motor
vehicles.
(a) Operation of new and existing
cargo tank motor vehicles. For a cargo
tank motor vehicle used to transport
liquefied compressed gases, other than
carbon dioxide, S 178.337-11(a)(l)(i) of
this subchapter requires that each
internal self-closing stop valve and
excess flow valve must automatically
close if any of its attachments are
sheared off or if any attached hoses or
piping are ruptured or separated. Other
regulations in Parts 173 and 180 of this
subchapter reference this requirement or
similar requirements in effect at the
time of manufacture of a cargo tank
motor vehicle. Notwithstanding this
requirement, a DOT MC 330 or MC 331
specification cargo tank motor vehicle,
or a non-specification cargo tank motor
vehicle conforming to the requirements
of S 173.315(k) of this subchapter, may,
without certification and demonstrated
performance of the internal self-closing
stop valve or the excess flow feature or
self-closing stop valve of its emergency
discharge control system, be represented
for use and used to transport certain
liquefied compressed gases under the
following conditions:
(1) Use. The cargo tank motor vehiclemust otherwise be operated, unloaded
and attended in full conformance with
all applicable requirements of this
subchapter and the following additional
requirements:

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Federal Register I Vol. 62, No. 159 / Monday, August 18. 1997 / Rules and Regulations 44049
._ - ~ _ _ _ _ ~- ~~~
(i) Before initiating each transfer from
equipment. Prompt activation of the
its provisions. The emergency operating
the cargo tank motor vehicle, the person
internal self-closing stop valve may be
procedure must be prominently
performing the function shall verify that
accomplished through:
displayed in or on the cargo tank motor
each comDonent of the discharge system
(A) Compliance with 5 178.337-
vehicle.
is of souid quality, is free of leaks,-and
1 1 (a) (1) (i) bf this subchapter; or
(vi) As required by 5 172.704 of this
that connections are secure. In addition,
(B) A qualified person positioned
subchapter, each manufacturer,
prior to commencing the first transfer of
within arm’s reach of the mechanical
assembler, retester. motor carrier and
each day, the transfer hose shall be
means of closure for the internal self-
other hazmat employer subject to the
subjected to full transfer pressure.
closing stop valve throughout the
requirements of this section shall ensure
(ii) Prior to commencing transfer
unloading operation; except, that person
that its hazmat employees are trained to
using a new or repaired transfer hose or
may be away from the mechanical
properly perform these new function-
a modified hose assembly for the first
means only for the short duration
specific requirements including the
time, the hose assembly must be
necessary to engage or disengage the
meaning of the marking specified in
subjected to a pressure test. The
motor vehicle power take-off or other
paragraph (b) of this section. The
pressure test must be performed at no
mechanical, electrical, or hydraulic
hazmat employer shall ensure that a
less than 120 percent of the design
means used to energize the pump and
record of the training is created,
pressure or maximum allowable
other components of the cargo tank
certified, and maintained as specified in
working pressure (MAWP) marked on
motor vehicle’s discharge system; or
5 172.704(d) of this subchapter.
the cargo tank motor vehicle, or the
(C) A fully operational remote-
pressure the hose is expected to be
controlled system capable of stopping
(2) Continuing qualification. An
subjected to during product transfer,
the transfer of lading by operation of a
existing in-service cargo tank motor
whichever is greater. This test must
transmitter carried by a qualified person
vehicle may continue to be marked and
include all hose and hose fittings and
attending unloading of the cargo tank
documented as required by Part 180 of
equipment arranged in the configuration
motor vehicle. Where the means for
this subchapter if the following
to be employed during transfer
closure of the internal self-closing stop
statement is added to the Certificate of
operations. A hose or associated
valve includes a remote-controlled
Compliance by the owner or operating
equipment that shows signs of leakage,
system, the attendance requirements of
motor carrier: “Emergency excess flow
significant bulging, or other defects.
5 177.834(i)(3) of this subchapter are
control performance not established for
may not be used. Where hoses are used
satisfied when a qualified person:
this unit.”
to transfer liquefied compressed gases, a
(I) Is carrying a radio transmitter that
(3) New cargo tank motor vehicles. A
procedure must be instituted to ensure
can activate the closure of the internal
new (unused) cargo tank motor vehicle
that hose assemblies are maintained at
self-closing stop valve;
manufactured, marked and certified
a level of integrity suited to each
(z) Remains within the operating
prior to March 1, 1999, may be marked
hazardous material. An acceptable
range of the transmitter: and
and certified as conforming to
procedure for maintenance, testing and
(3 Has an unobstructed view of the
specification MC 331 if it otherwise
inspection of hoses is outlined in
cargo tank motor vehicle at all times
meets all requirements of the
publication FWA/IP-11-2. “Manual for
that the internal stop-valve is open.
specification and the following
Maintenance, Testing and Inspection of
(iv) A cargo tank motor vehicle that
statement is added to the certification
Hose”, 1989 edition, published by the
has an emergency discharge system
document required by 5 178.337- 18 of
Rubber Manufacturers Association, 1400
conforming to the requirements in
this subchapter: “Emergency excess
K Street, N.W.. Washington, DC 20005.
5 178.337-ll(a)(l)(i) of this subchapter
flow control performance not
(iii) If there is an unintentional release
may be operated under the provisions of
established for this unit.”
of lading to the environment during
this paragraph (a) (1).
transfer, the internal self-closing stop
(v) A comprehensive written
(b) Marking. The following marking
valve shall be promptly activated, and
emergency operating procedure must be
must be displayed on a cargo tank motor
the qualified person unloading the cargo
developed for all transfer operations and
vehicle used or represented for use
under this section:
tank motor vehicle shall promptly shut
hazmat employees who perform
down all motive and auxiliary power
unloading functions must be trained in
BILLING CODE 4910-604
BILLING CODE 4910-6O-C

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44050 Federal Register I Vol. 62, No. 159 I Monday, August 18, 1997 I Rules and Regulations
~ ~
_. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ - (1) The letters must be white and the
background black.
(2) The letters must be at least 1.5cm
in height.
(3) The marking must be 6cmxl5cm.
(c) Requirements of this section are
applicable to a cargo tank motor vehicle
used to transport liquefied compressed
gases, other than carbon dioxide, from
August 16, 1997 through March 1. 1999.
Issued in Washington, DC on August 13.
1997, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
part 1.
Kelley Coyner.
Acting Administrator, Research and Special
Programs Administration.
Appendices
Note: The following appendices will not
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Dr. Dharmendra K. Sharma.
Administrator, Research & Special Programs
Administration, US. Department of
Transportation. 400 7th Street, S. W.,
Washington. D. C. 20590-0001.
Re: Petition for Reconsideration of Interim
Final Rule, Pursuant to 49 CFR
106.35: and
Petition for Rulemaking Pursuant to 49 CFR
5 106.31
Dear Administrator Sharma: On behalf of
the National Propane Gas Association
("NPGA" or the "Petitioner") and its
members, we hereby petition the Research
and Special Programs Administration
("RSPA") of the U.S. Department of
Transportation ("DOT") for reconsideration
of a single requirement imposed in the
Emergency Interim Final Rule on Cargo Tank
Motor Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed Gas
Service ("Interim Final Rule"), Docket No.
RSPA-97-2133 (HM-225), which was
published on February 19, 1997 (62 FR 7638).
By this petition, NPGA and its members do
not seek or otherwise request reconsideration
~- ~
evidence and the other reasons set forth
herein, this Petition for Reconsideration of
the additional attendance requirement in the
Interim Final Rule warrants the removal of
that burdensome requirement by RSPA. 1
Especially because the requirement was
imposed without any opportunity for notice
and comment, we further request that the
effectiveness of the additional attendance
requirement be stayed pending consideration
of this petition.
As discussed further below, NPGA believes
the magnitude of the impact on the propane
gas industry justifies RSPA's acting on its
Petition for Reconsideration immediately
without delay, an opportunity for notice and
comment, or any other proceedings. Such
expedited treatment is expressly
contemplated in the procedural provisions of
5 106.35. Nonetheless, pursuant to the
provisions in 49 CFR S 106.31, we
additionally petition RSPA for rulemaking to
amend 49 CFR 5 171.5(a)(l)(iii) in the event
RSPA denies the NPGA's Petition for
Reconsideration of the Interim Final Rule.
Appendix A-National Propane Gas
Association Petition for Reconsideration of
Interim Final Rule
of the entire Interim Final Rule. Instead,
NPGA seeks reconsideration of the single
requirement addressed herein. At the same
time, we remain committed to work with
March 21, 1997
By First Class Mail
The Honorable Dharmendra K. Sharma.
Administrator, Research & Special Programs
Administration, U.S. Department of
. Transportation, 400 7th Street, S. W..
Washington, D. C. 20590-0001.
Re: Amendment to NPGA's Petition for
Reconsideration
Dear Administrator Sharma: On behalf of
the National Propane Gas Association
("NPGA" or the "Petitioner") and its
members, we hereby amend our Petition for
Reconsideration of the Emergency Interim
Final Rule on Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in
Liquefied Compressed Gas Service ("Interim
Final Rule"), Docket No. RSPA-97-2133
(HM-225), filed on March 21, 1997, to correct
a typographical error.
On the bottom of page eight (8) of our
Petition for Reconsideration, we
inadvertently stated that the $660 million in
additional costs would represent "a potential
increase of .07 cents per gallon to the
consumer." The costs would reflect a
potential increase of 7 cents per gallon to the
consumer. Therefore, the sentence containing
this statement should read as follows: "This
figure represents a potential increase of 9.07
per gallon to the consumer."
We apologize for any confusion this error
may have caused.
Respectfully submitted,
Eric A. Kuwana.
Counsel for the National Propane Gas
Association.
RSPA to ensure the safe loading and
unloading of LP-gas (or propane gas) from
cargo tank motor vehicles.
The Petitions
Pursuant to the procedural provisions in 49
CFR 5 106.35(a). we specifically petition
RSPA for reconsideration of the additional
attendance requirement in 49 CFR
S 17lS(a)(l)(iii), which states, in relevant
part, that ' I [t] he person who attends the
unloading of a cargo tank motor vehicle must
have an unobstructed view of the discharge
system and be within arm's reach of a means
for closure (emergency shut-down device) of
the internal self-closing stop valve or other
device that will immediately stop the
discharge of product from the cargo tank."
This language effectively mandates that two
or more attendants travel to and be present
during the unloading of propane gas from a
cargo tank motor vehicle. The additional
attendance requirement is not justified by the
exceptional safety record of the propane gas
industry, is not necessary to ensure the safe
unloading of propane gas from a cargo tank
motor vehicle, and will result in enormous
costs and devastating impacts to the propane
gas industry.
This Petition for Reconsideration satisfies
the standard set forth in 49 CFR 5 106.35(a)
for such petitions in that compliance with
the additional attendance requirement in
1715(a)(l)(iii) is neither practicable,
reasonable, nor in the public interest. The
provision, which was effective immediately
NPGA's Efforts
Initially, we need to emphasize that NPGA
and its members have an absolute
commitment to the safe unloading of propane
gas from cargo tank motor vehicles. Simply
stated, the propane gas industry must
maintain a record of safety in order to keep
its customers, to receive insurance, to
maintain a favorable perception in the
community and, at the bottom line, to remain
in business. The propane industry has
achieved an admirable record of safety.
Consistent with this absolute commitment
to safety, members of the propane gas
industry undertook an immediate
investigation after the September 1996
incident at Sanford, North Carolina, and
voluntarily evaluated and disclosed the
specific issue relating to emergency discharge
control systems that triggered the Interim
Final Rule. Further, NPGA voluntarily
formed a task force to identify viable
alternatives to the current emergency
discharge control systems and to ensure the
safe unloading of propane gas under all
conditions.2 Consistent with this process,
NPGA and its members continue to embrace
the opportunity to participate with RSPA to
identify and fashion measures to ensure the
safe unloading of propane gas from cargo
tank motor vehicles in every circumstance.
NPGA Membership
NPGA is the national trade association
representing the LP-gas (principally propane)
industry and has about 3,500 member entities
and companies in all 50 states, including 37
affiliated state and regional associations.
Propane gas is vital to the economic well-
upon publication of the Interim Final Rule on
February 19. is extremely costly and will
have an immediate and severe financial
impact on the industry. Because the
additional attendance requirement in the
March 21. 1997
By Hand Delivery
202-457-6420
Interim Final Rule has no demonstrated
nexus to the reported accidents or incidents
cited by RSPA in that rule, RSPA cannot
justify the approximately $660 million cost of
compliance. NPGA and its members strongly
believe that, based on the clear weight of the
1 NPGA proposes instead that RSPA adopt the
less burdensome, but equally safe, requirement that
"[tlhe vehicle driver be continually in attendance
and control of the loading and unloading
operations."
2 A brief discussion of NPGA's efforts. including
those related to the Special Presidential Task Force,
can be found in NPGA's prepared Statement
submitted to Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HM-225)
during the public meeting on March 20. 1997. The
Statement is incorporated herein by reference.

<<<PAGE 119>>>

Federal Register / Vol. 6 2 , No. 159 / Monday, August 18, 1997 / Rules and Regulations __
being of this nation and is distributed for
critical industrial, commercial and
residential uses every single day of the year.
While the single largest group of NPGA
members are retail marketers of propane gas,
the membership also includes propane
producers, transporters and wholesalers, as
well as manufacturers and distributors of
associated equipment, containers and
appliances. Propane gas is used in over 18
million installations nationwide for home
and commercial heating and cooking, in
agriculture, in industrial processing, and as
a clean air alternative engine fuel for both
over-the-road vehicles and industrial lift
trucks.
The majority of NPGA's members are small
businesses, which bear a disproportionate
burden of the Interim Final Rule. According
to its own analysis, RSPA acknowledges that
at least 90 percent of the businesses affected
by the Interim Final Rule are small
businesses (62 FR 7646). It is NPGA's
position that the additional attendance
requirements will have an immediate and
devastating financial impact on these small
businesses.3 A more detailed analysis of the.
economic impact of the additional
attendance requirement is provided below.
Industry Safety Record
The propane gas industry has achieved an
extraordinary safety record. From 1986 to
1995, there were almost 10 million tank
transport truck deliveries and almost 300
million bobtail deliveries of propane.
(Attachment A).
Those deliveries carried almost 90 billion
gallons of propane to residential,
commercial, agricultural and industrial
consumers throughout every state and county
in the United States. (Attachment B).4 Except
for the incident in Sanford, North Carolina
described below, NPGA is unaware of any
other serious reported incident during this 10
year period relating to a failure of the
emergency discharge control system during
the unloading of a tank transport truck. There
have been no fatalities, injuries, fires or
explosions caused by a failure of the
emergency discharge control system during
the unloading of a tank transport truck in
~~
3 RSPA asserts that this rulemaking is exempt
from the Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended, 5
U.S.C. 55601 et seq.. because the Act Is not
applicable when a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
is not required (62 FR 7646). RSPA's argument
relies on the validity of its "good cause" finding
that it was impracticable, unnecessary or contrary
to the public interest to provide for notice and
comment. Because the Interim Final Rule was not
tailored carefully or otherwise necessary to avoid
any imminent harm, RSPA's findlng of good cause
is deficient and cannot justify an exemption from
the Act.
4 Based on current data compiled by NPGA. there
were 9,891,403 tank transport deliveries and
296,742,077 bobtail deliveries for a total of
306,633,479 deliveries of propane during the 10
year period. These deliveries carried 89,022.623.000
gallons of propane. Indeed, this estimate is
conservative because in actuality, these quantities
of propane are transported twice: first by transport
truck from the terminal to the bulk storage retail
facility, and then by bobtail to the residential,
commercial or industrial users. And, each instance
of transportation itself involves two transfers:
loading and unloading.
more than 10 million deliveries of propane.
As to the smaller bobtail cargo tanks, RSPA
acknowledges in the Interim Final Rule that
only 9 incidents of propane release have been
reported during the past 10 years involving
any allegation of a failure of the emergency
discharge control system on a bobtail cargo
tank.5 None of the 9 incidents of propane
release cited by RSPA resulted in any
fatalities. This represents approximately one
release per 30 million bobtail deliveries.
Based on these numbers, this also represents
one release per almost 10 billion gallons of
propane delivered in the past ten years.
The Sanford Event
Notwithstanding these statistics, RSPA
promulgated the Interim Final Rule without
providing for notice and comment after an
accidental release of propane that involved
no fire, no explosion and no injuries or
fatalities in Sanford, North Carolina on
September 8, 1996. The release involved a
large cargo tank semi-trailer pulled by a
highway truck tractor unloading a cargo of
propane into permanent storage tanks at a
propane marketing facility. Shortly after the
transfer operation began, the transfer hose
separated from the transfer connection at its
juncture with the plant piping and began
discharging liquid propane into the
atmosphere. The vehicle driver heard sounds
unusual for a transfer operation and shut orf
the vehicle engine. According to the report of
the Federal Highway Administration
("FHWA") inspector, the driver was not able
to get to the remote controls to close the
internal stop flow valve. Nonetheless,
apparently as a result of the failure of the
excess flow protection in the cargo tank
motor vehicle, the entire propane cargo of
approximately 9,700 gallons was discharged
into the atmosphere. There was no ignition
of the propane, and thus no fire, explosion.
loss of life or loss of property.
More importantly, the emergency flow
protection built into the permanent storage
tanks at the propane marketing facility
apparently did not activate automatically as
designed and, as a result, the approximately
35,000 gallons of propane in the storage
facility were also discharged into the
atmosphere. The failure of the flow
protection built into the permanent storage
tanks contributed the vast majority of the
released propane, not the cargo tank motor
vehicle. Because RSPA apparently does not
have jurisdiction over the permanent storage
tanks, the Interim Final Rule does not seek
to address the most significant failure
connected with the release at Sanford, North
Carolina.
There is absolutely no evidence that ti
event at Sanford could not have been
NPGA notes that the exact causes of the 9
incidents of propane release cited by RSPA in the
Interim Final Rule are not clear. There is absolutely
no evidence in the Interim Final Rule that the
additional attendance requirement in
5 171S(a)(l)(iii) would have prevented those 9
incidents or is tailored to address the causes of
those incidents. NPGA strongly believes that
improved training, hose testlng and system
inspections are more likely to prevent accidental
releases of propane than the burdensome and
unnecessary additional attendance requirement.
44051
______ ~
prevented by the improved training, hose
testing and system inspection requirements
proposed by NPGA in its Application for an
Emergency Exemption and subsequently
adopted by RSPA in its Interim Final Rule.
The Other Incidents Cited By RSPA
In addition to the Sanford incident, RSPA
cites to six other unrelated incidents
involving propane ignition and tragic
fatalities. Based in large part on these six
unrelated incidents, RSPA promulgated the
Interim Final Rule without notice and
comment to prevent the "grave
consequences" of an accidental release of
propane. Significantly, RSPA failed to cite a
single instance of a documented failure of an
emergency discharge control system on a
cargo tank motor vehicle resulting in an
explosion, fire, injury or loss of life in the
Interim Final Rule. The unrelated six
incidents, as listed by RSPA in the Interim
Final Rule, are as follows:
On July 25, 1962 in Berlin, NY. an MC
330 bulk transport ruptured releasing about
6,900 gallons of liquid propane. Ignition
occurred. Ten persons were killed. and 17
others were injured. Property damage
included total destruction of 18 buildings
and 11 vehicles.
On March 9, 1972 near Lynchburg. VA.
an MC 331 bulk transport overturned and
slid into a rock embankment. The impact
ruptured the tank's shell releasing about
4.000 gallons of liquid propane. Ignition
occurred. Two persons were killed and five
others were injured. Property damage
included a farmhouse, outbuildings and
about 12 acres of woodland.
On April 29, 1975. near Eagle Pass,
Texas, an MC 330 bulk transport struck a
concrete headwall and ruptured releasing
more than 8,000 gallons of liquefied
petroleum gas. The ensuing fire and
explosion killed 16 persons, injured 5 1 , and
destroyed 51 vehicles.
On February 22, 1978. 23 tank cars
derailed in Waverly. Tennessee. During
wreck-clearing operations, a 30,000 gallon
tank car containing liquefied petroleum gas
ruptured. The ensuing fire and explosion
killed 16 persons, injured 43. and caused
$1.8 million in property damage.
On December 23, 1988. in Memphis,
Tennessee, an MC 330 bulk transport struck
a bridge abutment and ruptured releasing
9,388 gallons of liquefied petroleum gas. The
ensuing fire and explosion killed eight
persons and injured eight.
On July 27. 1994. in White Plains, New
York, an MC 331 bulk transport struck a
column of an overpass and ruptured
releasing 9,200 gallons of propane. Ignition
occurred. The driver was killed, 23 people
were injured, and an area within a radius of
approximately 400 feet was engulfed in fire.
(62 FR 7639.)
In five of the above listed incidents, a cargotank motor vehicle was involved in a serious
accident resulting in a ruptured tank and
subsequent ignition of the propane gas.
While tragic examples of highway accidents,
none of these incidents would have been
avoided or minimized in any manner by the
new requirements of the Interim Final Rule
or an improved emergency discharge control

<<<PAGE 120>>>

44052 Federal Register / Vol. 62. No. 159 I Monday, August 18, 1997 I Rules and Regulations
system. More specifically, the additional
attendance requirement in 5 17 l.S(a) (1) (iii)
could not have prevented or helped to
prevent these tragic accidents.6
Finally, the sixth incident listed by RSPA.
the February 22. 1973, accident in Waverly.
Tennessee, involved rail tank cars, not cargo
tank motor vehicles, and thus is completely
unrelated to the Interim Final Rule. In fact,
the rupture in this particular case did not
even occur until wreck-clearing operations
had commenced, Again, there is absolutely
no evidence that this rail accident, or the five
other above listed accidents, could have been
prevented to any extent by the wholly
unrelated requirements in the Interim Final
Rule.
This Petition for Reconsideration Meets the
Standard Set Forth in 49 CFR 106.35(a)
The petition for reconsideration meets the
standard set forth in 49 CFR 106.35(a) in that
the challenged provision is not reasonable,
practicable, nor consistent with the public
interest.
The Additional Attendance Requirement Is
Not Reasonable
The Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 5 706(2)(A) provides that
an agency's actions in promulgating rules
may be set aside if "arbitrary. capricious. an
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with law." In order to withstand
a challenge that one of its rules is arbitrary
or capricious, an agency "must examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a
'rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made."'* Thus, courts will
scrutinize whether relevant data was taken
into consideration by the agency when it
fashioned its regulatory req~irements.~
Additionally, reviewing courts will give
increased deference (1) to an agency
depending on its degree of persuasiveness of
the agency's rationale for a rule and (2) to a
long-standing rule. 10
~~~ ~ ~~
6Indeed. if the Interim Final Rule had been in
effect at the time of these five accidents. a second
person likely would have been riding along with
the driver of the cargo tank motor vehicle at the
time of the accident because of the additional
attendance requirement for the unloading of
propane. Simply stated. the Interim Final Rule
would have increased, not decreased. the loss of life
in each incident cited by RSPA.
7 See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe. 401 U.S. 402. 414 (1971); Bowman
Transportation. Inc. v. Arkansas Best Freight
System, Inc.. 419 U.S. 281 (1974).
8 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the
United States, Inc. et a/. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.. et al.. 463 U.S. 29. 43
(1983) citing Burlington Truck Lines. Inc. v. United
States. 371 U.S. 156. 168 (1962).
YThe Court in Motor Vehicle Mfgr. Assoc. noted
"(n]ormally. an agency rule would be arbitrary and
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem. offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or
is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency
expertise." 463 U.S. at 43.
10 Visiting Nurse Association of North Shore. Inc.
v. Bullen. et al.. 93 F.3d 997. 1007 (1st Cir. 1996);
The new requirement added to Section
171S(a)(l)(iii) by the Interim Final Rule is
not reasonable in that the economic burdens
it will place on the industry are not justified
by the industry's safety record and are not
reasonably tailored to remedy the problems
identified by RSPA in its preamble to the
Interim Final Rule, and the explanantion
provided by the agency does not provide a
rational connection between the facts found
and the choices made. The six incidents
other than Sanford cited by RSPA in the
Interim Final Rule still would have occurred
if the additional attendance requirement was
in effect. Conversely, there is no evidence to
suggest that the Sanford incident would not
have been prevented by a combination of the
improved training, hose testing, system
inspection and qualification requirements
contained in the Interim Final Rule and a
requirement that the vehicle driver be
continually in attendance and control of the
loading and unloading operations. Thus.
RSPA has "offered an explanation for its
decision which runs counter to the evidence
before the agency." L I There is simply no
evidence that having additional service
personnel at each unloading would have
prevented any of the incidents identified and
cited by RSPA in its Interim Final Rule.12 In
sum, the severe economic consequences of
the challenged requirement are not
reasonably related to the goals cited by
RSPA.
The CostIBenefit Analysis Defies Common
Sense
An agency's rulemaking must be tailored to
address the problem at hand, and the
economic burden to the regulated industry
must bear some reasonable relationship to
the goal of the regulation. In this case, it is
obvious that RSPA either did not consider or
determined to disregard the unjustified and
unnecessary economic burden on the
propane industry. While the propane
industry is working diligently to develop,
manufacture and retrofit a new emergency
discharge control system for cargo tank motor
vehicles, operators of all tank transport
trucks and bobtails will need to recruit, hire,
train and pay new employees to meet the
additional attendance requirement in the
Interim Final Rule if it is allowed to stand.
The economic impacts of the additional
attendant requirement are extremely onerous
for the propane industry and its customers.
Based on a representative survey of its
members, NPGA estimates the cost of
compliance with the additional attendance
requirement to be $660 million, taking into
account costs associated with employee
recruitment, function specific training,
salary, and employee benefits.13 This figure
Bowen v. American Hosp. A s s h . . 476 U S . 610. 64
n. 34; Mayburgv. Sec. OfHealth and Human
Services, 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984).
Motor Vehicle Mfgr. Assoc.. supra.. at 43.
12 See American Horse Protection Assoc. v. Lyng.
812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (agency's decision set
aside where agency failed to consider evidence
which demonstrated that the factual presumptions
upon which the agency's decision was based were
inaccurate).
13Based on 1995 retali sales volume of 9.429.570
gallons multiplled by $.07 per gallon.
represents a potential increase of .07 cents
per gallon to the consumer. Even according
to the conservative estimates in the
Government's Preliminary Regulatory
Evalution for the Interim Final Rule filed in
Docket No. HM-225 on March 19. 1997, the
aggregate cost to the propane industry for a
second operator to comply with the
additional attendance requirement in
5 171,5(a)(l)(iii) is $237,017,143 annually.L4
The extraordinary compliance costs
estimated by both NPGA ($660 million) and
RSPA (almost $240 million) as a result of the
additional attendant requirement in the
Interim Final Rule stand in sharp contrast to
the proven safety record of the propane
industry over many years. In the Interim
Final Rule, RSPA cites to only 9 incidents of
releases relating to the emergency discharge
control systems on cargo tank motor vehicles,
none of which resulted in any fatalities.
RSPA also cites to 6 tragic incidents that are
wholly unrelated to emergency discharge
control systems on cargo tank motor vehicles.
Even in the Government's Preliminary
Regulatory Evaluation, RSPA's search of the
DOT'S Hazardous Materials Incident
Reporting System ("HMIS") found only 16
reports of propane releases. which may or
may not be related in any way to emergency
discharge control systems, from 1990 to 1996.
Those 16 releases averaged 3,109 gallons of
propane's-and there were no fatalities and
only 2 serious and 2 minor injuries resulting
in total damages of $932.166.
Most significantly, the Government's own
analysis of the aggregate total costs to society
from releases of propane as a result of a
'4The estimate on its face is faulty. On page 16
of the Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation. RSPA
concludes that only bobtails will be required to hire
a second attendant to remain with the bobtail
throughout the entire day of deliveries. RSPA
apparently hypothesizes that the only increased
costs for the larger tank transport trucks will be the
use a second attendant during the two hours of
actual unloading at a total hourly rate of $13.38.
RSPA apparently makes the unsupported
assumption that the larger tank transports will be
able to hire a qualified and trained individual at the
point for unloading and be able to compensate that
individual for only two hours work. This
assumption is further undermined by the fact that
it is common practice in the industry for deliveries
to be made in the evenings and on weekends so as
not to dlsturb the operations of the recipient. As
there would not ordinarily be anyone else on site
at these times, there would necessarily have to be
a second person riding in the truck, or someone
would have to be hired at overtime wages to attend
the transfer during the evening or on the weekend
period.
15 The chart containing this information on page
4 of the Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation
acknowledges that the estimated high amount of
any single release was 40.000 gallons, which
included the 30.000 gallons released from the two
storage tanks during the Sanford event. Discounting
the 30,000 gallons from that event, which was
completely unrelated to any failing of an emergency
control system on the cargo tank motor vehicle, the
average per release decreases from 3,109 149,744/
16) gallons to 1.234 (19.744/16) gallons. This
reduction would reduce greatly the annual cost
calculation for Alternative 1 ("do nothing") and
Alternative 2 ("temporarily withdraw the
requirement for emergency discharge system") in
the Government's Preliminary Regulatory
Evaluation.

<<<PAGE 121>>>

Federal Register 1 Vol. 62. No. 159 / Monday, August 18, 1997 / Rules and Regulations decision not to implement any changes or
new regulatory requirements is between
$322,192 to $1,520,705 annually.16 Simply
stated, according to the Govemment's own
estimates, complete Government inaction
( e g , no Interim Final Rule) on the issue of
emergency discharge control systems on
cargo tank motor vehicles would result in an
annual total cost below $1.5 million.
Moreover, the Government's analysis
demonstrates that a total suspension of the
regulatory requirement for an emergency
discharge control system on cargo tank motor
vehicles would result in essentially the same
relatively low range of cost to society-
between $322.192 to $1.5 million. Because
the additional attendance requirement has
not been demonstrated to rectify any specific
safety problem and its imposition is wholly
unsupported by the incidents cited by RSPA
in its Interim Final Rule, the requirement
cannot be justified in light of the incredible
increase in costs to the industry ($240 to
$660 million) compared to costs to society
from Government inaction ($322,192 to $1.5
million).
Finally, NPGA submits that the additional
attendance requirement in 171.5(a)(l)(iii)
will result in additional deaths and increased
costs to society based on the incidents cited
by RSPA in its Interim Final Rule. Of the five
cargo tank motor vehicle accidents cited by
RSPA, an attendant passenger could not have
prevented the accidents and likely would
have died in each case. Using the
Government's own estimates of $2.7 million
for the value of a single life from the
Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation, those five
additional deaths would have resulted in
$13.5 million increased aggregate costs to
society from that requirement. These
additional deaths and increased costs are
certainly not warranted by the wholly
undocumented and questionable benefits.
The overwhelming economic evidence
cited above should not be construed in any
manner to indicate a lack of concern by
NPGA about safety in the propane industry.
NPGA and its members are committed to the
safe loading and unloading of propane gas
from cargo tank motor vehicles under all
conditions. Moreover, we are not arguing that
regulations that increase safety cannot
increase costs for the regulated industry and
its customers. But in this particular case. the
additional attendance requirement is not
based on any evidence that the requirement
is reasonable, necessary, practicable and
consistent with the public interest. Simply
stated, the additional attendance requirement
is regulatory overkill and an enormous
burden on the propane industry and its
customers without any demonstrated benefits
to society.
The Additional Attendance Requirement Is
Not Practicable
NPGA and its members additionally seek
reconsideration of Section 17 1.5(a) (1) (iii) of
16 As stated above, this calculation would
decrease due to the Government's overestimate of
the average number of gallons released in the 16
reported incidents.
the Interim Final Rule in that compliance
with this requirement is not practicable.17
First, in addition to the costs of adding a
second attendant described above, two
attendants may be insufficient to meet the
letter of the provisions for the majority of
bobtail deliveries. Approximately half of the
piping on a bobtail delivery truck is
undemeath the cargo tank between the
vehicle chassis frame rails. The piping
therefore may not be in view of someone
standing beside the vehicle. Thus, to comply
literally with the provisions of the Rule, one
attendant must be under the truck and a
second attendant must be at the remote
control on the internal valve, in order to have
all the discharge system in view during the
transfer operation. These two attendants are,
of course, in addition to the third, principal
delivery person, who would attend the
transfer of product. The economic impact
outlined above therefore would be doubled.
Second, the recruiting, hiring and training
of the additional attendants required by this
new requirement makes the rule not
practicable. The Interim Final Rule, by its
very terms, is temporary in nature.
Nonetheless, the rule mandates a lengthy
process of recruiting, hiring and training,
some of which may not be completed by the
end of the temporary period on August 15,
1997. Moreover, the extremely high fixed
costs for such a process in light of the
temporary nature of the rule magnifies that
the rule is not practicable. Finally, NPGA
submits that the arm's reach requirement
now contained in Section 171.5(a)(l)(iii)
violates the National Fire Prevention
Association ("NFPA") 58's requirement for
separation of the receiving tank and source,
further rendering the provision impracticable
in that compliance with the Interim Rule may
cause violation of applicable fire code
provisions.
The Additional Attendance Requirement Is
Contrary to the Public Interest
An agency is to consider the important
aspects of a problem in fashioning a rule. 18
Here, RSPA has failed to address several key
aspects of the issue presented and, as a
result, has promulgated a rule that is contrary
to the public interest. Although RSPA may
promulgate rules for the safe transport of
hazardous materials, such rules cannot
properly be issued where the burden and
impact on the public is not warranted or has
not been considered in light of its tangible
benefits.
The public interest will not be served by
enforcement of the additional attendance
requirement in that the economic burden of
compliance will disproportionately impact
"At the March 20, 1997 Public Meeting. the issue
was raised as to the requirements now contained in
49 CFR 177.834(1)(3) that an attendant have an
unobstructed view of the cargo tank and be within
7.62 meters (25 feet) of the cargo tank. Paragraph
177.834(1)(5) provides that the delivery hose. when
attached to the cargo tank, is considered part of the
vehicle. Under this definition. an attendant
monitoring the delivery within 25 feet of the
delivery hose would be in compliance with the
previous section of the regulations.
18 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association. 463
US. at 43.
44053
small business. As noted above, RSPA
estimates that at least 90 percent of the
businesses impacted by the Interim Final
Rule are small businesses under the Small
Business Administration's size standard
definitions (62 FR 7646). Thus, the largest
percentage by far of the estimated $660
million in compliance costs will be borne by
small businesses. Because the cost of an
additional attendant will be a huge fived cost
and small businesses will have less revenue
to absorb this new fixed cost, it is likely that
many of these small businesses will cease to
exist. The loss of these small businesses will
result in higher unemployment and will have
a very real and direct impact on their
communities. Moreover. to the extent that
small businesses are able to survive, they will
pass these costs on to the consumer.
Unnecessary higher costs for all consumers of
propane gas is also contrary to the public
interest.
The preamble to the Interim Final Rule
specifically seeks comment as to whether
there are alternatives to the Final Rule that
accomplish RSPA's objectives, while at the
same time imposing less of an impact on
small businesses. NPGA strongly believes
that the Interim Rule's testing, training, and
qualification requirements, together with the
requirement that the vehicle driver be
continually in attendance and control of the
loading and unloading operations, meet
RSPA's objectives, while at the same time
preserving the continued economic viability
of the small businesses comprising the
majority of this industry.
Request for Relief
NPGA seeks expedited reconsideration of
the additional attendance requirement added
by the new provisions of S 17 1.5(a) (1) (iii) to
existing part 171 of Title 49, Code of Federal
Regulations, by the Interim Final Rule. The
additional attendance requirement, which
effectively mandates the physical presence of
a second attendant during the unloading of
a cargo tank motor vehicle, imposes
unreasonable and unnecessary financial
burdens on the affected industry, and is not
in the public interest in that it is not
reasonably tailored to achieve the safety
results at which it is aimed. NPGA further
submits that the requirement will have a
disproportionate and irreparable adverse
effect on small businesses nationwide. As a
result, the NPGA respectfully requests that
the Administrator stay the effectiveness of
the additional attendance requirement in
S 171.5(a)(l)(iii) pending a decision on this
Petition.
For the reasons cited above, NPGA
petitions RSPA to reconsider the additional
attendance requirement in the Interim Final
Rule. As an alternative, NPGA recommends
the language from our Application for
Emergency Exemption requiring that "[tlhe
driver will be continually in attendance and
control of the loading and unloading
operations."
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, NPGA. on behalfof its members, petitions RSPA to reconsider
Section 17 1.5(a) (1) (iii) of its Interim Final
Rule, and to stay the effectiveness of this

<<<PAGE 122>>>

44054
Federal Register / Vol 62, No. 159 / Monday, August 18, 1997 / Rules and Regulations
_______ ~~
____ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~ -~ --
provision during its consideratlon of our
petition In the event RSPA denies this
petition. we request that it be converted to a
petition for rulemaking to amend this
provision under 49 C.F.R. S 106.31.
Please do not hesitate to contact us in the
Respectfully submitted.
event RSPA requires further information to
Mary Beth Bosco. Eric A Kuwana.
process this petition
Counsel for the National Propane Gas
Association.
Attachments
AITACHMENT A.-Propane Tank Truck Deliveries
[ 1 986-1 995)
~-
_ _ ~ - ~ ~~ ~ - ~ - -
Scheduled
Propane fuel Number of bobtail Number of trans-
Year sales 1,000 delivenes port delivenes
gallons represented represented
commercial
airline de-
partures
- -
1986 .............................................
............................................................................
....................
1993 ......................
7,999,283
8,299,830
8,484,351
9,763,059
8,281,606
8.61 1,571
9,217,256
9,483,509
9,452,588
9,429,570
26,664,277 888,809
27,666,100 922,203
....................
28,281,170
942.706
....................
32.543,530
1 ,084,784 ....................
27,605,353
920,178 ....................
28,705,237
956,841 ....................
30,724,187
1,024,140 ....................
31,611,697
1,053.723 ....................
31,508,627
1,050,288 .....................
31,431,900
1,047,730 7,700,000
- __
Total ..................................................................
89,022,623
296,742,077
9,891,403 7,700,000 ~ ~ _ _ _ _ _
Total Deliverie
-306,633,479
AITACHMENT B.-SALES OF PROPANE BY PRINCIPAL FUEL USES, 1986-1 995
(1,000 Gallons]
Year
Residential
mercial
and com- I Industnall Enqine fuel I Farm Other2 Total
-
1986 .............. .........................................
1987 .............................................
...................................
1990 .........................................................................
1991 ..................................................................................
................................................
1994 .........................................
.................................................
4,368,591
4,837,271
4,806,779
5,388,742
4,974,632 ~
5,324.740 1
5,213,548
5,460,571 ~
5,375,245
5,513,207 I
1,614,711
1,387,696
1,695,978
1,709.440
1,340,196
1,287,077
1,918,169
1,914,762
2,032,765
1,994,819
654,168 1 1,131,905 ' 229,908 7,999,283
629,848 ~
582,749
581,155
531,325
542,064
500,092
500,278 I
507,193 ~
466,636
1,075,463
369,552 8,299.830
1,063,537
335,308 8,484,351
1,172,811
910,911 1 9,763,059
1,135,712
299,741 8,281,606
1,133,539
324,151 8,611,571
1,363,327
222,120 9,217,256
1,383.022
224,876 9,483,509
1,405,033
132,352 9,452,588
1,322,556
132,352 9,429,570
____ +- ~~~
I
Total .........................
.................... ~ ......................................... 89.022.623
......................
-
__I
1 Includes refinery fuel use, synthetic rubber manufacture, and gas utility.
2 Includes seconda recovery of petroleum and SNG feedstock.
Source: American vetroleum Institute.
Appendix B-Ferrellgas et al. Petition for
Reconsideration of Interim Final Rule
April 21, 1997
The Honorable Dharmendra K. Sharma.
Administrator. Research and Special
Programs Administration. U.S.
Department of Transportation. 400 7th
Street. S W, Room 84 IO, Washington, DC
20590.
Dear Administrator Sharrna: On March 21,
1997, Ferrellgas. LP.. Suburban Propane, L.P.,
AmeriCas Propane L.P.. Agway Petroleum
Corporation, and Cornerstone Propane
Partners, L.P., (collectively "Petitioners")
filed a Petition for Reconsideration pursuant
to 49 CFR 106.35 seeking modification of an
emergency interim final rule published at 62
FR 7638 (February 19, 1997). By this letter,
National Propane, L.P.. seeks to join in that
Petition as a party. With the addition of
National Propane, L.P., Petitioners include
six of the eight largest propane service
companies in the Nation. In addition to
adding National Propane as a party,
Petitioners seek to supplement their pending
petition with the following supplemental
cost benefit information to assist you in the
evaluation of their Petition.
As discussed in their pending Petition,
Petitioners' specific concem is with an
operator attendance requirement imposed as
an element of an interim compliance option
provided under the emergency rule. The
operator attendance requirement in question
was designed specifically to address the risk
that the automatic excess flow feature on an
MC 330, MC 331 or non-specification cargo
tank vehicle in liquefied compressed gas
service may fail to operate as required under
49 CFR 178.337-1 l(a) during product
unloading. Under 49 CFR 178.337-1 1 (a). the
automatic shut-off systems in question are
required to function only "in the event of a
complete failure (separation) of any attached
hoses or piping," not "in response to leaks
or partial failure of a pipe, fitting, or hose."
62 FR 7638 at 7643 col. 2 (February 19.
1997). The risk addressed by this operator
attendance requirement is thus the risk that:
(1) A complete separation of attached hoses
or piping will occur; (2) that such separation
will occur during product unloading (when
the attendance requirement applies): and (3)
that the automatic excess flow feature will
not actually function as required. Because
Petitioners are concerned principally with
the operator attendance requirement as it
applies to bulk tank vehicles (bobtails).
Petitioners have attempted to quantify the
magnitude of this risk in the bobtail context.

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Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 159 / Monday, August 18, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 44055
-
~ ~~ ~~
~~ ~
Based on RSPA's suggestion that nine
events involving the failure of automatic
excess flow features have occurred in bobtail
service over the last seven years,' the
likelihood of such an event occurring during
a bobtail delivery is extremely remote: on the
order of one in 35,000,000 based on
calculations presented in Petitioners' Petition
for Reconsideration. Nevertheless, RSPA
Officials have expressed concern that its own
data may be underinclusive, and that the
actual risk of such an event might therefore
be higher.
In an effort to address this concern,
Petitioners have attempted to identify any
incidents in the course of their own
operations in which an excess flow feature
failed (or may have failed) to operate after a
complete separation of attached hoses or
piping occurred during the unloading of a
bobtail vehicle. In this effort, Petitioners have
examined their safety and insurance records,
and have consulted with employees who
would be expected to be aware of any such
instances that may have occurred. In most
cases, documentary information was found to
be available going back at least three years,
and employees were identified who could be
expected to be aware of any incidents that
may have occurred within the last decade (in
several cases, the employees consulted had a
knowledge base going back several decades).
As a result of these efforts, Petitioners
collectively have been able to identify a total
of only three such instances2 Although
Petitioners cannot positively establish that
they have identified every such incident that
has occurred in their operations over the last
seven years, they are very confident-based
upon the nature and extent of the inquiries
undertaken-that their tally of incidents is
not substantially in error.
Because Petitioners collectively operate
slightly over one third of the estimated
population of 18,000 bobtails in service
nationwide, their incident rate of three
incidents over seven years could reasonably
be extrapolated to a rate of nine incidents
over the same period for the industry as a
whole. This is the same number of incidents
that Petitioners assumed in calculating a one
in 35.000.0000 incident rate in their Petition
for Reconsideration. Even if it is assumed
that the industry-wide incident rate is higher
than the incident rate Petitioners have
experienced, the overall incident rate at issue
would still be extraordinarily low.3 In fact, as
discussed in Petitioners' Petition for
Reconsideration, the estimated incident rate
-
~
I It should be noted that Petitioners are not aware
of any documented basis for this suggestion.
2 In one of these instances, ignition did not occur
and no injuries or property damage resulted.
Petitioners also identified one instance in which the
automatic excess flow feature functioned
immediately upon separation of a hose during a
bobtail delivery (no ignition, injuries, or damage
occurred). This latter instance was not included in
Petitioners' incident tally, because the operator
attendance requirement at issue would provide a
benefit only in an instance in which the automatic
excess flow feature fails to function as intended.
3 It should further be noted that this low risk
reflects the risk that a release will occur. whether
or not there is any ignition of the gas released. See
Footnote 2.
suggested by the available data would have
to be assumed to be five times higher before
it would even approach the incident rate of
passenger deaths per enplanement for the
US. commercial aviation transportation
system. Petitioners do not believe that this
incremental risk is of sufficient magnitude to
justify the high costs that compliance with
the operator attendance requirement of the
emergency rule would entail. Petitioners
accordingly urge RSPA to take prompt and
favorable action on their pending Petition by
modifying the operator attendance
requirement of the emergency rule
appropriately.
Please let me know if you have any
questions or if additional information would
be helpful.
Sincerely,
Walter B. McCormick. Jr.
cc: Alan I. Roberts
Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HM-225)
March 31, 1997
Mr. Alan I. Roberts,
Associate Administrator for Hazardous
Materials Safety, Department of
Transportation, 400 7th Street, SW, Mail
Code: DHM-1, Washington, DC 20590.
Dear Mr. Roberts: This letter responds to
your request for specific suggested regulatory
language designed to address the concerns
raised in the Petition of Ferrellgas. L.P..
Suburban Propane, L.P., AmeriCas Propane
L.P.. Agway Petroleum Corporation, and
Comerstone Propane Partners, L.P.,
(collectively "Petitioners") for
reconsideration of RSPA's emergency interim
final rule published at 62 FR 7638 (February
19, 1997).
We did not suggest specific regulatory
language in our Petition for Reconsideration
because we believe that our concerns could
appropriately be addressed through a variety
of different changes in regulatory language.
For example, Petitioners would fully support
adoption of the regulatory language suggested
on page 2, footnote 1 of the Petition for
Reconsideration filed with respect to the
same emergency rule by the National
Propane Gas Association. Alternatively,
Petitioners would be satisfied if new Section
171.5(a)(l)(iii) were amended to read as
follows:
"In addition to the attendance
requirements in 5 177.834(i) of this
subchapter, the person who attends the
unloading of a cargo tank vehicle must,
except as necessary to facilitate the
unloading of product or to enable that person
to monitor the receiving tank, remain within
an arm's reach of a remote means of
automatic closure (emergency shut-down
device) of the internal self-closing stop
valve."
If neither of these suggested regulatory
amendments is acceptable to the Agency,
Petitioners would be satisfied with any
alternative regulatory amendment that would
reasonably meet their needs as articulated in
their Petition for Reconsideration. It should
be emphasized, however, that Petitioners'
need for relief is most urgent. As the attached
documents demonstrate, local authorities are
already beginning to enforce the
requirements of the emergency rule at issue,
a factor that is exacerbating the already
impossible problems Petitioners face under
that rule. Accordingly. we urge RSPA to
provide appropriate relief in some form as
quickly as possible.
As we have discussed, Petitioners would
appreciate the opportunity to meet with the
Agency to discuss their Petition, to provide
supplementary information. and to discuss
any questions or concems you or your staff
may have. In the interim, we hope that this
clarification of the relief we seek is useful.
Thank you for the personal attention you
have paid to this important matter.
Sincerely,
Barton Day.
Counsel for Petitioners Ferrellgas. L.P ,
Suburban Propane, L.P., Americas Propane
L.P., Agway Petroleum Corporation, and
Cornerstone Propane Partners, L.P.
Attachment
March 21, 1997
The Honorable Dharmendra K. Sharma.
Administrator, Research and Special
Programs Administration, US.
Department of Transportation. 400 7th
Street, S. W.. Room 8410, Washington.
DC 20590.
Dear Administrator Sharma: Enclosed
pursuant to 49 CFR 106.35 is a Petition for
Reconsideration of the emergency interim
final rule published at 62 FR 7638 (February
19. 1997). This petition is being filed on
behalf of Ferrellgas. L.P., Suburban Propane,
L.P., AmeriCas Propane L.P.. Agway
Petroleum Corporation. and Cornerstone
Propane Partners, L.P.. (collectively
"Petitioners"). Petitioners are five of the eight
largest propane service companies in the
United States, and together they serve over
3,000.000 customers across all fifty states.
The emergency rule that is the subject of
this Petition was promulgated in response to
information suggesting that the excess flow
control valve designs currently in use on
specification MC 330, MC 331, and certain
non-specification cargo tank vehicles used to
transport propane may not satisfy the
requirements of 49 CFR 178.337-11(a). As
Petitioners understand it. the purpose of this
emergency rule was to provide a safe
alternative means of compliance that would
allow continued operation of such vehicles
on an interim basis while a long-term
solution to this problem is identified and
implemented. Unfortunately, it appears that
modification of certain operator attendance
provisions included in the emergency rule, is
necessary in order for the rule to achieve its
intended purpose. The basic problem is that
immediate compliance with the operator
attendance requirement of the emergency
rule, as currently written, does not appear to
be possible. In fact, it is reasonable to
question whether full compliance with these
interim requirements could realistically be
expected much before the interim
compliance period is scheduled to end, on
August 15th 1997. In addition, it appears that
these requirements would not be reasonable
interim compliance measures even if they
could be implemented relatively quickly.

<<<PAGE 124>>>

44056 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 159 / Monday, August 18, 1997 / Rules and Regulations
~ ~ . _ _
Petitioners believe that prompt modification
of these requirements is necessary to ensure
that the requirements of the interim
compliance option provided are reasonably
achievable on an interim basis.
Petitioners appreciate the constructive
manner in which RSPA has responded to the
issues underlying the emergency rule, and
look forward to working with your staff
cooperatively in order to resolve the concerns
raised in the Petition.
Sincerely,
Walter B. McCormick, Jr.
Enclosure
cc: Judith S. Kaleta. Chief Counsel, Alan I.
Roberts, Associate Administrator for
Hazardous Materials Safety, Docket No.
RSPA-97-2 133 (HM-225)
United States Department of Transportation
Research and Special Programs
Administration Before the Administrator
of the interim compliance option RSPA
provided.
Specifically, Petitioners have augmented
their safety procedures and operator training,
and are in the process of testing potential
engineering options both for interim and
long-term compliance. Unfortunately, it
appears that immediate compliance with the
new vehicle attendance requirements of this
option is not possible. and that longer-term
compliance would not be reasonable.
Because the emergency rule provides neither
a grace period for compliance nor any
reasonable means by which Petitioners can
achieve compliance in the near future, it
leaves Petitioners in an impossible position
from which they require immediate relief.
Accordingly, Petitioners urge RSPA to act
immediately to modify the vehicle
attendance requirements of its emergency
rule as necessary to provide a reasonably
practicable interim compliance option that
will, if implemented, provide positive safety
benefits.
In Re: Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank
Motor Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed Gas
Service; Interim Final Rule
62 FR 7638 (February 19. 1997)
[Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HM-225)1
Petition of Ferrellgas. L.P.. Suburban
Propane, L.P., Amerigas Propane, L.P.,
A w a y Petroleum Corporation and
Cornerstone Propane Partners, L.P. for
Reconsideration of RSPA’s February 19,
1997 Interim Final Rule
Pursuant to 49 CFR 106.35, Ferrellgas. L.P.,
Suburban Propane, L.P.. Americas Propane
L.P., Agway Petroleum Corporation, and
Comerstone Propane Partners. L.P..
(collectively “Petitioners”) hereby petition
for reconsideration of the emergency interim
final rule published at 62 FR 7638 (February
19. 1997). The emergency rule was
promulgated in response to information
suggesting that the excess flow control valve
designs currently in use on specification MC
330, MC 33 1, and certain non-specification
cargo tank vehicles used to transport propane
may not satisfy the requirements of 49 CFR
178.337-1 I(a). The purpose of the emergency
rule, as explained at RSPA’s March 4. 1997
Workshop concerning the rule. was to
provide a safe alternative means of
compliance that would allow continued
operation of such vehicles on an interim
basis while a long-term solution to this
problem is identified and implemented.
Petitioners appreciate the Agency’s prompt
efforts to achieve this critical objective, and
support most of the requirements of the
interim compliance option provided under
the emergency rule. Unfortunately, however,
the interim compliance option RSPA has
provided includes new operator attendance
requirements that are unreasonable,
impracticable, and are not in the public
interest. In fact, it appears that immediate
compliance with these requirements is
impossible, and that there is some basis to
question whether efforts to comply might do
more to increase than to decrease the overall
risks associated with propane delivery,
especially in the short term.
To adequately protect the public interest,
Petitioners urge RSPA to take immediate
action to modify the new operator attendance
requirements of its interim final rule SO as to
provide a reasonable and practicable interim
means of compliance for operators of the
cargo tank vehicles at issue. Such action is
necessary because, although automatic
systems that should satisfy RSPA’s
expectations under 49 CFR 178.337-1 l(a) are
already under development, there appears to
be no immediate way for the propane
industry to comply either with the
requirements of the interim final rule or with
the requirements of 49 CFR 178.337-1 1 as
RSPA interprets them. As RSPA itself has
recognized, unachievable regulatory
requirements for propane delivery are
unacceptable because any interruptions in
propane service would expose members of
the public to “unacceptable threats to their
safety and economic interests.” 4 Such
requirements are particularly inappropriate
in this case, because there is no evidence of
any safety crisis that would justify them. To
the contrary, the conditions of concern to
RSPA have existed continuously over many
years-and over the course of hundreds of
millions of propane deliveries-apparently
without any significant pattern of problems
having occurred. In fact, based on the
information cited by the Agency itself. it
seems clear that the incremental risk at issue
is extraordinarily low. It is therefore
imperative that some reasonably practicable
interim means of compliance be provided for
the propane industry. It is also important to
ensure that this interim means of compliance
will provide positive safety benefits.
Introduction
Petitioners are the first, second, third, fifth,
and eighth largest propane service companies
in the United States. Together they provide
service to some 3.039.000 customers in all
fifty states. Petitioners operate approximately
690 transports and 5,950 bulk trucks
(bobtails) of the type that are the subject of
the emergency rule at issue.
Petitioners understand RSPA’s concern
over the suggestion that the excess flow
control valves currently in use on such
vehicles may not satisfy the requirements of
49 CFR 178.337- 1 1. Petitioners are
committed to the highest level of safety in the
conduct of their business, and would like to
work in partnership with RSPA to address
this concern. As announced at RSPA’s March
4th Workshop, it appears that at least one
automatic system that should satisfy RSPA’s
expectations has already been d e ~ i s e d , ~ and
Petitioners are aware that other such systems
are also currently under development. The
problem is that it will take a significant
amount of time to more fully test such
systems, to get them into commercial
production, and to retrofit existing vehicies.
Until this process can be completed, a
reasonable option for interim compliance
must be available.
Since the emergency rule was published,
Petitioners have made diligent efforts to
understand and implement the requirements
Discussion
I. It Is Imperative That RSPA Provide a
Reasonable and Practicable Compliance
Option for the Propane Industry
A. Continued Propane Service Is Vital to the
Public
Millions of Americans are dependent on
propane for their basic energy needs.
Consequently, as RSPA has acknowledged,
any interruptions in propane service would
expose the public to “unacceptable threats to
their safety and economic interests.” fi To
protect the public interest, it is therefore vital
to ensure that propane service companies
such as Petitioners have some practicable
and lawful means of continuing their
operations.
B. The Risks at Issue Do Not Justify Stringent
Interim Regulation
RSPA’s concern is essentially that excess
flow control features on specification MC
330, MC 331 and certain non-specification
cargo tank vehicles used to transport propane
or other liquid compressed gases may not
function effectively under all operating
conditions. This concern is based primarily
upon one confirmed incident (the Sanford
incident), although the Agency does suggest
that nine other incidents (all involving
bobtails) may have occurred over the past
seven years.’ At the March 4th Workshop,
RSPA officials indicated that it does not
receive reports of all incidents that occur,
and suggested that additional incidents
involving the failure of excess flow control
devices may in fact have occurred.
Although this information is troubling, it is
important to recognize that it is indicative of
only an extremely Low risk. In fact, if the
suggestion that nine bobtail incidents
occurred over a seven year period is accepted
at face value, this would suggest that the risk
4 Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation, Docket HM-
225, Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquified
Compressed Gas Service (February 1997) at p. 6.
5 A copy of the announcement issued by A-B
Products. Inc. on March 3. 1997 Is provided as an
attachment to this Petition.
6 Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation, Docket HM-
225. Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquified
Compressed Gas Service (February 1997) at p. 6.
7 See Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation at 1 .
Petitioners note that no documentation concerning
these alleged incidents is included in the
administrative record.

<<<PAGE 125>>>

Federal Register I Vol. 62, No. 159 I Monday, August 18, 1997 I Rules and Regulations 44057
~- -____ ____
of an incident involving failure of an excess
operators must at least periodically step away
flow control device during a bobtail delivery
from their vehicles during unloading
is in the range of one in 35 million.* Even
operations to ensure, for safety purposes, that
if five times this number of incidents had
the receiving tank is not being overfilled or
actually occurred, the risk of any such
overpressurized. Immediate compliance with
incident during a residential propane
this new attendance requirement is
delivery would still be significantly lower
impossible because none of the options for
than the risk of a commercial airline
compliance-multiple attendants, a lanyard,
passenger being killed in an air crash on any
or some other remote shut-off system-can be
single flight.9 While even one accident is too
implemented in less than amatter of months.
many, these are, by any reasonable
The problem with the multiple attendant
assessment. very low risks indeed.
option is that Petitioners do not have enough
Certainly these risks are too low to justify
qualified personnel to send multiple
interim regulatory controls that will impose
attendants out on deliveries. To the contrary,
harsh compliance burdens on the propane
Petitioners-being well-run businesses-do
industry.
not have substantially more operators than
they need to serve their customers. Nor can
11. The Emergency Rule Fails To Provide Any
Petitioners substantially increase the
Reasonable and Practicable Compliance
workload of the operators they do have:
Option for the Propane Industry
indeed, regulations limiting hours af service
A. Immediate Compliance With the
for drivers would prohibit them from doing
Alternative Compliance Option Provided in
so. To provide additional operators,
the Emergency Rule Is Impossible
Petitioners would therefore have to hire
The alternative compliance option
them. If Petitioners were to hire one new
provided in the emergency rule imposes a
employee for each of their approximately
number of specific requirements. Several of
6.600 vehicles, this would amount to more
these-including certain inspection and
than a 40% increase in the total work force
testing requirements-are practicable
of these companies.' 1 Hiring programs of this
requirements that provide concrete safety
magnitude would obviously take months to
benefits. Petitioners concern is with a new
complete, even under the best of
operator attendance requirement that
circumstances. Applicants would need to be
effectively requires that the operator "have
solicited and appropriately screened. Once
an unobstructed view of the cargo delivery
new operators are hired, they would then
lines, and be within an arm's reach of a
need to be appropriately trained before they
means for closure of the internal self-closing
could be put into the field. In short, this
stop valve or other device that will stop the
option is completely unworkable as a near-
discharge of product from the cargo tank." 62
term, interim compliance option.
FR at 7643 col. 3. RSPA acknowledges that
Putting aside the question of whether
"this may require two operator attendants on
lanyards would function effectively-which
a cargo tank motor vehicle or the use of a
Petitioners contend they would not-the
lanyard, electromechanical, or other device
inescapable problem is that they cannot be
or system to remotely stop the flow of
deployed quickly. All of the propane cargo
product." Id. In fact, it appears that
vehicles Petitioners operate are already
compliance with this requirement would
equipped with emergency shut-off (ESO)
always require such measures. One of the
systems. However, Petitioners believe that
principal practical problems is that, in almost
substantially all of their ESO controls would
all cases, at least some of the controls that
have to be modified or repositioned before
must be activated in the unloading of product
lanyard systems couId be used effectively. In
are located out of reach of the controls for the
most cases the necessary work would need to
emergency shut-off system.10 Another is that
be performed by a truck fabricator, and it is
estimated that the work would take a number
-~ ~-
BAssuming nine billion gallons of propane
of months to complete. The specific
delivered by bobtail annually, with an average of
mechanical problems are as follows.
200 gallons per delivery, it is estimated that there
Although propane cargo vehicles have
were 315 million bobtail deliveries during the seven
ESOs of various different designs, their basic
year period at issue. If nine incidents are assumed
function is to trip the integral closing
to have occurred in the course of these 315 million
mechanism for an internal stop valve. The
deliveries, the corresponding incident rate is
approximately 0.029 incidents per mllllon
manually-controlled actuating device for the
deliveries, for an average of less than one incident
ESO system is normally positioned towards
in 35 million deliveries.
the front of the vehicle where it is more
9 Even if the kind of bobtail incidents at issue
accessible to the operator in the event that a
occurred at five times the rate of the reported
release of product occurs towards the rear of
incidents RSPA has referred to, the incident rate
the vehicle where most of the pumping
would amount to only about 0.14 incidents per
controls and operating valves are located.
million bobtail deliveries. By contrast. although
These ESO systems are normally operated by
commercial aviation accident rates fluctuate from
year to year, the passenger fatality rate for the
a lever or push-button controller mounted to
"extremely safe" U.S. commercial aviation
transportation system has ranged from 0.18 to
approximately 0.4 fatalities per milllon
enplanements. National Transportation Safety
Board, A Review of Flightcrew-Involved Major
Accidents of U.S. Carriers, 1978 Through 1990
(NTSB/SS-94/01) (January 1994) at 1-2.
IOln the case of bobtails. the flow of gas Is
initiated from a control located on the end of the
product dellvery hose. Because bobtails. for safety
purposes, are typically located more than I O feet
from the point of product transfer, this control must
always be activated from a position that is out of
reach of the controls located on the truck. In the
case of transports. the clutch and power take off
controls necessary for operation of the unloading
pumps are located in the vehicle cab, generally out
of reach of the emergency shut-off system controls,
out of sight of the loading lines. or both.
I 1 Together, Petitioners have a tow1 of
approximately 15,100 employees.
_______ . __
the truck frame behind the driver side of the
cab. Where levers are used, they are
relatively small, and may be mounted in
either a vertical or horizontal position.
Attachment of a lanyard to this type of
controller would require a series of pulleys
so as to direct the force of the pull in the
proper direction to actuate the system. On a
great many vehicles. however, the controllers
are of a push-button design that cannot
readily be operated by the tug of a lanyard.
These systems would need to be jerry-rigged
in some manner or replaced with a lever type
controller before a lanyard system could be
attached at all.
Petitioners are actively testing electro-
mechanical remote emergency shut-off
systems, but are not aware of any remote
control system that has yet been
demonstrated to be fully effective for use in
propane cargo vehicles. The principal
engineering challenges are to ensure that
such a device could reliably transmit signals
through metal structures, that it would not
itself provide a source of ignition in the event
of a propane release, and that it would be
compatible with the variety of ESO
configurations currently in bobtail service.
Even if such devices prove effective,
however. it would clearly take a considerable
amount of time to install them in all of the
propane cargo vehicles. In the end, it could
potentially take as long to develop, test, and
implement this "interim" solution as it
would to implement an appropriate final
solution. In any event, it does not appear that
immediate compliance with the alternative
compliance option provided in the
emergency rule is possible on any basis at all.
B. Multiple Operator and Remote Activation
Options Are Not Reasonable as Interim
Compliance Measures
Even if the multiple operator or remote
activation options could be implemented
substantially before the end of the interim
compliance period, Petitioners do not believe
that they would represent reasonable interim
compliance measures. The basic problem is
that either option would impose high costs
without providing any commensurate safety
benefit.
The multiple employee option would
effectively require a very large but temporary
expansion in the work force of propane
service companies. The costs of recruiting,
screening, training, compensating, and then
ultimately discharging this large number of
excess employees would be very high.
Petitioners estimate that these costs could
exceed $165,000,000.00 just for Petitioners
alone, assuming one new employee for each
of Petitioners' 6,600 vehicles.'z At the same
time, for several reasons, the safety benefits
of this approach can be expected to be
limited at best. First, as already indicated, the
risk to be addressed under this approach is
extraordinarily low in the first place. and that
risk would be reduced even further by
implementation of the other requirements of
the interim rule, which Petitioners believe
would be highly effective in addressing the
risk of uncontrolled propane releases during
IZConservatively assuming a total cost of
S25.000.00 per employee for recruiting costs. salary,
training, and benefits.

<<<PAGE 126>>>

44058 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 159 I Monday, August 18, 1997 I Rules and Regulations
~ _ . ~ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ __- - ~ -
~ ~ _ -
lading. Second, it would take considerable
time to implement this compliance option.
As a result, the window of time during which
this interim compliance option could
effectively provide any safety benefit would
be limited. Finally, it should be recognized
that it will be difficult to recruit high-quality
employees for interim jobs, and that the job
itself-standing ready to respond to an event
that is extraordinarily unlikely to occur-is
not one that should be expected to induce a
high level of performance. Accordingly, it
appears that interim employees might for
practical purposes provide very little safety
benefit at all.
As already discussed, the remote activation
option would require physical modification
of transport vehicles. Assuming that an
appropriate remote activation system can
indeed be made available at all. significant
costs would need to be incurred to purchase
and install the necessary equipment.
Petitioners estimate that even a relatively
low-cost system of the garage-door-opener
variety, if available, could not be put to use
in Petitioners' 6.600 existing vehicles for less
than about $2,300.000.00. Again, however,
for several reasons, this substantial cost
might provide little practical safety benefit.
As already indicated, the risk addressed
would be extremely small, particularly in
view of the other requirements of the
emergency rule. This option would also take
considerable time to implement-perhaps
nearly as long as an ultimate solution-and
might therefore provide interim protection
for only a very limited period. In addition,
it is not clear that such devices would be
capable of operating reliably under real-
world conditions, particularly in cold
weather and where obstructions-especially
metallic obstructions such as sheds, vehicles.
or fences-might interfere with signal
transmission. Accordingly, it is not clear that
such devices, if put to use, would provide
substantial safety benefits.
C. Requirements To Employ Multiple
Operators or Remote Activation Options
Could Potentially Do More To Increase Than
To Decrease the Overall Risks Associated
With Propane Delivery
In imposing safety regulation, it is
important at a minimum to ensure that the
rules adopted will do no harm. In particular,
it is important to ensure that efforts to
address one risk do not effectively increase
other risks. Petitioners believe that there is
legitimate basis to question whether efforts to
comply with the operator attendance
requirements of the emergency rule might
actually do more to increase than to decrease
the overall risks associated with propane
delivery, particularly in the short term.
Indeed, it appears that those requirement.-
in attempting to minimize the risks in the
event that an uncontrolled release of product
occurs during unloading-could potentially
increase the overall likelihood that product
releases will occur. The basis for this concern
is as follows.
Based on their operational experience,
Petitioners believe that human error-
particularly human error in the overfilling of
a customer tank during a bobtail delivery- .
represents the greatest risk of a product
release associated with unloading
operations.13 For two reasons, the new
operator attendance requirements of the
emergency rule could potentially increase
these risks.
The first concern arises with respect to
operators that attempt to achieve compliance
through the use of interim employees. As
already indicated, this option would
essentially require that large numbers of new
operators be hired, trained, and put into
service as quickly as possible. Petitioners
have thorough training programs, and believe
that these programs are effective in
minimizing the risk of human error in the
field. Nevertheless, if there is a way to
increase the risk of human error, the
compulsion to immediately hire and deploy
large numbers of new interim employees-on
what amounts to an emergency basis-would
appear to be it. Petitioners do not believe that
this incremental risk would be substantial.
and would obviously work as hard as
possible to ensure that it is not. Nevertheless,
Petitioners believe that the magnitude of this
small incremental risk could very well
exceed the magnitude of any incremental risk
reduction the interim employee option
would provide, particularly over the short
term.
The second concern arises with respect to
propane marketers that attempt to comply
without interim employees. The basic
concern is that the operator attendance
requirement of the emergency rule would
frequently have the effect of anchoring
operators in positions from which they will
be unable to effectively monitor the tank they
are filling during bobtail deliveries. This is a
critical concern, because monitoring of the
customer tank through use of a manual fixed
liquid level valve located on the tank is by
far the most effective way to ensure that
uncontrolled product releases will not occur
due to the overfilling of customer tanks. To
the extent that operators are inhibited from
monitoring the customer tank by the need to
keep a lanyard taut, to avoid signal
interference from a shed, or for any other
reason. the risks associated with the
overfilling of customer tanks is incrementally
increased. Again, Petitioners believe that the
magnitude of even a very small incremental
increase in this risk could well exceed the
magnitude of the safety benefit provided by
the new operator attendance requirements.
Ill. Modified Attendance Requirements
Would Provide A Practicable Basis for
Interim Compliance That Would Provide at
Least Equivalent Safety Benefits
As already indicated, Petitioners generally
support the interim requirements of the
emergency rule, specifically the interim
requirements for pressure testing of new or
modified hose assemblies and for visual
inspection of hoses and hose fittings prior to
unloading. These interim requirements
directly address the risk of catastrophic hose
failure-which is the principal risk at issue-
and should provide positive safety benefits.
Petitioners believe that all its concerns
regarding the operator attendance
requirements of the emergency rule can be
addressed-without any real sacrifice in
safety-if they are modified to provide
additional flexibility for two purposes. First,
the operator should be given the flexibility to
step away from the ESO system as necessary
to conduct the unloading operations.I4
Second, the operator should be allowed the
flexibility to step away from the ESO system
in order to monitor the customer tank. This
approach would effectively ensure that the
operator will remain within arms' reach of
the ESO system to the extent it is reasonable
to do so, but would eliminate the need to
attempt to deploy multiple operators or
remote activation systems on an interim
basis. As modified, the provision would
provide a practicable interim means of
compliance that provides a level of safety
that-for practical purposes-is likely to be
at least equivalent to the level of safety the
rule now provides.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioners
urge RSPA to take immediate action to
modify the vehicle attendance requirements
of its emergency rule as proposed in this
Petition to provide a reasonably practicable
interim compliance option that will, if
13 Overfilling is an issue of concern because
propane tanks are pressure vessels containing fluid
that expands and contracts in response to ambient
temperature variations. In order to ensure that
propane is not released as a result of fluid
expansion, it is necessary to maintain an adequate
vapor space within the tank. For this reason,
propane tanks are ordinarily filled only to 80
percent of their full volume. In the event a tank is
filled beyond the allowable limit. there is a risk that
propane may subsequently be released at some
point (often after the operator has left the customer
site). If the tank is filled to its full volumetric
capacity, a resulting release of product will occur
durlng the unloading process itself. In either case,
the safety concerns involved are serlous.
implemented, provide actual safety benefits.
Respectfully submitted.
Walter B. McCormick. Jr.
Barton Day
Bryan Cave, LLP,
Counsel for Petitioners.
[FR Doc. 97-21865 Filed 8-14-97; 11 58 am1
BILLING CODE 491+80+
'4This modification would by itself be sufficient
to address Petitioners' concerns with respect to
propane transports.
.

## Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2025-08/240112.pdf>
- Source ID: `phmsa`
- SHA-256: `9adfabf7b773ee73ee7a78aec3dc5e8cc100a1bf811f930fd7b8266e461cd5d2`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T00:59:31.977Z
- Exported: 2026-08-22T21:23:27.623Z
- Document slug: `phmsa-interpretation-24-0112`

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