# PHMSA Alert Notice — Pipeline Safety Interpretation

**Citation:** PI-89-001  
**Type / status:** guidance / guidance  
**Agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  
**Effective:** Not stated  
**Published:** 1989-03-08

PI-89-001 response to PHMSA Alert Notice concerning 195.401.

## Document text

<<<PAGE 1>>>

March 8, 1989
The Office of Pipeline Safety recommends that you read the enclosed
copy of the latest "Alert Notice" and take appropriate preventive
steps.
Sincerely,
Richard L. Beam
DB
C:\WP51\INTERPRT\195\401\89-03-08
1

<<<PAGE 2>>>

ALERT NOTICE
In January 28, 1988, the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)
issued an Alert Notice advising pipeline operators who have pipe
manufactured by the Electric Resistance Weld (ERW) process of the
occurrence of twelve hazardous liquid pipeline failures and of
actions which operators may take to reduce the risks of similar
failures.
The continuing failure of ERW seams remains a matter of
concern to the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA).
Since the issuance of the Alert Notice, the RSPA has data on eight
additional hazardous liquid pipeline failures and one on a gas
transmission pipeline involving pipe seams manufactured prior to
1970 by the ERW process. Of the eight additional hazardous liquid
pipeline failures, two appear to be due to selective corrosion of
the ERW seam. As stated in the 1988 Alert Notice, seams with
selective corrosion occurring in an area of manufacturing defects
may be particularly vulnerable to failure. However, the other
failures appear to have resulted from flaw growth of manufacturing
defects in the ERW seam.
Two of these failures resulted in some of the most significant
spills (more than 20,000 bbls.) in recent years. Both of these
failures involved pipelines which had not been hydrostatically
tested in accordance with current standards. One of the failures
occurred after the long-standing operating pressure had been
increased a relatively short period of time before the failure.
DB
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<<<PAGE 3>>>

This increase in pressure clearly decreased the margin of safety
between the operating pressure and highest pressure ever
experienced during the life of the pipeline and contributed to the
acceleration of the growth of a defect to failure.
The RSPA is planning to conduct research aimed at
characterizing ERW defects and their growth rates for variety of
environmental conditions, in addition to the pipe having cathodic
protection at less than standard pipe-to-soil potentials, coating
disbondment, fatigue, and corrosion fatigue. If the research is
successful, the resulting data could provide a basis for
establishing criteria regarding when an ERW pipeline should be
rehydrotested.
In view of the continuing ERW seam failures, OPS recommends
that all pipeline operators having ERW pipelines installed prior to
1970:
(1) Consider hydrostatic testing all hazardous liquid
pipelines that have not been hydrostatically tested to
125 percent of the maximum allowable pressure, or
alternatively reduce the operating pressure 20 percent;
(2) Avoid increasing a pipeline's long-standing operating
pressure;
(3) Assure the effectiveness of the cathodic protection
system. Consider the use of close interval pipe-to-soil
surveys after evaluating the pipe coating and
corrosion/cathodic protection history; and
DB
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<<<PAGE 4>>>

(4) In the event of an ERW seam failure, conduct
metallurgical examinations in order to determine the
probable condition of the remainder of the ERW seams in
the pipeline.
DB
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<<<PAGE 5>>>

TELECOPIER COVER SHEET
3-8-89
Regarding ERW pipe. This was sent to printing today.
DB
C:\WP51\INTERPRT\195\401\89-03-08
5

## Provenance

- Official: Yes
- Source: <https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/legacy/interpretations/Interpretation%20Files/Pipeline/1989/PI89001.pdf>
- Source ID: `phmsa`
- SHA-256: `9343497b5530075c791de5b59c47a4048721cde375fa73bcd73da833aff7d98b`
- Retrieved: 2026-08-20T00:59:31.977Z
- Exported: 2026-08-23T11:51:29.798Z
- Document slug: `phmsa-interpretation-pi-89-001`

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