# Qualification of Pipeline Personnel

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** Not available
- **title:** Qualification of Pipeline Personnel
- **source type:** rulemaking
- **agency:** Research and Special Programs Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 1994-08-03
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** This notice proposes qualification standards for personnel who perform, or directly supervise those persons performing, regulated operation, maintenance, and emergency-response functions. This action would amend current standards for training personnel performing operating or maintenance activities on hazardous liquid and carbon dioxide pipelines, and extend those standards to personnel performing similar functions on gas pipelines. This action is taken to ensure that pipeline personnel have the necessary knowledge and skills to competently perform these regulated functions. The intended effect of this proposed rulemaking is to improve pipeline safety by requiring operators to assure the competency of pipeline personnel through training, testing, and periodic refresher training.
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Federal Register, Volume 59 Issue 148 (Wednesday, August 3, 1994) [Federal Register Volume 59, Number 148 (Wednesday, August 3, 1994)] [Unknown Section] [Page 0] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] [FR Doc No: 94-18864] [[Page Unknown]] [Federal Register: August 3, 1994] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Research and Special Programs Administration 49 CFR Parts 192 and 195 [Docket No. PS-94; Notice 2] [RIN 2137-AB 38] Qualification of Pipeline Personnel AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: This notice proposes qualification standards for personnel who perform, or directly supervise those persons performing, regulated operation, maintenance, and emergency-response functions. This action would amend current standards for training personnel performing operating or maintenance activities on hazardous liquid and carbon dioxide pipelines, and extend those standards to personnel performing similar functions on gas pipelines. This action is taken to ensure that pipeline personnel have the necessary knowledge and skills to competently perform these regulated functions. The intended effect of this proposed rulemaking is to improve pipeline safety by requiring operators to assure the competency of pipeline personnel through training, testing, and periodic refresher training. DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments in duplicate by October 3, 1994. Late filed comments will be considered to the extent practicable. Interested persons should submit as part of their written comments all the material that is considered relevant to any statement of fact or argument made. ADDRESSES: Send comments to the Dockets Unit, Room 8421, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. Identify the docket and notice numbers stated in the heading of this notice. All comments and materials cited in this document will be available in the docket for inspection and copying in Room 8421 between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. each working day. Non-Federal employee visitors are admitted to DOT headquarters building through the southwest quadrant at Seventh and E Streets. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Albert C. Garnett, (202) 366-2036, regarding the subject matter of this notice, or Dockets Unit, (202) 366-5046, for copies of this notice or other material in the docket. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background The pipeline safety regulations in 49 CFR Parts 192 and 195 cannot be fully effective in preventing and mitigating pipeline accidents unless personnel who perform regulated functions, or directly supervise persons performing regulated functions, understand the applicable regulations and have the knowledge and skills needed for competent performance. Therefore, requiring operators to ensure that such personnel are qualified to perform operating, maintenance, and emergency response functions is an essential step in making the pipeline safety regulations effective. Also, requiring operation, maintenance, and emergency-response personnel to be knowledgeable about safety-related elements, such as flammability, toxicity, potential ignition sources, and to be able to recognize and appropriately react to abnormal and emergency conditions should further minimize the causes and consequences of pipeline accidents. In accidents clearly recognized as involving human error, circumstances often indicate that a deficiency in knowledge or skill, i.e. lack of qualification, has been a significant accident factor. However, the effects of personnel lacking qualifications are not always apparent. The effects may be too subtle to be recognized as an accident factor. For example, accidents that operators have attributed to equipment failure or corrosion may have actually been set in motion by poorly performed operation or maintenance procedures. In addition, the pipeline safety regulations require operators to report ``incidents'' (49 CFR 191.3) and ``accidents'' (49 CFR 195.50) only in instances meeting threshold requirements set out in those regulations. Thus, there may be many more accidents involving personnel lacking qualifications than commonly reported. Recommendations by National Transportation Safety Board In a letter to RSPA dated May 14, 1987, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) stated that incorrect human performance has already caused, or contributed to the severity of, many pipeline accidents, and that most of the errors involved could be linked to inadequate training. NTSB identified 110 related Safety Recommendations it had issued from 1975 through 1986 based on pipeline accidents indicating that training of pipeline personnel needed improvement. The following two accidents are among those cited by NTSB in its correspondence: On July 12, 1983, natural gas escaping under 60 psig pressure from a crack in a substandard butt-fusion joint in a 2-inch plastic gas main entered an apartment building in Clear Lake, Iowa. It exploded and then burned. Two gas distribution company employees were injured, one apartment building was destroyed, and the adjacent apartment building was damaged heavily. Damage was estimated at more than $1 million. Fortunately, none of the building residents were injured or killed. Company employees had been notified earlier about strong gas odors outside the apartments and were on site searching for the gas leak more than 2 hours before the explosion. They did not shut off the flow of gas to the leak and did not warn the residents to evacuate the apartment buildings before the explosion. NTSB recommended that the company train its employees, including supervisors, in procedures for responding to emergencies and protection of the public in areas exposed to leaking gas, and reinstruct its pipe fitters/operators in all elements of the procedures for fusion of plastic pipe. On May 26, 1983, natural gas at 815 psig began to escape through a failed gasket in a compressor at a transmission company's field compressor plant near Bloomfield, New Mexico. The compressor station operator heard a loud noise, ran to the valve manifold outside the compressor building, and tried to shut off the gas supply to compressor No. 14. Another employee, who also heard the noise, ran into the compressor building and tried to shut down the compressor engine. Before either person succeeded, the escaping gas ignited, exploded, and burned. The two employees were burned severely, compressor No. 14 was destroyed, another compressor was damaged, the windows and doors of the compressor building were blown out, and other structural damage resulted. NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the improper tightening of compressor head bolts, resulting in the rupture of a compressor head gasket and the escape and ignition of gas. Contributing to the accident was the operator's failure to assure that maintenance personnel were trained in proper bolt tightening procedures. Contributing to the extent of damage and to the duration of the emergency was the failure by plant personnel, due to inadequate training in emergency procedures, to promptly relieve gas pressure in the piping by activating the blowdown system. In a February 1987 report (NTSB/PAR-87/01) detailing two Texas Eastern Gas Pipeline Company accidents occurring in Kentucky in 1985 and 1986, NTSB determined that company employees who inspected corrosion damage had not been adequately trained to assess the effect of corrosion. It also determined that in the 1986 accident, supervisors had not been properly trained to cooperate with local officials during an emergency. In this report, NTSB recommended that RSPA: Amend 49 CFR Parts 192 and 195 to require that operators of pipelines develop and conduct selection, training, and testing programs to annually qualify employees for correctly carrying out each assigned responsibility which is necessary for complying with 49 CFR Part 192 and 195 as appropriate (Safety Rec. No. P-87-2). Additionally, in the May 14, 1987, letter from NTSB to RSPA identifying its 110 Safety Recommendations, NTSB urged OPS to require all pipeline operators, without regard to size or ownership of the pipeline, to develop, through job/task analyses, employee qualifications for all activities addressed by the pipeline safety standards. More recently the NTSB released the following account of an accident in Chicago that was attributed to inadequately trained gas distribution personnel. On January 17, 1992, employees of a natural gas utility were performing annual maintenance on a pressure regulator station that reduced high pressure upstream gas to the low pressure requirements of the downstream distribution system. During this routine procedure the pressure regulator is taken out of service and the normally closed by-pass valve is manually throttled to control gas flow to the low pressure distribution system. Workers operating the by-pass valve normally determine the need to increase or decrease the gas flow to the low pressure system by monitoring the liquid levels in manometers installed on that system. A manometer is a clear plastic U-tube used throughout the gas industry to measure pressure (pressure head) in mains and services. When used on low pressure systems the open ended U-tube commonly contains water. By observing the difference in height of the water columns, workers can readily determine the pressure in the connected gas piping. Although, the workers saw the water blow out of their manometers, at least twice, they waited for instructions from headquarters before shutting off the gas supply by closing the 4-inch by-pass valve. The resulting over pressure condition (as high as 10 psig) lasted about 45 minutes, during which gas in the downstream distribution system escaped through gas appliances into homes and other buildings where it was ignited by unidentified sources. The resulting explosion and fires killed four people, injured four people and damaged 14 houses and three commercial buildings. While the NTSB concluded that there was insufficient evidence to determine which way the 4-inch by-pass valve was turned or if it had been blocked by debris that become dislodged, it said that the accident could have been prevented or its severity lessened if the onsite supervisor had closed the by- pass valve as soon as he realized that the low pressure system was over pressured. Two of the workmen testified that they knew from their training that when water blew out of their manometers, it was caused by excessive high pressure gas flowing through the by-pass valve. However, none of the crew acknowledged having been trained to respond to emergencies, including those involving overpressurization. NTSB found that the gas company's training manual did not detail how to recognize or respond to those abnormal situations employees are likely to encounter nor did it tell supervisors the extent of their authority or reference the company's emergency plan. Nonetheless, the NTSB found that the gas company's service department responded very well after the gas was shut off. The NTSB also noted that such training deficiencies are not confined to Chicago, but are a nationwide problem. As a result of its investigation of this accident, NTSB reiterated its 1987 recommendation to RSPA that it require operators of pipelines to develop and conduct selection, training and testing programs to annually qualify employees for their safety-sensitive responsibilities under 49 CFR Parts 192 and 195. Recommendation by DOT Inspector General As the use of insufficiently qualified personnel by some operators has become known, several sources in addition to NTSB have recommended that DOT take action to regulate the qualifications of pipeline personnel. In December 1982, the DOT Inspector General (IG) recommended in a memorandum to the RSPA Administrator that RSPA require licensing or certification of managers/superintendents of gas distribution systems. The IG said: State safety inspectors have indicated that operators of small municipal and privately owned gas distributors are frequently unaware of the federal safety standards or lack the know-how to implement them. Managers or superintendents of gas distribution systems should demonstrate a basic knowledge and understanding of federal safety standards before they are allowed to operate/manage the systems. Licensing or certification of natural gas distribution operators would improve compliance and enable State safety inspectors to provide greater coverage by reducing the amount of time expended in explaining standards to operators. Many States already require the operators of other utility systems to be licensed. Recommendations by Congress The House Committee on Energy and Commerce in its November 17, 1987, report to accompany H.R. 2266, a bill to amend the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (NGPSA) 1 and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (HLPSA) stated that DOT ``may establish criteria for a program of testing for pipeline operations employees and include licensing based on that testing if this is appropriate'' (H.R. Rep. No. 445, Pt. 1, 100th Congress, 1st Session, 13). This bill culminated in the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-561; October 31, 1988), which, in sections 101 and 201, gave DOT discretionary authority to require ``that all individuals responsible for the operation and maintenance of pipeline facilities be tested for qualifications and certified to perform such functions.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Pub. L. No. 103-272 was enacted on July 5, 1994. This Act revises, codifies and enacts without substantive changes certain transportation laws, including those related to pipeline safety. Thus citations to the NGPSA and the HLPSA have been changed to 49 U.S.C. sec. 60101 et seq. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recommendation by Minnesota Commission on Pipeline Safety The need for qualification standards for pipeline personnel has also been recognized at the state level. Following the July 1986 failure of an 8-inch products pipeline in Minnesota that resulted in the deaths of two people and serious injury to another person, the Governor of Minnesota established the Minnesota Commission on Pipeline Safety. This commission examined the safety and reliability of pipelines operating in Minnesota. The commission's December 1986 report included a recommendation that the U.S. Department of Transportation study the need for additional registration, licensing, and certification requirements for pipeline design and construction personnel. Recommendations by National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives An alternative approach to government licensing or certification of operators or operator personnel was recommended in 1986 by the National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR), an association of state pipeline safety inspectors. In one of its annual resolutions (1986-9) submitted to the RSPA Administrator, NAPSR urged DOT ``to initiate a rulemaking to establish regulations which would require natural gas operator personnel qualification.'' NAPSR made this recommendation after determining that ``it would be in the best interest of public safety, and as a general standard for the natural gas industry, that all natural gas system operations be under the direction of a person who is qualified by test, experience, and training in natural gas work.'' Again in 1990, in one of its annual resolutions (1990-3), NAPSR urged the DOT Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) ``to create specific qualification standards of uniformity across the industry'' and that the rulemaking ``be expanded to include personnel engaged in design and construction.'' Like NTSB, NAPSR has recommended a rulemaking approach rather than Federal licensing or certification. In this notice RSPA has proposed that regulated design or construction functions required to properly accomplish covered operation, maintenance or emergency-response work must be performed by persons qualified as proposed in this notice. However, persons with pipeline expertise and registered as professional engineers in the state where the work is located are qualified for any such engineering design under this proposal. At this time, RSPA does not see the need to extend the proposed qualification requirements to include personnel engaged in all regulated design and construction functions as recommended in the NAPSR resolution. Application of the proposed requirements to only those personnel performing regulated operation, maintenance and emergency response functions is consistent with the intent of the Recommendations by Congress and the mandate contained in the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 (below). Nonetheless, in response to that NAPSR resolution, RSPA invites persons to comment on whether we should extend the testing and certification requirements to personnel engaged in all regulated design and construction of covered pipelines. Persons commenting in support of such an extension are requested to support their positions with data from related accidents that includes: the quantity of gas, hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide released and any resulting deaths, personal injuries, property damages and environmental damages. Small Gas Systems Although lack of sufficient training has been a factor contributing to accidents on both large and small pipeline systems, OPS, the advisory committees (below) and state pipeline safety inspectors recognize that there is a particular need to improve the knowledge and skills of personnel in some of the small gas distribution systems. Personnel with some deficiencies include not only the operator and operator personnel, but also contractors working for small gas distribution systems. Small gas distribution systems are characterized in this proposal as distribution systems serving fewer than 10,000 customers. They include petroleum gas systems (covered by Sec. 192.11) and master meter systems (defined in Sec. 191.3), both of which usually serve mobile home parks, housing projects, and apartment complexes; and public, private, and municipal distribution systems. Industry sources estimate that there are about 1,000 petroleum gas systems covered by Sec. 192.11, that serve 10 or more customers. Additionally, information in the OPS enforcement data base shows there are 52,000 master meter systems and 1,150 other small public, private, and municipal distribution systems. The lack of qualified personnel working on these small gas distribution systems looms as a potential threat to gas pipeline safety. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking On March 23, 1987, OPS published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) titled, ``Pipeline Operator Qualifications,'' requesting public comment on the need for additional regulations or a certification/licensing program regarding the qualification of personnel who design, construct, operate, or maintain gas or hazardous liquid pipelines (Docket PS-94, Notice 1; 52 FR 9189). The ANPRM outlined RSPA's existing regulations requiring the qualification or training of personnel in certain aspects of pipeline safety, such as welding steel pipe, corrosion control, and joining plastic pipe. In addition, the ANPRM discussed RSPA and state efforts to train operator personnel in understanding the pipeline safety regulations. Comments were received from 134 persons representing various gas and liquid pipeline operators, governmental agencies, and other interested parties. Of the 116 persons who commented on the competency level of operator personnel, approximately 75 percent felt that a lack of competent personnel did not pose a significant enough threat to public safety to warrant further governmental action. However, a minority of about 22 percent felt some attention should be given to small gas distribution systems. Of the 60 persons who commented on the question of whether governmental action, if taken, should apply industry-wide or be limited to small systems, approximately 62 percent favored the latter. Of the 34 persons expressing an opinion on the appropriate governmental action, about 53 percent favored increasing direct training and the preparation of guidance material for operator personnel. The remainder were almost evenly divided between more regulation of training/qualification and a licensing/certification program. Of the 24 persons who commented on what areas of pipeline safety should be covered if additional training and qualification requirements are developed, almost everyone favored various combinations of design, construction, operation, and maintenance. Finally, of the 61 persons expressing an opinion on whether additional regulations for training and qualification would result in an improvement in pipeline safety, approximately 46 percent expected an improvement in accidents prevented or mitigated. Advisory Committees The Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (TPSSC) and the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (THLPSSC) are OPS's gas and liquid advisory committees representing government agencies, pipeline operators, and the public. At a joint meeting in Washington, DC on September 23, 1987, the TPSSC and THLPSSC discussed the ANPRM. The advisory committees generally supported requiring all pipeline operators to conduct training and testing programs for personnel assigned to perform operation and maintenance functions. Many committee members were concerned, however, about the ability of some small gas distribution system operators to provide the necessary training, and requested that any new regulations be sensitive to the limited financial and technical resources of these small operators. Subsequently, on September 13 and 14, 1988, these committees met again in Washington, DC, and discussed a preliminary rulemaking proposal which OPS had developed for the qualification of pipeline personnel. The basic training and testing requirements now being put forward for public comment were embodied in that proposal. The TPSSC supported the proposal by unanimous vote. The THLPSSC, after making three minor recommendations for clarification of statements in the proposed regulations, also supported the proposal unanimously. However, the three recommendations are no longer germane, since the statements that required clarification have been removed from the proposed requirements. Congressional Mandate Under sections 106 and 205 of the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No. 102-508; October 24, 1992), 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60102, Congress mandated that DOT require ``all individuals responsible for the operation and maintenance of pipeline facilities be tested for qualifications and certified to perform such functions''. In complying with the congressional mandate, DOT is required to ``address the ability to recognize and appropriately react to abnormal operating conditions which may indicate a dangerous situation or a condition exceeding design limits.'' Furthermore, Congress provided that certification may, ``as the Secretary considers appropriate, be performed by the operator.'' Qualification and Certification RSPA is proposing that regulated pipeline operators implement requirements for the qualification of operation, maintenance and emergency-response personnel (including contractor personnel) and for the qualification of certain supervisory personnel. These requirements would be based on the continuing training program applicable to hazardous liquid and carbon dioxide pipeline operators. Operators would be required to certify the qualification of personnel for the performance of covered functions. However, RSPA is not proposing to establish an industry-wide personnel licensing program. This decision was made because the severity and extent of the personnel qualification problem does not currently warrant such an ambitious undertaking. In addition, there is no private or governmental apparatus currently in place to conduct such extensive licensing. This decision is consistent with the regulatory authority provided by 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60102, which requires qualification and certification of those individuals performing functions related to the operation and maintenance of pipeline facilities. Of course, where local conditions warrant more rigorous action, state agencies are not precluded from starting a licensing or certification program for intrastate pipeline operators under their regulatory jurisdiction. It is difficult to assess how detailed and extensive the new Federal personnel qualification regulations should be, because many pipelines have unique operating and maintenance requirements. Therefore, RSPA is proposing a more general performance-oriented regulatory approach based on an expansion of the continuing training program hazardous liquid operators must now provide under Sec. 195.403. Available Training Several states are working to improve the knowledge and skills of operator personnel in small gas distribution systems, including master meter systems, by state-sponsored educational programs. Currently, states with notable training programs include Alabama, Arizona, California, Kentucky, and Texas. In addition, some gas operators have established statewide and regional gas associations for the purpose of improving technical skills and the understanding of the gas pipeline safety regulations. These associations often encourage gas equipment suppliers to exhibit and instruct gas distribution and transmission personnel in the proper use of special tools and equipment. Similarly, state regulatory agencies are often encouraged to participate by teaching or clarifying the applicable Federal/state pipeline safety regulations to personnel working on small gas distribution systems. At the Federal level, RSPA provides pipeline safety training through its Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. In 1992 and 1993 gas pipeline safety seminars taught by instructors from the TSI were held in 20 and 21 states, respectively. These one, two, three, and four-day seminars teach various aspects of pipeline safety regulations and include instructional material oriented toward the operator personnel working on small gas distribution systems. The gas pipeline safety seminars will also be held in 26 states during 1994. Attendance at these instructive seminars requires advance registration and payment of a modest registration fee. Additionally, other hazardous liquid and gas pipeline safety courses planned by TSI for presentation in 1994 include regulation compliance, corrosion control and computer simulator dispatching. Pipeline operators interested in further information on TSI training courses should contact their state pipeline safety regulatory office or phone the Pipeline Safety Division of the Transportation Safety Institute at (405) 954-7219. In 1989, RSPA distributed to each state pipeline safety agency a set of 10 VHS cassettes prepared by the Pipeline Safety Section of the Arizona Corporation Commission for training small gas distribution operators in that state. The cassettes can be used by operators of small distribution systems in all the states to augment the training of their employees. The cassettes present fundamental theory and practical application of gas distribution plus the basics of the Federal pipeline safety regulations. Another RSPA training aid is the ``Guidance Manual for Operators of Small Gas Systems,'' which is available (in single copy) to pipeline operators at no cost from the Transportation Safety Institute, Pipeline Safety Division, DTI-60, Post Office Box 25082, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73125-5050. The manual was developed by RSPA with the assistance of state pipeline safety representatives and gas distribution trade association members. The manual has recently been revised and updated. It provides a broad overview of compliance responsibilities under parts 191, 192, and 199 of the Federal pipeline safety regulations and is designed for use by non-technically trained operator personnel working on small gas distribution systems, including master meter systems. Since the publication of the first edition in 1982, some 50,000 copies have been disseminated to gas operator personnel. Covered Functions The proposed regulations apply to personnel who perform regulated operation, maintenance, and emergency-response functions ( covered functions ) on a ``pipeline,'' as that term is defined in Secs. 192.3 and 195.2 of the pipeline safety regulations. Additionally, the proposed regulations would apply to ``supervisory persons'' (defined in Secs. 192.803 and 195.503, as operators, managers, supervisors, foremen, co-workers, and other personnel) who directly oversee persons performing these same covered functions. Lack of qualified personnel to perform regulated pipeline design and construction functions that are unrelated to pipeline operation, maintenance, or emergency response has not been identified as a significant safety problem. Thus, at this time, no new requirements are proposed for these areas. Nonetheless, if regulated design or construction functions are required to properly accomplish regulated operation, maintenance, or emergency-response work, then persons performing those related design or construction functions must be qualified as proposed in this notice. However, persons with pipeline expertise and registered as professional engineers in the state where the pipeline work is located are qualified for any such engineering design under the proposed requirements. Covered functions are those operation, maintenance, and emergency- response functions that are regulated by the pipeline safety regulations. However, covered functions are not limited to those under Part 192, Subpart L--Operations and Subpart M--Maintenance or Part 195, Subpart F--Operation and Maintenance. The covered functions are much broader and are generally identified as having all three of the following characterics: Characteristic No. 1--The function is performed by persons either in direct contact, or in close association with pipelines regulated by parts 192 or 195. Characteristic No. 2--The function performed applies to the operation or maintenance of pipelines, or the response to an emergency involving pipelines. These functions are performed on pipelines that are or have been in service, as opposed to new pipelines that have not yet been readied for service. Operating functions include, among other things, the control of pressure, movement, or storage of gas under part 192 and hazardous liquids or carbon dioxide under part 195. Maintenance functions keep a pipeline in proper condition or preserve a pipeline for future use. They include, among other things, functions involved in inspection, protection, repair, replacement, and integrity testing. Emergency-response functions are steps an operator takes to recognize emergency conditions; control or mitigate their harmful effects to persons, property, or the environment; and then return the pipeline to normal operating conditions. Characteristic No. 3--The function is regulated by a provision contained in part 192 or 195. A function is regulated in instances where a provision: (1) contains a rule that governs the conduct of the function, or (2) requires that the function be done according to a plan or procedure. Proposed Subparts Because the training and testing of pipeline personnel may be an expanding requirement, the qualification regulations under this proposal would be placed in new subpart N of part 192 and new subpart G of part 195. The current Sec. 195.403 (Training) would be deleted. Under the proposed Secs. 192.805(a) and 195.505(a), operators would have to assure that personnel (both experienced and inexperienced) who perform, or directly oversee persons performing, regulated operation, maintenance, or emergency-response functions (covered functions) have been qualified by completion of all the requirements for qualification. Persons qualified to perform certain covered functions may need additional training and testing before performing other covered functions to which they are upgraded, promoted, or transferred. The personnel affected by this proposal may be operators themselves; regular, part-time, or temporary employees of the operator; independent contractors and subcontractors engaged by the operator; and regular, part-time, or temporary employees of contractors and subcontractors. Under Secs. 192.805(b) and 195.505(b), functions required to be performed by qualified persons may (except for the specified functions) also be performed by persons without such qualification if, while performing the function, those persons are accompanied and directed by a qualified supervisory person. This provision is intended to permit on-the-job training of persons not yet qualified. The supervisory person involved would not only have to directly oversee performance of the covered function, but accompany and direct the trainee (or unqualified person) while he or she performs the function. Moreover, supervisory persons directly overseeing qualified persons performing covered functions would, themselves, be required to be qualified or required to be qualified administratively for those covered functions as required in Secs. 192.805(c) and 195.505(c). The term ``qualified administratively'' is defined in Secs. 192.803 and 195.503. Under the proposed Secs. 192.805(c) and 195.505(c), supervisory persons may become qualified administratively in certain covered functions by meeting all the proposed training and testing requirements, except those involving the demonstration of competent manual skills. Accordingly, supervisory persons directly overseeing personnel such as qualified welders would be permitted an exemption from ``hands-on'' welding. However, such supervisory persons would be required to demonstrate an appropriate knowledge of the pipeline safety regulations for welding--subpart E of part 192 or subpart D of part 195 as required under the proposed Secs. 192.811(d)(1) and 195.511(d)(1). RSPA encourages the practice of some pipeline operators to require that persons directly supervising welders be, themselves, fully qualified welders. Under Secs. 192.807 and 195.507, all evaluating, training, and testing of personnel would be performed by an instructor with demonstrable proficiency in the functions to be taught and tested. Demonstrable proficiency is proposed to be defined as evidence of competence acceptable to other persons with specialized training or certification in the performance of similar functions. However, the instructor's proficiency need only be commensurate with the level of knowledge and skills required for competent performance of the function on the operator's unique pipeline. This provision recognizes that the degree or extent of knowledge and skills required to competently perform some functions on a particular pipeline may be less than that required for similar functions on more complex pipelines. Operators (who own or operate pipelines) are permitted to serve as instructors or to select operator personnel or other entities to serve as instructors, providing that the operator or persons selected as instructors have the required level of proficiency. An operator who would not qualify as an instructor but would need to be evaluated for purposes of qualification would have to obtain the evaluation from an instructor, who could be another operator, employee of that other operator or an entity qualified as an instructor. Under Secs. 192.809(a) and 195.509(a), instructors would be required to evaluate the work experience and training of persons requiring qualification in order to determine what, if any, prior work experience and training were suitable and applicable to that required for competent performance of the persons' current functions. Work experience and training that are evaluated as equivalent to any of the general or specific training elements of Secs. 192.811 and 195.511 would not require retraining, but would require testing under Secs. 192.813 and 195.513 to confirm the evaluation. After completion of the evaluation of the prior experience and training of persons performing covered functions, the operator would be required by Secs. 192.809(b) and 195.509(b) to prepare a written or computerized qualification training and testing schedule containing details such as names and titles of affected persons, dates and locations for training and testing, elements of general and specific training to be taught or tested, and names of instructors. Under Secs. 192.809(c) and 195.509(c), the operator would be required to prepare a written or computerized refresher training schedule showing similar details, except that testing is not required, under this proposal, for refresher training. The proposed elements of qualification training under Secs. 192.811 and 195.511 are based on the training program hazardous liquid operators are now required to conduct under Sec. 195.403(a). However, the proposed requirements are more comprehensive. Under the proposal, all affected personnel (except persons with prior equivalent work experience or training that have been confirmed by testing) would have to satisfactorily complete general training elements of Secs. 192.811 and 195.511 appropriate to the operator's unique pipeline and specific training elements relevant to a person's covered functions on that unique pipeline. Operators would have to demonstrate that their personnel have received training relevant to the operator's unique pipeline system in the applicable elements of Secs. 192.811 and 195.511 through any, or a combination of the following methods: prior formal education, prior company-sponsored training, work experience, apprenticeship, or newly provided on-the-job or classroom training. All would qualify as legitimate training methods. The necessary depth and length of training would be established by the operator so that they are sufficient to assure personnel competency as demonstrated by subsequent testing under Secs. 192.813 and 195.513. Under this approach, pipeline instructors would determine for each individual what work experience and prior education or training are relevant to that individual's covered functions and what additional training is needed to meet the proposed elements of training. Consequently, wholesale training should be unnecessary for most experienced personnel of pipeline operators with currently adequate training programs. Although this approach is intended to give operators latitude in developing a qualification program, each operator's program would be required to result in personnel of the operator and the contractor being proficient in all the training elements proposed under Secs. 192.811 and 195.511. Because the training appropriate for one individual function, or a particular pipeline, may not be appropriate for another individual function, or another pipeline, an operator's qualification program would be developed and implemented to accommodate such distinctions. RSPA is particularly concerned that control center dispatchers and other operating personnel are adequately trained to recognize the abnormal operating conditions or the emergency conditions of proposed Secs. 192.811(d)(4) and 195.511(d)(4). Further, RSPA is concerned that control center persons and other operating personnel are adequate
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