{"operation":"document","citation":"75 FR 72878","title":"Pipeline Safety: Updates to Pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas Reporting Requirements","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2010-11-26","effective_on":"2011-01-01","summary":"This final rule revises the Pipeline Safety Regulations to improve the reliability and utility of data collections from operators of natural gas pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities. These revisions will enhance PHMSA's ability to understand, measure, and assess the performance of individual operators and industry as a whole; integrate pipeline safety data to allow a more thorough, rigorous, and comprehensive understanding and assessment of risk; and expand and simplify existing electronic reporting by operators. These revisions will improve both the data and the analyses PHMSA and others rely on to make critical, safety-related decisions, and will facilitate both PHMSA's and states' allocation of pipeline safety program inspection and other resources based on a more accurate accounting of risk.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-2010-29087.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-2010-29087.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-2010-29087","source_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/11/26/2010-29087/pipeline-safety-updates-to-pipeline-and-liquefied-natural-gas-reporting-requirements","body":"Federal Register, Volume 75 Issue 227 (Friday, November 26, 2010) [Federal Register Volume 75, Number 227 (Friday, November 26, 2010)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 72878-72908] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] [FR Doc No: 2010-29087] [[Page 72877]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Part II Department of Transportation ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 49 CFR Parts 191, 192, 193 et al. Pipeline Safety: Updates to Pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas Reporting Requirements; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 227 / Friday, November 26, 2010 / Rules and Regulations [[Page 72878]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR 191, 192, 193 and 195 [Docket No. PHMSA-2008-0291; Amdt. Nos. 191-21; 192-115; 193-23; and 195-95] RIN 2137-AE33 Pipeline Safety: Updates to Pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas Reporting Requirements AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: This final rule revises the Pipeline Safety Regulations to improve the reliability and utility of data collections from operators of natural gas pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities. These revisions will enhance PHMSA's ability to understand, measure, and assess the performance of individual operators and industry as a whole; integrate pipeline safety data to allow a more thorough, rigorous, and comprehensive understanding and assessment of risk; and expand and simplify existing electronic reporting by operators. These revisions will improve both the data and the analyses PHMSA and others rely on to make critical, safety-related decisions, and will facilitate both PHMSA's and states' allocation of pipeline safety program inspection and other resources based on a more accurate accounting of risk. DATES: This final rule is effective January 1, 2011. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Roger Little by telephone at 202-366- 4569 or by electronic mail at [email protected] . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Background On July 2, 2009, (74 FR 31675) PHMSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing to revise the Pipeline Safety Regulations (49 CFR Parts 190-199) to improve the reliability and utility of data collections from operators of natural gas pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines, and LNG facilities. Specifically, PHMSA proposed the following amendments to the regulations: 1. Modify 49 CFR 191.1 to reflect the changes made to the definition of gas gathering lines in Part 192. 2. Change the definition of an ``incident'' in 49 CFR 191.3 to require an operator to report an explosion or fire not intentionally set by the operator and to establish a volumetric basis for reporting unexpected or unintentional gas loss. 3. Require operators to report and file data electronically whenever possible. 4. Require operators of LNG facilities to submit incident and annual reports. 5. Create and require participation in a National Registry of Pipeline and LNG Operators. 6. Require operators to use a standard form in electronically submitting Safety-Related Condition Reports and Offshore Pipeline Condition Reports. 7. Merge the natural gas transmission IM Semi-Annual Performance Measures Report with the annual reports. Revise the leak cause categories listed in the annual report to include those nine categories listed in ASME B31.8S. Expand information on the natural gas transmission annual report to add information for miles of gathering lines by Type A and Type B gathering, class location information by specified minimum yield strength (SMYS), volume of commodity transported, and type of commodity transported. 8. Modify hazardous liquid operator telephonic notification of accidents to require operators to have and use a procedure to calculate and report a reasonable initial estimate of released product and to provide an additional telephonic report to the NRC if significant new information becomes available during the emergency response phase. 9. Require operators of hazardous liquid pipelines to submit pipeline information by state on the annual report for hazardous liquid pipelines. 10. Remove obsolete provisions that would conflict with the proposal to require electronic submission of all reports. 11. Update Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control numbers assigned to information collections. The statutory authority under 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq. authorizes this final rule; these Federal Pipeline Safety Laws grant broad authority to PHMSA to regulate pipeline safety. The proposed data collection and filing requirement revisions are wholly consistent with Section 15 of the PIPES Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-468, December 26, 2006), which requires PHMSA to review and modify the incident reporting criteria as appropriate to ensure that the data accurately reflects trends over time. For natural gas pipeline operators, specific reporting requirements in 49 CFR Part 191 are found at: Sec. 191.5 Telephonic notice of certain incidents. Sec. 191.7 Addresses for written reports. Sec. 191.9 Natural gas distribution incident report. Sec. 191.11 Natural gas distribution annual report. Sec. 191.15 Natural gas transmission and gathering incident report. Sec. 191.17 Natural gas transmission and gathering annual report. Sec. 191.23 Reporting safety-related conditions. Sec. 191.25 Filing safety-related condition reports. Sec. 191.27 Filing offshore pipeline condition reports. The requirement for reporting leaks and spills of LNG in accordance with Part 191 is found at Sec. 193.2011. Part 191 has excluded LNG from many of the reporting requirements. For hazardous liquid pipeline operators specific reporting requirements in 49 CFR Part 195 are found at: Sec. 195.48 Scope. Sec. 195.49 Annual report. Sec. 195.50 Reporting accidents. Sec. 195.52 Telephonic notice of certain accidents. Sec. 195.54 Accident reports. Sec. 195.55 Reporting safety-related conditions. Sec. 195.56 Filing safety-related condition reports. Sec. 195.57 Filing offshore pipeline condition reports. Sec. 195.58 Address for written reports. As the Nation's repository for pipeline data, PHMSA's data is used not only by PHMSA, but by state pipeline safety programs, congressional committees, metropolitan planners, civic associations and other local community groups, pipeline research organizations, industry safety experts, industry watch groups, the media, the public, industry trade association, industry consultants, and members of the pipeline and energy industries. A significant amount of critical safety information is cultivated from PHMSA's data through statistical analysis and information retrieval. One of the agency's most valued assets is the data it collects, maintains, and analyzes pertaining to the industry. PHMSA is responsible for maintaining the most comprehensive collection of accident/incident data for intrastate and interstate pipelines in the country. PHMSA is subject to continual interest and scrutiny by numerous and varied stakeholders for the reliability, utility, and applicability of information and statistics pertaining to pipelines and LNG facilities, including the collection, tracking, and retrieval of historical data. PHMSA, therefore, must periodically [[Page 72879]] modify its information and data collections and associated processes to address changes in industry business practices, changes in PHMSA's regulations, and changes in PHMSA's own data analysis strategies and objectives. This rule also responds to various Government Accountability Office (GAO) and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations. In GAO's report titled: ``Natural Gas Pipeline Safety: IM Benefits Public Safety, but Consistency of Performance Measure Should Be Improved,'' (GAO-06-946, September, 2006), GAO stated that the current gas incident reporting requirements do not adjust for the changing cost of gas released in incidents. GAO recommended that PHMSA ``revise the definition of a reportable incident to consider changes in the price of natural gas.'' In the same report, GAO also recommended PHMSA revise reporting of performance measures for the IM programs to measure the impact of the program. GAO recommended that PHMSA improve the measures related to incidents, leaks, and failures to compare performance over time and make the measures more consistent with other pipeline safety measures. The NTSB recommended that PHMSA modify 49 CFR 195.52 of the hazardous liquid pipeline regulations to require pipeline operators to have a procedure to calculate and provide a reasonable initial estimate of released product in their telephonic reports to the NRC (NTSB Safety Recommendation P-07-07). NTSB also recommended that the hazardous liquid regulations require pipeline operators to provide an additional telephonic report to the NRC if significant new information becomes available during the emergency response (NTSB Safety Recommendation P- 07-08). This rule includes provisions addressing these recommendations. Section 15 of the PIPES Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-468, December 26, 2006) requires PHMSA to review and modify the incident reporting criteria to ensure that the data accurately reflects trends over time. One of the goals of this rulemaking is to comply with the requirements of this mandate. In 2009, PHMSA revised the incident/accident report forms for gas transmission, gas distribution and hazardous liquid pipelines (August 17, 2009; 74 FR 41496). The use of these new forms were required beginning on January 1, 2010. The revisions to these forms were intended to make the information collected more useful to all those concerned with pipeline safety and to provide additional, and in some instances, more detailed data for use in the development and enforcement of its risk-based regulatory program. II. Analysis of Public Comments PHMSA received comments from 37 organizations including: Eight associations representing pipeline operators (trade associations). Fourteen gas distribution pipeline operators, many of which also operate small amounts of transmission pipeline as part of their pipeline systems. Five gas transmission pipeline operators. Two LNG facility operators. One operator of both gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines. The National Association of State Pipeline Safety Representatives. Two state pipeline regulatory authorities. Two pipeline service vendors. One standards developing organization. One citizens group. Most commenters supported PHMSA's proposal to improve its data collection, although many expressed concerns over specific aspects of the proposal. This section addresses general comments regarding PHMSA's approach. We address comments related to specific changes proposed in the NPRM and on related proposed reporting forms individually, below: General Comments Stability and Consistency A number of comments addressed stability and consistency in reporting and data collection. Southwest Gas Corporation (SWGas), Paiute Pipeline Company (Paiute), and TransCanada noted that PHMSA was revising incident report forms not affected by the changes proposed in this NPRM concurrently but in a separate docket. These commenters suggested that the dockets be combined or that PHMSA delay changes to the incident report forms until this proceeding was concluded. SWGas and Paiute also suggested that all data-collection changes should be considered in light of their potential impact on other PHMSA regulatory initiatives, such as control room management and IM for distribution pipelines. SWGas and Paiute also suggested that cause categories (e.g., for leaks, incidents) should be consistent across all reports and that PHMSA should convene working groups to agree on categories and the minimal set of data needed. They contended that PHMSA's proposal would involve collection of more data than it will ever use. Piedmont Natural Gas Company (Piedmont) also requested that causes be made consistent between transmission and distribution, noting that it is burdensome to track causes differently for each pipeline type. Distrigas of Massachusetts LLC (DOMAC) suggested that PHMSA and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) meet to reconcile inconsistencies in reporting for facilities over which both agencies exercise jurisdiction, noting that such a meeting was contemplated in the 1993 Memorandum of Understanding between the agencies but has never occurred. National Grid requested that PHMSA make reporting changes once and minimize subsequent changes because change is very costly to implement and requires an operator to modify its management systems for collecting data. Response PHMSA recognizes that changes in reporting requirements necessitate a change in an operator's procedures and practices and that these changes should be infrequent. PHMSA also must change its data management systems when different data is reported. Yet, good data is necessary for PHMSA to understand the state of pipeline safety and to identify areas where additional regulatory attention may be needed. PHMSA is updating all of its data collection/management and reporting requirements so that it has the data that it needs to advance as a data-driven organization. PHMSA acknowledges that the changes made in this final rule, and to the incident/accident forms, will require the reporting of more data. PHMSA is making every effort to assure that the outcome of this rulemaking will minimize the need for any future changes. PHMSA is coordinating all of the activities related to data collection and does not believe that it is necessary to combine dockets. PHMSA is trying to establish consistent use of cause categories across all types of reporting and is considering its data collection needs, and the effect of its data gathering requirements, in light of its other regulatory initiatives. PHMSA does not consider that a meeting with FERC to reconcile any differences in reporting is necessary at this time. While FERC and PHMSA share jurisdiction over some LNG facilities, there are many LNG facilities subject to PHMSA's regulations over which FERC exercises no jurisdiction. [[Page 72880]] Implementation The AGA, Northeast Gas Association (NEGas), Oklahoma Independent Petroleum Association (OKIPA) and five pipeline operators requested that PHMSA allow time for data collection processes, databases, and software to be modified before new forms are implemented. Some suggested allowing one year after the effective date of the final rule. OKIPA requested 18 months. SWGas and Paiute suggested that one full calendar year of data collection should be allowed before new forms are used. TransCanada suggested PHMSA conduct a 90-day trial and begin use of new forms at the beginning of the calendar year following the end of the trial, with no retroactive reporting. They asserted that this kind of approach is needed to make sure the system works and that retroactive reporting would be unnecessarily redundant and confusing. Response PHMSA recognizes that it will take time for operators to revise their internal data management and collection systems and processes to report newly-required information. At the same time, excessive delay only postpones PHMSA's ability to use new data to understand better the state of pipeline safety. PHMSA does not consider that any of the information required in the revised forms is new. Pipeline operators already collect this information. Changes to internal processes may, indeed, make it easier to organize and report this data, but PHMSA does not believe that any retroactive data gathering will be required to complete the new annual report forms. The industry has been aware for some time that changes of this nature were in development. As discussed above, PHMSA needs better data to judge the effectiveness of its regulatory activities and to make informed decisions about future activities. Further postponement will only delay PHMSA's ability to use better data. Operators will therefore be required to use the new annual report forms in 2011 to report data for 2010. The information required to complete the new LNG incident report form is related to the occurrence of an incident and is collected during investigation of the event, not over time. Thus, the rule requires that the new form be used as soon as it is approved. However, in order to develop its on-line systems, PHMSA is delaying the submission of the 2010 annual reports for gas transmission, LNG and hazardous liquids. For the reporting year 2010, the gas transmission annual report and the LNG annual report will not be required to be submitted until June 15th and the hazardous liquid annual report will not be required to be submitted until August 15, 2011. In addition, we are delaying the implementation of the OPID registry requirements until January 1, 2012. Additional Comment Opportunity The Gas Piping Technology Committee (GPTC) and the Pipeline Safety Trust (PST) suggested that PHMSA allow a second opportunity for public comment. They noted that many changes were proposed in the NPRM and that many issues remain to be unresolved. They also noted there are significant changes to the related reporting forms. Response PHMSA believes adequate time has been given for comment and that an additional comment period is not needed. PHMSA considers that the issues have been well vetted through discussions with industry data groups, the comments discussed in this notice, and discussion at the December 2009 public meeting of the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee and the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee. As discussed below, PHMSA is withdrawing the proposed new safety- related condition report form. Organization of Regulatory Reporting Requirements AGA, GPTC, DOMAC, and seven pipeline operators suggested that reporting requirements for gas pipelines and LNG facilities should be integrated into 49 CFR Parts 192 and 193 respectively. At present, reporting requirements for gas pipelines and LNG facilities are consolidated in Part 191 while the technical safety requirements applicable to these facilities are in Parts 192 and 193. For hazardous liquid pipelines, reporting and technical requirements are both in Part 195. Commenters suggested that relocation of the gas/LNG reporting requirements would improve clarity. DOMAC suggested it would be clearer for LNG facility operators given that the definitions in Part 193 are more specific to LNG--definitions in Part 191 are focused more on gas pipelines and can create confusion for LNG operators. SWGas and Paiute similarly commented that they consider LNG facilities to have unique characteristics that do not fit a pipeline-based reporting scheme. The other commenters also suggested that future changes would be facilitated and questioned why there is a different approach in the regulations for gas/LNG than for hazardous liquid pipelines. Response PHMSA did not propose any changes in how the pipeline safety reporting requirements should be organized. Thus, changes to incorporate Part 191 reporting requirements into Parts 192 and 193 are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. PHMSA will consider if it should undertake a future rulemaking to make these changes. Risk-Based Regulation Some commenters questioned whether the proposed changes reflect a risk-based approach. Technology and Management Systems, Inc. (TMS) noted that risk-based regulation would require consideration of both probability and consequences and standards that establish criteria on a risk basis. TMS also suggested that PHMSA should collect time and total volume of product flow between incidents, asserting that this data is needed for a true consideration of risk. DOMAC also suggested that throughput data be collected from all sectors on annual reports to provide a context for analysis of safety over time. Response PHMSA recognizes that a determination of risk involves consideration of both probability and consequence. Many of PHMSA's recent regulatory changes, particularly our IM initiatives, have been directed at managing risk, and these initiatives involve consideration of both the probability of an adverse event occurring and its potential consequences. PHMSA also recognizes that true ``risk-based'' regulation would involve standards expressed in terms of numerical thresholds related to risk. PHMSA does not consider such an approach practical for regulation of pipeline safety at this time. PHMSA does not agree that collecting information on time and volume of product flow between incidents would serve PHMSA's needs or provide a better analysis of risk. Similarly, additional data concerning product throughput is not needed. Overall information on product movement is available from data PHMSA and the Energy Information Administration collect on annual reports, and this information can be used to understand the context in which pipeline incidents occur. Definitions and Terminology Some commenters requested that PHMSA add definitions for terms not now formally defined in the regulations. PST suggested adding definitions to Part 191 for gas pipeline facility/facilities, [[Page 72881]] LNG plant, production facility, distribution pipeline system, gathering pipelines, and transmission pipelines, noting that these terms are used in the part but not now defined. DOMAC requested that the regulations refer to an ``LNG facility'' rather than an ``LNG plant or facility,'' because the regulations only define the term facility. El Paso Pipeline Group (El Paso) suggested that terms be defined as needed, particularly the term ``explosion.'' SWGas and Paiute recommended clarifying use of the term ``significant,'' noting that the regulatory analysis supporting the NPRM used this term to describe events using the same criteria as those defining accidents in Sec. 195.50. El Paso suggested that the references to ``subchapter'' in proposed Sec. 192.945 be revised to refer to ``part'' as found elsewhere in the regulations. Response In the NPRM, PHMSA did not propose to add the definitions suggested by PST to Part 191. PHMSA cannot now add definitions in the final rule without having allowed an opportunity for public comment. PHMSA notes that many of the terms are defined in Parts 192 and 193 and are thus commonly understood within the pipeline industry. PHMSA does not consider the lack of these definitions in Part 191 to be a cause of confusion. PHMSA will consider if future rulemaking is needed to define additional terms in Part 191. PHMSA does not consider that all terms used in the pipeline safety regulations must be defined explicitly. Terms require definition when they have particular meanings within the regulations. Terms that are used that reflect their commonly understood meaning need not be defined explicitly. As such, PHMSA does not think it is necessary to define ``LNG plant'' or to refer only to an ``LNG facility'' because that term is defined in Part 193. The use of ``plant'' to describe an industrial facility is common within the English language and does not need an explicit definition. PHMSA also does not find it necessary to define the term ``explosion.'' Although there are accepted technical definitions for this term, many involve factors, such as consideration of the magnitude of the resulting pressure wave that would require data not normally available for a pipeline event. At the same time, PHMSA considers that the difference between ``ignites'' (or burns) and ``explodes'' is commonly understood, and that reliance on this common understanding results in less confusion than would result from trying to apply a formal definition. With respect to the term ``significant,'' that term was used in the regulatory analysis to differentiate events that require reporting as accidents from events of lesser importance. It was not intended to reflect any more-important subset of reported incidents/accidents. Regulatory evaluations are prepared to explain the basis and benefits of proposed regulatory changes to all stakeholders, including those not directly involved in the regulated industry. It is thus necessary to reflect that not all adverse events that occur at a pipeline facility are reported as incidents, only those that are significant. Proposed Sec. 192.945 included two references to other sections of the pipeline safety regulations, one of which is in another Part (Part 191). Therefore, we must use ``of this subchapter'' for that reference. The other reference to Sec. 192.7 should be referred to as ``of this part.'' PHMSA has revised this section accordingly. Miscellaneous PST opposes the use of the National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) to collect data if information will not be available to the public via that system. El Paso and Spectra Energy Transmission LLC (Spectra) requested that PHMSA encourage all stakeholders to make use of the reported data. They noted that they currently answer many telephone calls from PHMSA and state pipeline safety regulatory personnel seeking information that this proposed rule would require be reported. OKIPA requested that PHMSA provide examples of significant information that would require a supplemental incident report under Sec. 191.15(c). Response PHMSA does not intend to use NPMS to gather data proposed for the annual reports. As we noted, PHMSA is redesigning its own information management systems. These changes will make information more readily available to PHMSA and state regulatory personnel. PHMSA will encourage its staff to obtain information from the PHMSA systems rather than telephoning operators. Section 191.15(c) does not require a supplemental report for ``significant'' information, and thus no examples are necessary to illustrate significance. This paragraph requires a supplemental incident report when additional information becomes known after an initial incident report is submitted. This could include information necessary to complete a section of the incident report form that was left blank in the initial submission because the information was not yet known. It could also include additional information that the operator concludes is important to understanding the incident and which the operator would report in the narrative section of the form. III. Discussion of Public Comments on Individual Issues (1) Modifying the Scope of Part 191 To Reflect the Change to the Definition of Gas Gathering Lines 49 CFR 191.1 Proposal In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to revise the scope of Part 191 to address an inadvertent omission in the March 15, 2006, final rule that redefined the definition of gas gathering pipelines in Part 192. Part of that rulemaking effort revised Sec. 192.1 to reflect the change in the scope of Part 192. A corresponding change was not made to the scope of Part 191, which specifies requirements for reporting incidents and other events and for submission of annual reports by operators of pipelines subject to Part 192. Because of this omission, there was confusion whether operators of gathering lines that became regulated only with the 2006 rule were required to submit reports. Further, operators of gathering lines have been reporting the number of miles of gas gathering lines by the old definition and not by the new definition in Part 192. Comments The Texas Oil and Gas Association (TXOGA) and Atmos Energy Corporation (Atmos) suggested clarifying Sec. 191.15, requiring submission of incident reports, and Sec. 191.17, requiring annual reports, to indicate that they apply only to regulated gathering lines. The National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives, supported by the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB), suggested PHMSA require operators of all gathering lines to report incidents, regardless of whether they are regulated under Part 192. The commenters noted that data on incidents that occur on non-regulated lines is necessary to determine whether additional regulation is needed. Response PHMSA has not changed the proposed regulatory language. Section 191.1(b)(4)(ii), as revised in this final rule, clearly states that Part 191 does not apply to gathering lines that are not regulated gathering lines as determined in accordance with Sec. 192.8. Thus, none [[Page 72882]] of the provisions in Part 191, including Sec. Sec. 191.15 and 191.17, applies to non-regulated gathering lines. The clarification TXOGA and Atmos requested is not needed. PHMSA agrees that data for incidents that occur on non-regulated gathering lines could be useful in determining whether these pipelines should be brought under the reporting regulations. However, PHMSA did not propose such a change. PHMSA would have to undertake a new rulemaking to bring unregulated gathering lines under Part 191 incident reporting requirements. (2) Changing the Definition of an ``Incident'' for Gas Pipelines 49 CFR 191.3 Proposal In the NPRM, PHMSA proposed to change the definition of an incident in 49 CFR 191.3 to establish a new reporting category: An explosion or fire not intentionally set by the operator. This proposed change would make the definition consistent with the accident reporting criteria for hazardous liquid pipelines in Part 195. The NPRM also proposed to establish a volumetric basis of 3,000 Mcf (the abbreviation ``Mcf'' means thousand cubic feet) for reporting unintentional gas loss. This proposal responded to a GAO recommendation. In a report titled: ``Natural Gas Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management Benefits Public Safety, but Consistency of Performance Measure Should Be Improved,'' (GAO-06-946, September, 2006), GAO stated that the current gas incident reporting requirements do not adjust for the changing cost of gas released in incidents. GAO recommended that PHMSA ``revise the definition of a reportable incident to consider changes in the price of natural gas.'' In November 2005, the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) submitted a petition for rulemaking recommending PHMSA adopt a volume basis instead of the cost of gas lost. INGAA recommended 20 million standard cubic feet as a reporting threshold. INGAA based this volume on the $50,000 reporting threshold and the 1985 \\1\\ cost of gas at $2.50 per Mcf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \\1\\ The criterion for reporting property damage exceeding $50,000 was established in 1984 and began widespread use in 1985. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The proposed change responded to both the GAO recommendation and the INGAA petition. It would remove the cost of gas lost from consideration in determining whether an event constitutes an incident under the existing criterion of $50,000 damage. This would correct the problem GAO identified in that the volatility of gas prices would no longer be an issue in determining whether a particular event met the definition of an incident. The new criterion would separately capture events in which a large quantity of gas is lost regardless of the value of resulting property damage. The proposal also changed the language preceding the criteria to make clear that an incident was an event that resulted in one of the listed consequences. Previously, the regulations referred only to events that ``involve[d]'' one of the consequences and it was not clear that events of interest were those in which the gas pipeline failure resulted in the listed consequences. Comments Causality INGAA, the Texas Pipeline Association (TPA), TransCanada, and NiSource Gas Transmission and Storage (NiSource) supported the change to make it clear that events only become incidents if the listed consequences resulted from a release of gas from a pipeline. DOMAC and National Grid disagreed, noting that conclusions of causality could imply legal liability, and expressing a preference for the former structure of reporting events that ``involve'' stated consequences to avoid pre-judging liability. Explosion or Fire Not Intentionally Set by the Operator AGA, the American Public Gas Association (APGA), GPTC, NAPSR, IUB, and many pipeline operators objected to the addition of this criterion. Many of these comments reflected confusion about fires that did not result from the gas pipeline failure. Commenters noted, for example, that over 400,000 structure fires occur each year in the U.S. In many of those fires, a gas meter is damaged and gas subsequently becomes involved in the pre-existing fire. These commenters maintained that PHMSA has no jurisdiction over fires that begin from non-pipeline causes and that reporting these events as pipeline incidents would significantly misrepresent pipeline safety and would distort current incident trends. They also asserted that other agencies (e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency) already collect fire data. GPTC and several operators commented that a brief ``fire'' is an expected operational event during many activities associated with operation and maintenance of gas distribution pipelines. DOMAC claimed, for example, that the proposed criterion would require reporting of a lightning strike that ignites a gas relief vent that is designed to close and snuff out the resulting fire with no safety consequences. APGA argued that this criterion could significantly increase the number of ``incidents'' and that PHMSA had not considered the significant burden that could result due to existing requirements to test personnel involved in an incident for drugs and alcohol. Some commenters also objected that analyses referred to in the NPRM in support of this proposed new criterion were not included in the docket for public examination. Several pipeline operators suggested that the new criterion was not needed since the remaining criteria would provide a complete picture of consequential events. INGAA, El Paso, and Spectra took a contrary position and suggested that the proposed new criterion apply to events resulting from intentional and unintentional releases of gas. IUB suggested that we should not exclude fires intentionally set by an operator because hazardous liquid pipeline operators sometimes intentionally set fires to consume released product that cannot otherwise be recovered. AGA commented that nearby fires should be deleted as a primary cause of a gas pipeline incident because these are outside PHMSA jurisdiction. Volume Measure for Released Gas AGA, NAPSR, IUB, and several pipeline operators questioned the practicality of the proposed criterion. AGA and several pipeline operators noted the difficulty in calculating the amount of a release within two hours, by which time a telephonic report of an incident is expected. They contended that factors necessary for this analysis are not readily obvious. IUB, Atmos, and Michigan Consolidated Gas (MichCon) questioned the applicability of this criterion to distribution pipeline incidents. They noted that property damage is the predominant component of costs for distribution incidents, and that the concern expressed by INGAA and others that increases in the cost of gas (and resulting increase in the calculated cost of gas lost) strongly influence the determination of whether an event constitutes an incident generally is not applicable to distribution pipeline events. They also noted that it is sometimes difficult to calculate the amount of gas lost in distribution events. SWGas and Paiute, [[Page 72883]] distribution and transmission pipeline operators respectively, agreed, stating that the volume of gas lost was usually ancillary to other reporting criteria. Baltimore Gas & Electric (BG&E) suggested eliminating or qualifying this criterion to apply only to unintended releases. BG&E contended that release of gas is a routine part of doing business and classifying such events as incidents could distort safety trends. Most commenters questioned the size of the proposed criterion. Many noted that it was incorrectly stated in the proposed rule language as 3,000 million cubic feet, although the preamble discussion described the proposed amount as 3,000 Mcf. The industry trade associations and many operators argued that the proposed magnitude of the criterion is too small and that 3,000 Mcf is inconsistent with a criterion of $50,000 in property damage. INGAA suggested that the release criterion should be 20,000 Mcf. Other commenters suggested different values, varying between 10,000 and 20,000 Mcf. Northern Natural Gas (Northern) and Spectra (gas transmission pipeline operators) suggested that it would be appropriate to establish different criteria for gas transmission and distribution pipelines. INGAA and several pipeline operators requested clarification concerning how the proposed criterion was to be applied. El Paso and Spectra contended that intentional releases, including from appurtenances designed to release gas (e.g., relief valves) should not require reporting because these are not consequential incidents. These operators also suggested that the criterion not be applied to small leaks that might release large quantities of gas over an extended period. Similarly, NiSource commented that the criterion should only apply to immediate releases resulting from an event and should exclude subsequent blowdowns which have no significant effect on public safety. INGAA, El Paso, and TransCanada also suggested that the criterion be limited to gas lost at the incident location because gas lost at controlled locations (such as would be used for blowdowns) does not pose the same risk. The industry trade associations and several operators also requested that PHMSA make clear that the introduction of this new criterion means that the cost of gas lost will no longer be used in determining whether an event constitutes an incident because of $50,000 in property damage costs. PST also requested clarification in this area. IUB suggested that PHMSA should provide guidance on how the amount of gas lost is to be calculated. Property Damage Criterion AGA and a number of pipeline operators commented that the existing criterion of $50,000 property damage is too low and should be raised. The commenters noted that this criterion was established in 1984 and has not been adjusted since; inflation has made events reportable that would not have been reportable in 1984. Commenters suggested that the criterion should be increased to $100,000, that it should be revised periodically or indexed for inflation, or that various categories of costs should be excluded from consideration. Contrary to this general trend, SWGas and Paiute suggested that all costs, including third-party damages and costs to relight customers, should be included, since these are costs directly related to the event. Miscellaneous PHMSA received several comments related to the definition of a gas pipeline incident that did not fit into the categories discussed above. MidAmerican, a gas distribution pipeline operator, suggested not to change the definition because the proposed changes would add events of little or no safety significance and divert resources from safety. The Missouri Public Service Commission (MOPSC) suggested revising the existing criterion related to injuries to include medical care at an emergency room or other facility in addition to inpatient hospitalization. MOPSC contended that changes in the practice of medicine have resulted in many injuries that formerly required inpatient hospitalization now being treated at such facilities. INGAA, NAPSR, Northern, Atmos, and TransCa","truncated":true,"body_characters":210893}