{"operation":"document","citation":"65 FR 21695","title":"Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Research and Special Programs Administration","status":"proposed","official":true,"published_on":"2000-04-24","effective_on":null,"summary":"This document proposes regulations to test, repair and validate through analysis the integrity of most hazardous liquid pipelines that could affect populated areas, commercially navigable waterways, and areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage. RSPA's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) proposes to define these areas as high consequence areas. In these proposed high consequence areas, OPS is proposing that an operator develop and follow an integrity management program that continually assesses and evaluates the integrity of those pipelines that could affect a high consequence area, through internal inspection or pressure testing, and data integration and analysis. Through this required program, OPS expects operators to comprehensively evaluate the entire range of threats to pipeline integrity by analyzing all available information about the pipeline and consequences of a failure. This would include information on the potential for damage due to excavation, data gathered through the required integrity assessment, results of other inspections and tests required by the pipeline safety regulations, including corrosion control monitoring and cathodic protection surveys, and information about how a failure could affect the high consequence area, such as location of water intakes. The proposed rule requires an operator to take prompt action to address the integrity issues raised by the assessment and analysis. This means an operator must evaluate and repair all defects that could reduce a pipeline's integrity according to specified risk criteria. The integrity of these pipelines would be further assured through other remedial actions, and preventive and mitigative measures.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-00-9934.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-00-9934.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-00-9934","source_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2000/04/24/00-9934/pipeline-safety-pipeline-integrity-management-in-high-consequence-areas","body":"Federal Register, Volume 65 Issue 79 (Monday, April 24, 2000) [Federal Register Volume 65, Number 79 (Monday, April 24, 2000)] [Proposed Rules] [Pages 21695-21710] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] [FR Doc No: 00-9934] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Research and Special Programs Administration 49 CFR Part 195 [Docket No. RSPA-99-6355; Notice 3] Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: This document proposes regulations to test, repair and validate through analysis the integrity of most hazardous liquid pipelines that could affect populated areas, commercially navigable waterways, and areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage. RSPA's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) proposes to define these areas as high consequence areas. In these proposed high consequence areas, OPS is proposing that an operator develop and follow an integrity management program that continually assesses and evaluates the integrity of those pipelines that could affect a high consequence area, through internal inspection or pressure testing, and data integration and analysis. Through this required program, OPS expects operators to comprehensively evaluate the entire range of threats to pipeline integrity by analyzing all available information about the pipeline and consequences of a failure. This would include information on the potential for damage due to excavation, data gathered through the required integrity assessment, results of other inspections and tests required by the pipeline safety regulations, including corrosion control monitoring and cathodic protection surveys, and information about how a failure could affect the high consequence area, such as location of water intakes. The proposed rule requires an operator to take prompt action to address the integrity issues raised by the assessment and analysis. This means an operator must evaluate and repair all defects that could reduce a pipeline's integrity according to specified risk criteria. The integrity of these pipelines would be further assured through other remedial actions, and preventive and mitigative measures. DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit comments on this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) by June 23, 2000. Late filed comments will be considered to the extent practicable. ADDRESSES: You may submit written comments by mail or delivery to the Dockets Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590-0001. It is open from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays. You also may submit written comments to the docket electronically. To do so, log on to the following Internet Web address: http://dms.dot.gov . Click on ``Help & Information'' for instructions on how to file a document electronically. All written comments should identify the docket and notice numbers stated in the heading of this notice. Anyone desiring confirmation of mailed comments must include a self-addressed stamped postcard. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Israni, (202) 366-4571, or by e- mail: [email protected] , regarding the subject matter of this proposed rule, or the Dockets Facility (202) 366-9329, for copies of this proposed rule or other material in the docket. All materials in this docket may be accessed electronically at http://dms.dot.gov . General information about the RSPA/Office of Pipeline Safety programs may be obtained by accessing OPS's Internet home page at http://ops.dot.gov . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background This proposed rulemaking is the culmination of experience gained from inspections, accident investigations and risk management and system integrity initiatives. This experience has given us the foundation for proposing a rulemaking that addresses in a comprehensive manner NTSB recommendations, Congressional mandates and pipeline safety and environmental issues raised over the years. Accident analyses Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations and analyses of major pipeline incidents have emphasized the importance of ensuring safety and environmental protection in areas of population density and in areas unusually sensitive to environmental [[Page 21696]] damage. NTSB recommendations on this subject include: NTSB recommended that OPS require periodic testing and inspection to identify corrosion and other time-dependent damages. NTSB recommended that OPS establish criteria to determine appropriate intervals for inspections and tests, including safe service intervals between pressure testing. NTSB recommended that OPS determine hazards to public safety from electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe and establish standards for leak detection. NTSB recommended that OPS expedite requirements for installing automatic or remote-operated mainline valves on high- pressure lines in urban and environmentally sensitive areas to provide for rapid shutdown of failed pipeline segments. Several incidents, including pipeline ruptures in Bellingham, Washington; Simpsonville, South Carolina; Reston, Virginia; and Edison, New Jersey have illustrated the importance of integrating and analyzing data from various sources to ensure a pipeline's integrity. Our analyses indicate that many accidents are caused by complex factors involving mechanical and control system failures, previous outside force damage, system design errors and operator error. These accidents indicate the need for operators to address the potential interrelationship among failure causes and to implement coordinated risk control actions to supplement the protection of the regulations. We are persuaded of the urgent need to propose regulations for an overall pipeline integrity management program that requires continual assessment and evaluation through internal inspection or pressure testing, data integration and analysis, and follow-up remedial, preventive and mitigative actions. Statutory Requirements Congress has directed OPS to undertake a variety of activities concerning areas where the risk of a pipeline spill could have significant impact. Required actions include: 49 U.S.C. 60109(a)(2)--OPS is to prescribe standards establishing criteria for identifying gas pipeline facilities located in high-density population areas and hazardous liquid pipelines that cross waters where a substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists, located in a high-density population area, or in an area unusually sensitive to environmental damage (USAs). 49 U.S.C. 60102(f)(2)--OPS is to prescribe additional standards requiring the periodic inspection of pipelines in USAs and high-density population areas. The regulations are to prescribe when an instrumented internal inspection device, or similarly effective inspection method, should be used to inspect the pipeline. 49 U.S.C. 60102(j)--OPS is to survey and assess the effectiveness of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) and other procedures, systems, and equipment used to detect and locate hazardous liquid pipeline ruptures, and to prescribe regulations on the circumstances where an operator of a hazardous liquid pipeline facility must use an EFRD or such other procedure, system, or equipment. Risk Management Initiatives Although the pipeline safety regulations have a demonstrated record in addressing risks to the nation's pipelines, safety programs based only on compliance with the regulations may overlook the interrelationships among failure causes and the benefits of coordinated risk control activities. To study and evaluate if comprehensive and integrated approaches to safety and environmental protection could work, OPS created the Risk Management Demonstration Program and the Systems Integrity Inspection (SII) Pilot Program. These programs encourage and evaluate operator- developed safety and environmental management processes that incorporate operator- and pipeline-specific information and data to identify, assess, and address pipeline risks, in conjunction with compliance with existing pipeline safety regulations. These programs, along with the Oil Spill Response Plan Review and Exercise Program, have helped OPS refine its regulatory oversight to ensure that pipeline operators have effective processes to identify the most important risks to the public and the environment, and to develop and implement cost- effective preventive and mitigative actions to manage these risks. OPS's interim assessment of the benefits of risk management processes, after four years of experience with the demonstration program, indicates the validity of focusing resources and establishing higher levels of protection in areas where a pipeline spill could have significant consequences. Operator-Developed Integrity Management Programs In evaluating the operators who applied for the Risk Management and SII Programs, OPS found that liquid operators have made progress in developing and implementing formalized management systems to identify and address the most significant integrity threats to their pipeline systems. These programs are designed to supplement the protections that the pipeline safety regulations provide. OPS further found that liquid operators generally have more experience than natural gas operators with using internal inspection devices. In the Risk Management Demonstration Program, participants perform systematic and comprehensive risk assessments to identify the specific nature and location of the most significant risks posed by operation of their pipeline system. An essential feature of these risk assessments is the integration of information from many diverse sources to fully understand the integrity threats at specific locations on the pipeline. Environmental consequences and the impact on nearby population are explicitly considered in these risk assessments. Through formal, risk- based decision making processes, these companies can use the risk assessment results to identify projects and activities that address potential system integrity threats, thereby preventing pipeline failures. The risk management process also examines the consequences of potential releases and explores opportunities to minimize the environmental and public safety and health impacts should a failure occur. Participants are using these risk-based programs to comprehensively investigate all potential sources of risk, and implement risk control activities to prevent these risks or mitigate their consequences. These programs supplement the public and environmental protections the pipeline safety regulations provide. The SII pilot program is focused on developing a more integrity- based approach to OPS inspections. Instead of basing inspections on a checklist approach to compliance with the regulations, the program focuses the inspection process on how an operator controls the integrity of the pipeline. In this program, OPS is working with the operator to better understand the most significant integrity threats and assure that programs actually address these risks. Similar to the Risk Management Program, the SII program focuses on how operators evaluate their system and make sound integrity management decisions. Although OPS has consulted with a limited number of operators who have applied for these programs, OPS discussions with other pipeline companies during standard inspections, in industry forums and through working groups have indicated that integrated [[Page 21697]] risk-based programs are becoming more common, particularly within the hazardous liquid industry. OPS has found that many liquid companies are using diagnostic tools and developing more sophisticated and mature integrity management systems. The hazardous liquid pipeline companies in the Risk Management and SII programs use internal inspection in their integrity management programs because of its powerful diagnostic capability. Examples of how these programs use internal inspection include: Comparing multiple internal inspection runs over the same line to determine corrosion growth rates; Testing new inspection techniques to detect seam flaws and stress corrosion cracking; Overlaying internal inspection log results with Geographic Information System data to correlate locations of metal loss with cathodic protection system performance, environmentally sensitive areas, and other geo-spatial data; Integrating hydrostatic pressure testing with internal inspection where appropriate; Using probabilistic techniques to optimize the frequency at which internal inspection and pressure testing is conducted; Using probabilistic approaches to prioritize and define the extent of anomaly excavation and repair; and Developing more sophisticated analytical tools to evaluate internal inspection results. New High Impact Inspection Format (NHIF) OPS is also working to improve overall pipeline integrity through the inspection process. OPS is gaining value from the approach taken in the Risk Management and SII programs, particularly benefitting from evaluating pipelines on a ``systems'' basis. Therefore, last year, OPS implemented this approach through a new high impact inspection format, evaluating pipeline systems as a whole rather than in small segments. A system-wide approach is a more effective and, in most cases, more efficient means of evaluating pipeline integrity. As part of the ``systems'' approach, we are evaluating how pipeline operators integrate information about their pipeline to determine the best means of addressing risk. We will build on this experience in developing detailed inspection guidelines to evaluate compliance with the requirements we are proposing in this rule. As noted previously, accident and investigation analyses have identified several critical pipeline safety issues that appear to either cause or significantly contribute to pipeline accidents. As part of our NHIF process, we are evaluating how pipeline companies are addressing these issues and are noting the best industry practices we observe. Effectively managing these critical issues often relates to integrating information about different problems and examining their relationship in contributing to the potential for a failure. Public Meeting On November 18 & 19, 1999, OPS hosted a public meeting in Herndon, VA to gather information on current pipeline assessment methods and integrity management programs so that OPS could develop a regulatory process to require testing and other means of identifying and repairing defects and further evaluating pipeline integrity in areas where a pipeline release posed the greatest safety or environmental harm. Topics discussed included the key elements of an effective integrity management program, the extent to which operators now have integrity management programs, and how to validate the effectiveness of such programs. The Breakout Sessions At the meeting, OPS held breakout sessions to specifically discuss some key issues about how to better protect high consequence areas through an integrity management process. 1. The Characteristics of High Consequence Areas In addition to areas already given greater protection in the regulations or covered by the proposed USA definition (discussed later in this document), attendees suggested OPS consider areas in proximity to large bodies of water used for transportation or recreation; industries that impact public health and welfare, such as water treatment facilities and power plants; and major corridors such as road ways, rail roads and power lines. Several pipeline companies described approaches they use in their risk assessments and integrity evaluations to identify locations where a pipeline failure might have significant human health and safety impacts. Some participants maintained that defining actual impact zones would be preferable to the classic population corridor used in the gas regulations. For liquid lines, it was suggested that a more useable definition of non-rural areas than currently exists in the regulations may be desirable to provide greater clarity. Some participants suggested that OPS let operators test a definition of high consequence areas for a trial period. 2. Key Elements of an Integrity Management Program There was a general belief that many of the components of effective integrity management are already in the regulations, the major exception being effective integration of information in support of decision making. Attendees also pointed out that the Risk Management Program Standard or API standard 1129 could be used to define the elements of an integrity management program. Participants said that a successful integrity management program must be embodied within an environment, safety, and health management system framework. Several companies described elements of their environment, safety, and health management systems and emphasized the importance of policy, leadership, and continuous improvement to program success. Public representatives identified the need for thoroughness in assessing risks and the importance of better data to monitor leak and failure history. Public communication and local safety and planning agencies' participation in identifying risks were also emphasized as key program elements. 3. The Elements OPS Should Review/Evaluate/Inspect Participants suggested that operators have a documented integrity management plan that has goals and performance measures so that regulators could review the plan, and evaluate performance against that plan. Some participants said that the review should be performance- based. It was also suggested that OPS review the results of the operator's audit of its own program. Concerns were raised over how OPS would assure staff expertise to adequately conduct performance-based inspections, and how OPS would establish a uniform standard against which to measure company performance. 4. Types of Information a Company Should Integrate To Ensure Pipeline Integrity Attendees listed a variety of information, emphasizing location- specific information from sources such as close interval surveys, patrols, in-line inspection data, top-side anomaly information, maintenance history, third party excavation activity, physical pipe inspections, incident and leak history. [[Page 21698]] 5. Key Questions for OPS to Ask During an Inspection. Participants emphasized that OPS should focus on the key location- specific issues an operator identifies, examine the process an operator uses to address these issues, and examine changes since the last inspection. Several attendees suggested using SII Program Protocols in crafting an approach to reviewing operator programs. Other Pre-NPRM Meetings Due to the complexity of the issues, OPS requested participants submit additional information and comments by December 20, 1999. We then extended the comment period to January 17, 2000 (64 FR 71713) to allow adequate time for commenters to prepare and submit information. OPS also established an electronic public discussion forum to get ideas on requirements for an effective integrity management programs. We posted a draft conceptual model for a pipeline integrity management process on the OPS web-site. The comments and information we received from the public meeting and electronic forum helped us in drafting this proposed rule. We discuss these comments later in this document. OPS also hosted a number of smaller meetings and conference calls to make sure we considered the broadest range of comments and information in drafting this NPRM. Discussion items included the areas that should be considered high consequence areas, reasonable milestones for completing benchmark or baseline testing, developing industry standards to support a rule, how a rule should acknowledge differences between the gas and liquid pipeline industries as well as among individual operators, and how best to involve affected communities. These topics were discussed with Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) representatives on January 12, American Petroleum Institute (API) representatives on January 13 and National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR) on January 14, February 15, and March 3. Discussions with public interest representatives on January 19 and February 29 included the National League of Cities; Safe Bellingham; the City of Fredericksburg, Virginia; the Environmental Defense Fund; the City of Austin, Texas; the Pipeline Reform Coalition; and the national organization of Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC's). OPS met with the NTSB on February 8. Minutes from each of these sessions are in the Docket. These meetings again showed how hazardous liquid and gas pipeline operators' experience differed in developing and implementing a risk- based integrity approach to pipeline safety. Comments Received in the Docket For reasons discussed later in this document, at this time we are applying this proposed rule to certain hazardous liquid operators i.e., those hazardous liquid operators operating 500 or more miles of pipeline used in transportation. Therefore, we will discuss only those comments relevant to this action. Later this year, when we issue proposed system integrity rules that apply to those hazardous liquid operators not covered by this initial action and to all natural gas transmission pipeline operators, we will discuss the other comments. We received comments relevant to this action from the following sources: Trade Associations: American Petroleum Institute American Society of Safety Engineers Interstate Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators: BP Amoco Pipeline Company All American Pipeline, L.P. Tosco Corporation Enbridge (U.S.) Inc. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. Engineering firm: Advanced Technology Corporation Engineering Consultant: Foy Milton, P.E. State Regulators: New York State Department of Public Service State of Florida Department(s) of Community Affairs Federal Agency: U.S. Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service Citizen Group: SAFE Bellingham We discuss the comments under the applicable heading below. Commenters generally supported the idea of providing further protection for critical areas. Operators and industry groups requested regulations that allow flexibility. SAFE Bellingham urged stronger federal regulation of pipelines, to include requirements for pressure testing, internal inspection, leak detection systems, safety management practices and audits, valve location and safety condition reporting. As discussed later in this document, this proposal specifically requires an integrity assessment done by internal inspection, pressure testing or an equivalent technology within specified time frames established by specified risk criteria. The proposed program must comprehensively evaluate all threats to pipeline safety in high consequence areas. Among the required elements of an integrity management program are a continuous process to assess and maintain pipeline integrity, an analysis that integrates all information about the pipeline, information on how a failure would affect a high consequence area, and measures to prevent and mitigate pipeline failures, such as installing emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) and establishing or modifying systems that monitor pressure and detect leaks. Scope The New York State Department of Public Service commented that the integrity management program should apply to all transmission pipeline facilities, not just those in areas deemed high consequence. At our recent meeting, NTSB also recommended that pipeline integrity management requirements, including testing, be applied system-wide, not just in high consequence areas. Pipeline safety regulations apply to the entire pipeline to protect the public and the environment from a pipeline release. We have decided to focus this immediate initiative on pipelines in areas where additional protection is the most critical--the populated areas, unusually sensitive environmental areas, and commercially navigable waterways. We believe operators should take necessary steps to develop and maintain an effective integrity management program for their pipeline system-wide. However, based on available data, OPS is proposing additional measures, particularly pipeline testing and evaluation, for those areas where additional protection is clearly warranted at this time. We will continue to consider whether integrity- related actions for the rest of the pipeline should be required. We also intend to look at additional protection for other environmentally sensitive and vital resources, such as designating additional areas of national importance, cultural resources, sensitive environmental resources that do not meet the USA filtering criteria, wetlands and water bodies, and other transportation networks. Nonetheless, many of the proposed measures for high consequence areas may benefit other parts of the pipeline system. For example, the proposed rule requires an operator to analyze and integrate various data about the integrity of the entire pipeline. This analysis is likely to benefit other segments of the pipeline system. The preventive and [[Page 21699]] mitigative measures that the rule proposes an operator take to protect the high consequence area might also yield benefits beyond the segment in the critical area. Many operators will choose to extend the internal inspection or testing beyond the pipeline segment in or near the high consequence areas. Specification vs. Performance Foy Milton recommended against a subjective performance-based rule, asserting the advantages of specification-type standards (uniformity of application, ease of understanding). Other commenters stated that regulatory requirements that set performance standards for pipeline operators are the most effective. The proposed rule uses both performance and specification-based language. Specification-type standards do not provide for selection of the most effective processes and technologies as they become available. OPS needs to create incentives for operators to invest in the development of new technology. Because internal inspection technology and other integrity monitoring equipment have evolved considerably in recent years and are expected to continue to improve, we want to encourage operators to use and make recommendations on how to improve the best available technologies and processes, rather than specifying only currently available technologies. Thus, the performance-based parts of the rule provide for operators to develop customized programs that address pipeline-specific characteristics, are fully integrated into company safety and environmental protection programs, and use the best available technologies to inspect and repair pipelines. The specification parts of the rule ensure uniformity among integrity management programs so that they all, at minimum, address key issues, such as baseline and continual inspection or testing, data integration, and remedial, preventive and mitigative measures. High Consequence Areas OPS received several comments on how to define high consequence areas. Commenters said that these areas should be limited to populated areas, unusually sensitive areas, and commercially navigable waterways. API recommended that these areas be defined as high population areas of greater than 100,000 people, based on U.S. Census data, other populated areas including non-rural areas, and unusually sensitive environmental areas. API argued that expansion beyond these areas would dilute industry resources and reduce the impact of any rule on public safety and environmental protection. API suggested that both subcategories of populated areas be similarly considered in conducting risk assessments, but might be treated differently for prevention activities. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. expressed the opinion that high consequence areas can differ dramatically depending on the nature of the product in the pipeline. They offered the example that a sensitive estuary might be a high consequence environment for under water hazardous liquid pipelines, but would be a very low consequence environment for an under water hydrogen pipeline. Fish and Wildlife Service stated high consequence areas should include high population areas and areas designated as critical habitats for threatened and endangered species, areas of national significance, areas migratory birds concentrate, wetlands and riparian areas, areas of recreational significance, and areas of tribal subsistence, ceremonial use, or historic value. All American Pipeline stated it considers all areas along its pipeline as high consequence areas, but distinguishes areas that have a higher consequence than others based on: proximity to populated places and waterways, potential to impact USAs or drinking water resources, and policies and regulations of local, county government bodies, and local political climate. New York State Department of Public Service stated that creating a high consequence area definition would be difficult, and perhaps, unnecessary. Rather, a model properly developed and applied to the entire pipeline system would distinguish high consequence components that are given higher priority for repair or remedial action. Participants at the public meeting said the high consequence area definition should include both safety and environmental impacts. The hazardous liquid industry breakout groups agreed that the definition should include a population component and USAs. We are focusing this rulemaking on areas where we have determined a pipeline failure could pose the greatest threat to public safety, the environment, and water commerce. We are designating these areas ``high consequence areas''. Our proposed definition does not take the type of product into account in defining the high consequence area. However, an operator needs to consider product type when determining which risk factors apply in establishing schedules for pipeline integrity assessments and other forms of evaluation. High consequence areas will be identified on OPS's National Pipeline Mapping System and made available to the public on the Internet. High Population Areas and Other Populated Areas OPS agreed with commenters that the population definitions should follow the U.S. Census Bureau's work. OPS is, therefore, proposing that the population portion of the high consequence area definition follow the Census Bureau's definitions and delineations of populated areas. The U.S. Census Bureau is the expert on, and the collector of, population data. It has used its collected data to create maps of populated areas in the United States that anyone may access. To protect the public from a potential pipeline failure, we are proposing a definition of high consequence area that encompasses two population tiers: high population areas and other populated areas. These are areas in the United States that have significant population densities. High population areas are areas of the United States with moderate to high population densities. The U.S. Census Bureau calls these places ``Urbanized Areas'', and defines them as areas that contain 50,000 or more people and have a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile. Other population areas are areas the U.S. Census Bureau identifies as ``Places'', and defines them as areas that contain a concentrated population, such as an incorporated or unincorporated city, town, village, or other designated residential or commercial area. Although an operator must assess and evaluate the integrity of pipelines that could affect either population area, an operator might give different inspection priorities to the areas. The U.S. Census Bureau has created digital data layers and maps of high population areas (Urbanized Areas) and other populated areas (Places). OPS has obtained these data layers and will make them available on our National Pipeline Mapping System home page http://www.npms.rspa.dot.gov . The National Pipeline Mapping System will allow an operator, member of the public, or other government agency to view and download this data and to view pipelines in relation to these populated areas. Unusually Sensitive Areas (USAs) We are also including unusually sensitive environmental areas (USAs) in our proposed high consequence area definition. These will be the same drinking water and ecological resource [[Page 21700]] areas that we recently proposed as unusually sensitive to environmental damage if there is a hazardous liquid pipeline release (64 FR 73464; December 30, 1999). The Federal Register notice gives more details of the proposed definition (proposed section 195.6). The proposed USA definition was created through a series of public workshops and our collaboration with a wide range of federal, state, public, and industry stakeholders. The identification of USAs is based on a multi-step process that begins by designating and assessing environmentally sensitive areas (ESAs), determining which of these ESAs are potentially more susceptible to permanent or long term damage from a hazardous liquid release (areas of primary concern), and finally identifying filtering criteria to determine which areas of primary concern can be reached by a release and sustain permanent or long-term damage. The areas that result are the proposed USAs. OPS is conducting a pilot test to determine if the proposed definition can be used to identify and locate unusually sensitive drinking water and ecological resources using available data from government agencies and environmental organizations. Texas, California, and Louisiana were the states chosen for the test due to the large number of hazardous liquid pipelines and the considerable drinking water and ecological resources that exist in these states. OPS is using the results to evaluate whether the proposed definition identifies the majority of unusually sensitive areas and whether environmental data is accessible and appropriate to support the proposed definition. Once OPS finishes the test, receives technical review from federal and state water and ecological experts and gets public comment on the proposed definition, it will go forward with a final rule. In addition, OPS believes that other sensitive and vital resources may need to be considered in this regulation. OPS requests comments on whether this regulation should cover additional areas of national importance, cultural resources, sensitive environmental resources that do not meet the USA filtering criteria, including certain wetlands and water bodies, and other transportation networks. OPS currently protects some of these resources in accordance with requirements for spill response planning of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. We will be working with the other Federal agencies to help define and identify any additional resources that should be considered in this or future regulations. OPS is holding a technical workshop April 27-28 to gather technical comments. Commercially Navigable Waterways OPS is including commercially navigable waterways in the proposed high consequence area definition. Because these waterways are critical to interstate and foreign commerce and supply vital resources to many American communities, are a major means of commercial transportation, and are a part of a national defense system, a pipeline release in these areas could have significant impacts. We are proposing to define commercially navigable waterways as those waterways ``where a substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists.'' Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Vanderbilt University have created a geographic database of navigable waterways in and around the United States. The database, called the National Waterways Network, was created with input from the National Waterway GIS Design Committee which is comprised of members from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. DOT's Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, the Maritime Administration, the Military Traffic Management Command, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Bureau of Census, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Railroad Administration. The database includes commercially navigable waterways and non- commercially navigable waterways. The database can be downloaded from the BTS website: http://www.bts.gov/gis/ntatlas/networks.html . OPS will place a map and database of the commercially navigable waterways portion of the National Waterways Network database on the National Pipeline Mapping System. Operators will be able to determine which areas of their pipeline intersect commercially navigable waterways, and the public and other government agencies will be able to view pipelines in relation to commercially navigable waterways. Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRDs) OPS has been concerned for some time with the issue of the optimum placement of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) to limit commodity release after the location of the release has been identified. EFRD means a check valve or remotely controlled valve. A 1991 Departmental study titled ``Emergency Flow Restricting Devices Study'' (1991 EFRD Study) recommended that OPS seek public input on the placement of EFRDs in urban areas, at water crossings, at other critical areas affected by commodity release, and areas in close proximity to the public outside of urban areas. The 1991 Study concluded remote control and check valves are the only effective EFRDs. A copy of the 1991 EFRD Study is filed in Docket No. PS-133. In response to 49 U.S.C. 60102(j), OPS issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) (59 FR 2802, Jan. 19, 1994) asking questions concerning the performance of leak detection equipment and location of EFRDs. Those responding were generally against requiring EFRDs. Some endorsed the selective use of EFRDs in high risk areas based on an operator's particular pipeline system. Although the number of responses was small, there was sufficient information to give guidance in considering the circumstances under which hazardous liquid pipeline operators should have EFRDs. In addition, past accidents, such as the 1986 Mounds View, Minnesota accident involving two deaths and one injury where it took one hour and 40 minutes to isolate the ruptured section, and the 1988 Maries County, Missouri accident where the installation of a check valve would have substantially reduced the 20,554 barrel (863,268 gallons) spill, demonstrated the need to propose regulations requiring the selective use of EFRDs. In October 1995, we held a public workshop to discuss the issues involved in developing regulations on EFRDs. Participants were generally against installing EFRDs except in very limited situations. Participants had concerns about the costs and effectiveness of these mitigative features. Because environmental sensitivity of the location is a factor when considering installing an EFRD, we have previously deferred proposing requirements until there was a USA definition. Since we now have a proposed USA definition, and because an EFRD can minimize a spill in a high consequence area, we have decided to include a proposal for EFRDs in this rulemaking. The rule proposes that a required element of an integrity management program is for an operator to take preventive and mitigative measures to protect a high consequence area. The operator must conduct a risk analysis to determine what additional protections are needed. Installing EFRDs is one of several [[Page 21","truncated":true,"body_characters":112406}