{"operation":"document","citation":"62 FR 7638","title":"Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed Gas Service; Interim Final Rule","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Research and Special Programs Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"1997-02-19","effective_on":"1997-02-19","summary":"In this interim final rule, RSPA is amending the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) to specify the conditions under which certain cargo tank motor vehicles may continue to be used on an interim basis, even if they are equipped with emergency discharge control systems which may not function as required by the regulations under all operating conditions. This rule addresses specification MC 330, MC 331, and certain non-specification cargo tank motor vehicles which are used to deliver propane and other liquefied compressed gases. It responds to a recently discovered safety deficiency which may affect many of these cargo tank motor vehicles. The intended effect of this action is to ensure, on an interim basis, an acceptable level of safety for delivery of liquefied compressed gases while a permanent solution to the problem is developed and implemented. During the term of this interim rule, RSPA is seeking comments and data on the costs and effectiveness of alternative means of achieving a level of safety for the long term comparable to that provided by its long-standing regulation. At the same time, the Agency is also seeking comments on the costs and benefits of the interim measures adopted in this rule. A public meeting is scheduled for March 20, 1997, to receive comments and recommendations in regard to the measures adopted in this interim final rule and to solicit recommendations for a permanent solution. Additionally, two workshops have been scheduled for March 4- 5, 1997 and April 8-9, 1997. All interested persons, including trade organizations, cargo tank producers, individual wholesale and retail entities involved in the distribution of liquefied compressed gases and representatives of public protection organizations, are encouraged to participate.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-97-4116.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-97-4116.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-97-4116","source_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/1997/02/19/97-4116/hazardous-materials-cargo-tank-motor-vehicles-in-liquefied-compressed-gas-service-interim-final-rule","body":"Federal Register, Volume 62 Issue 33 (Wednesday, February 19, 1997) [Federal Register Volume 62, Number 33 (Wednesday, February 19, 1997)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 7638-7649] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] [FR Doc No: 97-4116] [[Page 7637]] _______________________________________________________________________ Part IV Department of Transportation _______________________________________________________________________ Research and Special Programs Administration _______________________________________________________________________ 49 CFR Part 171 Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed Gas Service; Interim Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations [[Page 7638]] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Research and Special Programs Administration 49 CFR Part 171 [Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HM-225)] RIN 2137-AC97 Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed Gas Service; Interim Final Rule AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT. ACTION: Emergency Interim final rule and announcement of a public meeting. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: In this interim final rule, RSPA is amending the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) to specify the conditions under which certain cargo tank motor vehicles may continue to be used on an interim basis, even if they are equipped with emergency discharge control systems which may not function as required by the regulations under all operating conditions. This rule addresses specification MC 330, MC 331, and certain non-specification cargo tank motor vehicles which are used to deliver propane and other liquefied compressed gases. It responds to a recently discovered safety deficiency which may affect many of these cargo tank motor vehicles. The intended effect of this action is to ensure, on an interim basis, an acceptable level of safety for delivery of liquefied compressed gases while a permanent solution to the problem is developed and implemented. During the term of this interim rule, RSPA is seeking comments and data on the costs and effectiveness of alternative means of achieving a level of safety for the long term comparable to that provided by its long-standing regulation. At the same time, the Agency is also seeking comments on the costs and benefits of the interim measures adopted in this rule. A public meeting is scheduled for March 20, 1997, to receive comments and recommendations in regard to the measures adopted in this interim final rule and to solicit recommendations for a permanent solution. Additionally, two workshops have been scheduled for March 4- 5, 1997 and April 8-9, 1997. All interested persons, including trade organizations, cargo tank producers, individual wholesale and retail entities involved in the distribution of liquefied compressed gases and representatives of public protection organizations, are encouraged to participate. DATES: Effective date: This interim final rule is effective February 19, 1997 through August 15, 1997. Comment date: Comments must be received by April 21, 1997. Public meeting: A public meeting will be held on Wednesday, March 20, 1997, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in Washington, D.C. Workshops: Workshops will be held on--March 4-5, 1997, and April 8- 9, 1997, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in Washington, D.C. Oral presentations: Any person wishing to present an oral statement at the public meeting should notify Jennifer Karim by telephone or in writing, on or before March 12, 1997. ADDRESSES: Written comments: Address comments to the Dockets Office, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20590-0001. Comments should identify the docket number and be submitted in two copies. Persons wishing to receive confirmation of receipt of their comments should include a self-addressed, stamped postcard. The Dockets Office is located on the Plaza Level of the Nassif Building at the Department of Transportation at the above address. Public dockets may be reviewed there between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Public meeting: The public meeting will be held at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Auditorium, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, D.C. 20591. Workshops: (1) March 4-5, 1997, U.S. Department of Transportation (Room 6244, Nassif Building), 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20590; (2) April 8-9, 1997, U.S. Department of Transportation (Room 6200, Nassif Building), 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20590. Oral presentations: Submit written text of oral statement to Jennifer Karim, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room 8100, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. Five copies of written text of oral statements should be presented to RSPA staff immediately prior to the oral presentation. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ronald Kirkpatrick, Office of Hazardous Materials Technology, Research and Special Programs Administration, telephone (202) 366-4545, or Stephen Keppler, Office of Motor Carrier Safety and Technology, Safety and Hazardous Materials Division, Federal Highway Administration, telephone (202) 366-2978, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW, telephones 20590-0001. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Background On September 8, 1996, more than 35,000 gallons of propane were released during a delivery at a bulk storage facility in Sanford, North Carolina. During the unloading of a specification MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicle into two 30,000-gallon storage tanks, the discharge hose from the cargo tank separated at its hose coupling at the storage tank inlet connection. Most of the cargo tank's 9,800 gallons and more than 30,000 gallons from the storage tanks were released during this incident. If this large quantity of propane had reached an ignition source, 125 people (workers, residents and emergency responders) could have been killed. The hazards associated with transportation of liquefied petroleum gas have been demonstrated repeatedly on U.S. highways. In fact, propane releases are the second leading cause of death in hazardous materials transportation. Between 1990 and 1991, five reported deaths and 695 injuries resulted from propane incidents in highway transportation. For example, when liquid propane is released into the atmosphere, it quickly vaporizes into its normal non-pressurized gaseous form. This happens very rapidly, and in the process, the propane combines readily with air to form fuel-air mixtures which are ignitable over a range of 2.2 to 9.5 percent by volume. If an ignition source is present in the vicinity of such highly flammable mixtures, the vapor cloud ignites and burns very rapidly (characterized by some experts as ``explosively''). This has occurred a number of times over the years, and even though the incidents described below were not caused by spills during lading transfer, they illustrate the grave consequences of a large propane release when ignition occurs: On July 25, 1962 in Berlin, NY, an MC 330 bulk transport ruptured releasing about 6,900 gallons of liquid propane. Ignition occurred. Ten persons were killed, and 17 others were injured. Property damage included total destruction of 18 buildings and 11 vehicles. On March 9, 1972 near Lynchburg, VA, an MC 331 bulk transport overturned and slid into a rock embankment. The impact ruptured the tank's shell releasing about 4,000 gallons of liquid propane. Ignition occurred. Two persons were killed and five others were injured. Property damage included a farmhouse, outbuildings and about 12 acres of woodland. [[Page 7639]] On April 29, 1975, near Eagle Pass, Texas, an MC-330 bulk transport struck a concrete headwall and ruptured releasing more than 8,000 gallons of liquefied petroleum gas. The ensuing fire and explosion killed 16 persons, injured 51, and destroyed 51 vehicles. On February 22, 1973, 23 tank cars derailed in Waverly, Tennessee. During wreck-clearing operations, a 30,000-gallon tank car containing liquefied petroleum gas ruptured. The ensuing fire and explosion killed 16 persons, injured 43, and caused $1.8 million in property damage. On December 23, 1988, in Memphis, Tennessee, an MC-330 bulk transport struck a bridge abutment and ruptured releasing 9388 gallons of liquefied petroleum gas. The ensuing fire and explosion killed eight persons and injured eight. On July 27, 1994, in White Plains, New York, an MC-331 bulk transport struck a column of an overpass and ruptured, releasing 9,200 gallons of propane. Ignition occurred. The driver was killed, 23 people were injured, and an area within a radius of approximately 400 feet was engulfed in fire. In the Sanford incident, the driver became aware of the system failure when the hose began to violently oscillate while releasing liquid propane. He immediately shut down the engine, stopping the discharge pump, but he could not access the remote closure control to close the internal stop valve. The excess flow feature of the emergency discharge control system did not function, and propane continued to be released from the system. Additionally, the back flow check valve on the storage tank system did not function and propane was released from the storage tanks. In light of the large quantity of propane released, this incident could have resulted in a catastrophic loss of life and extensive property damage if the gas had reached an ignition source. Fortunately, there was no fire. Based on the preliminary information from the Sanford incident, RSPA published an advisory notice in the Federal Register on December 13, 1996 (61 FR 65480). This notice alerted persons involved in the design, manufacture, assembly, maintenance or transportation of hazardous materials in MC 330 and MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicles of this problem with the excess flow feature of the emergency discharge control systems and reminded them that these tanks and their components must conform to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR Parts 171- 180; HMR). Since that time, RSPA has received applications for emergency exemptions from both the National Propane Gas Association (NPGA) and the Mississippi Tank Company that indicate the problem is more extensive than originally believed. Additionally, The Fertilizer Institute (TFI) and National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. (NTTC) have submitted applications to become party to these exemptions. In support of its exemption application the Mississippi Tank Company, a manufacturer of specification MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicles, has provided preliminary information that there is reason to suspect the problem may be common to nearly all cargo tank motor vehicles used in liquefied compressed gas service within the United States. This problem may exist also in the non-specification cargo tanks authorized in Sec. 173.315(k). Both applications for exemption are reprinted in their entirety and discussed in detail below. II. National Propane Gas Association Application for Emergency Exemption The body of NPGA's application for exemption is reproduced as follows (numbers in brackets have been added for ease of reference in the following discussion): [1] The National Propane Gas Association (NPGA), acting as an agent for its members, presents here an application for a DOT Exemption to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) to permit the continued operation of certain cargo tank motor vehicles in propane service pending development and installation of equipment intended to overcome an operational difficulty identified recently. The Association also requests that this application be handled as an emergency exemption under the procedures outlined in 49 CFR 107.113. Upon issuance of this emergency exemption, NPGA will submit a second request to convert the emergency exemption to a conventional exemption. [2] NPGA is the national trade association of the LP-gas (principally propane) industry with a membership of about 3,500 companies, including 37 affiliated state and regional associations, representing members in all 50 states. Although the single largest group of NPGA members are retail marketers of propane gas, the membership also includes propane producers, transporters and wholesalers, as well as manufacturers and distributors of associated equipment, containers and appliances. Propane gas is used in over 18 million installations nationwide for home and commercial heating and cooking, in agriculture, in industrial processing, and as a clean air alternative engine fuel for both over-the-road vehicles and industrial lift trucks. [3] On September 8, 1996, a cargo tank motor vehicle, of the type in the industry known as a highway transport--a large cargo tank semi-trailer pulled by a highway truck tractor--was unloading a cargo of propane into permanent storage tanks at a propane marketing facility in Sanford, North Carolina. Shortly after the transfer operation began, the transfer hose separated from the transfer connection at its juncture with the plant piping and began discharging liquid propane to the atmosphere. The vehicle driver heard sounds unusual for a transfer operation and shut off the vehicle engine. According to the report of the Federal Highway Administration inspector, the driver was not able to get to the remote controls to close the internal stop flow valve. The driver then ran to an adjacent residential area to warn residents to immediately evacuate the area. As will be discussed later in this letter, the excess flow protection in the cargo tank did not activate and the entire propane cargo was discharged to the atmosphere. [4] Likewise, emergency flow protection in the plant piping did not activate automatically as designed and intended. As a result, the entire contents of the storage facility--something in excess of 35,000 gallons of propane--was also discharged to the atmosphere. While the emergency flow control system on the transport is subject to the HMR, the storage tank system is subject to regulations of the State of North Carolina. Investigation of that segment of the incident is being handled as a separate matter. The purpose of this letter is to discuss the transport system, applicable regulations and what can be done to prevent such an incident from recurring. [5] Mr. Samuel E. McTier, NPGA President, has appointed a special task force to work directly under the NPGA Executive Committee to determine the extent and nature of the underlying causes of this incident. The task force was directed to study this incident and develop two plans of action: First, how to provide for continued safe operation of existing propane cargo tanks while necessary changes are developed and put into place [including those cargo tanks to be built during this transition period], and second, how to correct safety and operational problems for the long term through changes to the MC-331 specification, if necessary, and to industry recommended safety and operating practices to preclude such an incident from happening again. This task force first met December 12-13, 1996 in Atlanta, Georgia. The enclosed recommendations and accompanying comments are based on their deliberations. [6] NPGA understands that Mississippi Tank Company has already submitted an application for an emergency exemption and supports the technical discussions in that application as a succinct presentation of the overall problem. In the time that has passed since that application was filed with DOT, however, additional information has become available. As a consequence, while much of the Mississippi Tank information has been incorporated into this application, there are certain significant differences between the NPGA application and the Mississippi tank document. [7] It is important to recognize that the situation described in the Mississippi Tank application is not unique to that company. Rather, that situation can reasonably be expected to occur with propane transports from other assemblers. [[Page 7640]] [8] In the smaller propane cargo tank motor vehicles (typically smaller than 3,500 gallons water capacity, called bobtails), the cargo tank is mounted directly on the vehicle chassis. These vehicles have a somewhat different piping arrangement than that used on transports. Consequently, on preliminary review, bobtails do not appear to have the same operating characteristics as transports. As a result, the first priority of this NPGA special task force has been directed at the transports; once the situation with the transports has been brought under control for the short term, the task force will immediately make similar investigations and studies of the bobtail vehicles. [9] NPGA is gravely concerned about the underlying causes of the North Carolina incident and is committed to identifying and implementing appropriate changes to industry recommended safety and operating practices and to the HMR requirements to preclude such an incident occurring again. [10] The propane industry transports between 7 and 10 billion gallons annually in these highway transports; that same volume is transported again in these local delivery bobtail tank trucks. In the past 10 years, there has not been a similar reported incident during the unloading of a transport. According to DOT's information, some 8 or 10 events have occurred unloading bobtails. That incident rate works out to be less than one per year. [11] The propane industry is committed to prompt correction of any problems or concerns that are identified with DOT by this special task force as part of our continuing desire and goal to continue that safety record. We also believe that the current incident experience record is testimony to the validity and effectiveness of the safety and operating systems presently in use for transportation of propane, both in the Hazardous Materials Regulations and in industry safety and operating practices. The Difficulty [12] 49 CFR 178.337-11(a)(1)(i) requires each internal self- closing stop valve and excess flow valve to automatically close if any of its attachments are sheared off or if any attached hose or piping is separated. 49 CFR 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) expands on the requirements for properly sizing excess flow valves regarding branching or other restrictions and the addition of additional smaller capacity excess flow valves, where required. [13] Mississippi Tank Company recently conducted tests in an effort to determine why the excess flow feature of the internal valve in the transport cargo tank outlet flange in the Sanford, North Carolina incident did not function as intended by the MC-331 specification requirements. The Mississippi Tank tests clearly show that the internal stop flow valves available for use with flange mounted pumps will not always close automatically under conditions simulating the situation where the hoses or piping might be sheared off or separated from the pump. Mississippi Tank has also determined that there are no such internal valves presently available that will provide the protection required by Secs. 178.337-11 (a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(v). [14] Principal among the conclusions reached from the Mississippi Tank tests is that the internal valve equipped with the 400 gpm spring (which operates the excess flow feature to provide automatic closure) would close dependably with tank pressures as low as 65 psig but that the excess flow feature would not operate at tank pressures lower than 65 psig. Rather than repeat the discussion of the test results in the Mississippi Tank application, in the interests of brevity, we refer you to that application. Solutions to the Situation--Long Term [15] From the Mississippi Tank tests and from discussions with the manufacturers of the cargo tank pumps and the internal valves, NPGA has concluded that the second and third sentences of Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) are self-conflicting and mutually exclusive. Based on present technology and equipment, it simply is not possible to comply with both provisions. [16] When this provision was reworded in the HM-183 amendments, industry review of the new provisions indicated that there would be no problem in complying with the requirement. The revised wording was accepted at face value merely as a rewording of the provisions that existed at that time in the MC-331 specification prior to the amendments. At the time, all of the vehicle assemblers believed that their individual practices for compliance with the specification requirements were appropriate and adequate to the need. However, the studies and discussions undertaken as a consequence of this North Carolina incident have demonstrated, and have been confirmed by the Mississippi Tank tests, that there is a basic conflict in the provisions contained in these two sentences in Sec. 178.337- 11(a)(1)(v). [17] It is now clear that excess flow protection, whether when incorporated into the discharge internal valve or as an in-line device, will not function under all climatic conditions nor under other low flow rate conditions. In recognition of the preliminary conclusion that excess flow devices will not always operate as intended or desired, the NPGA special task force has concluded that new control and operating systems must be developed to provide the desired level of reliability and emergency flow control during unloading operations. Devising these new systems is the next priority for the special task force appointed by President McTier. [18] The task force will also review control systems and operating procedures for loading operations to be sure that the desired level of emergency flow control will also be available in that operation as well. The loading operations aspect of this project, has been assigned a second level of priority, since there have not been any reported incidents during those operations. [19] The special task force already has identified several possible alternatives for emergency flow control during transport unloading for consideration as permanent changes to industry recommended safety and operation practices or for adoption as regulatory provisions. These possible solutions include: A pneumatic deadman device interlocked with the internal stop flow valve and the tank truck brakes, possibly combined with a lanyard for remote activation. Possibly applicable to bobtails as well. Note: The term ``deadman'' is used to identify a system that must be in place and operable in order for the unloading system to operate. If the shut-down mechanism of the system is activated for any reason, the unloading operation is discontinued and the internal stop flow valve closes. A mechanical deadman device, possibly combined with a lanyard for remote activation. Possibly applicable to bobtails as well. A differential valve downstream of the pump. If the engine is shut down, the set-pressure differential is detected and stops the flow of propane. This system would only protect piping downstream of the differential valve. Applicable to bobtails as well. [20] Amendment of Sec. 173.33 will also be needed to apply this improved level of safety on a permanent basis to the continued operation of existing MC-330 and MC-331 propane tank trucks and the non-specification cargo tanks operated under Sec. 173.315(k). [21] The special task force will also study provisions for allowance of the physical and chemical properties of the lading in designing the emergency flow protection system required by the MC- 331 specification. Such provisions are not presently a directly- mentioned provision in the specification. The preliminary analyses conducted by the special NPGA task force indicate that such considerations are of primary importance. As an example, while NPGA has every confidence in the results of the excess flow valve capacity tests conducted by Mississippi Tank Company, which used water under pneumatic tank pressure as the test medium, we also now know that those tests only approximate the performance of the same equipment when handling propane in a general manner. Sufficient data and other information is not presently available to satisfactorily model the performance of that equipment in water flow to satisfactorily predict the manner in which the same equipment would perform when handling propane, or any other liquefied compressed gas, for that matter. Solutions to the Situation--Short Term [22] Responding to the long term need for a new control system is the ultimate goal for the NPGA special task force. Part of that mission includes presentation of appropriate recommendations to DOT for further consideration and adoption as amendments to the MC-331 specification for new construction and to Sec. 173.33 to provide for the continued operation of existing cargo tanks. [23] However, the immediate problem is how to provide for the continued operation of (1) existing MC-330 and MC-331 cargo tank motor vehicles in propane service, (2) the non-specification vehicles authorized under Sec. 173.315(k) of the HMR, and (3) any new vehicles built in the interim period pending formal amendment of the HMR. Also, provisions must be made in this continued operation aspect for the annual leakage test and external inspection and for [[Page 7641]] the five-year requalification requirements of the HMR for these vehicles. [24] As an agent for the members of the Association, NPGA now submits an application for a DOT Exemption. For reasons set forth below, NPGA also recommends that this application be handled under the provisions for emergency exemptions (Ref: Sec. 107.113). Following DOT's approval of such an exemption, NPGA will promptly submit an application to convert that emergency exemption to a conventional exemption. Such a combination of Exemptions would provide two things: (1) authorization for the continued operation of existing cargo tank motor vehicles in propane service in the interim to the adoption of appropriate regulatory provisions to correct these technical and operational difficulties and (2) for the conditional operation (including annual tests and inspections and the five-year requalification) of any cargo tank motor vehicles built under the present regulations pending adoption of said amendments. Given the exceptional safety record discussed earlier for both transports and bobtails, NPGA believes that the following provisions for the proposed Exemption will continue this safety record while the relevant changes to industry safety and operating practices and any changes to the Hazardous Materials Regulations are developed and put into place. [25] NPGA is not advocating removal of Secs. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(v) at the present time. Rather, we believe that further information is needed as to the nature and extent of changes to be considered for the MC-331 specification before any proposed changes are considered for the Hazardous Materials Regulations. [26] NPGA recognizes the importance of prompt and expedient action in developing recommended changes to industry safety and operating practices and provisions of the Hazardous Materials Regulations to improve present the respective provisions for emergency flow control. To that end, NPGA will present a time plan with respective completion points for identification, development, testing and implementation of retrofits and the presentation of proposed changes to the Hazardous Materials Regulations to DOT by February 17, 1997. Furthermore, NPGA representatives will be in frequent contact with RSPA/Office of Hazardous Materials Safety and FHWA/Office of Motor Carrier Safety staff in a liaison capacity regarding the deliberation so this NPGA special task force and will present formal quarterly progress reports at appropriate liaison meetings. [27] Provisions of the Exemption: 1. Compliance with applicable provisions of the Hazardous Materials Regulations, with the exception of Secs. 173.315(n), 178.337-11(a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(v). 2. NPGA will contact all of its members operating or assembling propane cargo tank motor vehicles and will work with industry trade press and other resources to reach affected non-member companies. The purpose of this outreach effort will be to bring the North Carolina incident and related, identified concerns to the attention of companies operating or assembling propane cargo tank motor vehicles. 3. Transfer hose used under the terms of the exemption (1) will be inspected before continued use, with particular attention to the condition and suitability of the hose end couplings for service and (2) otherwise comply with applicable provisions of NFPA 58, 1995 edition. New transfer hose assemblies will be tested as required by Sec. 180.407(h)(1)(ii) before the hose assembly is placed in service. NFPA 58, 1995 edition designates NFPA 58 Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases, published by the National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts. In its capacity as an American National Standard, NFPA 58 has been used as the basis of regulation by virtually all of the 50 states. A copy of the 1995 edition (the current edition) is enclosed for your information and consideration. 4. The vehicle driver will be continually in attendance and control of the loading and unloading operations. 5. Drivers will be advised of the events leading to the December 8, 1996 incident at Sanford, North Carolina and trained against the potential of that incident occurring again. Such training will include the inspection of delivery hose and connections to be used for the transfer operation to determine, among other things, that the hose is suitable for continued service and that the hose-end fittings and related connections to plant piping and tank truck valves are suitable for service. Driver training as required by Secs. 172.702 and 172.704 will include recognition of the potential severity of equipment failure or malfunction during product transfer and appropriate actions to be taken should such an event occur. Records of this training will be included in records required by Sec. 172.704(d). During the term of this exemption, a statement signed by the driver acknowledging such training and operating instructions will be filed by the employer in the files required by Sec. 172.704. 6. The proposed exemption would apply to two types of vehicles: (1) The continued operation of those cargo tanks already in service--MC-330 and MC-331 cargo tank motor vehicles in propane service and non-specification propane cargo tanks authorized for continued operation under the provisions of Sec. 173.315(k) and (2) the entrance into service of new or remounted vehicles that will be built or assembled in the interim period to the adoption of formal regulatory provisions providing new approaches to emergency flow control as an alternative to excess flow valves. 7. The proposed Exemption will authorize continued assembler and design certification of new MC-331 cargo tank motor vehicles and required annual inspection and 5-year requalification certifications that the subject vehicle complies with the Hazardous Materials Regulations, with the exception of Secs. 173.315(n) and 178.337- 11(a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(v). Treatment as an Emergency Exemption [28] In recognition of the provisions of HMR/Sec. 107.113(a), a copy of this request for Emergency Exemption is being filed concurrently with the Chief, Hazardous Materials and Safety Division, Office of Safety and Technology, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590-0001. [29] The propane industry is in the midst of the winter heating season. Over 80 percent of the 7-9 billion gallons of propane referenced at the beginning of this letter is used as a residential heating fuel in rural locations where natural gas service is not available. Virtually all of these cargo tank motor vehicles--highway transports and bobtails alike--are needed to provide timely and adequate delivery of this heating fuel. In addition to residential heating fuel, the industry also provides heating fuel to dairy barns, chicken and hog brooders, peak shaving for natural gas utilities. In addition, propane is also widely used as an alternative engine fuel. [30] There is another aspect of the need for expedient action in the approval and implementation of this exemption--financial impact on the propane marketers, propane producers, common carriers, vehicle assemblers and equipment manufacturers. propane marketers--Unless they are able to deliver fuel, these companies literally will not be able to continue in business. Of our 3,500 member companies, some 3,200 are small, independent businesses operating about 3,400 bulk plants (local retail facilities). There are another 3,400 bulk plants operated by 17 multistate marketer companies. Our members sell over 85% of the propane used as a residential heating fuel. Once the propane has been delivered to a bulk plant by a highway transport, it is transported again by bobtail cargo tank vehicles to the ultimate consumer. propane producers--Propane heating fuel has two sources: a co-product of natural gas production and a by-product of crude petroleum cracking and refining operations. common carriers--Over 90 percent of the propane used as a heating fuel is transported first by pipeline and then by highway transport to the local propane bulk plant. While some propane marketers have their own fleet of transport tank trucks, many of these companies rely on motor common carriers to deliver their propane supply. While many of these carriers carry other materials as well (hazardous as well as non-hazardous), for many carriers, propane transportation is a very significant part of their business. vehicle assemblers--For some of the vehicle assemblers, propane cargo tank motor vehicles (especially bobtails) are a very major part of their business. The companies building propane highway transports typically produce semi-trailer cargo tank motor vehicles for the transportation of other hazardous materials as well. equipment manufacturers--The manufacturers of pumps, valves, hose and the other equipment from which a tank truck is assembled obviously service other industries than just propane; at the same time, supplying the propane industry has become a rather significant part of their business. [31] The ability to be able to operate propane bobtails and highway transports has [[Page 7642]] so many impacts and is so pervasive as be almost incalculable from an economic impact viewpoint. On the one hand, we believe the extremely large volume of propane handled annually (9,000,000,000 gallons) by transport and then a second time by the bobtails in local deliveries and the demonstrated safety record over the history of the industry is clear testimony to the commitment of this industry to safety and employee training. On the other hand, we are committed to correction of the provisions of Sec. 178.337-11 regarding emergency flow control to address the problems that have been identified in the subject incident. [32] The NPGA special task force believes it can identify alternative emergency flow control systems in the very near future. While several systems are already under study, no preferences have been established, nor do we know currently what present or new equipment will be necessary to implement any changes. Also, we want to be reasonably sure that these ``new'' systems will indeed operate as intended to provide the desired level of safety and operation control under emergency conditions, thus, actual service tests will be conducted before widespread installation is undertaken. [33] Consequently, there is an extreme and vital need to keep the present cargo tank motor vehicles in service, albeit under closer scrutiny and control than has previously been the case, until these retrofit devices and systems can be developed and placed into operation. [34] For many years, the propane industry has demonstrated its dedication to safety and compliance with standards and regulations. Issuance of this exemption will in no way reduce the safe transportation of propane. On the contrary, identification of the hazard illustrated by the Sanford, North Carolina incident will prompt utmost caution during the period of the proposed Exemption. Conclusion [35] Therefore, NPGA believes that a true emergency exists for handling this Exemption request in an expedited manner and thus pledges that this exemption will be continued in use no longer than absolutely necessary during the retrofit of any propane cargo tanks requiring the authorization for operation, recertification or requalification provided by the Exemption. III. Mississippi Tank Company Application for Exemption The body of the Mississippi Tank Company application for exemption is reproduced as follows: The purpose of this letter is to make application for an emergency exemption of the Hazardous Materials Regulations stated above. We urgently need an expedited response to our request and offer the information required by part 107.3 as follows: 1. CFR 178.337-11Ali requires that each internal self-closing stop valve and excess flow valve must automatically close if any of its attachments are sheared off or if any attached hose or piping is separated. Paragraph 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) expands on requirements for properly sizing excess flow valves while considering branching or other restrictions and, the addition of additional smaller capacity excess flow valves, where required. We learned during recent evaluation and testing of internal self closing stop-valves on cargo tank trailers that the flange mounted internal valves available for use with pumps will not automatically close under conditions simulating the situation where the hoses or piping might be sheared off or separated from the pump. Upon further research and consideration, it has become apparent that there are no internal valves available that will provide protection as required by the above paragraphs. Some considerations of the complex series of problems that are facing us considering these requirements are listed as follows: A. The most commonly used internal self-closing stop valve is a Fisher C404-M32-600 flanged internal valve whose 600 at the end of the model number indicates the flow rating of 600 GPM (propane). Testing at our facility under simulated conditions using air pressure and water indicates that this internal valve with this 600 GPM spring will not close with tank pressures up to 125 psig. Other flow rates available (which is determined by the type of internal spring that is furnished in the internal valve) are 340 GPM, 400 GPM, 800 GPM and 1000 GPM. Both the 340 GPM and 400 GPM springs were tested to determine their behavior, with most of the testing performed using the 400 GPM springs. It was determined that the internal valve with the 400 GPM spring would close dependably with pressures down to 65 psig but not at all at lower pressures. This testing was performed while allowing the pump to ``free-wheel'', which would allow the pump to pass more product than if it were not allowed to free-wheel. Obviously, a pump shaft held stationary would prevent the pump from allowing as much product to pass, thereby preventing the sufficient flow of product through the pump and discharge piping to trigger the self-closing mechanism of the internal valve. B. Internal valves (which are excess flow valves when open) have springs with manufacturing tolerances of--20%/+10%, thereby allowing a broad range of performance in a given flow-rated internal valve. Example: a 400 GPM spring can allow a flow between 320 GPM to 440 GPM. In order to insure proper operation of a pumping system on cargo tanks, various sources in the industry have indicated that internal valve flow rating have been sized with a minimum flow ","truncated":true,"body_characters":83390}