# Hazardous Materials: Improving the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation of Hazardous Materials

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** 73 FR 17818
- **title:** Hazardous Materials: Improving the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation of Hazardous Materials
- **source type:** rulemaking
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** proposed
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2008-04-01
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and the Federal Railroad Administration are proposing revisions to the Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations to improve the crashworthiness protection of railroad tank cars designed to transport poison inhalation hazard materials. Specifically, we are proposing enhanced tank car performance standards for head and shell impacts; operational restrictions for trains hauling tank cars containing PIH materials; interim operational restrictions for trains hauling tank cars not meeting the enhanced performance standards; and an allowance to increase the gross weight of tank cars that meet the enhanced tank-head and shell puncture-resistance systems.
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-e8-6563.json
- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-e8-6563.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/federal-register-e8-6563
- **source url:** https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2008/04/01/E8-6563/hazardous-materials-improving-the-safety-of-railroad-tank-car-transportation-of-hazardous-materials
**body:**

Federal Register, Volume 73 Issue 63 (Tuesday, April 1, 2008) [Federal Register Volume 73, Number 63 (Tuesday, April 1, 2008)] [Proposed Rules] [Pages 17818-17865] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] [FR Doc No: E8-6563] [[Page 17817]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Part V Department of Transportation ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 49 CFR Parts 171, 173, 174 and 179 Hazardous Materials: Improving the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation of Hazardous Materials; Proposed Rule Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 63 / Tuesday, April 1, 2008 / Proposed Rules [[Page 17818]] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Parts 171, 173, 174 and 179 [Docket No. FRA-2006-25169] RIN 2130-AB69 Hazardous Materials: Improving the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation of Hazardous Materials AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and the Federal Railroad Administration are proposing revisions to the Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations to improve the crashworthiness protection of railroad tank cars designed to transport poison inhalation hazard materials. Specifically, we are proposing enhanced tank car performance standards for head and shell impacts; operational restrictions for trains hauling tank cars containing PIH materials; interim operational restrictions for trains hauling tank cars not meeting the enhanced performance standards; and an allowance to increase the gross weight of tank cars that meet the enhanced tank-head and shell puncture-resistance systems. DATES: Submit comments by June 2, 2008. To the extent possible, late- filed comments will be considered as we develop a final rule. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number FRA- 2006-25169 by any of the following methods: Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov . Follow the instructions for submitting comments. Fax: 1-202-493-2251. Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and docket number (FRA-2006-25169) for this rulemaking. Note that all comments received will be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov including any personal information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the ``Regulatory Analyses and Notices'' section of this document for Privacy Act information related to any submitted comments or materials. Internet users may access comments received by DOT at http://www.regulations.gov . FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Schoonover, (202) 493-6229, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Federal Railroad Administration; Lucinda Henriksen, (202) 493-1345, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration; or Michael Stevens, (202) 366-8553, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Abbreviations and Terms Used in This Document AAR--Association of American Railroads ABS--Automatic Block Signal Action Plan--National Rail Safety Action Plan ADAMS--Automated Dynamic Analysis of Mechanical Systems ARI--American Railway Car Institute ATIP--Automated Track Geometry Program BNSF--BNSF Railway Company BTS--Bureau of Transportation Statistics C3RS--Confidential Close Call Reporting System CEQ--Council on Environmental Quality CPC--Casualty Prevention Circular CI--Chlorine Institute CP--Canadian Pacific CPR--Conditional Probability of Release CSXT--CSX Transportation Department--U.S. Department of Transportation DOW--Dow Chemical Company DOT--U.S. Department of Transportation ECP--Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake Systems ETMS--Electronic Train Management System Federal hazmat law--Federal hazardous materials transportation law (40 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.) FRA--Federal Railroad Administration HMR--Hazardous Materials Regulations NGRTCP--Next Generation Rail Tank Car Project NPRM--Notice of Proposed Rulemaking NTSB--National Transportation Safety Board OMB--Office of Management and Budget PHMSA--Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PIH--Poison Inhalation Hazard PTC--Positive Train Control PV--Present Value QA--Quality Assurance R&D--Research and Development RSAC--Railroad Safety Advisory Committee RSI--Railway Supply Institute SAFETEA-LU--Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient, Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. 109-59 SBA--Small Business Administration SOMC--Association of American Railroads Safety and Operations Management Committee SRT--Structural Reliability Technologies Tank Car Manual--Association of American Railroads Tank Car Committee Tank Car Manual TCC--Association of American Railroads Tank Car Committee TFI--The Fertilizer Institute TIH--Toxic Inhalation Hazard TRANSCAER[supreg]--Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response TSA--Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration Trinity--Trinity Industries, Inc. Union Tank--Union Tank Car Company UP--Union Pacific Railroad Company Volpe--Volpe National Transportation Systems Center Table of Contents for Supplementary Information I. Background II. Summary of Proposals in this NPRM III. Statutory Authority, Congressional Mandate, and NTSB Recommendations IV. Brief Overview of FRA Programs to Continuously Improve Rail Safety Outside of Tank Car-Specific Efforts V. Relevant Regulatory Framework VI. Railroad Accidents Involving Hazardous Materials Releases and Accompanying NTSB Recommendations A. Minot B. FRA's Responses to the NTSB Tank Car Recommendations for Minot C. Macdona D. Graniteville E. FRA's Responses to the NTSB Tank Car Recommendations for Graniteville VII. Evaluating the Risk Related to Potential Catastrophic Releases from PIH Tank Cars in the Future A. Graniteville B. Minot VIII. The Railroad Industry's Liability and the Impact of Accidents Involving the Shipment of PIH Materials on Insurance Costs and Shipping Rates IX. Industry Efforts to Improve Railroad Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety A. General Industry Efforts B. Trinity Industries, Inc.'s Special Permit Chlorine Car C. AAR Proposals for Enhanced Chlorine and Anhydrous Ammonia Tank Cars D. Dow/UP Safety Initiative and the Next Generation Rail Tank Car Project E. The Chlorine Institute Study X. Discussion of Relevant Tank Car Research XI. Discussion of Public Comments A. May 31-June 1, 2006 Public Meeting B. December 14, 2006 Public Meeting C. March 30, 2007 Public Meeting XII. Proposed Rule and Alternatives XIII. Section-by-Section Analysis XIV. Regulatory Analyses and Notices A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures C. Executive Order 13132 D. Executive Order 13175 E. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272 [[Page 17819]] F. Paperwork Reduction Act G. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act I. Environmental Assessment J. Privacy Act I. Background Hazardous materials are essential to the economy of the United States and to the well being of its people. These materials are used in water purification, farming, manufacturing, and other industrial applications. Railroads carry over 1.7 million shipments of hazardous materials annually, including millions of tons of explosive, poisonous, corrosive, flammable, and radioactive materials. The need for hazardous materials to support essential services means that the transportation of highly hazardous materials is unavoidable. Rail transportation of hazardous materials is a safe method for moving large quantities of hazardous materials over long distances. The vast majority of hazardous materials shipped by railroad tank car each year arrive at their destinations safely and without incident. In the year 2004 (most recent data available), for example, out of the approximately 1.7 million shipments of hazardous materials transported by rail, there were 29 accidents in which a hazardous material was released. In these accidents, a total of 47 hazardous material cars released some amount of product; thus, the risk of a release was a tiny fraction of a percent (0.0028 percent or 47/1,700,000). The DOT Hazardous Materials Information System's ten-year incident data for 1997 through 2006 identifies a total of 17 fatalities resulting from rail hazardous materials incidents. While even one death is too many, these statistics show that train accidents involving a release of hazardous materials that causes death are rare. We recognize, however, that rail shipments of hazardous materials frequently move through densely populated or environmentally-sensitive areas where the consequences of an incident could be loss of life, serious injury, or significant environmental damage. Historically, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), working closely with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), has issued a number of regulations to improve the survivability of rail tank cars in accidents.\1\ Among other things, these regulations require hazardous material tank cars to be equipped with tank-head puncture resistance systems (head protection), coupler vertical restraint systems (shelf couplers), insulation, and for certain high-hazard materials, thermal protection systems. The historical safety record of railroad tank car hazardous material transportation demonstrates that these systems, working in combination, have been successful in greatly reducing the potential harm to human health and the environment when tank cars are involved in accidents. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Crashworthiness Protection Requirements for Tank Cars; Detection and Repair of Cracks, Pits, Corrosion, Lining Flaws, Thermal Protection Flaws and Other Defects of Tank Car Tanks, 60 FR 49048 (Sept. 21, 1995); Performance-Oriented Packaging Standards; Miscellaneous Amendments, 58 FR 50224 (Sept. 24, 1993); Performance Oriented Packaging: Changes to Classification, Hazard Communication, Packaging and Handling Requirements Based on UN Standards and Agency Initiative, 55 FR 52402 (Dec. 21, 1990); Transportation of Hazardous Materials, Miscellaneous Amendments, 54 FR 38790 (Sept. 20, 1989); Specifications for Railroad Tank Cars Used to Transport Hazardous Materials, 49 FR 3468 (Jan. 27, 1984); Shippers, Specifications for Tank Cars, 49 FR 3473 (Jan. 27, 1984); Interlocking Couplers and Restrictions of Capacity of Tank Cars, 35 FR 14215 (Sept. 9, 1970); Shippers; Specifications for Pressure Tank Cars, 42 FR 46306 (Sept. 15, 1977); Tank Car Tank-head Protection, 41 FR 21475 (May 26, 1976). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the last several years, however, there have been a number of rail tank car accidents in which the car was breached and product lost on the ground or into the atmosphere. Of particular concern have been accidents involving materials that are poisonous, or toxic, by inhalation (referred to as PIH or TIH materials). For example, on January 18, 2002, a Canadian Pacific Railway Company (CP) train derailed in Minot, North Dakota, resulting in one death and 11 serious injuries due to the release of anhydrous ammonia when five tank cars carrying the product catastrophically ruptured, and a vapor plume covered the derailment site and surrounding area. On June 28, 2004, a Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) train collided with a Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (now known as BNSF Railway Company) (BNSF) train in Macdona, Texas, breaching a loaded tank car containing chlorine and causing the deaths of three people and seriously injuring 30 others. On January 6, 2005, a Norfolk Southern Railway Company train collided with a standing train on a siding in Graniteville, South Carolina. The accident resulted in the breach of a tank car containing chlorine, and nine people died from the inhalation of chlorine vapors. Although none of these accidents was caused by hazardous material tank cars, the failure of the tank cars involved led to fatalities, injuries, evacuations, property and environmental damage. On August 10, 2005, Congress passed the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. 109-59 (SAFETEA-LU). SAFETEA-LU added section 20155 to the Federal hazmat law. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20155. As discussed below, section 20155, in part, required FRA to (1) validate a predictive model quantifying the relevant dynamic forces acting on railroad tank cars under accident conditions, and (2) initiate a rulemaking to develop and implement appropriate design standards for pressurized tank cars. In response to these recent accidents and in light of Congress's mandate in SAFETEA-LU to develop and implement appropriate design standards for pressurized tank cars, PHMSA and FRA, the two operating administrations within DOT responsible for overseeing the safe transportation of hazardous materials by rail, initiated a comprehensive review of design and operational factors that affect rail tank car safety. DOT's approach to enhancing the safety of rail tank cars and transportation of hazardous materials by rail tank cars is on- going and multi-faceted. For example, DOT is utilizing a risk management approach to identify ways to enhance the safe transportation of hazardous materials in tank cars, including: (1) Tank car design, manufacture, and requalification; (2) railroad operational issues such as human factors, track conditions and maintenance, wayside hazard detectors, signals and train control systems; and (3) improved planning and training for emergency response. Recognizing the need for public input into this review of hazardous material tank car safety, on May 31 and June 1, 2006, PHMSA and FRA hosted a public meeting to discuss the initiation of this comprehensive review and to invite interested parties to participate in the agencies' efforts to surface and prioritize issues relating to the safe transportation of hazardous materials by railroad tank car. Subsequent to the meeting, FRA established a public docket (Docket No. FRA-2006- 25169) to provide interested parties with a central location to both send and review relevant information concerning the safety of railroad tank car transportation of hazardous materials and a venue to gather and disseminate information and views on the issues. See 71 FR 37974 (July 3, 2006). Building on the initial public meeting, FRA and PHMSA held a second public meeting on December 14, 2006. At this second meeting, FRA announced DOT's commitment to develop an enhanced tank car standard by 2008. In addition, [[Page 17820]] at this meeting, the agencies solicited input and comments in response to nine specific questions pertaining to potential methods and goals of tank car improvements. On March 30, 2007, PHMSA and FRA held a third public meeting at which FRA shared the preliminary results of its research related to tank car survivability and provided an update on DOT's progress towards developing enhanced tank car safety standards. As discussed in Section XI below, meeting participants from both the railroad and shipping industries expressed agreement on the need for continuous improvement in the safe transportation of hazardous materials by railroad tank car, particularly in light of the Minot, Macdona, and Graniteville accidents. Accordingly, after careful review and consideration of all of the relevant research and data, oral comments at the public meetings, and comments submitted to the docket, PHMSA and FRA are proposing enhanced tank car performance standards and operating limitations designed to minimize the loss of lading from tank cars transporting PIH materials in the event of an accident. Issuance of this NPRM does not mean that FRA and PHMSA's efforts to improve tank car safety will end. Improving the safety and security of hazardous materials transportation via railroad tank car is an on-going process. Going forward, FRA's hazardous materials research and development (R&D) program will continue to focus on reducing the rate and severity of hazardous materials releases by optimizing the manufacture, operation, inspection, and maintenance procedures for the hazardous materials tank car fleet. FRA's overall R&D program will also continue to examine railroad operating practices and the use of technologies designed to increase overall railroad safety. II. Summary of Proposals in this NPRM As discussed in detail in Section X below, DOT's tank car research has shown that the rupture of tank cars and loss of lading are principally associated with the car-to-car impacts that occur as a result of derailments and train-to-train collisions. Conditions during an accident can be such that a coupler of one car impacts the head or the shell of a tank car. With sufficient speed, such impacts can lead to rupture and loss of lading. When a tank car is transporting PIH materials, the consequences of that loss of lading can be significant. Based on the information currently available, DOT believes that a significant opportunity exists to enhance the safe transportation of PIH materials by railroad tank car. Accordingly, in order to enhance the safety of hazardous materials transportation, and in direct response to the Congressional directive of 49 U.S.C. 20155, DOT is proposing revisions to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-180) that would improve the accident survivability of railroad tank cars used to transport PIH materials. Specifically, in this NPRM, we are proposing to require: A maximum speed limit of 50 mph for all railroad tank cars used to transport PIH materials; A maximum speed limit of 30 mph in non-signaled (i.e., dark) territory for all railroad tank cars transporting PIH materials, unless the material is transported in a tank car meeting the enhanced tank-head and shell puncture-resistance systems performance standards of this proposal; As an alternative to the maximum speed limit of 30 mph in dark territory, submission for FRA approval of a complete risk assessment and risk mitigation strategy establishing that operating conditions over the subject track provide at least an equivalent level of safety as that provided by signaled track; Railroad tank cars used to transport PIH materials to be manufactured to meet enhanced performance standards for tank-head and shell puncture-resistance systems; The expedited replacement of tank cars used for the transportation of PIH materials manufactured before 1989 with non- normalized steel \2\ head or shell construction; and --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Non-normalized steel is steel that has not been subjected to a specific heat treatment procedure that improves the steel's ability to resist fracture. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- An allowance to increase the gross weight on rail for tank cars designed to meet the proposed enhanced tank-head and shell puncture-resistance systems performance standards. In drafting this proposed rule, DOT has carefully considered the results of all of its research regarding tank car accident survivability, all comments received through the series of public meetings held in the course of DOT's comprehensive review of tank car safety, as well as all written comments submitted to the docket of this proceeding. DOT believes that its two-pronged approach to enhancing the accident survivability of tank cars--that is, limiting the operating conditions of the tank cars transporting PIH materials and enhancing the tank-head and shell puncture-resistance performance--represents the most efficient and cost-effective method of improving the accident survivability of these cars. DOT invites comments on all aspects of this proposed rule. First, with regard to the proposed speed and operating restrictions, we have reviewed the results of research on the current tank car fleet used for the transportation of PIH materials. We have also reviewed recent accidents and subsequent recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). As discussed in Section X below, FRA's research demonstrates that the speed at which a train is traveling has the greatest effect on the closing velocity between cars involved in a derailment or other accident situation. Specifically, the research indicates that, in general, the secondary car-to-car impact speed is approximately one-half that of the initial train speed--the speed of the train at the time of the collision or derailment. Limiting the operating speed of tank cars transporting PIH materials is one method to impose a control on the forces experienced by these tank cars. The rail industry, through the Association of American Railroads (AAR), has developed a detailed protocol on recommended operating practices for the transportation of hazardous materials. These recommended practices were originally implemented in 1990 by all of the Class 1 rail carriers operating in the United States. In 2006, AAR issued a revised version of this protocol, known as Circular OT-55-I, with short-line railroads also participating in the implementation. Among other requirements, OT-55-I restricts the operating speeds to a maximum of 50 mph for key trains, which are defined to include trains containing five or more tank car loads of PIH materials. Pursuant to OT-55-I, most trains with tank cars containing PIH materials are transported under this speed restriction. The period in which these tank cars are picked up or delivered is the most likely time when a train might not contain a sufficient quantity of hazardous materials to meet the definition of a key train and thus not operate under the 50 mph speed restriction. However, it is likely that the class of track into the facility may already limit the speed below 50 mph. Under FRA's Track Safety Standards,\3\ there are minimum safety requirements that a track must meet, and the condition of the track is directly tied to the maximum allowable operating speed for the track. Only the two highest categories of track typically used for freight service, Classes 4 and 5, [[Page 17821]] have a maximum allowable operating speed above 50 mph. In addition, 50% of track in the United States is non-signaled and restricted by the Track Safety Standards to a speed limit of 49 mph. We therefore believe that the proposed restrictions in this NPRM represent an effective way to control the forces experienced by the tank car during most derailment or accident conditions without imposing an undue burden on the industry. We invite commenters to address whether our assumption that most tank cars transporting PIH materials are transported in accordance with the speed restrictions in OT-55-I is accurate, particularly for smaller and short-line carriers. In addition, we invite commenters to address whether there are alternative approaches to reduce the consequences of a train derailment or accident involving PIH materials, including data and information in support of suggested alternative approaches or strategies. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ See 49 CFR part 213. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FRA analyzed data from chlorine incidents between 1965 and 2005, and anhydrous ammonia incidents between 1981 and 2005, to study those incidents resulting in loss of product from head and shell punctures, cracks, and tears.\4\ This analysis suggests that a disproportionate number of those incidents occurred in non-signaled (dark) territory, as compared to the percentage of total train miles in dark territory. Additionally, this analysis showed that at the time of these accidents, the median train speed was 40 mph and the average speed was 38 mph. This analysis also demonstrates that approximately 80% of the losses occurred at speeds greater than 30 mph. Notably, no catastrophic losses of chlorine occurred at speeds below 30 mph. Based on this data, we are proposing an interim measure to limit the speed of the existing fleet of tank cars used to transport PIH materials when traversing non- signaled territory. Specifically, we propose to limit the maximum allowable operating speed to 30 mph for tank cars transporting PIH materials over non-signaled territory unless the tank cars meet the enhanced tank-head and shell puncture-resistance systems performance standards of this proposal. We are also proposing alternate provisions that a railroad may choose to follow in lieu of the speed restriction. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ See document no. 30 in docket no. FRA-2006-25169, ``Loss of TIH Product in Head and Shell Punctures, Cracks & Tears.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Second, we are proposing enhanced tank-head and shell puncture- resistance performance standards that are designed to enhance the accident survivability of tank cars. One critical aspect of this enhancement is improved tank-head and shell puncture-resistance standards. The enhanced standards would require tank cars that transport PIH materials in the United States to be designed and manufactured with a shell puncture-resistance system capable of withstanding impact at 25 mph and with a tank-head puncture-resistance system capable of withstanding impact at 30 mph. As noted above, we are proposing these enhanced performance standards in tandem with an operational speed restriction of 50 mph. Because the secondary car-to- car impact speed in a derailment or collision scenario is approximately one-half of the initial train speed, designing and constructing tank cars to withstand shell impacts of at least 25 mph and limiting the speed of those tank cars to 50 mph will ensure that in most instances, the car will not be breached if it is involved in a derailment or other type of accident. Designing and constructing tank cars to withstand tank-head impacts of at least 30 mph would take advantage of the greater available space for impact-attenuating structures in front of the tank-head and would help mitigate possible differences between the generalized tank-head impact scenarios and the actual tank-head impacts that occur in collisions or derailments. Empirical evidence from recent accidents and the derailment dynamics research prepared by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe) show that impacts happen to both tank car heads and shells. Tank car heads have historically been provided more protection than tank shells because the majority of tank car punctures occurred in rail yards to the heads of tank cars as a result of overspeed impacts. However, given the recent PIH releases in train accidents, we believe that it is time to enhance the accident survivability of the tank car, increasing the level of protection to both the tank-head and the shell. To support the enhanced tank-head and shell puncture-resistance standards, we are proposing performance criteria, including impact test requirements. The proposed tests reflect generalized impact scenarios as a means to evaluate the performance of alternative designs. In the shell impact scenario, a rigid ram car with a punch impacts the shell of the tank car. Similarly, in the head impact scenario, a rigid ram car with a punch impacts the head of the tank car. The test procedures are based on the modeling developed by Volpe and the baseline tank car testing performed in cooperation with the Next Generation Rail Tank Car Project (NGRTCP), as discussed in Section IX below. As proposed in this NPRM, compliance with the proposed standards can be shown by computer simulation, by simulation in conjunction with substructure testing, by full-scale impact testing, or a combination thereof. The highest level of confidence, although at the greatest cost, is provided by full-scale impact testing. The least costly and lowest level of confidence is provided by simulation alone. Substructure testing significantly increases the confidence in simulation modeling, potentially with relatively modest costs, depending on the details of the substructure test. Economic analysis indicates that freight rail industry economics should allow the development of several new tank car designs, through compliance shown with simulations and substructure testing. The performance criteria proposed in this NPRM provide for full-scale testing, scale model or component testing, simulation, or comparative analysis to an approved design. We are proposing to require designs for which no full-scale testing is performed to be submitted to FRA for review. FRA's review is necessary to ensure that modeling parameters and scale or substructure testing are sufficient to ensure that the necessary level of safety has been achieved. In evaluating a design, FRA will consider appropriate data and analysis showing how the proposed design meets the enhanced performance standards for head and shell impacts. FRA will consider proper documentation of competent engineering analysis or practical demonstrations, or both, which may include validated computer modeling, structural crush analysis, component testing, or any combination thereof. This approach is consistent with FRA's practice in determining compliance with equipment performance standards promulgated in other areas of railroad safety. See, e.g., 49 CFR 229.211 (Locomotive Crashworthiness). We request comments on this proposal. Third, to ensure timely replacement of the PIH tank car fleet, we are proposing an implementation schedule that allows for design development and manufacturing ramp-up in the first two years after the final rule becomes effective. We are also proposing that in the next three years, one-half of the existing fleet will be replaced, with the remaining fleet replacement taking place in the following three years. This schedule will allow for replacement of the current PIH tank car fleet within eight years from the effective date of the final rule. [[Page 17822]] One of the factors we have taken into consideration in developing this proposal is the NTSB's recommendations related to pre-1989 tank cars manufactured with non-normalized steel. The NTSB, in its report on the Minot, North Dakota accident,\5\ concluded that low fracture toughness of non-normalized steels used for tank shells contributed to the complete fracture and separation of the derailed cars. While we believe that low fracture toughness of non-normalized steels is only one of many material and design characteristics that can contribute to tank car releases, the pre-1989 tank cars are reaching the upper limits of their useful life. Therefore, we believe that these pre-1989 cars, which were manufactured with non-normalized steel, should be replaced in an expedited fashion. To accomplish this safety goal, we propose to prohibit the use of tank cars manufactured with non-normalized steel heads or shells beginning five years after the effective date of the final rule. We want to emphasize that this requirement is focused on the expedited removal of the pre-1989 tank cars that were manufactured using non-normalized steel. We recognize the efforts of the AAR to incorporate requirements for normalized steel for cars manufactured after 1988. We also recognize that some tank car manufacturers began using normalized steel prior to 1988; those tank cars would not be affected by this proposal. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ See infra Section VI for a detailed discussion of the Minot, North Dakota accident. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, we are proposing to allow an increase in the gross weight of tank cars allowed on rail. Improvements in tank car performance have historically relied in large part on thicker and/or stronger steel, which brings with it a corresponding addition to the empty weight of the tank car. Therefore, a potential consequence of the proposed enhanced tank-head and shell puncture-resistance performance standards in this NPRM could be a measurable increase in the total number of PIH rail shipments to convey the same quantity of product to the customer since a heavier tank car means must contain less lading to keep within the gross weight limit. As noted above, however, there is a long history of safe shipment of hazardous materials via railroad tank car, and the enhancements proposed in this NPRM will further increase the accident survivability of the tank cars used to transport PIH materials. Accordingly, we are proposing to allow an increase in the gross weight allowed on rail (up to 286,000 pounds) for tank cars that transport PIH materials to offset the potentially increased weight of the enhanced tank car. This measure should enable shippers to continue meeting customer demands without significantly increasing the total number of PIH shipments. In proposing to allow tank cars meeting the enhanced tank- head and shell puncture-resistance system requirements to weigh up to 286,000 pounds gross weight on rail, we recognize that there are mechanical and structural concerns that must be addressed to ensure the safety of these cars during transportation. To ensure that tank cars exceeding the existing 263,000 pound limitation and weighing up to 286,000 pounds gross weight on rail are mechanically and structurally sound, we propose to require that such cars conform to AAR Standard S- 286-2002, SPECIFICATION FOR 286,000 LBS. GROSS RAIL LOAD CARS FOR FREE/ UNRESTRICTED INTERCHANGE SERVICE (adopted November 2002 and revised September 1, 2005), which we propose to incorporate by reference into the HMR. AAR Standard S-286-2002 is the existing industry standard for designing, building, and operating rail cars at gross weights between 263,000 pounds and 286,000 pounds. A copy of AAR Standard S-286-2002 has been placed in the docket. We recognize that some facilities and railroads do not currently have infrastructure sufficient to support the use of a 286,000 pound tank car. We anticipate tank car designers, working with the end users, will develop tank cars that will meet the enhanced tank-head and shell performance standards while minimizing the addition of weight to the empty car. The existing tank car specifications provide flexibility that will allow some use of new technologies and materials to provide the improved accident survivability required by this proposal. DOT encourages the development of innovative engineering design changes to meet the proposed enhanced accident survivability standard while minimizing added weight to the empty tank car. We also anticipate that the growing use of rail cars with gross weight on rail exceeding 263,000 lbs. for non-hazardous commodities, such as coal and grain, will minimize the track infrastructure barriers to the use of the heavier cars over time. For these reasons, we believe that the number of PIH shipments will not be significantly increased by the proposed enhanced accident survivability standards. As in all aspects of this proposed rule, we request comments on this proposal. We are particularly interested in data and information concerning the extent to which track infrastructure has already been modified to accommodate heavier rail cars, including how those modifications were accomplished and at what cost. We also invite comments concerning additional infrastructure modifications that may be required to accommodate the heavier cars that would be permitted in accordance with the proposals in this NPRM and the extent to which PIH shipments along certain rail lines may increase because existing infrastructure may not accommodate heavier cars. The specific proposals in this rule are explained in more detail in Section XIII, the Section-by-Section Analysis, which is set forth below. III. Statutory Authority, Congressional Mandate, and NTSB Recommendations The Federal hazardous material transportation law (Federal hazmat law, 49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.) authorizes the Secretary of DOT (Secretary) to ``prescribe regulations for the safe transportation, including security, of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.'' The Secretary has delegated this authority to PHMSA. 49 CFR 1.53(b). The HMR, promulgated by PHMSA, are designed to achieve three goals: (1) To ensure that hazardous materials are packaged and handled safely and securely during transportation; (2) to provide effective communication to transportation workers and emergency responders of the hazards of the materials being transported; and (3) to minimize the consequences of an incident should one occur. The hazardous material regulatory system is a risk management system that is prevention-oriented and focused on identifying a safety or security hazard and reducing the probability and quantity of a hazardous material release. Under the HMR, hazardous materials are categorized by analysis and experience into hazard classes and packing groups based upon the risks that they present during transportation. The HMR specify appropriate packaging and handling requirements for hazardous materials, and require a shipper to communicate the material's hazards through the use of shipping papers, package marking and labeling, and vehicle placarding. The HMR also require shippers to provide emergency response information applicable to the specific hazard or hazards of the material being transported. Finally, the HMR mandate training requirements for persons who prepare hazardous materials for shipment or who transport hazardous materials in commerce. The HMR also include operational [[Page 17823]] requirements applicable to each mode of transportation. The Secretary also has authority over all areas of railroad transportation safety (Federal railroad safety laws, 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq.), and has delegated this authority to FRA. 49 CFR 1.49. Pursuant to its statutory authority, FRA promulgates and enforces a comprehensive regulatory program (49 CFR parts 200-244) to address railroad track, signal systems, railroad communications, rolling stock, rear-end marking devices, safety glazing, railroad accident/incident reporting, locational requirements for the dispatch of U.S. rail operations, safety integration plans governing railroad consolidations, merger and acquisitions of control, operating practices, passenger train emergency preparedness, alcohol and drug testing, locomotive engineer certification, and workplace safety. FRA inspects railroads and shippers for compliance with both FRA and PHMSA regulations. FRA also conducts research and development to enhance railroad safety. In addition, both PHMSA and FRA are working with the emergency response community to enhance its ability to respond quickly and effectively to rail transportation accidents involving hazardous materials. As noted above, on August 10, 2005, Congress passed SAFETEA-LU, which added section 20155 to the Federal hazmat law. 49 U.S.C. 20155. In part, se
- **truncated:** true
- **body characters:** 349812