# Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based Adjustment of Transportation Security Plan Requirements

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** 73 FR 52558
- **title:** Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based Adjustment of Transportation Security Plan Requirements
- **source type:** rulemaking
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** proposed
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2008-09-09
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** PHMSA, in consultation with the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is proposing to modify its current security plan requirements governing the commercial transportation of hazardous materials by air, rail, vessel, and highway. Based on an evaluation of the security threats associated with specific types and quantities of hazardous materials, the proposed rule would narrow the list of materials subject to security plan requirements and reduce associated regulatory costs and paperwork burden. The proposed rule also would clarify certain requirements related to security planning, training, and documentation and incorporate and build on recent international standards governing hazardous materials security.
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- **source url:** https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2008/09/09/E8-20856/hazardous-materials-risk-based-adjustment-of-transportation-security-plan-requirements
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Federal Register, Volume 73 Issue 175 (Tuesday, September 9, 2008) [Federal Register Volume 73, Number 175 (Tuesday, September 9, 2008)] [Proposed Rules] [Pages 52558-52572] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] [FR Doc No: E8-20856] [[Page 52557]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Part V Department of Transportation ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 49 CFR Part 172 Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based Adjustment of Transportation Security Plan Requirements; Proposed Rule Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 9, 2008 / Proposed Rules [[Page 52558]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part 172 [Docket No. PHMSA-06-25885 (HM-232F)] RIN 2137-AE22 Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based Adjustment of Transportation Security Plan Requirements AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: PHMSA, in consultation with the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is proposing to modify its current security plan requirements governing the commercial transportation of hazardous materials by air, rail, vessel, and highway. Based on an evaluation of the security threats associated with specific types and quantities of hazardous materials, the proposed rule would narrow the list of materials subject to security plan requirements and reduce associated regulatory costs and paperwork burden. The proposed rule also would clarify certain requirements related to security planning, training, and documentation and incorporate and build on recent international standards governing hazardous materials security. DATES: Submit comments by November 10, 2008. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number (PHMSA-06-25885) by any of the following methods: Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov . Follow the online instructions for submitting comments. Fax: 1-202-493-2251. Mail: Docket Operations, U.S. Department of Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Routing Symbol M-30, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. Hand Delivery: To Docket Operations, Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. For more detailed instruction on comment submission, see the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan Gorsky or Ben Supko, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 202-366-8553. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Comment Submission Instructions: Identify the agency and docket number (PHMSA-06- 25885) at the beginning of your submission. Except for comments that receive confidential treatment, all comments received will be posted without change to the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS), including any personal information provided. Detailed instructions for requesting confidential treatment are provided below, under the Privacy Act heading. Docket: For access to the dockets to read background documents or comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov or DOT's Docket Operations Office (see ADDRESSES). Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search the electronic form of any written communications and comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the document (or signing the document, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78), which may also be found at http://www.regulations.gov . You may request confidential treatment of comments or portions of comments under the procedures set forth in 49 CFR part 105. While all comments should be sent to the FDMS, PHMSA will consider separately and not place in the public docket those comments or portions of comments PHMSA determines to include trade secrets, other confidential commercial information, or sensitive security information (SSI). In accordance with 49 CFR 105.30, you may ask PHMSA to keep information confidential using the following procedures: (1) Mark ``confidential'' on each page of the original document you would like to keep confidential; (2) send FDMS both the original document and a second copy of the original document with the confidential information redacted; and (3) explain why the information is confidential (as a trade secret, other confidential commercial information, or SSI). In your explanation, you should provide enough information to enable PHMSA to determine whether the information provided is protected by law and must be handled separately. In addition, for comments or portions of comments that you believe contain SSI as defined in 49 CFR 15.7, you should comply with Federal regulations governing the handling of SSI. See 49 CFR 1520.9 and 49 CFR 15.9, Restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive security information. Those regulations restrict the disclosure of SSI to those with a need to know and set forth specific requirements for marking, packaging, and disposing of documents containing SSI. Note when mailing in or using a special delivery service to send comments containing SSI, comments should be wrapped in a manner to prevent the information from being read. PHMSA may perform concurrent reviews on requests for designations as SSI. After reviewing your request for confidentiality and the information provided, PHMSA will determine whether the information should be treated as confidential under applicable laws and regulations. PHMSA will notify you of the decision to grant or deny confidential treatment. If PHMSA denies your request, you will be provided an opportunity to request reconsideration before the information is publicly disclosed. PHMSA will reconsider its decision to deny confidentiality based on your response. To further guard against disclosure of SSI, PHMSA will review all submissions, whether or not they are identified as confidential, prior to their posting on the public docket. PHMSA will notify you if we determine that information in your submission should not be disclosed to the public. If you have any questions concerning the procedures for determining confidentiality or security sensitivity, you may call one of the individuals listed below. I. Background A. Current DOT Security Requirements The Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171-180) require persons who offer for transportation or transport certain hazardous materials in commerce to develop and implement security plans. The security plan requirements in subpart I of part 172 of the HMR apply to persons who offer for transportation or transport: (1) A highway-route controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive) material; (2) More than 25 kg (55 lbs.) of a Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 (explosive) material; (3) More than 1 L (1.06 qt.) per package of a material poisonous by inhalation in Hazard Zone A; [[Page 52559]] (4) A shipment in a bulk packaging with a capacity equal to or greater than13,248 L (3,500 gallons) for liquids or gases or greater than 13.24 cubic meters (468 cubic feet) for solids; (5) A shipment in other than a bulk packaging of 2,268 kg (5,000 lbs.) gross weight or more of one class of hazardous materials for which placarding is required; (6) A select agent or toxin regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention under 42 CFR part 73 or a select agent or toxin regulated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture under 9 CFR part 121; or (7) A shipment that requires placarding under subpart F of part 172 of the HMR. A security plan must include an assessment of possible transportation security risks and appropriate measures to address the assessed risks. Specific measures implemented as part of the plan may vary with the level of threat at a particular time. At a minimum, the security plan must address personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route security. For personnel security, the plan must include measures to confirm information provided by job applicants for positions involving access to and handling of the hazardous materials covered by the plan. For unauthorized access, the plan must include measures to address the risk of unauthorized persons gaining access to materials or transport conveyances being prepared for transportation. For en route security, the plan must include measures to address security risks during transportation, including the security of shipments stored temporarily en route to their destinations. As indicated above, the HMR set forth general requirements for a security plan's components rather than a prescriptive list of specific items that must be included. The HMR set a performance standard providing offerors and carriers with the flexibility necessary to develop security plans addressing their individual circumstances and operational environments. Accordingly, each security plan will differ because it will be based on an offeror's or a carrier's individualized assessment of the security risks associated with the specific hazardous materials it ships or transports and its unique circumstances and operational environment. B. International Transportation Security Standards The United Nations Model Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UN Recommendations) identify high consequence dangerous goods for which enhanced security measures are recommended. The recommended security measures include security plans and are similar to the requirements in subpart I of part 172 of the HMR. The UN Recommendations define high consequence dangerous goods as materials with the ``potential for mis-use in a terrorist incident and which may, as a result, produce serious consequences such as mass casualties or mass destruction.'' The UN Recommendations list the following materials as high consequence dangerous goods: (1) Division 1.1 explosives; (2) Division 1.2 explosives; (3) Division 1.3 compatibility group C explosives; (4) Division 1.5 explosives; (5) Bulk shipments of Division 2.1 flammable gases; (6) Division 2.3 toxic gases (excluding aerosols); (7) Bulk shipments of Class 3 flammable liquids in PG I or II; (8) Class 3 and Division 4.1 desensitized explosives; (9) Bulk shipments of Division 4.2 PG I materials; (10) Bulk shipments of Division 4.3 PG I materials; (11) Bulk shipments of Division 5.1 PG I oxidizing liquids; (12) Bulk shipments of Division 5.1 perchlorates, ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate fertilizers; (13) Division 6.1 PG I toxic materials; (14) Division 6.2 infectious substances of Category A (UN2814 and 2900); (15) Class 7 radioactive materials in quantities greater than 3000 A 1 (special form) or 3000 A 2 , as applicable, in Type B(U) or Type B(M) or Type (C) packages; and (16) Bulk shipments of Class 8 PG I materials. For purposes of the security provisions, the UN defines ``in bulk'' to mean quantities greater than 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.) or 3,000 liters (793 gallons) in portable tanks or bulk containers. C. Petitions for Rulemaking PHMSA has received two petitions for rulemaking requesting a review and reevaluation of the current HMR security plan requirements. The Council on Safe Transportation of Hazardous Articles (COSTHA) petitioned PHMSA (P-1447) to reevaluate the security requirements in subpart I of part 172 of the HMR to ``enhance international harmonization and to better utilize available resources in enhancing hazardous materials transportation security.'' COSTHA notes that the list of hazardous materials subject to the security plan requirements differs from the list of high consequence dangerous goods in the UN Recommendations. COSTHA requests that PHMSA adopt the same criteria as the UN Recommendations for materials that are subject to the security plan requirements or, as an alternative, eliminate the security plan requirement for quantities of hazardous materials currently subject to placarding under subpart F of part 172. COSTHA cites several examples of hazardous materials (e.g., automobile batteries, inks, paint, flavoring extracts) that, based on hazard class and quantity are placarded and subject the security plan requirements under the HMR, but not covered by the list of high consequence dangerous goods in the UN Recommendations. COSTHA acknowledges that these materials pose certain risks in transportation, but contends it is highly unlikely a terrorist would use these materials to perpetrate a terrorist attack. Similarly, the American Trucking Associations (ATA) petitioned PHMSA (P-1466) to designate a subset of ``security sensitive hazardous materials'' that would trigger security plan requirements. The ATA urges PHMSA to use the list of materials and quantities subject to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) Hazardous Materials Safety Permit requirements as the starting point for determining security sensitive hazardous materials. In 49 CFR part 385, FMCSA requires a safety permit for motor carriers transporting specified quantities of Class 7 (radioactive) materials; Class 1 materials (explosives); materials that are poisonous or toxic by inhalation (PIH or TIH materials); and compressed or refrigerated liquefied methane or liquefied natural gas. In addition to those materials, ATA suggests that PHMSA add the following materials from the UN high consequence dangerous goods list: (1) Bulk shipments of Division 2.1; (2) bulk shipments of Class 3, PG I and II; (3) Class 3 and Division 4.1 desensitized explosives (quantity to be determined); (4) bulk shipments of Division 4.2, PG I; (5) bulk shipments of Division 4.3, PG I; (6) bulk shipments of Division 5.1, PG I; (7) bulk shipments of Division 5.1 perchlorates, ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate fertilizers; (8) Division 6.2 infectious substances of Category A (quantity to be determined); (9) any quantity of select agents; and (10) bulk shipments of Class 8, PG I. The ATA uses quantities greater than 3,500 gallons or 5,000 pounds to define ``bulk'' for purposes of security planning. [[Page 52560]] We agree with COSTHA and ATA that the list of materials for which a security plan is required should be reevaluated. Our existing security plan rules were developed as baseline requirements. We considered the company preparing the security plan to be in the best position to assess security risks based on its operational circumstances. If security risks were determined to be insignificant, this would be reflected in a simple security plan with minimal content. Increased coverage would be required when security risks are more substantial. The security plan requirements went into effect more than four years ago, on September 25, 2003. Since then, both the industry and the government have gained experience evaluating security risks associated with specific hazardous materials and transportation environments and identifying appropriate measures to address those risks. Accordingly, we initiated this rulemaking, in coordination with other DOT modal administrations (the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and FMCSA), and TSA to consider modifications to the list of hazardous materials for which security plans are required. II. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking On September 21, 2006, PHMSA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) seeking public comment on the current security plan requirements. Commenters were asked to address the list of materials posing a security threat sufficient to justify preparation and implementation of a security plan, including factors that should be considered in assessing security risks; quantity thresholds that would trigger the security plan requirement; packing group criteria; and the availability of hazardous materials outside of transportation. On November 30, 2006, PHMSA hosted a public meeting to discuss these issues and invite further comments and information concerning the types and quantities of materials that should be covered by the security plan rule. Six persons made presentations at the public meeting. A transcript of the meeting, with the statements of presenters, is available for review in the public docket for this rulemaking. Written comments were received from 34 industry associations, offerors, carriers, and private citizens, identified in the following list. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ID/name/company Date Docket No. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Clare L. Welker............................. 09/28/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-2 2 Gregory Sutherland.......................... 10/03/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-3 3 Clare L. Welker............................. 10/19/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-4 4 Duplainville Transport...................... 10/25/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-5 5 Ecolab...................................... 11/22/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-6 6 Arthur E. Hall.............................. 11/21/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-7 7 Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME)..... 11/30/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-8 8 Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator 12/13/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-9 Facility (Jefferson Lab). 9 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)............. 12/18/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-10 10 Thomas L. Dunaway.......................... 12/18/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-11 11 National Refrigerants, Inc. (NRI).......... 12/19/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-13 12 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 12/19/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-14 (NRC). 13 Veolia ES Technical Solutions, L.L.C. 12/19/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-15 (Veolia). 14 Council on Radionuclides and 12/19/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-16 Radiopharmaceuticals, Inc. (CORAR). 15 Flavor and Extract Manufacturers 12/20/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-17 Association (FEMA). 16 Fragrance Materials Association (FMA)...... 12/20/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-18 17 The Dow Chemical Company (Dow)............. 12/20/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-19 18 Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings. 12/19/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-20 19 American Trucking Associations, Inc (ATA).. 12/20/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-21 20 Dangerous Goods Transport Consulting, Inc.. 12/20/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-22 21 Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration 12/20/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-23 Institute (ARI). 22 Total Petrochemicals USA, Inc.............. 12/20/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-24 23 American Beverage Association (ABA)........ 12/19/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-25 24 Reusable Industrial Packaging Association 12/20/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-26 (RIPA). 25 Utility Solid Waste Activities Group 12/20/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-27 (USWAG). 26 Association of Hazmat Shippers, Inc. (AHS). 12/21/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-28 27 National Paint & Coatings Association, Inc. 12/20/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-29 (NPCA). 28 National Propane Gas Association (NPGA).... 12/21/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-30 29 Dangerous Goods Advisory Council (DGAC).... 12/21/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-31 30 Council on Safe Transportation of Hazardous 12/22/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-32 Articles, Inc. (COSTHA). 31 National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. (NTTC).. 12/27/2006 PHMSA-2006-25885-33 32 Battery Council International (BCI)........ 01/12/2007 PHMSA-2006-25885-34 33 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)............. 01/12/2007 PHMSA-2006-25885-35 34 Bill Bradshaw--Comments.................... 05/17/2007 PHMSA-2006-25885-36 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The full text of their comments are available for review through the Federal eRulemaking Portal ( http://www.regulations.gov ). Most commenters agree that the list of materials for which security plans are required should be revised to include only those materials that pose a significant security threat in transportation. In the words of one commenter, ``[R]egulating hazardous materials transportation security at the placarded load level is inconsistent with a risk-based approach. Using placards as a trigger for hazardous materials security regulations results in the overregulation of materials that are not capable of being used as a terrorist weapon.'' (ATA) Several commenters suggest that our rule should address two types of threats from the misuse of hazardous materials. As one put it: ``First, there are commercial shipments of materials that, based on the hazard and quantity in the package would, if attacked in transportation and catastrophically released, enhance the damage or destruction of the attack. * * * Second, there are other materials whose value to a terrorist is in the theft [[Page 52561]] or diversion of the material for manipulation into weapons of mass destruction (WMD).'' (IME) Similarly, ``Risk should be assessed considering the nature of the threat, the vulnerability of the target, and the potential consequences of an incident. Threat scenarios should consider the potential for a serious catastrophic release from a direct attack, the potential for tampering and subsequent downstream impact, and the potential for theft and misuse as a weapon of mass destruction.'' (Dow) Commenters also agree that, in developing this list, PHMSA should consider the potential for a material to be used for a criminal or terrorist act and the consequences of such an action, based on the hazard class and packing group of the material and the quantity or volume transported. Commenters generally oppose a material-specific list of chemicals and other materials that pose a security risk. ``We urge PHMSA to reject [security sensitive hazardous materials] lists that are material-by-material based and to continue to embrace one based on a hazard class approach. * * * Among other advantages, a hazard class approach can be internationally harmonized and it addresses issues created by mixtures and solutions that have plagued material-by-material lists in other regulatory venues.'' (IME) Most commenters suggest that security plan requirements should apply to the list of hazardous materials identified in the UN Recommendations as ``high consequence dangerous goods.'' ``[W]e believe the current Security Plan requirements should be harmonized with the UN Recommendations so that they focus on the types of hazards and volumes that pose a real threat of weaponization.'' (Flavor and Extract Manufacturers Association) Also, ``[t]he UN recommendation to require security plans for 'High Consequence Dangerous Goods' appears to be a reasonable approach, which considers hazard, form of packaging and volume thresholds.'' (Dow) As well, ``the UN Recommendations individually define `significant risk' materials and quantities based on the actual risk factors * * * rather than general transport classifications. Importantly, material identification is accomplished through a stakeholder developed `list of high consequence dangerous goods' ensuring that material is independently peer reviewed before it is assigned a risk level.'' (Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute). III. Proposed Modifications to Security Plan Criteria A. Summary of Proposal Based on the comments received on the ANRPM and an evaluation of possible security threats posed by specific types and classes of hazardous materials, PHMSA is proposing to modify the list of materials for which a security plan is required. PHMSA agrees with the commenters to the ANPRM that the UN list of high consequence dangerous goods includes most of the hazardous materials that pose a significant transportation security risk. The UN list of high consequence dangerous goods was used as the starting point for our deliberations for this NPRM. PHMSA worked closely with FRA, FMCSA, and TSA to assess the transportation security risks associated with the different classes and quantities of hazardous materials. To determine the types of materials that should be subject to security planning requirements, PHMSA evaluated specific transportation scenarios in which a terrorist could deliberately use hazardous materials to cause large-scale casualties and property damage. In our qualitative risk evaluation, we considered the following factors: (1) Physical and chemical properties of the material or class of materials and how those properties could contribute to a security incident; (2) quantities shipped and mode of transport; (3) past terrorist use; (4) potential use; and (5) availability. One of the most significant security vulnerabilities involves the potential for a perpetrator to take control of a conveyance containing a high-risk material and move it to a site where the material could cause maximum damage or provide unusual leverage. For some hazardous materials, the primary security threat involves theft or highjacking of raw materials for use in weapons of mass destruction. On the basis of these considerations, PHMSA proposes to modify the current list of materials covered by the security plan requirement, as summarized in the following table: Proposed Revisions to the List of Hazardous Materials for Which Transportation Security Plans Will Be Required ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Class Current threshold Proposed threshold Change ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1.1................ Any quantity................. Any quantity................. None. 1.2................ Any quantity................. Any quantity................. None. 1.3................ Any quantity................. Any quantity................. None. 1.4................ A quantity requiring Any quantity of UN 0104, Security plan required only placarding. 0237, 0255, 0267, 0289, for detonators and shaped 0361, 0365, 0366, 0440, charges. 0441, 0455, 0456, 0500. 1.5................ A quantity requiring Any quantity................. Security plan required for placarding. all shipments. 1.6................ A quantity requiring Not subject.................. Security plan not required placarding. for any Division 1.6 shipments. 2.1................ A quantity requiring 3,000 L in a single packaging Security plan not required placarding. for less than 3,000 L. 2.2................ A quantity requiring Not subject except for oxygen Security plan not required placarding. and gases with a subsidiary for most non-flammable, non- 5.1 hazard (3,000 L in a poisonous compressed gas single packaging). shipments. 2.3................ Any quantity................. Any quantity................. None. 3.................. A quantity requiring 3,000 L in a single packaging Security plan not required placarding. and any quantity of Class 3 for less than 3,000 L except desensitized explosives. for desensitized explosives. 4.1................ A quantity requiring Any quantity desensitized Security plan not required placarding. explosives. except for desensitized explosives. 4.2................ A quantity requiring PG I and II only in Security plan not required placarding. quantities of 3,000 kg or for PG III materials. more in a single packaging. 4.3................ Any quantity................. Any quantity................. None. [[Page 52562]] 5.1................ A quantity requiring PG I and II liquids, Security plan not required placarding. perchlorates, ammonium for PG III liquids or nitrate (including unlisted solids. fertilizers) in quantities of 3,000 L or more in a single packaging. 5.2................ Any quantity of Organic Any quantity of Organic None. peroxide, Type B, liquid or peroxide, Type B, liquid or solid, temperature solid, temperature controlled. controlled. 6.1................ A quantity requiring Any quantity of PG I; 3,000 L Security plan not required placarding; any quantity of for PG II and III. for less than 3,000 L of PG PIH material. II and III. 6.2................ Select agents................ Select agents................ None. 7.................. Shipments requiring Yellow For radionuclides covered by Security plan only required III label; highway route the IAEA Code of Conduct, for Class 7 materials that controlled quantity. Category 1 and Category 2 pose transportation security sources per package; for all risk. other radionuclides, 3000 A2 per package. 8.................. A quantity requiring PG I only in quantities of Security plan not required placarding. 3,000 L or more in a single for PG II and III materials. packaging. 9.................. Capacity >3,500 gallons for Not subject.................. Security plan not required liquid/gas; volumetric for Class 9 materials. capacity >468 cubic feet for solids. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Our proposed revisions are explained in detail in the following section. B. System Characteristics and Risks A number of characteristics of the hazardous materials transportation system create the potential for misuse: (1) Substantial quantities of inherently dangerous materials are transported; (2) these materials are already mobile; (3) these materials are frequently transported in proximity to densely populated areas; and (4) placards or other markings required for safety may communicate hazard information to those who would misuse it. Following are the hazards of greatest concern from a transportation security perspective: Explosion and fire. Hazardous materials that pose a risk of explosion or fire may be used to attack large groups of people and critical infrastructure, such as buildings, tunnels, bridges, subways, communication centers, and electrical power grids. Poison Inhalation Hazards (PIH). PIH materials, either as gases or volatile liquids, can be used to attack people in confined spaces such as buildings or subways. Bulk quantities present dangers to large areas and could affect a significant number of people in urban areas. Poison liquids or solids. Poisons can be used to attack food or drinking water supplies or to attack groups of people indoors or outdoors. Infectious substances. Depending on the mode of transmission for a given material, infectious substances can be used to contaminate food or water supplies or to expose large numbers of people to disease. The suspected or possible presence of these materials can result in long- term denial of the use of space, facilities, or goods. Radioactive materials. These materials can cause severe chronic effects on large numbers of people, depending on exposure levels and the time exposed. The suspected or possible presence of these materials can result in long-term denial of the use of space, facilities, or goods. Other materials of concern. Certain hazardous materials can be mixed to create explosions, intensified burning, and toxic effects or used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of more dangerous substances. For example, mixing poisonous materials with acidic material can generate toxic gases (e.g., sodium cyanide mixed with hydrochloric acid will generate hydrogen cyanide gas). C. Security Risks for Specific Classes of Materials A detailed discussion of the transportation security risks posed by specific classes of hazardous materials follows. 1. Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 Explosives Division 1.1., 1.2, and 1.3 explosive materials (e.g. , certain types of ammunition and cartridges, black powder, gun powder, demolition devices, depth charges, certain types of detonators, certain types of fireworks, rockets, and warheads) pose significant safety and security risks in transportation. A Division 1.1 explosive is one that presents a mass explosive hazard. A mass explosion is one that affects almost the entire load simultaneously. An explosion of Division 1.1 materials creates a pressure pulse that moves faster than the speed of sound. A Division 1.2 explosive has a projection hazard, which means that if the material explodes, it will project fragments outward at some distance. A Division 1.3 explosive presents a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both. If compromised in transit by detonation or as a secondary explosion to an improvised explosive device (IED), these materials could result in significant numbers of fatalities and substantial damage to transportation infrastructure and the surrounding area. When available, these explosives have been the preferred weapon of terrorists. This trend is not expected to change. Significant quantities of Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives are transported by highway and rail for both commercial and military applications. The Department of Defense alone moves approximately 30,000 shipments a year by motor carrier. Motor carrier shipments are transported largely on the nation's interstate highway system, which bisects or adjoins many metropolitan areas offering significant iconic- value and critical infrastructure targets. About 500 carloads of these explosives are transported by rail each year. Like the interstate highway system, the rail transportation network intersects many densely populated areas. The HMR currently require security plans for shipments of any quantity of Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives. PHMSA believes that this requirement provides an appropriate level of security, given the potential [[Page 52563]] vulnerabilities and risks associated with these materials and thus proposes to retain this requirement in the NPRM. 2. Division 1.4 Explosives Division 1.4 explosives are those that present a minor explosive hazard. The explosive effects are largely confined to the package, with no projection of fragments of appreciable size or range. This category of explosives includes detonators used to detonate the Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.2 explosives described above. Detonators are part of all IEDs. Over 500,000 tons of Division 1.4 explosives are transported by rail and highway in the United States every year. Currently, the HMR require security plans for placarded amounts of Division 1.4 explosives. Our evaluation suggests that most Division 1.4 explosives do not pose a significant transportation security risk. However, Division 1.4 detonators are an attractive target for theft and use as initiating devices for IEDs. Therefore, in this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to require security plans only for shipments of any quantity of the following types of Division 1.4 explosives (listed by proper shipping name and UN identification number) because they are difficult to produce, are key components to IEDs, and can be used as initiators for other explosives: (1) Detonator assemblies, non electric for blasting (UN 0361, UN 0500) (2) Detonators for ammunition (UN 0365, UN 0366) (3) Detonators, electric, for blasting (UN 0255, UN 0456) (4) Detonators, non-electric, for blasting (UN 0267, UN 0455) (5) Cord, detonating, flexible (UN 0289) (6) Cord, detonating, mild effect, metal clad (UN 0104) (7) Charges, shaped, flexible, linear (UN 0237) (8) Charges, shaped, without detonator (UN 0440, UN 0441) 3. Division 1.5 Explosives Division 1.5 explosives are very insensitive explosives. This division covers substances that have a mass explosion hazard but are so insensitive that they pose very little probability of initiation or of transition from burning to detonation under normal conditions of transport. In practice, Division 1.5 explosives are activated using a higher-energy explosive charge. Roughly 4.3 million tons of Division 1.5 explosives are transported by rail and highway in the United States every year. Division 1.5 explosives could be used in attacks on people or infrastructure. While these explosives are insensitive to effects from normal transportation accident conditions, such as fire or violent shock, Division 1.5 explosives can be made to detonate if initiated by an explosive charge. The detonation effects, while less severe than those of Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives, are substantial. An example of a Division 1.5 explosive is ammonium nitrate-fuel oil mixture (ANFO) that, with a properly designed explosive chain, can produce a substantial blast wave. Insensitive bulk blasting agents like ANFO have been used by terrorists in the past, most notably in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Currently, the HMR require security plans for placarded shipments of Division 1.5 explosives. In this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to require security plans for shipments of Division 1.5 explosives transported in any quantity. 4. Division 1.6 Explosives Division 1.6 explosives are extremely insensitive articles that do not have a mass explosion hazard and that contain only extremely insensitive detonating substances with only a negligible probability of accidental initiation or propagation. Currently, the HMR require security plans for shipments of placarded amounts of Division 1.6 materials. However, our evaluation concludes that these materials do not pose a transportation security risk. Therefore, in this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to delete Division 1.6 explosives from the list of materials for which security plans are required. 5. Division 2.1 Flammable Gases Division 2.1 materials are flammable gases that may be transported at ambient pressure in a compressed or liquefied compressed state. Flammable gases will burn if mixed with an appropriate amount of air; confined burning of a flammable gas can lead to detonation. A commonly transported example of a flammable gas is propane, a liquefied compressed gas. When liquid propane is released into the atmosphere, it quickly vaporizes into the gaseous form that is its normal state at atmospheric pressure. This happens very rapidly, and in the process, the propane combines readily with air to form fuel-air mixtures that are ignitable over a range of 2.2 to 9.5 percent propane by volume. If an ignition source is present in the vicinity of a highly flammable mixture, the vapor cloud ignites and burns very rapidly (characterized by some experts as ``explosively''). Over 120 million tons of flammable gas are used and distributed in the United States on an annual basis. A significant portion is transported by pipeline; however, more than 200,000 carloads of these materials are transported by rail, and over 40 million tons are transported by highway each year. These materials generally are consumer products and can be purchased without special licenses or security procedures. Based on their hazard characteristics and the frequency with which propane and other Division 2.1 materials are transported in this country, PHMSA believes that materials meeting the definition for classification as Division 2.1 materials present a sufficient security risk to warrant the imposition of security plan requirements. Terrorists overseas have used flammable gas in attacks on people and buildings, using an IED to detonate the gas. The resulting disbursement and ignition of the gas creates a significantly larger fireball and heat signature than typical of an explosive detonation. The HMR currently require security plans for shipments of Division 2.1 materials in amounts that require placarding--that is, amounts greater than 119 gallons in a single packaging or container. In evaluating specific security risks associated with shipments of Division 2.1 materials, PHMSA has concluded that shipments in quantities less than 3,000 L in a single package do not pose a transportation security threat warranting development and im
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