{"operation":"document","citation":"65 FR 75378","title":"Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators With 500 or More Miles of Pipeline)","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Research and Special Programs Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2000-12-01","effective_on":"2001-03-31","summary":"This final rule specifies regulations to assess, evaluate, repair and validate through comprehensive analysis the integrity of hazardous liquid pipeline segments that, in the event of a leak or failure, could affect populated areas, areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage and commercially navigable waterways. OPS is requiring that an operator develop and follow an integrity management program that provides for continually assessing the integrity of all pipeline segments that could affect these high consequence areas, through internal inspection, pressure testing, or other equally effective assessment means. The program must also provide for periodically evaluating the pipeline segments through comprehensive information analysis, remediating potential problems found through the assessment and evaluation, and ensuring additional protection to the segments and the high consequence areas through preventive and mitigative measures. Through this required program, hazardous liquid operators will comprehensively evaluate the entire range of threats to each pipeline segment's integrity by analyzing all available information about the pipeline segment and consequences of a failure on a high consequence area. This includes analyzing information on the potential for damage due to excavation; data gathered through the required integrity assessment; results of other inspections, tests, surveillance and patrols required by the pipeline safety regulations, including corrosion control monitoring and cathodic protection surveys; and information about how a failure could affect the high consequence area. The final rule requires an operator to take prompt action to address the integrity issues raised by the assessment and analysis. This means an operator must evaluate all defects and repair those could reduce a pipeline's integrity. An operator must develop a schedule that prioritizes the defects for evaluation and repair, including time frames for promptly reviewing and analyzing the integrity assessment results and completing the repairs. An operator must also provide additional protection for these pipeline segments through other remedial actions, and preventive and mitigative measures.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-00-29570.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-00-29570.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-00-29570","source_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2000/12/01/00-29570/pipeline-safety-pipeline-integrity-management-in-high-consequence-areas-hazardous-liquid-operators","body":"Federal Register, Volume 65 Issue 232 (Friday, December 1, 2000) [Federal Register Volume 65, Number 232 (Friday, December 1, 2000)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 75378-75411] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] [FR Doc No: 00-29570] [[Page 75377]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Part III Department of Transportation ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Research and Special Programs Administration ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 49 CFR Part 195 Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators With 500 or More Miles of Pipeline); Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 232 / Friday, December 1, 2000 / Rules and Regulations [[Page 75378]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Research and Special Programs Administration 49 CFR Part 195 [Docket No. RSPA-99-6355; Amendment 195-70] RIN 2137-AD45 Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators With 500 or More Miles of Pipeline) AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT. ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: This final rule specifies regulations to assess, evaluate, repair and validate through comprehensive analysis the integrity of hazardous liquid pipeline segments that, in the event of a leak or failure, could affect populated areas, areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage and commercially navigable waterways. OPS is requiring that an operator develop and follow an integrity management program that provides for continually assessing the integrity of all pipeline segments that could affect these high consequence areas, through internal inspection, pressure testing, or other equally effective assessment means. The program must also provide for periodically evaluating the pipeline segments through comprehensive information analysis, remediating potential problems found through the assessment and evaluation, and ensuring additional protection to the segments and the high consequence areas through preventive and mitigative measures. Through this required program, hazardous liquid operators will comprehensively evaluate the entire range of threats to each pipeline segment's integrity by analyzing all available information about the pipeline segment and consequences of a failure on a high consequence area. This includes analyzing information on the potential for damage due to excavation; data gathered through the required integrity assessment; results of other inspections, tests, surveillance and patrols required by the pipeline safety regulations, including corrosion control monitoring and cathodic protection surveys; and information about how a failure could affect the high consequence area. The final rule requires an operator to take prompt action to address the integrity issues raised by the assessment and analysis. This means an operator must evaluate all defects and repair those could reduce a pipeline's integrity. An operator must develop a schedule that prioritizes the defects for evaluation and repair, including time frames for promptly reviewing and analyzing the integrity assessment results and completing the repairs. An operator must also provide additional protection for these pipeline segments through other remedial actions, and preventive and mitigative measures. DATES: Effective Date: This final rule takes effect March 31, 2001. Compliance Dates: An operator must complete an identification of all pipeline segments that could affect a high consequence area no later than December 31, 2001. An operator must develop a written integrity management program no later than March 31, 2002. Comment Date: Interested persons are invited to submit comment on the provisions of the rule concerning actions an operator must take to address integrity issues on the pipeline (Sec. 195.452(h)) by March 31, 2001. At the end of the comment period, we will publish a document modifying these remedial action provisions or a document stating that the provisions will remain unchanged. ADDRESSES: Comments limited to the provisions on actions an operator must take to address pipeline integrity issues (Sec. 195.452(h)) must be sent to the Dockets Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590-0001. It is open from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays. You also may submit written comments to the docket electronically. To do so, log on to the following Internet Web address: http://dms.dot.gov . Click on ``Help & Information'' for instructions on how to file a document electronically. All written comments should identify the docket number stated in the heading of this rule. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Israni, (202) 366-4571, or by e- mail: [email protected] , regarding the subject matter of this final rule, or the Dockets Facility (202) 366-9329, for copies of this final rule or other material in the docket. All materials in this docket may be accessed electronically at http://dms.dot.gov . General information about the RSPA/Office of Pipeline Safety programs may be obtained by accessing OPS's Internet home page at http://ops.dot.gov . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Notice of Proposed Rulemaking On April 24, 2000, OPS published a notice of proposed rulemaking (65 FR 21695) that proposed pipeline integrity management program requirements for hazardous liquid operators that operated 500 or more miles of pipeline. The proposed requirements were to apply to hazardous liquid pipelines that could affect areas we proposed as high consequence areas--populated areas, areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage, and commercially navigable waterways. OPS issued the proposal after a public meeting that OPS hosted on November 18 & 19, 1999, to gather information on current pipeline assessment methods and integrity management programs. OPS had also established an electronic public discussion forum to gather further information. Comments and information gathered from these forums were used in developing the proposed rule for larger hazardous liquid operations. The proposed rule was the first in a series of rulemakings that will require all regulated pipeline operators to have integrity management programs. The notice proposed that a hazardous liquid operator develop and follow an integrity management program. Among the proposed required elements of a program were-- Baseline assessment of all pipelines that could affect a high consequence area. The integrity of these pipelines was to be assessed by internal inspection, pressure test, or equivalent alternative new technology. The assessment had to be completed in seven years, with 50% of the pipeline mileage done in three and one-half years. Continual assessment of all pipelines that could affect a high consequence area. An operator would have to continue to assess, at intervals not to exceed ten-years, and periodically evaluate the integrity of the pipelines. Data integration. An operator would have to integrate all information about the pipeline from diverse sources to analyze the entire range of threats to a pipeline's integrity. Prompt remedial action. An operator would have to take prompt action to address all integrity issues raised by the integrity assessment and data integration analysis. Preventive and mitigative measures. An operator would have to evaluate the need for additional measures to prevent and mitigate pipeline failures, such as installing emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) and establishing or [[Page 75379]] modifying systems that monitor pressure and detect leaks. Performance measures to measure the effectiveness of the program. The proposed rule permitted two options in establishing baseline and continual assessment schedules. An operator choosing the first option would have to base the schedule on specified risk factors. With the second option, an operator would base the schedule on risk factors the operator considered essential in risk or consequence evaluation. The NPRM explained in great detail the background of the proposed rule for the integrity management program (65 FR 21695; April 24, 2000). In the NPRM, we said that we intended to apply integrity management program requirements to all regulated pipeline operators but that we would implement the requirements in several steps; when we were done, all regulated operators would be required to have an integrity management program. We explained that because natural gas and hazardous liquid have different physical properties, pose different risks, and the configuration of the systems differ, and because we needed to gather more information about smaller liquid operations, we were beginning the series of integrity management program proposals with hazardous liquid operators operating 500 or more miles of pipeline. We further stated that proposed regulatory requirements for the other operators would soon follow. The proposed rulemaking was the culmination of experience gained from inspections, accident investigations and risk management and system integrity initiatives. This experience was the foundation for proposing a rulemaking that addressed in a comprehensive manner NTSB recommendations, Congressional mandates and pipeline safety and environmental issues raised over the years. To recap the history of the rulemaking-- The rulemaking addressed several recommendations NTSB made to OPS concerning pipeline safety. (1) Require periodic testing and inspection to identify corrosion and other time-dependent damages. (2) Establish criteria to determine appropriate intervals for inspections and tests, including safe service intervals between pressure testing. (3) Determine hazards to public safety from electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe and establish standards for leak detection, and expedite requirements for installing automatic or remote-operated mainline valves on high-pressure lines in urban and environmentally sensitive areas to provide for rapid shutdown of failed pipeline segments. Our analyses of several pipeline ruptures in Bellingham, Washington; Simpsonville, South Carolina; Reston, Virginia; and Edison, New Jersey, brought to light the need for operators to address the potential interrelationship among failure causes and to implement coordinated risk control actions to supplement the protection of the regulations. The rulemaking also addressed several Congressional mandates to OPS concerning areas where the risk of a pipeline spill could have significant impact. (1) 49 U.S.C. 60109(a)--prescribe standards establishing criteria for identifying gas pipeline facilities located in high-density population areas and for hazardous liquid pipelines that cross waters where a substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists, or are located in a high-density population area, or are located in an area unusually sensitive to environmental damage (USAs). (2) 49 U.S.C. 60102(f)(2)--prescribe, if necessary, additional standards requiring the periodic inspection of pipelines in USAs and high-density population areas, and those crossing commercially navigable waterways, to include any circumstances when an instrumented internal inspection device, or similarly effective inspection method, should be used to inspect the pipeline. (3) 49 U.S.C. 60102(j)--survey and assess the effectiveness of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) and other procedures, systems, and equipment used to detect and locate hazardous liquid pipeline ruptures, and to prescribe standards on the circumstances where an operator of a hazardous liquid pipeline facility must use an EFRD or such other procedure, system, or equipment. Risk Management and Inspection Initiatives The proposed rulemaking was also based on what we had learned about integrity management programs from our risk management and pipeline inspection activities, particularly the Risk Management Demonstration Program, the Systems Integrity Inspection (SII) Pilot Program and the new high impact format for inspections. (These programs and activities are discussed in greater detail in the NPRM (65 FR 21695).) In the Risk Management Demonstration and Systems Integrity Inspection Pilot Programs, we studied and evaluated comprehensive and integrated approaches to safety and environmental protection. These approaches incorporated operator- and pipeline-specific information and data to identify, assess, and address pipeline risks, in conjunction with compliance with existing pipeline safety regulations. From these programs, we also learned about the extent and variety of internal inspection and other diagnostic tools that hazardous liquid pipeline operators use in their integrity management programs. OPS implemented a systems approach through a new high impact inspection format that evaluates pipeline systems as a whole rather than in small segments. We found that a system-wide approach is a more effective and, in most cases, more efficient means of evaluating pipeline integrity. As part of this approach, we have been evaluating how pipeline operators integrate information about their pipelines to determine the best means of addressing risk. This experience is helping us to develop detailed inspection guidelines to evaluate compliance with the requirements of this rule. Advisory Committee Consideration The Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (THLPSSC) is the Federal advisory committee charged with responsibility for advising on the technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost- effectiveness, and practicability of proposed hazardous liquid pipeline safety standards. The 15 member committee has balanced membership with individuals having the requisite expertise who represent industry, government, and the general public. We presented the proposed rule to the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee at its meeting on May 4, 2000. At the request of various committee members, who believed that they had not had sufficient time to review the proposed rule, which was published in April, 2000, formal consideration of the proposal was postponed to September. In preparation for this consideration, the draft cost-benefit analysis was mailed to the members on June 16, 2000 and the members were briefed on the proposed rule in a teleconference on August 24, 2000. The committee began consideration of the proposed rule at a September 11, 2000 meeting (by teleconference) and completed consideration at a September 22, 2000 meeting (by teleconference). At the September 22 meeting, ten of the eleven participating THLPSSC members voted to accept the proposed rule provided several changes were made. [[Page 75380]] One member abstained from the general vote, but voted on the individual changes. These changes as well as other comments including minority views are described below. A more complete description can be found in the transcript of the committee's consideration of the proposed rule which is available in the docket. Various committee members had earlier expressed concern about the quality of the cost-benefit analysis. Concerns expressed included the lack of clear articulation of the benefits and the failure to follow the framework for cost-benefit analysis developed for use in pipeline safety rulemaking. In response to these concerns, OPS committed to revise the cost-benefit analysis to be more consistent with the framework prior to publication of a final rule. Discussion of the issue at the September 22nd meeting indicated that members did not want to delay the issuance of a final rule, but that they believed that the quality of the cost-benefit analysis to be important. The committee voted unanimously that it could not conclude that the proposed rule is reasonable at this time until OPS completed a more meaningful cost- benefit analysis based on the framework. The committee recommended that this be done prior to issuance of the final rule. In addition, the committee unanimously made the following recommendations for changes to the proposed rule: Add pipeline stress to the list of risk factors to be considered in determining the frequency of integrity assessment. Clarify OPS's responsibility to identify, generate, publish, and update maps of high consequence areas. Establish time requirements for completion of repairs following detection of the defects. The timing may be tiered. Require leak detection capability. Specify the date (for example, January 1995) for acceptability of data from previously conducted internal inspections. This date should be consistent with the proposed 5 year look-back. With the exception of item 2 (responsibility for maps), RSPA has made changes to the final rule that address each of these recommendations. RSPA is addressing item 2 in this preamble, under the topic heading ``Definition of High Consequence Areas--Identification'', rather than in language of the rule. That section describes the process through which RSPA intends to make maps identifying high consequence areas available to the operators and the public. In addition to the formal recommendations of the committee, individual committee members raised two issues about which there was general agreement. The first of these concerned the need to clarify the applicability of the rule to offshore areas. This issue is addressed under the topic heading ``Applicability (Coverage) of the Rule.'' The second of these was the need to clarify the use of internal inspection to assess the integrity of pre-1970 electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe. The committee member was concerned that a footnote in the proposed rule would preclude internal inspection of this type of pipe. Accordingly, RSPA has modified the rule to address the issue. We discuss the rule modification later under the topic heading ``Program Implementation and Integrity Assessment Time Frames, Assessment Methods and Criteria.'' Prior to the meeting, one committee member had raised the issue of requirements for emergency flow restricting devices. RSPA had indicated that it was considering including criteria for requiring the use of such devices. After a brief discussion in the meeting, the member decided not to pursue a formal recommendation by the committee. As discussed later in the Preamble under the topic heading ``Requirements for Preventive and Mitigative Measures, including, Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRDs) and Leak Detection Devices'', RSPA has modified the rule's provisions concerning emergency flow restricting devices. There was some discussion in the various meetings that indicated some concern about how RSPA would be able to enforce broad requirements for programs. Some committee members suggested the need for specific criteria that inspectors could apply in reviewing an operator's program. Although these discussions did not result in formal recommendations by the committee, RSPA has included additional specificity in the final rule that will aid in reviewing integrity management programs. In addition, enforceability is discussed elsewhere in this preamble. The committee also discussed three other issues about which there was not general agreement. Four members of the committee believed that the final rule or a future modification should require leak detection systems and specify performance standards for those systems. The proposed rule did not propose to require or set standards for leak detection systems. (Current regulations require computational pipeline monitoring leak detection systems to comply with API 1130, the industry consensus standard.) Industry members raised concerns about the scope of the current proposed rule and offered to brief the committee at a future meeting on the range of leak detection systems currently available. As noted above, the committee finally recommended by unanimous consent that the final rule require that pipelines affecting high consequence areas have the capability of detecting leaks. As explained later in the Preamble under the topic heading ``Requirements for Preventive and Mitigative Measures, including, Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRDs) and Leak Detection Devices'', we have revised the rule to address this recommendation. A second area of discussion about which there was not agreement was a motion to reduce the time for completion of the initial baseline assessment from seven years to three years. RSPA's rationale for not reducing this time frame is discussed elsewhere in this preamble. The third area was a motion to reduce the time interval for subsequent assessments from ten years to five years. The committee was evenly divided on this issue. As discussed elsewhere in this document under the heading ``Program Implementation and Integrity Assessment Time Frames, Assessment Methods and Criteria'', RSPA has decided to modify the time interval for integrity re-assessments subsequent to the baseline assessment. Comments to NPRM We received comments from 36 sources in response to the NPRM: 2 Trade associations with members affected by this rulemaking American Petroleum Institute (API) American Water Works Association (AWWA) 3 Trade associations with members not directly affected by this rulemaking American Gas Association (AGA) New York Gas Group Interstate National Gas Association of America (INGAA) 8 Individual liquid operators Tosco Corporation Chevron Pipe Line Company BP Amoco Colonial Pipeline Company Koch Pipeline Company Equilon Pipeline Company Enbridge (U.S.) Inc. and Lakehead Pipe Line Partners Dynegy Midstream Services 4 Operators not directly affected by this rulemaking The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company (LDC and intrastate) [[Page 75381]] Tennessee Gas Company (natural gas transmission) Enron Pipeline Group(natural gas transmission) Consumers Energy (natural gas transmission and distribution) 2 State agencies Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA) State of Missouri--Department of Natural Resources 6 Advocacy groups Robert B. Rackleff, Friends of the Aquifer Pipeline Survivor's(sic) Association Environmental Defense National Pipeline Reform Coalition Fuel Safe Washington Harry S. Kottke and Delbert L. Moine, representing Ohio Pennsylvania Landowners Association (OPLA) 4 Federal agencies Environmental Protection Agency, Region III Environmental Protection Agency, Oil Program Center Department of Energy National Transportation Safety Board 2 Cities Austin, Texas Bellingham, Washington 3 Consultants/Contractors Batten and Associates Dr. Neb I. Uzelac SEFBO 2 Individuals U.S. Senator John Breaux Dene Miller Alden General Comments Virtually all commenters were supportive of the need for additional and stronger regulations in this area, and provided comments and suggestions focusing on specific details and language of the proposed rule. Commenters generally fell into one of two groups: those that thought the general structure of the proposed rule was adequate and provided the appropriate balance between prescriptive requirements and pipeline-specific analysis, and those that believed the proposed rule was not sufficiently strong, broad enough in scope, or specific. All commenters were positive about the need for additional communication among industry, public safety officials, regulators, and the public concerning pipeline risks. We have decided to address the topic of public communication and interaction in a subsequent related rulemaking. We will address these comments in more detail in that rulemaking. The trade associations and operators that are not directly affected by this rulemaking provided comments in anticipation of future integrity management program regulations that would affect them. We will use these comments when preparing the proposed rulemakings for the other operators. We have summarized the comments we received under the following topic areas: 1. Clarity and Specificity in the Proposed Rule 2. Remedial Actions 3. Review, Approval, and Enforcement Processes 4. Program Implementation and Integrity Assessment Time Frames, Assessment Methods and Criteria 5. Applicability (Coverage) of the Rule 6. Consensus Standard on Pipeline Integrity 7. Definition of High Consequence Areas 8. Requirements for Preventive and Mitigative Measures, including, Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRDs) and Leak Detection Devices 9. Methods to Measure Program Effectiveness 10. Cost Benefit Analysis 11. Information for Local Officials and the Public 12. Appendix C Guidance In addition, there were a variety of technical comments and suggestions concerning specific details of proposed Appendix C, and other technical language in the proposed rule. We did not include discussion of these detailed technical comments here but we did consider them in preparing the final rule and revising the Appendix. RSPA personnel also had numerous discussions with representatives from several federal government agencies during this rulemaking to resolve issues the agencies had raised about the proposed rule. These agencies included the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice, (DOJ/ENRD); Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), Bureau of Land Management, Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance and National Park Service from the Department of the Interior (DOI),\\1\\ the Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water, Oil Program Center, and Region 3 from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ); and the Office of Management and Budget. Where we have made changes to the rule to address comments these agencies raised during the discussions, we have so indicated. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \\1\\ The Department of the Interior submitted comments to the docket in the USA rulemaking (RSPA-99-5455). We will consider and address those comments in that rulemaking. The DOI comments we discuss in this rulemaking were made during the inter-agency meetings. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Clarity and Specificity in the Proposed Rule The proposed rule used primarily performance-based language to allow operators to use pipeline- and location-specific information to determine the necessary integrity management practices. The proposed rule used specification language to prescribe the required elements of an integrity management program and baseline assessment plan, the allowable methods of integrity assessment and the required intervals for conducting baseline and continual assessments. The proposed rule also specified that an operator was to follow best industry practices unless a rule section specified otherwise or the operator could justify reasons for deviating from such practices and that the deviation was supported by a reliable engineering evaluation. The proposed rule recognized that an integrity management program was an evolving program that an operator needed to continually improve. API and the liquid operators supported the proposed rule's holistic approach to pipeline integrity management that incorporated risk assessment and risk-based decision making. API further praised the use of performance-based language in OPS's regulations. Koch commented that ``a pipeline integrity management program allows an operator to consider the unique factors that impact a specific pipeline or pipeline segment and is more effective in improving pipeline safety than prescriptive regulations that treat all pipelines, no matter what their characteristics or where they are located, the same.'' Environmental Defense, other advocacy groups, and other commenters maintained that the rule should have more specific requirements. These commenters stated that without such specificity, OPS would not be able to evaluate the adequacy of operator programs and enforce the rule. The City of Austin cautioned against a performance-based approach and urged us to clearly define the performance requirements and standards for monitoring, inspection and response. NTSB reiterated its ongoing concern that OPS have regulations that contain measurable standards for performance. EPA Oil Program Center commented that the proposed rule failed to include the specific requirements for an integrity management program or the process for determining if a pipeline will affect a high consequence area. The City of Austin said the rule should [[Page 75382]] require an operator to determine the potential impact for a worst case spill. Colonial Pipeline recommended that the rule clarify, either in the regulatory language or through guidance, how pipelines outside the high consequence area could affect the area. API recommended that the rule recognize the value of planning changes and allow an operator to make changes to the baseline assessment plan. DOJ/ENRD expressed concern that the proposed rule's language about an integrity program being an evolving program that an operator had to continually improve left too much to the operator's discretion. DOJ/ ENRD had similar concerns with the language about an operator using and documenting a practice other than a standard industry practice. DOJ/ ENRD further thought a deviation from a standard practice should only be allowed when new technology is being used. DOJ/ENRD also strongly urged substantial revisions of the proposed rule to improve its enforceability. DOJ/ENRD wanted clearly stated and unambiguous requirements for specific actions that achieve measurable results, the violation of which subject the operator to meaningful penalties. NTSB expressed concern about the proposed rule's use of the term best industry practices without explaining where these practices could be found. EPA Region III also questioned who would be responsible for establishing, compiling, and disseminating the best industry practices. API commented that the term best industry practices may cause controversy over its meaning and suggested that the term proven industry practices would be more appropriate. Response: To achieve effective integrity management programs that evolve and take advantage of changing technologies, the final rule uses both performance and specification-based language. Based on our considerable experience with performance-based regulations, OPS believes that performance-based language will best achieve effective integrity management programs that are sufficiently flexible to reflect pipeline-specific conditions and risks.\\2\\ However, we recognize that certain elements of the rule need to be written in specification language. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \\2\\ Our using performance-based language in the rule is consistent with the Administration's policy of using performance- based standards. (See Executive Order 12866, Section 1(b) The Principles of Regulation (September 30, 1993).) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Performance-based standards allow an operator to select the most effective processes and technologies as they become available. OPS wants to create incentives for operators to invest in the development of new technology. Because internal inspection technology and other integrity monitoring equipment have changed considerably in recent years and are expected to continue to improve, we want to encourage operators to use and strive to improve the best available technologies and processes. Thus, rather than only specify the use of currently available technologies, parts of the rule are performance-based to allow operators to develop customized programs that address pipeline- specific characteristics, are fully integrated into company safety and environmental protection programs, and use the best available technologies to assess and repair pipelines. The specification parts of the rule ensure uniformity among integrity management programs so that they all address key issues, such as baseline and continual integrity assessment intervals, information integration and analysis requirements, and time frames to review and analyze integrity assessment results and to complete remedial actions. As suggested by commenters, we have revised the rule to allow an operator to modify its baseline assessment plan and to clarify the basis for an operator changing and improving its integrity management program. We have added a provision allowing an operator to modify its baseline assessment plan so long as the operator documents the modification and reasons for the modification. An operator would have to document any modification at the time the decision is made to modify the plan, not at the time the modification is implemented. OPS enforcement personnel would review these supporting documents during a field inspection. Although reworded, the rule still provides that an integrity management program is a continually changing program. However, the rule now specifies that an operator must continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and surveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. The rule also clarifies that an operator's integrity management program will evolve from the initial program framework the operator develops. We have revised the rule to clarify that the integrity management program requirements apply to each pipeline segment that could affect a high consequence areas. An operator's program must address the risk factors each pipeline segment poses to a high consequence area. The proposed rule specified required elements of an operator's integrity management program. Other than some minor word changes and edits, we have not changed those elements in the final rule. We believe these elements will ensure sound integrity management programs. However, to address commenters' concerns that the proposed rule failed to specify a process for determining if a release could affect a high consequence area, we have added two related requirements: that, as a first step, an operator identify all pipeline segments that could affect a high consequence area and also include a process in its program for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high consequence area. (Identifying those segments that could affect an area involves determining if a release from a segment in or near a high consequence area could affect the area.) Although we did not propose these requirements in the notice, we believe they were implicit. Whether explicitly stated or not, an operator would have to identify which pipeline segments could affect a high consequence area before determining how the line pipe in those segments would be assessed. Moreover, since the trigger for the integrity management program requirements is whether a pipeline segment could affect a high consequence area, an essential element must be a process for identifying those pipeline segments that could affect the defined high consequence areas. In the Appendix to the rule, we have also provided guidance to help an operator in identifying high consequence areas and in evaluating how a pipeline release could affect a high consequence area. This guidance will help an operator in developing the required process. The final rule requires that an operator follow recognized industry practices unless the rule otherwise requires a different practice or the operator can demonstrate that an alternative practice is supported by a reliable engineering evaluation. Paragraph (b)(3) does not affect an operator's obligation to comply with all other requirements in this rule. In the final rule, we have changed the term best industry practices to recognized industry practices. We believe this is an easily understood term by operators and enforcement personnel. Recognized industry practices include those found in national consensus standards or reference guides, and generally conform to the practices of the American [[Page 75383]] National Standards Institute. Companies' successful use of these practices helps determine their validity and acceptance. We have further revised the provision to clarify the basis for an operator using an alternative practice. The rule now provides that an operator's selection of an alternative must be based on a reliable engineering evaluation. Use of an alternative must provide an equivalent level of public safety and environmental protection. An operator must document its use of an alternative practice from when the operator makes the decision to use the alternative. An operator must be able to provide the documentation to OPS enforcement personnel for review during a field inspection. We have not limited an operator's use of alternative practices to only when new technology is being used. For example, an alternative practice could be one that has been successfully used in other countries or by other pipeline companies but has not yet been codified into a national consensus standard. OPS wants to encourage operators to use innovative practices that are based on sound engineering judgment. OPS also wants to encourage innovation in technology and recognizes that an existing technology may be improved and given a new application. We have also revised language throughout the rule to make the rule clearer and more understandable. These changes have not affected the requirements of the rule, most have simply been made to improve the rule's overall clarity and to ensure the consistency in use of terms. Others have been made to address DOJ's concerns about making the rule more specific and enforceable and clarifying the operator's required responsibilities under the rule. Any substantive changes are discussed in this document. 2. Remedial Actions--Proposed Section 195.452(g) The proposed rule required an operator to take prompt action to address all pipeline integrity issues raised by the integrity assessment and data integration analysis. The rule proposed that an operator evaluate and repair all defects that could reduce a pipeline's integrity, and establish an evaluation and repair schedule. The rule did not propose time frames for making the repairs, other than an operator could not operate the affected part of its pipeline system until it had corrected a condition presenting an immediate hazard. The NPRM also asked for comment on whether the rule should contain specific time lines for conducting repairs. API was against specific time lines and said that criteria for when repairs should be implemented could not be reduced to simple statements suitable for inclusion in the rule. API added that the consensus standard will offer guidance to operators. Enbridge stated that a one- size-fits-all time frame for conducting repairs is not practical or technically justified; however, Enbridge said that it supported the goal of ensuring that no imminent hazard is left unaddressed. Environmental Defense recommended a relatively short time to conduct repairs after serious defects are identified, e.g., one month to complete repairs unless pipeline pressure is significantly reduced. The City of Austin said that the rule should include repair time lines, acceptable methods of remediation and a better definition of what pipeline flaws constitute an immediate hazard. The City of Bellingham also recommended that the rule establish a specific and expeditious deadline for conducting repairs. EPA Region III commented that the proposed rule did not define what conditions constituted immediate hazard conditions. Peoples Energy commented that the proposed language about ","truncated":true,"body_characters":249499}