{"operation":"document","citation":"75 FR 10974","title":"Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based Adjustment of Transportation Security Plan Requirements","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2010-03-09","effective_on":"2010-10-01","summary":"PHMSA, in consultation with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is modifying current security plan requirements applicable to the commercial transportation of hazardous materials by air, rail, vessel, and highway. Based on an evaluation of the security threats associated with specific types and quantities of hazardous materials, the final rule narrows the list of materials subject to security plan requirements and reduces associated regulatory costs and paperwork burden. The final rule also clarifies certain requirements related to security planning, training, and documentation.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-2010-4778.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-2010-4778.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-2010-4778","source_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/03/09/2010-4778/hazardous-materials-risk-based-adjustment-of-transportation-security-plan-requirements","body":"Federal Register, Volume 75 Issue 45 (Tuesday, March 9, 2010) [Federal Register Volume 75, Number 45 (Tuesday, March 9, 2010)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 10974-10989] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] [FR Doc No: 2010-4778] [[Page 10973]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Part IV Department of Transportation ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 49 CFR Part 172 Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based Adjustment of Transportation Security Plan Requirements; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 45 / Tuesday, March 9, 2010 / Rules and Regulations [[Page 10974]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part 172 [Docket No. PHMSA-06-25885 (HM-232F)] RIN 2137-AE22 Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based Adjustment of Transportation Security Plan Requirements AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: PHMSA, in consultation with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is modifying current security plan requirements applicable to the commercial transportation of hazardous materials by air, rail, vessel, and highway. Based on an evaluation of the security threats associated with specific types and quantities of hazardous materials, the final rule narrows the list of materials subject to security plan requirements and reduces associated regulatory costs and paperwork burden. The final rule also clarifies certain requirements related to security planning, training, and documentation. DATES: Effective date: This final rule is effective October 1, 2010. Voluntary compliance date: Voluntary compliance with all the amendments in this final rule is authorized as of April 8, 2010. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan Gorsky or Ben Supko, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 202-366-8553. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Background A. Current DOT Security Requirements The federal hazardous materials transportation law (federal hazmat law, 49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to ``prescribe regulations for the safe transportation, including security, of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.'' The Secretary has delegated this authority to PHMSA. Authority to enforce the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-180) has been delegated to the FAA ``with particular emphasis on the transportation or shipment of hazardous materials by air''; the FRA ``with particular emphasis on the transportation or shipment of hazardous materials by railroad''; PHMSA ``with particular emphasis on the shipment of hazardous materials and the manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance, reconditioning, repair or test of multi-modal containers that are represented, marked, certified, or sold for use in the transportation of hazardous materials''; and the FMCSA ``with particular emphasis on the transportation or shipment of hazardous materials by highway.'' 49 CFR Part 1, Subpart C. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is authorized to enforce the HMR in connection with certain transportation or shipment of hazardous materials by water. This authority originated with the Secretary and was first delegated to USCG prior to 2003, when USCG was made part of the Department of Homeland Security. DHS Delegation No. 0170, Section 2(99) & 2(100); see also 6 U.S.C. 458(b), 551(d)(2). Thus, enforcement of the security plan and training regulations is shared among the DOT operating administrations and the USCG, with each placing particular emphasis on their respective authorities. The HMR require persons who offer for transportation or transport certain hazardous materials in commerce to develop and implement security plans. The security plan requirements in Subpart I of Part 172 of the HMR apply to persons who offer for transportation or transport: (1) A highway-route controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive) material; (2) More than 25 kg (55 lbs.) of a Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 (explosive) material; (3) More than 1 L (1.06 qt.) per package of a material poisonous by inhalation in Hazard Zone A; (4) A shipment in a bulk packaging with a capacity equal to or greater than 13,248 L (3,500 gallons) for liquids or gases or greater than 13.24 cubic meters (468 cubic feet) for solids; (5) A shipment in other than a bulk packaging of 2,268 kg (5,000 lbs.) gross weight or more of one class of hazardous materials for which placarding is required; (6) A select agent or toxin regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention under 42 CFR Part 73 or a select agent or toxin regulated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture under 9 CFR Part 121; or (7) A shipment that requires placarding under Subpart F of Part 172 of the HMR. A security plan must include an assessment of possible transportation security risks and appropriate measures to address the assessed risks. Specific measures implemented as part of the plan may vary with the level of threat at a particular time. At a minimum, the security plan must address personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route security. For personnel security, the plan must include measures to confirm information provided by job applicants for positions involving access to and handling of the hazardous materials covered by the plan. For unauthorized access, the plan must include measures to address the risk of unauthorized persons gaining access to materials or transport conveyances being prepared for transportation. For en route security, the plan must include measures to address security risks during transportation, including the security of shipments stored temporarily en route to their destinations. As indicated above, the HMR set forth general requirements for a security plan's components rather than a prescriptive list of specific items that must be included. The HMR set a performance standard providing offerors and carriers with the flexibility necessary to develop security plans addressing their individual circumstances and operational environments. Accordingly, each security plan will differ because it will be based on an offeror's or a carrier's individualized assessment of the security risks associated with the specific hazardous materials it ships or transports and its unique circumstances and operational environment. B. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking On September 9, 2008, PHMSA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM; 73 FR 52558) to propose modifications to the list of materials for which a security plan is required. The NPRM was based on comments received in response to an ANRPM issued under this docket (71 FR 55156) and in a public meeting we hosted on November 30, 2006, and an evaluation of possible security threats posed by specific types and classes of hazardous materials. In identifying materials to which a security plan should apply, we consulted with the Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the Department of Homeland Security, to assess the transportation security risks associated with the different classes and quantities of hazardous materials. We evaluated specific transportation scenarios in which a terrorist could deliberately use hazardous materials to cause large- scale casualties and property [[Page 10975]] damage. In our qualitative risk evaluation, we considered the following factors: (1) Physical and chemical properties of the material or class of materials and how those properties could contribute to a security incident; (2) quantities shipped and mode of transport; (3) past terrorist use; (4) potential use; and (5) availability. One of the most significant security vulnerabilities involves the potential for an individual or group to take control of a conveyance containing a high- risk material and move it to a site where the material could cause maximum physical or psychological damage. For some hazardous materials, the primary security threat involves theft or highjacking of raw materials for use in developing explosive devices or weapons. As we indicated in the NPRM, one of our goals for this rulemaking is to harmonize to the extent consistent with our security goals the list of materials for which security plans are required with the list of materials designated as high consequence dangerous goods for which enhanced security measures are recommended in the United Nations Model Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UN Recommendations). The recommended security measures include security plans and are similar to the requirements in Subpart I of Part 172 of the HMR. The UN Recommendations define high consequence dangerous goods as materials with the ``potential for mis-use in a terrorist incident and which may, as a result, produce serious consequences such as mass casualties or mass destruction.'' The UN Recommendations list the following materials as high consequence dangerous goods: (1) Division 1.1 explosives; (2) Division 1.2 explosives; (3) Division 1.3 compatibility group C explosives; (4) Division 1.5 explosives; (5) Bulk shipments of Division 2.1 flammable gases; (6) Division 2.3 toxic gases (excluding aerosols); (7) Bulk shipments of Class 3 flammable liquids in Packing Group I or II; (8) Class 3 and Division 4.1 desensitized explosives; (9) Bulk shipments of Division 4.2 Packing Group I materials; (10) Bulk shipments of Division 4.3 Packing Group I materials; (11) Bulk shipments of Division 5.1 Packing Group I oxidizing liquids; (12) Bulk shipments of Division 5.1 perchlorates, ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate fertilizers; (13) Division 6.1 Packing Group I toxic materials; (14) Division 6.2 infectious substances of Category A (UN2814 and 2900); (15) Class 7 radioactive materials in quantities greater than 3000 A 1 (special form) or 3000 A 2 , as applicable, in Type B(U) or Type B(M) or Type (C) packages; and (16) Bulk shipments of Class 8 Packing Group I materials. For purposes of the security provisions, the UN defines ``in bulk'' to mean quantities greater than 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.) for solids and 3,000 liters (793 gallons) for liquids and gases in portable tanks or bulk containers. In the NPRM, we proposed the following modifications to the list of materials subject to security plans: NPRM List ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Class Current threshold Proposed threshold Change ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1.1.......................... Any quantity.............. Any quantity.............. None. 1.2.......................... Any quantity.............. Any quantity.............. None. 1.3.......................... Any quantity.............. Any quantity.............. None. 1.4.......................... A quantity requiring Any quantity of UN 0104, Security plan required placarding. 0237, 0255, 0267, 0289, only for detonators and 0361, 0365, 0366, 0440, shaped charges. 0441, 0455, 0456, 0500. 1.5.......................... A quantity requiring Any quantity.............. Security plan required placarding. for all shipments. 1.6.......................... A quantity requiring Not subject............... Security plan not placarding. required for any Division 1.6 shipments. 2.1.......................... A quantity requiring >3,000 L in a single Security plan not placarding. packaging. required for 3,000 L (793 gallons) or less. 2.2.......................... A quantity requiring Not subject except for Security plan not placarding. oxygen and gases with a required for most non- subsidiary 5.1 hazard flammable, non-poisonous ( 3,000 L (793 gallons) in Security plan not placarding. a single packaging and required for 3,000 L any quantity of Class 3 (793 gallons) or less desensitized explosives. except for desensitized explosives. 4.1.......................... A quantity requiring Any quantity desensitized Security plan not placarding. explosives. required except for desensitized explosives. 4.2.......................... A quantity requiring PG I and II only in Security plan not placarding. quantities >3,000 kg in a required for PG III single packaging. materials. 4.3.......................... Any quantity.............. Any quantity.............. None. 5.1.......................... A quantity requiring PG I and II liquids, Security plan not placarding. perchlorates, ammonium required for PG III nitrate (including liquids or unlisted fertilizers) in solids. quantities >3,000 L (793 gallons) in a single packaging. 5.2.......................... Any quantity of Organic Any quantity of Organic None. peroxide, Type B, liquid peroxide, Type B, liquid or solid, temperature or solid, temperature controlled. controlled. 6.1.......................... A quantity requiring Any quantity of PG I; Security plan not placarding; any quantity >3,000 L (793 gallons) required for 3,000 L of PIH material. for PG II and III. (793 gallons) or less of PG II and III. 6.2.......................... Select agents............. Select agents............. None. [[Page 10976]] 7............................ Shipments requiring Yellow For radionuclides covered Security plan only III label; highway route by the IAEA Code of required for Class 7 controlled quantity. Conduct, Category 1 and materials that pose Category 2 sources per transportation security package; for all other risk. radionuclides, 3000 A2 per package. 8............................ A quantity requiring PG I only in quantities Security plan not placarding. >3,000 L (793 gallons) in required for PG II and a single packaging. III materials. 9............................ Capacity >3,500 gallons Not subject............... Security plan not for liquid/gas; required for Class 9 volumetric capacity >468 materials. cubic feet for solids. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- II. Coordination With TSA DHS is the lead federal agency for transportation and hazardous materials security. DOT consults and coordinates on security-related hazardous materials transportation matters to ensure consistency with DHS requirements and broader security objectives. Both departments work to ensure that the regulated industry is not confronted with inconsistent government-issued security guidance or requirements. Under Section 101(a) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, Pub. L. 107-71, November 19, 2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 114) and 49 CFR 1502.1, TSA has broad responsibility and authority for ``security in all modes of transportation * * * '' TSA has additional responsibilities for surface transportation security, as specified in 49 U.S.C. 114(f), through delegation by the Secretary of Homeland Security under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act, Pub. L. 110-53; 121 Stat. 266, August 3, 2007). In sum, TSA's authority with respect to transportation security is comprehensive and supported with specific powers related to the development and enforcement of regulations, security directives, security plans, and other requirements. Under this authority, TSA may identify a security threat to any mode of transportation, develop a measure for dealing with that threat, and enforce compliance with that measure. Moreover, in addition to inspecting for compliance with specific regulations, TSA may conduct general security assessments. Under its authority, TSA may assess threats to transportation security; monitor the state of awareness and readiness throughout the various sectors; determine the adequacy of an owner or operator's transportation-related security measures; and identify security gaps. TSA, for example, could inspect and evaluate for emerging or potential security threats based on intelligence indicators to determine whether the owner or operator's strategies and security measures are likely to deter deficiencies. When PHMSA adopted its security regulations, it was stated that these regulations were ``the first step in what may be a series of rulemakings to address the security of hazardous materials shipments.'' 68 FR 14511. PHMSA noted in the NPRM that TSA ``is developing regulations that are likely to impose additional requirements beyond those established in this final rule'' and stated that it would ``consult and coordinate with TSA concerning security-related hazardous materials transportation regulations * * * '' Id. In this regard, note that under section 1512 of the 9/11 Commission Act and delegated authority from the Secretary of Homeland Security, TSA must promulgate regulations establishing standards and guidelines for developing and implementing vulnerability assessments and security plans for ``high-risk'' railroad carriers. TSA published a final rule on rail security on November 26, 2008 (73 FR 72131). That rule established security requirements for freight railroad carriers; intercity, commuter, and short-haul passenger train service providers; rail transit systems; and rail operations at certain, fixed-site facilities that ship or receive specified hazardous materials by rail. It codified the scope of TSA's existing inspection program and requires regulated parties to allow TSA and DHS officials to enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, conveyances, and records relevant to rail security. The rule also requires that regulated parties designate rail security coordinators and report significant security concerns. In addition, the rule requires freight rail carriers and certain facilities handling specified hazardous materials to be able to (1) report location and shipping information to TSA upon request and (2) implement chain of custody requirements to ensure a positive and secure exchange of specified hazardous materials. TSA also clarifies and amends the sensitive security information (SSI) protections to cover certain information associated with rail transportation. TSA intends to promulgate additional regulations for railroad carriers and other modes of surface transportation that will require them to submit vulnerability assessments and security plans to DHS for review and approval, as well as to develop and implement security training programs for employees performing security-sensitive functions to prepare for potential security threats and conditions. The security plan requirements established by the HMR are to be used as a baseline for security planning. When TSA regulations are issued, the PHMSA security plan and security training requirements for regulated parties that will be subject to the TSA regulations will be reevaluated and revised as appropriate. To this end, we have worked closely with TSA to align our proposed list of materials subject to security plans with ongoing efforts by TSA in identifying Highway Security Sensitive Hazardous Materials (HSSM). TSA has used its HSSM list in conjunction with voluntary security practices (referred to as Security Action Items or SAIs) to increase the security of certain hazardous materials transported by motor vehicle. Minor differences between our proposal and the TSA HSSM list have been resolved and the overall approach taken by the two agencies in identifying materials that should be subject to security based requirements is consistent and supported by industry associations, offerors, carriers, and private citizens, as evidenced by the comments submitted in response to our NPRM. Finally, as it implements its transportation security authority, TSA may identify a need to review transportation security plans and programs developed and implemented in accordance with Subpart I of Part 172 [[Page 10977]] of the HMR. Under ATSA, TSA has the authority to ``ensure the adequacy of security measures for the transportation of cargo'' 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(10) and to ``oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of security measures at airports and other transportation facilities.'' 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(11). Therefore, parties subject to this regulation must allow TSA and other authorized DHS officials, at any time and in a reasonable manner, without advance notice, to enter and inspect and must provide TSA inspectors with a copy of any security related document required by the HMR or pursuant to TSA's statutory or regulatory authorities. This includes security plans and training documents required under 49 CFR Part 172. TSA does not, however, have the authority to directly enforce DOT safety or security requirements established in the HMR. If, in the course of an inspection of a railroad or motor carrier or a rail or highway hazardous material shipper or receiver, TSA identifies evidence of non-compliance with a DOT safety or security regulation, TSA will provide the information to FRA (for rail) or FMCSA (for motor carriers) and PHMSA for appropriate action. Similarly, since DOT does not have the authority to enforce TSA security requirements, if a DOT inspector identifies evidence of non- compliance with a TSA security regulation or identifies other security deficiencies, DOT will provide the information to TSA for appropriate action. It is important to note that TSA and DOT have established a tiered approach to transportation security that imposes increasingly stringent security requirements for materials that pose more significant transportation security risks. Thus, the DOT security planning requirements established in 2003 and modified in this final rule establish a baseline requirement for materials that have been determined to pose a security risk across all modes of transportation. However, both TSA and DOT have established more stringent security requirements for certain rail shipments of hazardous materials. As explained in the TSA and DOT final rules on rail security published jointly on November 26, 2008 (73 FR 72130 and 73 FR 72181, respectively), the list of designated ``security sensitive'' materials to which the enhanced safety and security requirements adopted in those final rules apply--certain shipments of Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, PIH, and radioactive materials--is based on specific railroad transportation scenarios. These scenarios depict how hazardous materials could be deliberately used to cause significant casualties and property damage or accident scenarios resulting in similar catastrophic consequences. DOT and TSA determined that the materials specified in the rail security final rules present the greatest rail transportation safety and security risks--because of the potential consequences of an unintentional release of these materials--and are the most attractive targets for terrorists--because of the potential for these materials to be used as weapons of opportunity or weapons of mass destruction. While DOT and TSA agree that other hazardous materials pose certain safety and security risks, the risks are not as great as those posed by the explosive, PIH, and radioactive materials specified in the rail security final rules. TSA, in consultation with DOT, will continue to evaluate the transportation security risks posed by all types of hazardous materials and the effectiveness of current regulations in addressing those risks and will consider revising specific requirements as necessary. III. Comments and Analysis A total of 160 persons submitted comments in response to the September 9, 2008 NPRM. The majority of the comments were submitted by companies, but we also received comments from public interest groups; local, state, and federal government agencies; industry associations; and private citizens. The majority of commenters focused on the proposed revisions to security plan requirements for explosives that are used by the special effects and motion picture industries. To review rulemakings, regulatory evaluations, environmental assessments, comments, and letters submitted in response to this regulatory action go to http://www.regulations.gov under docket number PHMSA-06-25885. To locate a specific commenter by name simply use the search function provided by Regulations.gov . Generally, commenters express support for the regulatory reduction efforts proposed by the NPRM although some commenters disagree with some of the types and classes of materials that would be subject to security planning requirements under the NPRM. In this comment summary, we address areas of concern, as expressed by commenters, including the key comments regarding the types and classes of materials that we included in the proposed list of materials subject to security plans. We especially focus on aligning our list of materials requiring security plans and TSA's HSSM list. Commenters emphasize that consistency is very important in this area, and we agree. TSA's HSSM list focused on materials that have the potential to cause significant fatalities and injuries or significant economic damage when released or detonated during a transportation security incident. Materials classed as HSSM fall into one of two tiers and are subject to specific voluntary security measures that should be taken by manufacturers, shippers, and carriers of the listed materials. In this final rule we are revising the list of materials subject to security planning. We made several changes to the list of materials based on comments and discussions with our federal partners. We consulted with TSA throughout the development of this final rule. Below we list by Class/Division the Hazardous materials and thresholds subject to security planning under this final rule. The phrase ``large bulk quantity,'' as used in the following table, refers to a quantity greater than 3,000 kg (6,614 pounds) for solids or 3,000 liters (792 gallons) for liquids and gases in a single packaging such as a cargo tank motor vehicle, portable tank, tank car, or other bulk container. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ PHMSA final rule security plan Class/ division revisions ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1.1............................ Any quantity. 1.2............................ Any quantity. 1.3............................ Any quantity. 1.4............................ Placarded quantity. 1.5............................ Placarded quantity. 1.6............................ Placarded quantity. 2.1............................ A large bulk quantity. 2.2............................ A large bulk quantity of materials with an oxidizer subsidiary. 2.3............................ Any quantity. 3.............................. PG I and II in a large bulk quantity; placarded quantity desensitized explosives. 4.1............................ Placarded quantity desensitized explosives. 4.2............................ PG I and II in a large bulk quantity. 4.3............................ Any quantity. 5.1............................ Division 5.1 materials in PG I and II, and PG III perchlorates, ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrate fertilizers, or ammonium nitrate emulsions or suspensions or gels in a large bulk quantity. 5.2............................ Any quantity of Organic peroxide, Type B, liquid or solid, temperature controlled. 6.1............................ Any quantity PIH or a large bulk quantity of a material that is not a PIH. 6.2............................ CDC or USDA list of select agents. 7.............................. IAEA Categories 1 & 2; HRCQ; known radionuclides in forms listed as RAM- QC by NRC; or a quantity of uranium hexafluoride requiring placarding under Sec. 172.505(b). [[Page 10978]] 8.............................. PG I in a large bulk quantity. 9.............................. Not subject. ORM-D.......................... Not subject. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Any minor differences between the TSA HSSM list and the above list have been discussed with TSA and resolved. A. Applicable Materials and Thresholds (Sec. 172.800(b)) As indicated above, the NPRM proposed to narrow the list of materials to which security plan requirements would apply to cover only those materials that pose a significant security risk in transportation. In accordance with Sec. 172.800(b) of the HMR, a security plan is currently required for a quantity of hazardous materials that requires placarding under Subpart F of Part 172. We proposed to remove certain classes of materials from the list and to raise the threshold quantity that would trigger security planning requirements for other classes of materials. Generally, the NPRM proposed to continue the security plan requirement for materials listed in Table 1 of Sec. 172.504, which specifies materials for which placarding is required when any quantity of the material is transported in a bulk packaging, freight container, transport vehicle, or rail car. Thus, we proposed to retain the security plan requirement for any quantity of Division 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 explosive materials; 2.3 poison gases; 4.3 dangerous when wet material; 5.2 Type B organic peroxides, liquid or solid, temperature controlled; and 6.1 materials poisonous by inhalation. We also proposed to require security plans for any quantity of certain Division 1.4 materials, Division 1.5 explosives, Class 3 and Division 4.1 desensitized explosives, and 6.1 materials assigned to Packing Group I. Several commenters contend that the ``any quantity'' threshold standard, especially when applied to Table 2 materials (see Sec. 172.504(e)), will present unreasonable and unnecessary compliance challenges for covered persons. We agree that the ``any quantity'' threshold standard is inappropriate for most Table 2 materials, based on the security risks posed in transportation, and proposed to modify the threshold quantities that would trigger security planning requirements accordingly. The security planning requirement is critical to reducing the security risks associated with a very broad spectrum of hazardous materials. More specific, modal based requirements that apply to larger quantities of material, such as through our rail routing rule, may be required to address specific threats. We are maintaining the ``any quantity'' threshold because those materials may present a significant security risk under certain modal specific risk-based transportation scenarios even when transported in small amounts. Dow suggests that we simplify the process of identifying materials for security planning purposes by adding a special provision to the Hazardous Materials Table to identify those materials for which security plans would be required. We disagree with a material-based strategy for identifying high-risk materials. Consistent with our approach to evaluating the safety risks posed by hazardous materials in transportation, we continue to believe that an assessment of hazardous materials security risks should be based on the hazard class and packing group of the material and the quantity or volume transported. In this way, we can ensure that all materials that pose a similar security risk are covered, including mixtures and solutions. Moreover, identifying individual materials through special provisions is inefficient and overly complex. In the following sections of the preamble we address comments concerning whether specific classes of materials should be subject to security planning requirements. 1. Explosives (Divisions 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6) The majority of comments received specifically addressed explosives. A total of 125 persons involved with special effects for the motion picture industry submitted comments addressing the proposed threshold for Division 1.4 explosives and desensitized explosives in Class 3 and Division 4.1. Currently, security plans are required for placarded quantities of these materials. In the NPRM, we proposed to require security plans for any quantity of Division 1.4 explosives shipped under certain UN identification numbers and any quantity of desensitized explosives in Class 3 and Division 4.1. Commenters unanimously oppose this provision of the NPRM. The Alliance of Special Effects & Pyrotechnic Operators, Inc. (ASEPO) states that the proposed requirement for security plans to apply to any quantity of Division 1.4 or desensitized explosive materials is unnecessary because secure transportation of the Division 1.4 explosives and desensitized explosives used for special effects has already been achieved under present security measures. ASEPO did not provide details of the security measures currently employed, but stated its belief that the current measures are effective based on the industry's long history of safe and secure transportation of these materials. The Dangerous Goods Advisory Council (DGAC), Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME), International Society of Explosives Engineers (ISEE), and United Parcel Service of America, Inc. (UPS) suggest that we retain the current threshold for security planning purposes--that is, security plans should be required for explosives, including desensitized explosives, when transported in quantities that require placarding. UPS notes that ``shipments are undetectable in commerce unless they reach the level requiring the carrier to apply placards on the vehicle'' and suggests that the lack of placards on these shipments enhances their security. It was not our intent to significantly expand upon current security planning requirements applicable to explosives. In the NPRM, we indicated that most Division 1.4 explosives do not pose a significant transportation security risk and limited security plan requirements to any quantity of a material identified as UN 0104, UN 0237, UN 0255, UN 0267, UN 0289, UN 0361, UN 0365, UN 0366, UN 0440, UN 0441, UN 0455, UN 0456, or UN 0500. Our concern, as expressed in the NPRM, was that Division 1.4 detonators make an attractive target for theft and use as initiating devices for improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In addition, it was our understanding that detonating assemblies and devices such as those listed above were generally shipped with greater quantities of Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives and thus were covered by security plans applicable to those materials. Based on the comments we received, we now understand that the Division 1.4 materials identified in the NPRM are frequently transported in small quantities and in separate shipments from Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 materials. Because of the strongly adverse comments we received on this issue, and after consulting with TSA, we re-evaluated the proposal to require security plans for shipments of any quantity of Division 1.4 detonators in the specified UN numbers. We agree with commenters that the security risks associated with the transportation of small numbers of these devices are not sufficient to warrant the development and implementation of security plans, particularly given the security measures voluntarily utilized by shippers and carriers. Therefore, in this final rule we are not adopting the proposed revision applicable to Division 1.4 explosives. [[Page 10979]] Instead, the security planning requirement will apply, as it does now, to all Division 1.4 explosives transported in quantities that require placarding under Subpart F of Part 172 of the HMR. Currently, a security plan is required for Division 1.5 and 1.6 explosives transported in a quantity that requires placarding. In the NPRM, we proposed to require security plans for any quantity of Division 1.5 materials and remove Division 1.6 explosives from the list of materials for which a security plan is required. Commenters indicate that the proposed revisions to the thresholds for both Division 1.5 materials and 1.6 materials are not necessary. IME and ISEE suggest the inclusion of all explosives at the current level--quantities requiring placarding--has proven to be effective. In regard to Division 1.6 explosives, the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) does not disagree with our statements in the NPRM regarding the insensitivity of Division 1.6 materials, but indicates that their insensitivity can be overcome by suitable boostering, with results similar to that of a Division 1.2 material. In its comments, DDESB recommends that any quantity of Division 1.6 explosives be included in the list of hazardous materials that require security plans. Though we do not agree that the any quantity threshold is appropriate for Division 1.6 materials, we do agree that security plans should be required for explosives at a given threshold. As a result, this final rule will not eliminate security plan requirements applicable to Division 1.5 and 1.6 materials. Security plans will continue to be required for Division 1.5 and 1.6 materials that are offered for transportation or transported in quantities that require placarding. We did not propose to change current security planning requirements applicable to Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives in the NPRM. Commenters agree that security plans should be required for these materials when transported in any quantity. In this final rule, we are retaining the current requirement. Thus, without regard to the mode by which the material is transported, shippers and carriers of Divisions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives (transported in any quantity) and Divisions 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 explosives (transported in quantities that require placarding) must develop and implement security plans. Note that the security planning requirements are triggered by the offering or transportation of a hazardous material in a quantity that requires placarding, not by the absence or presence of a placard on a given shipment. 2. Flammable Gases (Division 2.1) Currently, security plans are required for shipments of Division 2.1 materials when transported in a quantity requiring placarding. In the NPRM, we proposed to raise the threshold trigger for security planning purposes to a quantity greater than 3,000 L (793 gallons). We concluded that shipments of flammable gases in quantities of 3,000 L (793 gallons) or less in a single package do not pose a transportation security risk warranting development and implementation of security plans. Two commenters address the proposed requirements for compressed gases in Division 2.1. The Gases and Welders Distribution Association supports the proposed changes, suggesting that adopting a threshold that is consistent with security planning provisions in the UN recommendations will facilitate compliance for international transportation and reduce costs for shippers and carriers handling such materials in international commerce. The National Propane Gas Association (NPGA) suggests that propane should not be considered a weapon of mass destruction and it should not be subject to security plans. We disagree. Propane is among the liquefied compressed gases most commonly transported throughout the nation. When liquid propane is released into the atmosphere, it quickly vaporizes into the gaseous form that is its normal state at atmospheric pressure. This happens very rapidly, and in the process, the propane combines readily with air to form fuel air mixtures that are ignitable over a range of 2.2 to 9.5 percent propane by volume. If an ignition source is present in the vicinity of a highly flammable mixture, the vapor cloud ignites and burns very rapidly (characterized by some experts as ``explosively''). Based on these ","truncated":true,"body_characters":113836}