# Pipeline Safety: Control Room Management/Human Factors

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** 74 FR 63310
- **title:** Pipeline Safety: Control Room Management/Human Factors
- **source type:** rulemaking
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2009-12-03
- **effective on:** 2010-02-01
- **summary:** PHMSA is amending the Federal pipeline safety regulations to address human factors and other aspects of control room management for pipelines where controllers use supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Under the final rule, affected pipeline operators must define the roles and responsibilities of controllers and provide controllers with the necessary information, training, and processes to fulfill these responsibilities. Operators must also implement methods to prevent controller fatigue. The final rule further requires operators to manage SCADA alarms, assure control room considerations are taken into account when changing pipeline equipment or configurations, and review reportable incidents or accidents to determine whether control room actions contributed to the event. Hazardous liquid and gas pipelines are often monitored in a control room by controllers using computer-based equipment, such as a SCADA system, that records and displays operational information about the pipeline system, such as pressures, flow rates, and valve positions. Some SCADA systems are used by controllers to operate pipeline equipment, while, in other cases, controllers may dispatch other personnel to operate equipment in the field. These monitoring and control actions, whether via SCADA system commands or direction to field personnel, are a principal means of managing pipeline operation. This rule improves opportunities to reduce risk through more effective control of pipelines. It further requires the statutorily mandated human factors management. These regulations will enhance pipeline safety by coupling strengthened control room management with improved controller training and fatigue management.
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Federal Register, Volume 74 Issue 231 (Thursday, December 3, 2009) [Federal Register Volume 74, Number 231 (Thursday, December 3, 2009)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 63310-63330] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] [FR Doc No: E9-28469] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Parts 192 and 195 [Docket ID PHMSA-2007-27954; Amdt. Nos. 192-112 and 195-93] RIN 2137-AE28 Pipeline Safety: Control Room Management/Human Factors AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); DOT. ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: PHMSA is amending the Federal pipeline safety regulations to address human factors and other aspects of control room management for pipelines where controllers use supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Under the final rule, affected pipeline operators must define the roles and responsibilities of controllers and provide controllers with the necessary information, training, and processes to fulfill these responsibilities. Operators must also implement methods to prevent controller fatigue. The final rule further requires operators to manage SCADA alarms, assure control room considerations are taken into account when changing pipeline equipment or configurations, and review reportable incidents or accidents to determine whether control room actions contributed to the event. Hazardous liquid and gas pipelines are often monitored in a control room by controllers using computer-based equipment, such as a SCADA system, that records and displays operational information about the pipeline system, such as pressures, flow rates, and valve positions. Some SCADA systems are used by controllers to operate pipeline equipment, while, in other cases, controllers may dispatch other personnel to operate equipment in the field. These monitoring and control actions, whether via SCADA system commands or direction to field personnel, are a principal means of managing pipeline operation. This rule improves opportunities to reduce risk through more effective control of pipelines. It further requires [[Page 63311]] the statutorily mandated human factors management. These regulations will enhance pipeline safety by coupling strengthened control room management with improved controller training and fatigue management. DATES: Effective Date: The effective date of this final rule is February 1, 2010. Compliance Date: An operator must develop control room management procedures by August 1, 2011 and implement the procedures by February 1, 2012. Incorporation by Reference Date: The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this rule is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of February 1, 2010. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical information contact: Byron Coy at (609) 989-2180 or by e-mail at [email protected] . For legal information contact: Benjamin Fred at (202) 366-4400 or by e-mail at [email protected] . All materials in the docket may be accessed electronically at http://www.regulations.gov . General information about PHMSA may be found at http://phmsa.dot.gov . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Background A. Pipelines Approximately two-thirds of our domestic energy supplies are transported by pipeline. There are roughly 170,000 miles of hazardous liquid pipelines, 295,000 miles of gas transmission pipelines, and 1.9 million miles of gas distribution pipelines in the United States. Hazardous liquid pipelines carry crude oil to refineries and refined products to locations where these products are consumed or stored for later use. Hazardous liquid pipelines also transport highly volatile liquids (HVLs), other hazardous liquids such as anhydrous ammonia, and carbon dioxide. The regulations in 49 CFR part 195 apply to owners and operators of pipelines used in the transportation of hazardous liquids and carbon dioxide. Throughout this document, the term ``hazardous liquid'' refers to all products in pipelines regulated under part 195. In addition, the term ``operator'' refers to both owners and operators of pipeline facilities. Gas transmission pipelines typically carry natural gas over long distances from gas gathering, supply, or import facilities to localities where it is used to heat homes, generate electricity, and fuel industry. Gas distribution pipelines take natural gas from transmission pipelines and distribute it to residential, commercial, and industrial customers. The regulations in 49 CFR part 192 apply to operators of pipelines that transport natural gas, flammable gas, or gas which is toxic and corrosive. Throughout this document, the term ``gas'' refers to all gases in pipelines regulated under part 192. B. Control Rooms and Controllers Pipelines vary from small and simple to large and complex. Pipelines often span broad geographic areas. Gas distribution pipelines may cover entire metropolitan areas, literally street-by-street. Gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines may traverse hundreds or thousands of miles. Equipment exists throughout pipelines that must be operated to control the safe movement of commodity. This includes pumps and compressors to provide motive force and valves that control pressure or change position to direct the flow of commodity. In many cases, parameters measuring pipeline operations, such as pressure and flow, are monitored from remote, central locations referred to as control rooms. Pipeline equipment may also be operated remotely from control rooms. The employees who monitor pipeline parameters and direct certain actions from control rooms are known as controllers. Most pipelines are underground and operate without disturbing the environment or negatively impacting public safety. However, accidents do occur occasionally. Effective control is one key component of accident prevention.\1\ Controllers can help identify risks, prevent accidents, and minimize commodity loss if provided with the necessary tools and working environment. This rule will increase the likelihood that pipeline controllers have the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to help prevent accidents. The rule will also ensure that operators provide controllers with the necessary training, tools, procedures, management support, and environment where a controller's actions can be effective in helping to assure safe operation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The pipeline safety regulations in 49 CFR parts 191, 192, and 193 refer to certain events on a gas pipeline system as ``incidents'' while part 195 refers to similar failures on a hazardous liquid pipeline system as ``accidents.'' Throughout this document the terms ``accident'' and ``incident'' may be used interchangeably to mean an event or failure on a gas or hazardous liquid pipeline. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Most operators use computer-based SCADA systems, distributed control systems (DCS), or other less sophisticated systems to gather key information electronically from field locations.\2\ These systems are configured to present field data to the controllers, and may include additional historical, trending, reporting, and alarm management information. Controllers track routine operations continuously and watch for developing abnormal operating or emergency conditions. A controller may take direct action through the SCADA system to operate equipment or the controller may alert and defer action to others. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ SCADA, DCS or other similar systems perform similar functions. Throughout this document, where the term SCADA is used, it should be interpreted to mean SCADA, DCS or other similar systems. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Control rooms and controllers are critical to the safe operation of pipelines. Control rooms often serve as the hub or command center for decisions such as adjusting commodity flow or facilitating an operator's initial response to an emergency. The control room is the central location where humans or computers receive data from field sensors. Commands from the control room may be transmitted back to remotely controlled equipment. Field personnel also receive significant information from the control room. In essence, the control room is the ``brain'' of many pipeline systems. Errors made in control rooms can have significant effects on the controlled systems. A controller's errors can initiate or exacerbate an accident. A controller's improper action or lack of action can place undue stresses on a pipeline, which could result in a subsequent failure, the loss of service, or an increase in lost commodity and risk to people, property, the environment, and the fuel supply. On the other hand, proper controller responses to developing abnormal operating conditions or accidents can alleviate the consequences of some events, or prevent them altogether, regardless of the initial cause. C. Knowledge and Information Are Required To Do the Job A controller must possess certain abilities, and attain the knowledge and skills necessary to complete the various tasks required for a specific pipeline system. To attain the necessary knowledge and skills, the controller is typically required to complete extensive on- the-job training and is often closely observed by an experienced controller for a period of time. The controller must also review and understand appropriate procedures, including those associated with emergency response, and repeatedly practice the correct responses to a variety of abnormal operating conditions. Pipeline operators periodically evaluate a controller's skills and knowledge through the regulatory- [[Page 63312]] required operator qualification (OQ) process. Pipeline controllers must have adequate and up-to-date information about the conditions and operating status of the equipment they monitor and control if they are to succeed in maintaining pipeline safety. Incorrect, delayed, missing, or poorly displayed data may confuse a controller and lead to problems despite the extensive training, qualification, and abilities of the controller. SCADA systems perform the function of gathering this information and displaying it to the controller. Operators need to assure that SCADA systems perform this important function correctly, and that the information is displayed in a manner that facilitates controller understanding and recognition of abnormal operating conditions. D. Control Room Management All of this must occur within an environment that facilitates appropriate and correct actions. Operators must prudently manage the factors affecting the controller. This includes relevant human factors, such as factors that can affect controller fatigue, and operator processes and procedures for managing the pipeline from the control room. PHMSA refers to the combination of all these factors as control room management. This rule requires that operators take specific actions to assure that pipeline control room management contributes to the safe operation of pipeline facilities. E. NPRM On September 12, 2008, PHMSA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) (73 FR 53076) proposing to require operators of hazardous liquid pipelines, gas pipelines, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities to amend their existing written operations and maintenance procedures, OQ programs, and emergency plans to assure controllers and control room management practices and procedures are adequate to maintain pipeline safety and integrity. In summary, the NPRM proposed to revise the Federal pipeline safety regulations by: (1) Requiring operators to amend their Operations and Maintenance Manuals to address the human factors management plan required by the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006 (PIPES Act (Pub. L. 109-468), Section 12). (2) Defining the terms alarm, controller, control room, and SCADA. (3) Requiring operators to define roles and responsibilities so that management and controllers have uniform expectations and understandings about response requirements before an abnormal operating condition or emergency arises. (4) Requiring operators to establish procedures to facilitate controllers receiving management input in a timely manner when required. (5) Requiring operators to assure that controllers receive the timely and necessary information they need to fulfill their responsibilities. (6) Requiring operators to conduct an initial point-to-point baseline verification for each SCADA system to validate and document that field equipment configurations agree with computer displays. (7) Requiring operators to record critical information during each shift. (8) Requiring operators to include in their written procedures a limit on the length of time a controller may work and a requirement to allow time for adequate rest between shifts. (9) Requiring two levels of alarm management review. (10) Requiring operators to establish thorough and frequent communication between controllers, management, and field personnel when planning and implementing changes to pipeline equipment and configuration. (11) Requiring operators to review all reportable accidents and incidents and certain other events on a routine basis to identify and correct deficiencies related to: Controller fatigue; field equipment; procedures; SCADA system configuration and performance; and training. (12) Requiring operators to include certain content in their controller training programs. The proposed rule included a minimum set of elements that would overlap and supplement existing OQ programs. (13) Requiring additional controller qualifications to measure or verify a controller's performance, including the prompt detection of, and appropriate response to, abnormal and emergency conditions likely to occur. (14) Mandating that a senior executive officer validate certain aspects of controller training, qualification, and compliance with the requirements of this rule. (15) Requiring operators to maintain records that demonstrate compliance with the regulation and to document any deviations from their control room management procedures. The intent of the NPRM was to ensure that pipeline controllers would have the necessary knowledge, skills, abilities, and qualifications to help prevent accidents. The proposal was also intended to assure that operators would provide controllers with accurate information and the training, tools, procedures, management support, and operating environment where a controller's actions can help prevent accidents and minimize commodity losses. The requirements proposed in the NPRM were based on a controller study conducted by PHMSA that had identified areas for enhancement, an NTSB SCADA safety study, and certain mandates in the PIPES Act. F. PHMSA Controller Study As detailed in the NPRM, PHMSA had been studying and evaluating control room operations for many years and began developing control room inspection guidance in 1999. Congress subsequently enacted the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (PSIA) (Pub. L. 107-355), which required a pilot program be conducted to evaluate the need for pipeline controllers to be certified through tests and other requirements. In response to the PSIA, PHMSA conducted the Controller Certification (CCERT) project study and reported its findings to Congress within a report dated December 17, 2006, entitled ``Qualification of Pipeline Personnel.'' This project included a comprehensive review of existing controller training, qualification processes, procedures, and practices. This review also included identifying potential enhancements to controller qualifications and control room operations, such as validation and certification processes currently used in other industries to enhance public safety. Additional information on the CCERT study may be found in the NPRM. G. NTSB SCADA Study The NTSB conducted a safety study on hazardous liquid pipeline SCADA systems during the same period PHMSA conducted its CCERT study. While the PHMSA project addressed a wider perspective of interest, the two studies include similar findings.\3\ The NTSB study identified areas for potential improvement, which resulted in five recommendations. Three are incorporated in this final rule. PHMSA is addressing the other two recommendations independent of this rulemaking. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ See ``Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems in Liquid Pipelines,'' Safety Study NTSB/SS-05-02, adopted November 29, 2005. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The impetus of the NTSB study was a number of hazardous liquid accidents investigated by the NTSB in which there was a delay between the initial [[Page 63313]] indications of a leak evident on the SCADA system and the controller's initiation of response efforts. The NTSB designed its SCADA study to examine how hazardous liquid pipeline companies use SCADA systems to monitor and record operating data and to evaluate the role of SCADA systems in leak detection. The study identified five areas for potential improvement: Display graphics. Alarm management. Controller training. Controller fatigue data collection. Leak detection systems. While the NTSB SCADA study specifically addressed hazardous liquid pipelines, the report included an appendix of all NTSB SCADA-related recommendations since 1976, which resulted from investigations of both hazardous liquid and gas pipeline accidents. Since 1976, the NTSB has issued approximately 30 recommendations to various entities related to SCADA systems involving both hazardous liquid and gas pipeline systems. PHMSA considers the NTSB recommendations in the most-recent SCADA safety study to be applicable for both gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. The recommendations being addressed through this rulemaking are as follows: NTSB Recommendation P-05-1 Operators of hazardous liquid pipelines should be required to follow the API Recommended Practice 1165 (API RP 1165) for the use of graphics on the SCADA screens. NTSB Recommendation P-05-2 PHMSA should require pipeline companies to have a policy for the review and audit of SCADA-based alarms. NTSB Recommendation P-05-3 Operators should be required to include simulator or non- computerized simulations for training controllers in recognition of abnormal operating conditions, in particular leak events. H. PIPES Act of 2006 The PIPES Act introduced additional requirements for PHMSA with respect to control room management and human factors. Section 12 of the PIPES Act (codified at 49 U.S.C. 60137) requires PHMSA to issue regulations requiring each operator of a gas or hazardous liquid pipeline to develop, implement, and submit a human factors management plan designed to reduce risks associated with human factors, including fatigue, in each control room for the pipeline. The plan must include, among other things, a maximum limit on the hours of service for controllers working in a control room. PHMSA, or a state authorized to exercise safety oversight, is required to review and approve operators' human factors plans, and operators are required to notify PHMSA (or the appropriate state) of any deviations from the plan. Section 19 of the PIPES Act requires PHMSA to issue standards to implement the three recommendations of the NTSB SCADA safety study described above. This final rule fulfills requirements in sections 12 and 19 of the PIPES Act. II. Summary of Public Comments PHMSA received a total of 144 comments on the NPRM, including comments from trade associations, municipal operators, local distribution companies (LDC), NTSB, LNG facilities, gas transmission pipeline operators, other gas distribution pipeline operators, hazardous liquid pipeline operators, state regulators, and private citizens. In addition, PHMSA participated in two trade association meetings during the public comment period: (1) On October 14-15, 2008, at the American Petroleum Institute (API) and Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL) forum for control room management in Houston, Texas; and (2) on October 30, 2008, at the American Gas Association (AGA) control room management workshop in Ashburn, Virginia. Summaries of PHMSA's interactions at these meetings are available in the docket. Subsequent to the public comment period, on February 12, 2009, PHMSA staff met with NTSB staff in Washington, DC to discuss NTSB's comments on fatigue mitigation. A summary of this meeting is also in the docket. The national pipeline trade associations, consisting of the AGA, the American Public Gas Association (APGA), the API, the AOPL, and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), submitted a joint comment on October 8, 2008, shortly after the NPRM was issued, suggesting the agency withdraw the proposed rule. The associations contended that the proposed rule was overly-broad, unduly burdensome, and exceeded what the associations saw as the intent of Congress. They proposed that PHMSA issue an amended proposed rule with a clear scope and revised definitions that would reflect congressional intent and input from previous public meetings, and that would incorporate available consensus standards to a greater degree. The trade associations submitted a second letter on November 12, 2008, reaffirming their previous suggestion that the proposed rule be reissued. The second joint letter provided alternative rule language to support the associations' suggested re-issuance of the proposed rule. The letter also suggested that PHMSA provide its pipeline safety advisory committees the opportunity to vote on their suggested alternative language at a joint committee meeting scheduled for December 2008. AGA, APGA, INGAA, and API/AOPL also individually submitted comments on the proposed rule. Other associations that submitted comments were: The National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR), Northeast Gas Association (NGA), Texas Energy Coalition (TEC), Texas Oil and Gas Association (TXOGA), and Texas Pipeline Association (TPA). NGA supported AGA's comments and TEC, TXOGA, and TPA supported the joint trade associations' comments and the associated alternative regulatory language. APGA stated that the rule as written would have a disproportionately greater impact on small utilities with no offsetting benefits based on its survey that found, on average, 22 percent of small public gas system employees would be classified as controllers subject to this rule. APGA noted that the agency's Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) did not address adequately the impact on small entities. NAPSR is an organization of state agency pipeline safety managers responsible for the administration of their state's pipeline safety programs. NAPSR expressed concerns about jurisdictional authority in situations where a pipeline crosses State boundaries while under the control of a control room, or where a pipeline connects to a dispatch center or communications center in another State. NAPSR proposed adopting the definitions of control room and controller in API Recommended Practice 1168 (API RP 1168) to resolve the issue of jurisdictional authority. Comments from individual pipeline operators generally echoed the comments of the joint trade associations and the individual trade associations. Their comments mainly addressed the scope of the proposed rule. Many of these commenters were concerned with the proposed definitions of ``controller'' and ``control room,'' contending that these definitions would have the effect of making the proposed rule's scope unreasonably broad. Another area of significant concern was the proposed requirement to conduct a 100 percent baseline data point verification of SCADA systems. Pipeline operators generally commented that this proposed requirement would entail significant cost for very limited benefit. The [[Page 63314]] pipeline operators all supported the alternative regulatory language submitted by the joint trade associations or their own trade association. III. Advisory Committees Meeting On December 11, 2008, the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (TPSSC) and the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (THLPSSC) met jointly for their bi-annual public meeting in Arlington, Virginia.\4\ This meeting included consideration of the proposed control room management rule. As described above, the joint trade associations had submitted comments suggesting that the proposal be withdrawn and that the rule be significantly revised before being reissued. The associations submitted proposed alternative rule language as a basis for revision and had asked that the advisory committees be afforded the opportunity to consider their revised language if PHMSA did not withdraw the proposed rule. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ The TPSSC and THLPSSC are statutorily-mandated advisory committees that advise PHMSA on proposed safety standards, risk assessments, and safety policies for natural gas pipelines and for hazardous liquid pipelines. Both committees were established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C. App. 1) and the pipeline safety law (49 U.S.C. Chap. 601). Each committee consists of 15 members--with membership evenly divided among the Federal and State government, the regulated industry, and the public. The committees advise PHMSA on technical feasibility, practicability, and cost-effectiveness of each proposed pipeline safety standard. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Based on the comments filed by the joint trade associations, those received during the public meetings described above, and the general trend of other comments, PHMSA presented the Advisory Committees with three variations of the regulatory language being considered by the Agency. These included the language proposed in the NPRM, the alternative language proposed by the joint trade associations, and a third option that reflected the trade associations' proposed language with modifications to reflect critical NPRM language and other comments that had been received. PHMSA provided these variations of the regulatory language to facilitate the Advisory Committee members' discussion of the rule and to provide a process by which the members could recommend a certain course of action by PHMSA with regard to the rule. Although PHMSA had not selected any particular course of action at that time, PHMSA expressed its view that the third option might be the most viable alternative. The TPSSC discussed exempting gas distribution from all requirements of this rulemaking action. After substantial discussion, the TPSSC voted against recommending that PHMSA exclude distribution from the rule, but voted in favor of recommending that PHMSA limit the requirements placed on certain small distribution operators to fatigue management and associated recordkeeping issues. The Advisory Committees provided additional substantive and editorial comments to the proposed definitions, the scope of part 192, general requirements, requirements concerning SCADA systems, verification, backup control, fatigue mitigation, alarm management, change management, operating experience, and training requirements. Also, members of the public were afforded an opportunity to comment during the meeting, and several participants from the public provided their viewpoints for the record. After further discussion among the members, the TPSSC voted twelve to one, and the THLPSSC voted unanimously in favor. Also, both Advisory Committees provided a recommendation for PHMSA to make the changes noted during discussion. A transcript of the Advisory Committees meeting is posted in the docket (PHMSA-2007-27954-0184.2). The Advisory Committees recommended the following changes to the rule language proposed in the NPRM: Changing the definitions of controller and control room to limit the scope of the rule. The revised definitions would exclude field personnel who operate equipment and operator personnel who use SCADA information but who have no operational responsibility to respond to SCADA indications. Adding a scope statement to explicitly limit the application of the rule to controllers using SCADA systems. Excluding gas distribution pipelines serving less than 250,000 customers or gas transmission pipelines without compressor stations from many of the requirements. Reducing specificity in the elements operators would be required to define as controllers' roles and responsibilities. Limiting applicability of SCADA display guidance in API RP 1165 to SCADA systems that would be installed or undergo certain changes after the rule became effective. Requiring point-to-point verification of SCADA only when new field equipment is installed or when changes are made to field equipment or displays that could affect pipeline safety. Eliminating requirements to implement additional measures to monitor for fatigue when only a single controller is on duty. Reducing the scope and frequency of required alarm reviews. Eliminating the proposed requirement that operators review for lessons learned pipeline events that did not require reporting as incidents and focusing required reviews of incidents on those events where there is reason to believe that control room actions contributed to the event. Deferring to existing requirements for operator qualification rather than imposing an additional qualification requirement for controllers. Eliminating the proposed requirement that a senior officer of each pipeline company submit certification that the requirements of the rule have been implemented. Our changes to the final rule in response to the comments and advisory committees' recommendations are discussed below in section V. IV. Summary of Final Rule This final rule imposes requirements for control room management for all gas and hazardous liquid pipelines subject to parts 192 and 195 respectively that use SCADA systems and have at least one controller and control room. The scope of the rule is narrower in several respects than was proposed in the NPRM. First, for the reasons set forth below, LNG facilities are not covered by the rule, and no new requirements are adopted for part 193. In addition, changes to the proposed definition of a controller focus the new requirements on persons who work in control rooms and use SCADA systems to control their pipelines. The scope of the final rule has also been revised for gas pipeline operators such that each control room whose operations are limited to either or both of distribution with fewer than 250,000 customers or gas transmission without compressor stations must follow procedures with appropriate documentation that implement only the requirements for fatigue management, validation, and compliance and deviations. Pipelines meeting these criteria are generally smaller and simpler. They pose less complexity, obviating the need for the other requirements in this rule. This rule requires pipeline operators to have and follow written control room management procedures. The operators must define the roles and responsibilities of controllers in normal, abnormal, and emergency operating [[Page 63315]] situations. The final rule does not enumerate specific responsibilities that must be defined, as did the proposed rule. Instead, the final rule leaves the scope of controller responsibilities to be defined by each pipeline operator taking into consideration the characteristics of its pipeline and its methods of safely managing pipeline operation. Pipeline operators will be required by this final rule to assure that new SCADA displays and displays for SCADA systems that are expanded or replaced meet the provisions of the consensus standard governing such displays, API RP 1165. Displays for gas pipelines are required to meet only some provisions of the standard. The proposed rule would not have limited applicability of this requirement to new or modified SCADA systems. Operators will be required to validate the accuracy of SCADA displays whenever field equipment is added or moved and when other changes that may affect pipeline safety are made to field equipment or SCADA displays. The proposed rule would have required that all operators perform a 100 percent verification of existing SCADA systems within a few years. This provision was not included in the final rule. Pipeline operators will also be required to test any backup SCADA systems and to test and verify a means to manually operate the pipeline (in the event of a SCADA failure) at least annually. Pipeline operators must also establish a means of recording shift changes and other situations in which responsibility for pipeline operations is handed over from one controller to another. Such changes in responsibility may occur at scheduled shift changes or within a shift, when a controller is relieved for breaks and other reasons. Handovers can also occur between control rooms, for example where only one of multiple control rooms is used during night shifts. Pipeline operators will need to define procedures for shift changes and other circumstances in which responsibility for pipeline operation is transferred from one controller to another. The procedures must include the content of information to be exchanged during the turnover. Pipeline operators must implement measures to prevent fatigue that could influence a controller's ability to perform as needed. Operators will need to schedule their shifts in a manner that allows each controller enough off-duty time to achieve eight hours of continuous sleep. Operators must train controllers and their supervisors to recognize the effects of fatigue and in fatigue mitigation strategies. Finally, each operator's procedures must establish a maximum limit on the number of hours that a controller can work. PHMSA recognizes there may be infrequent emergencies during which an operator may find the need to deviate from the maximum limit it has established to ensure adequate coverage in the control room for emergency response. Accordingly, the regulation provides that an operator's procedures may provide for the deviation from the maximum limit in the case of an emergency. Such a deviation would only be permitted if necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline facility. PHMSA or the head of the appropriate State agency, as the case may be, may review the reasonableness of any deviation from an operator's maximum limit on hours of service when considering whether to take enforcement action. All pipeline operators are subject to the fatigue management requirement, even those whose operations do not involve multiple shifts. Controller fatigue can affect even single-shift pipeline operations and the PIPES Act requires that all pipeline operators have a plan that addresses fatigue. PHMSA expects that small operators, many of which operate only a single shift, will be able to meet these requirements with little effort. Shift schedule rotation is not an issue for these operators and written instructional material (e.g., pamphlets) that can be reviewed during scheduled training may be sufficient to address the education and training requirements for such small operators. SCADA alarms are a key tool for managing pipeline operations, but excessive numbers of alarms can overwhelm controllers. This final rule will require pipeline operators to develop written alarm management plans. These plans must include monthly reviews of data points that have been taken off scan or have had forced or manual values for extended periods. Operators will also need to verify correct alarm set- points, eliminate erroneous alarms, and review their alarm management plans at least annually. Proposed requirements for weekly reviews of issues related to alarm management and specified elements to include in annual reviews were not incorporated in the final rule. Some elements that would have been included in those weekly reviews, particularly ``nuisance alarms,'' have been generalized to points that have had alarms inhibited (which would likely result if nuisance alarms occur) or which have generated false alarms, both of which are now required to be included in monthly reviews. Operators will also be required to monitor the content and volume of activity being directed to their controllers (including alarms and actions directed to controllers from sources other than the SCADA system) at least annually. Pipeline operators will be required to consider the effects of future changes to the pipeline on control room operations. They must involve controllers, controller representatives, or their management in planning prior to implementing significant hydraulic or configuration changes that could affect control room operations. This participation must be accomplished with enough time prior to the implementation to allow adequate training, procedure development and review by the affected controllers. Operators must also assure good communications when field personnel are implementing physical changes to pipeline equipment or configuration. Proposed requirements to track SCADA maintenance, coordinate SCADA changes in advance, and consider effects on control rooms in merger and acquisition plans have not been incorporated. Mergers and acquisitions are events that can introduce changes of importance to controllers. Acquired assets are often added to existing SCADA systems, or divested assets are removed. Other changes in operating practices may occur as a result of management changes associated with a merger. The proposed rule would have required that merger, acquisition, and divestiture plans be developed and used to establish and conduct controller training and qualification prior to the implementation of any changes to the controller's responsibilities. A unique section regarding merger, acquisition, and divestiture plans for the control room has not been included in the final rule, because these types of plans frequently include many elements that do not affect control rooms and controllers. Nevertheless, PHMSA considers that operators should take into account potential implications on control rooms during such events. Other requirements of this rule address many of the important factors affecting control room operations and controllers in a merger, acquisition, or divestiture. For example, operators will be required to consider additional alarms added to a controller station to determine whether they could create a ``flood'' that would potentially overwhelm the controller. PHMSA expects that operators would also consider alarm descriptors and prioritization if changes are made to a controller console. Changes to SCADA systems to incorporate new (or delete old) assets would trigger requirements [[Page 63316]] for display point validation and display design (i.e., required elements of API RP 1165). PHMSA thus considers that important changes associated with mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures are still addressed within this rule even though the proposed explicit requirement to address them in plans for these events has not been included. Pipeline operators will be required to review their operating experience to identify lessons that might improve control room management. Specifically, operators will be required to review any reportable event and determine if control room actions contributed to the event. This is more focus
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