# Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** 84 FR 52260
- **title:** Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines
- **source type:** rulemaking
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2019-10-01
- **effective on:** 2020-07-01
- **summary:** In response to congressional mandates, NTSB and GAO recommendations, lessons learned, and public input, PHMSA is amending the Pipeline Safety Regulations to improve the safety of pipelines transporting hazardous liquids. Specifically, PHMSA is extending reporting requirements to certain hazardous liquid gravity and rural gathering lines; requiring the inspection of pipelines in areas affected by extreme weather and natural disasters; requiring integrity assessments at least once every 10 years of onshore hazardous liquid pipeline segments located outside of high consequence areas and that are "piggable" (i.e., can accommodate in-line inspection devices); extending the required use of leak detection systems beyond high consequence areas to all regulated, non-gathering hazardous liquid pipelines; and requiring that all pipelines in or affecting high consequence areas be capable of accommodating in-line inspection tools within 20 years, unless the basic construction of a pipeline cannot be modified to permit that accommodation. Additionally, PHMSA is clarifying other regulations and is incorporating Sections 14 and 25 of the PIPES Act of 2016 to improve regulatory certainty and compliance.
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Federal Register, Volume 84 Issue 190 (Tuesday, October 1, 2019) [Federal Register Volume 84, Number 190 (Tuesday, October 1, 2019)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 52260-52298] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] [FR Doc No: 2019-20458] [[Page 52259]] Vol. 84 Tuesday, No. 190 October 1, 2019 Part III Department of Transportation ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 49 CFR Part 195 Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 84 , No. 190 / Tuesday, October 1, 2019 / Rules and Regulations [[Page 52260]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part 195 [Docket No. PHMSA-2010-0229; Amdt. No. 195-102] RIN 2137-AE66 Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: In response to congressional mandates, NTSB and GAO recommendations, lessons learned, and public input, PHMSA is amending the Pipeline Safety Regulations to improve the safety of pipelines transporting hazardous liquids. Specifically, PHMSA is extending reporting requirements to certain hazardous liquid gravity and rural gathering lines; requiring the inspection of pipelines in areas affected by extreme weather and natural disasters; requiring integrity assessments at least once every 10 years of onshore hazardous liquid pipeline segments located outside of high consequence areas and that are ``piggable'' (i.e., can accommodate in-line inspection devices); extending the required use of leak detection systems beyond high consequence areas to all regulated, non-gathering hazardous liquid pipelines; and requiring that all pipelines in or affecting high consequence areas be capable of accommodating in-line inspection tools within 20 years, unless the basic construction of a pipeline cannot be modified to permit that accommodation. Additionally, PHMSA is clarifying other regulations and is incorporating Sections 14 and 25 of the PIPES Act of 2016 to improve regulatory certainty and compliance. DATES: The effective date of this final rule is July 1, 2020. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the rule was approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of March 24, 2017 and March 6, 2015. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Technical questions: Steve Nanney, Project Manager, by telephone at 713-272-2855. General information: Robert Jagger, Senior Transportation Specialist, by telephone at 202-366-4361. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Executive Summary A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action B. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action in Question C. Costs and Benefits II. Background A. Detailed Overview B. Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 C. National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations D. Summary of Each Topic III. Pipeline Advisory Committee IV. Analysis of Comments and PHMSA Response A. Reporting Requirements for Gravity Lines B. Reporting Requirements for Gathering Lines C. Pipelines Affected by Extreme Weather and Natural Disasters D. Periodic Assessment of Pipelines Not Subject to IM E. IM and Non-IM Repair Criteria F. Leak Detection Requirements G. Increased Use of ILI Tools in HCAs H. Clarifying Other Requirements V. PIPES Act of 2016 VI. Section-by-Section Analysis VII. Regulatory Notices I. Executive Summary A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action In recent years, there have been significant hazardous liquid pipeline accidents, most notably the 2010 crude oil spill near Marshall, MI, during which at least 843,000 gallons of crude oil were released, significantly affecting the Kalamazoo River. In response to accident investigation findings, incident report data and trends, and stakeholder input, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is amending the hazardous liquid pipeline safety regulations to improve protection of the public, property, and the environment by closing regulatory gaps where appropriate and ensuring that operators are increasing the detection and remediation of pipeline integrity threats, and mitigating the adverse effects of pipeline failures. On October 18, 2010, PHMSA published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in the Federal Register (75 FR 63774). The ANPRM solicited stakeholder and public input and comments on several aspects of the hazardous liquid pipeline regulations being considered for revision or updating to address various pipeline safety issues. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (Pub. L. 112-90) (2011 Pipeline Safety Act). That legislation included several provisions that are relevant to the regulation of hazardous liquid pipelines. The 2011 Pipeline Safety Act included mandates for PHMSA to complete studies on topics including existing Federal and State regulations for gathering lines, on automatic shutdown and remote control valves, expanding integrity management requirements beyond high-consequence areas, and on the leak detection systems used by hazardous liquid operators. PHMSA completed these studies and submitted the valve and leak detection studies to Congress on December 27, 2012; the gathering line study to Congress on May 8, 2015; and the integrity management (IM) study in April of 2016. These studies are available in the docket for this rulemaking. Shortly after the 2011 Pipeline Safety Act was passed, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued its accident investigation report on the Marshall, MI, accident on July 10, 2012. In it, the NTSB made recommendations regarding the need to revise and update hazardous liquid pipeline regulations. Specifically, the NTSB issued recommendations P-12-03 and P-12-04, which addressed detection of pipeline cracks and ``discovery of condition,'' respectively. The ``discovery of condition'' recommendation would require, in cases where a determination about pipeline threats has not been obtained within 180 days following the date of inspection, that pipeline operators notify PHMSA and provide an expected date when adequate information will become available. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) also issued a recommendation in 2012 concerning hazardous liquid and gas gathering pipelines. Recommendation GAO-12-388, dated March 22, 2012, states, ``To enhance the safety of unregulated onshore hazardous liquid and gas gathering pipelines, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the PHMSA Administrator to collect data from operators of federally unregulated onshore hazardous liquid and gas gathering pipelines, subsequent to an analysis of the benefits and industry burdens associated with such data collection.'' On October 13, 2015, PHMSA published a NPRM to seek public comments on proposed changes to the hazardous liquid pipeline safety regulations (80 FR 61609). A summary of those proposed changes is provided later in this document. Between the publication of the NPRM and this final rule, the President signed the ``Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2016'' (PIPES Act of 2016), Public Law 114-183, on June 22, 2016. While the PIPES Act of 2016 contained several mandates that must be addressed [[Page 52261]] through rulemaking, certain provisions are self-executing standards that can be incorporated into this final rule rulemaking without a prior NPRM and opportunity to comment. Those changes are outlined in Section V of this document. B. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action In response to these mandates, recommendations, lessons learned, and public input, PHMSA is making certain amendments to the Pipeline Safety Regulations affecting hazardous liquid pipelines. The first and second amendments extend reporting requirements to certain hazardous liquid gravity and rural gathering lines not currently regulated by PHMSA. The collection of information about these lines, including those that are not currently regulated, is authorized under the Pipeline Safety Laws, and the resulting data will assist in determining whether the existing Federal and State regulations for these lines and the scope of their applicability are adequate. The third amendment requires inspections of pipelines in areas affected by extreme weather or natural disasters that could impose unexpected longitudinal or circumferential pipe loads, or other risks to the pipeline's integrity and continued safe operation. This provision affects all covered lines under Sec. 195.1, whether they be onshore or offshore, and in a high consequence area (HCA) or outside an HCA.\1\ Such inspections will help to ensure that operators can safely operate pipelines after these events. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ High Consequence Areas are defined in 49 CFR 195.450. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The fourth amendment requires integrity assessments at least once every 10 years, using inline inspection tools or other technology, as appropriate for the threat being assessed, of onshore, piggable, hazardous liquid pipeline segments located outside of HCAs. Existing regulations require operators to assess hazardous liquid pipeline segments located inside HCAs at least once every 5 years. These assessments will provide important information to operators about the condition of these pipelines, including the existence of internal and external corrosion and deformation anomalies. The fifth amendment extends the required use of leak detection systems beyond HCAs to all regulated hazardous liquid pipelines, except for offshore gathering and regulated rural gathering pipelines. The use of such systems will help to mitigate the effects of hazardous liquid pipeline failures that occur outside of HCAs. The sixth amendment requires that all pipelines in or affecting HCAs be capable of accommodating in-line inspection tools within 20 years, unless the basic construction of a pipeline cannot be modified to permit that accommodation. In-line inspection tools are an effective means of assessing the integrity of a pipeline and broadening their use will improve the detection of anomalies and prevent or mitigate future accidents in high-risk areas. Finally, PHMSA is clarifying other regulations and is incorporating Sections 14 and 25 of the PIPES Act of 2016 to improve regulatory certainty and compliance. C. Cost and Benefits Consistent with Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, PHMSA has prepared an assessment of the benefits and costs of the rule as well as reasonably feasible alternatives. PHMSA estimates that up to 502 hazardous liquid operators may incur costs to comply with the NPRM. The estimated annual costs for individual components of the requirements in this rulemaking range between approximately $5,000 and $10.5 million, with aggregate costs of approximately $19.5 million to $21.4 million for all requirements.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Estimated costs are annualized using a 7 percent discount rate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This final rule is primarily designed to mitigate or prevent hazardous liquid pipeline incidents, and is expected to reduce pipeline incident damages, including injuries and fatalities, cleanup and response costs, property damage, product loss, and ecosystem impacts. The rule's information reporting requirements are designed to provide PHMSA information to inform regulatory decision-making. The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for this final rule is available in the docket. The table below provides a summary of the estimated costs and benefits for each of the eight major provisions and in total (see the RIA for the details of these estimates). Annualized Costs and Benefits by Requirement Area (2017$) \3\ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Annual costs \1\ Final rule requirement area -------------------------------------------------------- Benefits 3% discount rate 7% discount rate ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Reporting requirements for $5,000.................... $5,000.................... Better risk gravity lines. understanding and management.\2\ 2. Reporting requirements for $75,000................... $76,000................... Better risk gathering lines. understanding and management.\3\ 3. Inspections of pipelines in Minimal................... Minimal................... Additional clarity and areas affected by extreme certainty for pipeline weather events or natural operators. disasters \4\. 4. Assessments of onshore $6,467,000................ $6,467,000................ Avoided incidents and pipelines that are not already damages through covered under the IM program detection of safety using ILI every 10 years 5 6. conditions.\7\ 5. IM repair criteria \8\...... $0........................ $0........................ $0. 6. LDSs on pipelines located $8,652,000................ $10,508,000............... Reduced damages through outside HCAs \6\. earlier detection and response.\9\ 7. Increased use of ILI tools Minimal................... Minimal................... Improved detection of \10\. pipeline flaws.\10\ 8. Clarify certain IM plan $4,269,000................ $4,343,000................ Reduced damages through requirements. prevention and earlier detection and response.\11\ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total...................... $19,468,000............... $21,399,000............... Reduced damages from avoiding and/or mitigating hazardous liquid releases. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Costs in this table are rounded to the nearest thousand dollars and may differ from costs presented in individual sections of the document. One-time costs are annualized over a 10-year period using discount rates of 3 percent and 7 percent. \2\ Gravity lines can present safety and environmental risks. Depending on the elevation change, a gravity flow pipeline could have more pressure than a pipeline with pump stations to boost the pressure. The benefits of this requirement are not quantified, but based on social costs of $51 per gallon for releases from regulated gathering lines (see Section 2.6.2), the information would need to lead to measures preventing the release of 101 gallons per year to generate benefits that equal the costs. [[Page 52262]] \3\ The benefits are not quantified, but based on social costs of $51 per gallon for releases from regulated gathering lines (see Section 2.6.2), the information would need to lead to measures preventing the release of 1,493 gallons per year to generate benefits that equal the costs. \4\ To the extent that the 72-hour timeline required in the final rule results in higher costs for conducting inspections following a disaster (e.g., due to staff overtime), the final rule could result in costs not reflected in this analysis. \5\ PHMSA also conducted a sensitivity analysis that uses alternative baseline assumptions for pipelines not currently covered under the IM program. Specifically, PHMSA estimated the costs for two alternative scenarios: (1) A scenario that assumes that 100 percent of mileage outside HCAs is assessed in the baseline; and (2) a scenario that assumes that 83 percent of the mileage is assessed in the baseline. Costs for these two scenarios are $0 and $12.9 million, respectively. \6\ Excludes gathering lines. \7\ Given a cost per incident of $536,800, incremental assessment of pipelines outside of HCAs would need to prevent 12 incidents for benefits to equate costs. \8\ PHMSA is not finalizing any changes to the repair criteria and as such expects no incremental costs or benefits. \9\ As discussed in Section 2.6.2, 1,918 incidents involved pipelines outside HCAs between 2010 and 2017, or an average of 240 incidents per year. Transmission pipeline incidents outside HCAs had average costs of approximately $382,179, not including additional damages and costs that are excluded or underreported in the incident data. The annual cost estimate is equivalent to the average damages of 28 to 32 such incidents. \10\ Costs (to retrofit pipes to accommodate ILI) and benefits (from avoided damages) would accrue only to the extent that existing practices deviate from industry standards; PHMSA expects costs and benefits will be minimal due to baseline prevalence of ILI-capable pipelines in all areas. \11\ The benefits of reduced costs associated with the prevention or reduction of released hazardous liquids cannot be quantified but could vary in frequency and size depending on the types of failures that are averted. Including additional pipelines in the IM plan, integrating data, and conducting spatial analyses is expected to enhance an operator's ability to identify and address risk. The societal costs associated with incidents involving pipelines in HCAs average $1.7 million per incident (see Section 2.6.2). The annual cost estimates for this requirement are equivalent to the average damages from less than three such incidents. This is relative to an annual average of 161 incidents in HCAs between 2010 and 2017. II. Background --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Numbers in this table may not sum due to rounding. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. Detailed Overview This final rule addresses the requirements established by Congress in the 2011 Pipeline Safety Act, which are consistent with the emerging needs of the Nation's hazardous liquid pipeline system. This final rule also advances an important safety need to adapt and expand risk-based safety practices considering changing markets and a growing national population whose location choices are in ever-closer proximity to existing pipelines. This final rule strengthens protocols for IM, including protocols for inspections, and improves and streamlines information collection to help drive risk-based identification of the areas with the greatest safety deficiencies. Hazardous Liquid Infrastructure Overview There are two major types of pipelines along the petroleum transportation route: Gathering pipeline systems, and crude oil and refined products pipeline systems. The location, construction and operation of these systems are generally regulated by Federal and State requirements. Gathering lines are typically smaller pipelines no more than 8\5/8\ inches in diameter that transport petroleum from onshore and offshore production facilities. Hazardous liquid pipelines transport the crude oil from the gathering systems to refineries and from refineries to distribution centers. Hazardous liquid lines transport both crude and refined products, and can be hundreds of miles long. These lines may cross State and continental borders, and range in size from 2 to 48 inches in diameter. Hazardous liquid pipeline networks also include pump stations, which move the product through the pipelines, and storage terminals. Changes in product demand has also led to efforts by operators to increase pipeline capacity through flow-direction reversals or converting natural gas pipelines into hazardous liquid pipelines. Per PHMSA's database, 43 percent of all hazardous liquid pipelines were installed prior to 1970.\4\ However, pipeline manufacturing, construction, and operational and maintenance practices have been improving steadily in recent decades, and some older pipes are susceptible to certain manufacturing or construction defects. For example, low-frequency electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe used from the early 1900s through the post-World War II construction boom that lasted well into the 1970s is vulnerable to seam-quality issues. Since the early 1970s, many improvements in pipe manufacturing and materials have been made, and steel and seam properties of pipe have improved with the increased use of high-frequency electric welded (HF-ERW), submerged arc welded (SAW), and seamless pipe (SMLS).\5\ In addition, smart pigs, which are tools that record information about the internal conditions of a pipeline, were not developed until the 1960s and 1970s prior to the adoption of the part 195 regulations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ PHMSA's Annual Report Mileage for Hazardous Liquid or Carbon Dioxide Systems; https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/gas-distribution-gas-gathering-gas-transmission-hazardous-liquids . \5\ HF-ERW steel pipe has a welded pipe seam made using a high frequency welding current. SMLS steel pipe has no longitudinal weld seam. SAW steel pipe has a weld seam made using a submerged welding arc in a bed of powdered flux to shield it from impurities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Since 2012, U.S. oil production has increased about 70 percent from approximately 2.4 to 3.4 Billion barrels annually \6\ resulting in the United States becoming the world's largest producer of liquid fuels in early 2014. Much of the recent increases in production have been in tight oil plays. Tight oil shale formations are heterogeneous and vary widely over relatively short distances and are subjected to fracking. Examples of tight oil formations include the Bakken Shale, the Niobrara Formation, Barnett Shale, and the Eagle Ford Shale in the United States. Per data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2017, tight oil plays accounted for approximately half of the U.S. production, balancing declining production in older plays. While tight oil from shale plays has historically been more difficult to extract, improvements in drilling and production methods, such as horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, have made it economically recoverable. These tight oil plays are located both in regions that have had an oil extraction industry for decades and new regions, such as the Bakken region in North Dakota and Montana, that were not previously oil-producing areas. This has expanded U.S. refiners' access to domestically produced crudes, and U.S. crude oil imports dropped by 7 percent since 2012.\7\ Additionally, exports have risen from minimal amounts in 2012 to [[Page 52263]] over a million barrels per day in 2017.\8\ These supply increases and spatial changes in production patterns are creating wide-ranging impacts on liquid fuels transportation infrastructure. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Crude Oil Production. Producers extracted 2.4 billion barrels of crude oil from U.S. fields in 2012 and 3.4 billion barrels of crude oil in 2017. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm . \7\ EIA, U.S. Imports of Crude Oil (Thousands of Barrels per Day). https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_a.htm . \8\ EIA, U.S. Exports of Crude Oil (Thousand Barrels per Day). https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_exp_dc_NUS-Z00_mbblpd_a.htm . --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regulatory History Congress established the current framework for regulating the safety of hazardous liquid pipelines in the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act (HLPSA) of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-129). The HLPSA provides the Secretary of Transportation (the Secretary) with the authority to prescribe minimum Federal safety standards for hazardous liquid pipeline facilities. That authority, as amended in subsequent reauthorizations, is currently codified in the Pipeline Safety Laws (49 U.S.C. 60101, et seq.). PHMSA is the agency within DOT that administers the Pipeline Safety Laws. PHMSA has issued a set of comprehensive safety standards for the design, construction, testing, operation, and maintenance of hazardous liquid pipelines. Those standards are codified in the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Regulations (49 CFR part 195). Part 195 applies broadly to the transportation of hazardous liquids or carbon dioxide by pipeline, including on the Outer Continental Shelf, with certain exceptions set forth by statute or regulation. A combination of prescriptive and management-based safety standards is used (i.e., an objective is specified, but the method of achieving that objective is not). Risk management principles play a key role in the IM requirements. PHMSA exercises primary regulatory authority over interstate hazardous liquid pipelines, and the owners and operators of those facilities must comply with safety standards in part 195. States may apply to PHMSA for a certification to conduct inspections of intrastate hazardous liquid pipelines. Public utility commissions administer most State pipeline safety programs. These State authorities must adopt the Pipeline Safety Regulations as part of a certification or agreement with PHMSA, but may establish more stringent safety standards for intrastate pipeline facilities within their State regulatory authorities. PHMSA is precluded from regulating the safety standards or practices for an intrastate pipeline facility if a State is currently certified to regulate that facility. States certified to regulate their intrastate lines can also enter into agreements with PHMSA to serve as an agent for inspecting interstate facilities, and they can receive Federal monetary grants to off-set the costs of those State inspections. In 2000 and 2002, the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published regulations requiring IM programs for hazardous liquid pipeline operators in response to a hazardous liquid incident in Bellingham, WA, in 1999 that killed three people.\9\ The regulations were broad- reaching and supplemented PHMSA's prescriptive safety requirements with performance and process-oriented requirements. The approach aimed to set expectations for operators while giving them a degree of flexibility in how they complied with those expectations. The objectives of the IM regulations were to accelerate and improve the quality of integrity assessments conducted on pipelines in areas with the highest potential for adverse consequences; promote a more rigorous, integrated, and systematic management of pipeline integrity and risk by operators; strengthen the government's role in the oversight of pipeline operator integrity plans and programs; and increase the public's confidence in the safe operation of the Nation's pipeline network. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ 65 FR 75378; December 1, 2000; Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators With 500 or More Miles of Pipeline). 67 FR 1650; January 14, 2002; Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Repair Criteria). 67 FR 2136; January 16, 2002; Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators With Less Than 500 Miles of Pipelines). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In January 2011, PHMSA published the Hazardous Liquid Integrity Management Progress Report,\10\ which reported on PHMSA's progress in achieving the program objectives and examined accident trends. The report found that the IM rule and PHMSA's rigorous oversight of operator compliance with the rule are contributing to improved safety performance, including a reduction in the frequency of significant accidents and a decrease in volume spilled in significant accidents. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/iim/IM_Jan2011_StatusReport_01_23_11.pdf . --------------------------------------------------------------------------- PHMSA's Progress on Integrity Management The original part 195 Pipeline Safety Regulations were not designed with risk management in mind. In the mid-1990s, following models from other industries such as nuclear power, PHMSA started to explore whether a risk-based approach to regulation could improve safety of the public and the environment. During this time, PHMSA found that many operators were performing forms of IM that varied in scope and sophistication but there were not consistent minimum standards or requirements. Since the implementation of the IM regulations more than 15 years ago, many factors have changed. Most importantly, there have been sweeping changes in the oil industry, and the Nation's relatively safe but aging pipeline network faces increased pressures from these changes. Long-identified pipeline safety issues, some of which IM set out to address, remain problems. Infrequent but severe accidents indicate that some pipelines continue to be vulnerable to failures stemming from, among other things, outdated construction methods or materials. Some severe pipeline accidents have occurred in areas outside HCAs where the application of IM principles is not required.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ Per PHMSA annual report data accessed May 14, 2019, 1677 non-HCA accidents have occurred since 2010. Of these accidents, 908 resulted in a ``large'' spill, which for reporting purposes is defined as those spills where there was a fatality, injury, fire, explosion, water contamination, property damage of greater than $50,000, or an unintentional loss of product greater than 210 gallons (5 bbls). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The current IM program is both a set of regulations and an overall regulatory approach to improve pipeline operators' ability to identify and mitigate the risks to their pipeline systems. On the operator level, an IM program includes adopting procedures and processes to identify HCAs, which are areas with the greatest population density and environmental sensitivity; determining likely threats to the pipeline within the HCA; evaluating the physical integrity of the pipe within the HCA; and repairing or remediating any pipeline defects found. Because these procedures and processes are complex and interconnected, effective implementation of an IM program relies on continual evaluation and data integration. Operators have made great progress towards achieving the IM objectives. Operators have an improved understanding of the precise locations of their HCAs--those areas where integrity assessments and other protective measures spelled out in the IM rule must be taken to assure public safety and environmental protection. During an incident, petroleum can spread over large areas and cause environmental damage. The IM protections for HCAs are designed to account for the potential environmental and community risks from oil releases. Per PHMSA's hazardous liquid annual [[Page 52264]] data, 42 percent of the Nation's hazardous liquid pipelines \12\ can potentially affect HCAs and thus receive the enhanced level of integrity assessment and protection mandated by the IM rule. As required by the IM rule, operators have also conducted baseline integrity assessments on all pipelines that could affect HCAs and have begun conducting reassessments of these same pipeline segments. Through this requirement to assess their pipelines, operators now have an improved understanding of the condition of pipelines in these safety- sensitive areas. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ http://phmsa.dot.gov/portal/site/PHMSA/menuitem.6f23687cf7b00b0f22e4c6962d9c8789/?vgnextoid=a872dfa122a1d110VgnVCM1000009ed07898RCRD&vgnextchannel=3430fb649a2dc110VgnVCM1000009ed07898RCRD&vgnextfmt=print . --------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to PHMSA's January 2011 Hazardous Liquid Integrity Management Progress Report, which tracked the progress and effectiveness of the IM program in its first decade, as a result of these initial baseline assessments, operators have made more than 7,600 repairs of anomalies that required immediate attention, remediated over 28,000 other conditions on a scheduled basis, and addressed an additional 79,000 anomalies that were not required to be addressed by the IM rule, thus significantly improving the condition of the Nation's pipelines. However, based on recent accidents and mandates from the 2011 Pipeline Safety Act, improvement is still needed in the areas of data integration and their use in risk modelling, risk analysis, and to identify and implement additional preventive and mitigative measures to reduce risk. Improving data integration is critical, as the integrity assessment provisions of the rule only address some of the causes of pipeline failures. Inadequate Leak Detection, Exposure to Weather, Increased Use, and Age Can Increase the Risk of Pipeline Incidents Risk factors for pipeline safety issues stem from many sources, including manufacturing issues, external weather and environmental factors, land-use activities near pipelines, other operational issues, and age-related integrity issues. On July 25, 2010, a segment of a 30-inch-diameter pipeline called Line 6B, owned and operated by Enbridge Incorporated, ruptured in a wetland area in Marshall, MI. Per Sec. Sec. 195.450 and 195.6, this area was identified by the operator as an ``other populated area,'' which meant it was within an HCA. Per the NTSB's Pipeline Accident Report on the incident, the rupture occurred during the last stages of a planned shutdown and was not discovered or addressed for over 17 hours. During the time lapse, Enbridge twice pumped additional oil (81 percent of the total release) into Line 6B during two startups; the total release was estimated by Enbridge to be 843,444 gallons of crude oil.\13\ The oil saturated the surrounding wetlands and flowed into the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. In all, 4,632 acres of land were impacted, 346 animals were killed, 4,208 animals were oiled, and fish and benthic invertebrate communities were impacted. Further, approximately 100,000 recreational user-days were lost, including activities like fishing and boating, and general shoreline park and trail use. The incident also resulted in losses of tribal use, as the Kalamazoo River is used by two tribes for water travel; subsistence; and medicinal, economic, educational, and ceremonial services.\14\ This incident motivated a reexamination of hazardous liquid pipeline safety. The NTSB made recommendations to PHMSA and the regulated industry regarding the need to improve hazardous liquid pipeline safety. Congress also directed PHMSA to reexamine many of its safety requirements, including the expansion of IM regulations to more hazardous liquid pipelines. Other recent accidents, including a pair of related failures that occurred in 2010 on a crude oil pipeline in Salt Lake City, UT, corroborated the significance of having an adequate means for identifying and responding to leaks in all locations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ National Transportation Safety Board: ``Enbridge Incorporated Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Rupture and Release, Marshall, Michigan, July 25, 2010,'' Accident Report NTSB/PAR-12/01, adopted 2012; http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PAR1201.pdf . \14\ U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: ``Final Damage Assessment and Restoration Plan/Environmental Assessment for the July 25-26, 2010 Enbridge Line 6B Oil Discharges near Marshall, MI;'' Sections 1.4--Summary of Natural Resource Injuries and 3.0--Injury Assessment and Quantification. October 2015. https://www.fws.gov/midwest/es/ec/nrda/MichiganEnbridge/pdf/FinalDARP_EA_EnbridgeOct2015.pdf . --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Nation's pipeline system also faces significant risk from failure due to extreme weather events and natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, mudslides, tornadoes, and earthquakes. On January 17, 2015, a breach in the Bridger Pipeline Company's Poplar system resulted in a spill into the Yellowstone River near the town of Glendive, MT, releasing 31,835 gallons (758 barrels) \15\ of crude oil into the river and affecting local water supplies. Information indicated over 100 feet of pipeline was exposed on the river bottom, and the release point was near a girth weld. A depth of cover survey indicated sufficient cover in late 2011,\16\ but the area experienced localized flooding in early 2014. A previous crude oil spill into the Yellowstone River in 2011 near Laurel, MT, was caused by channel migration and river bottom scour, leaving a large span of the pipeline exposed to prolonged current forces and debris washing downstream in the river. Those external forces damaged the exposed pipeline. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ PHMSA Database: ``Operator Information: Incident and Mileage Data: Bridger Pipeline LLC,'' http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/operator/OperatorIM_opid_31878.html?nocache=4851%20-%20_Incidents_tab_3#_OuterPanel_tab_2 . \16\ PHMSA, Corrective Action Order, CPF No. 5-2015-5003H, page 4, January 23, 2015; http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Files/Pipeline/520155003H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_01232015.pdf . --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In October 1994, flooding along the San Jacinto River led to the failure of eight hazardous liquid pipelines and undermined a number of other pipelines. The escaping products were ignited, leading to 547 people in the area suffering extensive smoke inhalation or burn injuries.\17\ According to PHMSA's Accident and Incident Data for hazardous liquid pipelines, from 2010 to 2017, there were 145 reportable incidents \18\ in which storms or other severe natural force conditions damaged pipelines and resulted in their failure. Operators reported total damages of over $232 million from these incidents.\19\ PHMSA has issued several Advisory Bulletins to operators warning about extreme weather events and the consequences of flooding events, including river scour and river channel migration. Further, in December 2017, the American Petroleum Institute issued a Recommended Practice 1133 that provided guidance to operators on how to identify at-risk river crossings and take measures to reduce such risks before, during, and after flooding- and river-scour events. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ NTSB, Pipeline Special Investigation Report, ``Evaluation of Pipeline Failures During Flooding and of Spill Response Actions, San Jacinto River Near Houston, Texas, October 1994;'' NTSB/SIR-96/ 04, Adopted September 6, 1996. \18\ Reporting thresholds for hazardous liquid pipelines are established at Sec. 195.50. Operators must report any failures of a hazardous liquid pipeline resulting in any of the following: (1) An explosion or fire not intentionally set by the operator, (2) A release of 5 gallons or more of hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide, (3) The death of an individual, (4) Personal injury requiring hospitalization, (5) Estimated property damage exceeding $50,000. \19\ PHMSA Hazardous Liquid Accident Reports. https:/
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