{"operation":"document","citation":"DCA00MP006","title":"Rupture of Piney Point Oil Pipeline and Release of Fuel Oil","source_type":"incident","agency":"National Transportation Safety Board","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2026-01-30","effective_on":"2000-04-07","summary":"Accident. in Chalk Point, MD, USA. on 2000-04-07. Potomac Electric Power Company. Rupture","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-case-dca00mp006.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-case-dca00mp006.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-case-dca00mp006","source_url":"https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA00MP006.aspx","body":"NTSB investigation DCA00MP006.\n\nEvent Type: Accident\n\nEvent Date: 2000-04-07\n\nEvent City: Chalk Point\n\nEvent State Or Region: MD\n\nEvent Country: USA\n\nPipeline Operator: Potomac Electric Power Company\n\nPipeline Type: Hazardous Liquid - Regulated\n\nAccident Type: Rupture\n\nCompletion Status: Completed\n\nReport Number: PAR-02-01\n\nProbable cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the April 7, 2000, Piney Point Oil Pipeline accident at the Potomac Electric Power Company?s Chalk Point, Maryland, generating station was a fracture in a buckle in the pipe that was undiscovered because the data from an in-line inspection tool were interpreted inaccurately as representing a T-piece. Contributing to the magnitude of the fuel oil release were inadequate operating procedures and practices for monitoring the flow of fuel oil through the pipeline to ensure timely leak detection.\n\nTier1Name: System operating\n\nTier2Name: Product leak/release\n\nTier1Name: System operating\n\nTier2Name: Pipe structural malfunction/failure\n\nFinding Tier1Name: Organizational\n\nFinding Tier2Name: Support/oversight/monitoring\n\nFinding Tier3Name: Oversight\n\nFinding Modifier Name: Federal agency\n\nFinding Report Text: Organizational - Support/oversight/monitoring - Oversight - Federal agency\n\nFinding Tier1Name: Organizational\n\nFinding Tier2Name: Development\n\nFinding Tier3Name: Selection/testing\n\nFinding Modifier Name: Inspection organization\n\nFinding Report Text: Organizational - Development - Selection/testing - Inspection organization\n\nFinding Tier1Name: Pipeline\n\nFinding Tier2Name: Pipline systems/equipment\n\nFinding Tier3Name: (general)\n\nFinding Modifier Name: Inadequate inspection\n\nFinding Report Text: Pipeline - Pipline systems/equipment - (general) - Inadequate inspection\n\nFinding Tier1Name: Pipeline\n\nFinding Tier2Name: Pipeline structure\n\nFinding Tier3Name: Pipe\n\nFinding Modifier Name: Failure\n\nFinding Report Text: Pipeline - Pipeline structure - Pipe - Failure\n\nOfficial NTSB investigation data. NTSB findings determine probable cause and make safety recommendations; they do not adjudicate civil liability or regulatory violations.\n\nWhat Happened\nOn the morning of April 7, 2000, the Piney Point Oil Pipeline system, which was owned by the Potomac Electric Power Company, experienced a pipe failure at the Chalk Point Generating Station in southeastern Prince Georgeís County, Maryland. The release was not discovered and addressed by the contract operating company, Support Terminal Services, Inc., until the late afternoon. Approximately 140,400 gallons of fuel oil were released into the surrounding wetlands and Swanson Creek and, subsequently, the Patuxent River as a result of the accident. No injuries were caused by the accident, which cost approximately $71 million for environmental response and clean-up operations.\n\nWhat We Found\nWe determined that the probable cause of the April 7, 2000, Piney Point Oil Pipeline accident at the Potomac Electric Power Companyís Chalk Point, Maryland, generating station was a fracture in a buckle in the pipe that was undiscovered because the data from an in-line inspection tool were interpreted inaccurately as representing a T-piece.\nContributing to the magnitude of the fuel oil release were inadequate operating procedures and practices for monitoring the flow of fuel oil through the pipeline to ensure timely leak detection.\nThis report discusses the following major safety issues:\n\nThe sufficiency of the evaluation procedures for pipe wrinkles;\nThe efficiency of the leak notification procedures; and,\nThe effectiveness of the incident command.\n\nIn addition to these issues, our investigation addressed the leak detection procedures used on the Piney Point Oil Pipeline and the analysis of the pipeline in-line inspection results.\n\nWhat We Recommended\nAs a result of this investigation, we made the following new safety recommendations.\nTo the Research and Special Programs Administration:\n\nEstablish quantitative criteria, based on engineering evaluations, for determining whether a wrinkle may be allowed to remain in a pipeline. (P\u000202-01)\nRequire pipeline owners and operators to provide follow-up telephone updates to the National Response Center when they discover that the information they initially reported contains significant errors or when they identify significant new information directly related to the reporting criteria. (P-02-02)\nTo the Environmental Protection Agency: Require all your regions to integrate the principles contained in the National Response Team's Technical Assistance Document Incident Command System/Unified CommandóManaging Responses to Oil Discharges and Hazardous Substance Releases under the National Contingency Plan in their area contingency plans and require the regions to train all personnel who are assigned responsibility to implement the plans according to those principles. (P-02-03)\n\nPAR-02-01\n<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nNTSB/PAR-02/01\nPB2002-916501\nPipeline Accident Report\nRupture of Piney Point Oil Pipeline\nand Release of Fuel Oil\nNear Chalk Point, Maryland\nApril 7, 2000\nT\nR\nA\nN\nF\nA\nS\nE\nN\nA\nT\nI\nO\nN\nA\nL\nP\nL\nU\nR\nI\nB\nU\nS\nU\nN\nU\nM\nE\nT\nY\nB\nO\nR\nT\nA\nT\nI\nO\nN\nD\nP\nR\nS\nA\nO\nNational\nTransportation\nSafety Board\nWashington, D.C.\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nthis page intentionally left blank\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nPipeline Accident Report\nRupture of Piney Point Oil Pipeline\nand Release of Fuel Oil\nNear Chalk Point, Maryland\nApril 7, 2000\nNTSB/PAR-02/01\nPB2002-916501 National Transportation Safety Board\nNotation 7285A 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.\nAdopted July 23, 2002 Washington, D.C. 20594\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nNational Transportation Safety Board. 2002. Rupture of Piney Point Oil Pipeline and Release of Fuel\nOil Near Chalk Point, Maryland, April 7, 2000. Pipeline Accident Report NTSB/PAR-02/01.\nWashington, DC.\nAbstract: On the morning of April 7, 2000, the Piney Point Oil Pipeline system, which was owned by the\nPotomac Electric Power Company, experienced a pipe failure at the Chalk Point Generating Station in\nsoutheastern Prince Georgeís County, Maryland. The release was not discovered and addressed by the\ncontract operating company, Support Terminal Services, Inc., until the late afternoon. Approximately\n140,400 gallons of fuel oil were released into the surrounding wetlands and Swanson Creek and,\nsubsequently, the Patuxent River as a result of the accident. No injuries were caused by the accident, which\ncost approximately $71 million for environmental response and clean-up operations.\nThe safety issues discussed in this report are the sufficiency of the evaluation procedures for pipe wrinkles;\nthe efficiency of the leak notification procedures; and the effectiveness of the incident command.\nAs a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issued safety recommendations to\nthe Research and Special Programs Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency.\nThe National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine,\npipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board\nAct of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study\ntransportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board\nmakes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and\nstatistical reviews.\nRecent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also\nmay be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:\nNational Transportation Safety Board\nPublic Inquiries Section, RE-51\n490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.\nWashington, D.C. 20594\n(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551\nSafety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To\npurchase this publication, order report number PB2002-916501 from:\nNational Technical Information Service\n5285 Port Royal Road\nSpringfield, Virginia 22161\n(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000\nThe Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports\nrelated to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\niii Pipeline Accident Report\nContents\nAcronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v\nExecutive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi\nFactual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1\nAccident Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1\nThe Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1\nActions Taken After Pipeline Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9\nResponse to Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10\nNotifying Authorities and Containing Spill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10\nResponse to Escape From Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17\nDamage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20\nPersonnel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20\nPostaccident Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21\nTests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22\nPiney Point Oil Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24\nPipeline Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24\nOperations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27\nPipeline Maps and Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28\nMeteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29\nPepco Oil Spill Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29\nPostaccident Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30\nOffice of Pipeline Safety Postaccident Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30\nPipeline Safety Actions Since Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31\nOther Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32\nIncident Command System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32\nPostaccident Assessments of Chalk Point Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33\nNovember 2000 Safety Board Hearing on Pipeline Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35\nAnalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36\nThe Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36\nPipeline In-line Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37\nEvaluation of Pipe Wrinkles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37\nLeak Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38\nLeak-related Notifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41\nInaccurate National Response Center Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41\nLimited Involvement of Local Response Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43\nIncident Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44\nConclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48\nFindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48\nProbable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48\nRecommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nContents iv Pipeline Accident Report\nAppendixes\nA: Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51\nB: Initial Incident Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52\nC: Significant Events From Leak Recognition to Loss of Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53\nD: Significant Environmental Response and Clean-up Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nv Pipeline Accident Report\nAcronyms and Abbreviations\nAPI -- American Petroleum Institute\nCFR -- Code of Federal Regulations\nEPA -- Environmental Protection Agency\nMirant -- Mirant Piney Point, LLP\nPepco -- Potomac Electric Power Company\nRSPA -- Research and Special Programs Administration\nSCADA -- supervisory control and data acquisition\nST Services -- Support Terminal Services, Inc.\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nvi Pipeline Accident Report\nExecutive Summary\nOn the morning of April 7, 2000, the Piney Point Oil Pipeline system, which was\nowned by the Potomac Electric Power Company, experienced a pipe failure at the Chalk\nPoint Generating Station in southeastern Prince Georgeís County, Maryland. The release\nwas not discovered and addressed by the contract operating company, Support Terminal\nServices, Inc., until the late afternoon. Approximately 140,400 gallons of fuel oil were\nreleased into the surrounding wetlands and Swanson Creek and, subsequently, the\nPatuxent River as a result of the accident. No injuries were caused by the accident, which\ncost approximately $71 million for environmental response and clean-up operations.\nThe National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of\nthe April 7, 2000, Piney Point Oil Pipeline accident at the Potomac Electric Power\nCompanyís Chalk Point, Maryland, generating station was a fracture in a buckle in the\npipe that was undiscovered because the data from an in-line inspection tool were\ninterpreted inaccurately as representing a T-piece. Contributing to the magnitude of the\nfuel oil release were inadequate operating procedures and practices for monitoring the\nflow of fuel oil through the pipeline to ensure timely leak detection.\nThis report discusses the following major safety issues:\nï The sufficiency of the evaluation procedures for pipe wrinkles;\nï The efficiency of the leak notification procedures; and,\nï The effectiveness of the incident command.\nIn addition to these issues, the Safety Boardís investigation addressed the leak\ndetection procedures used on the Piney Point Oil Pipeline and the analysis of the pipeline\nin-line inspection results.\nAs a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board makes safety\nrecommendations to the Research and Special Programs Administration and the\nEnvironmental Protection Agency.\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\n1 Pipeline Accident Report\nFactual Information\nAccident Synopsis\nOn the morning of April 7, 2000, the Piney Point Oil Pipeline system, which was\nowned by the Potomac Electric Power Company (Pepco), experienced a pipe failure at the\nChalk Point Generating Station in southeastern Prince Georgeís County, Maryland. (See\nfigure 1 for a map showing the location of the Chalk Point Generating Station and the spill\nsite.) The release was not discovered and addressed by the contract operating company,\nSupport Terminal Services, Inc., (ST Services) until the late afternoon. Approximately\n140,400 gallons1 of fuel oil were released into the surrounding wetlands and Swanson\nCreek and, subsequently, the Patuxent River as a result of the accident. No injuries were\ncaused by the accident, which cost approximately $71 million for environmental response\nand clean-up operations.\nThe Accident\nAt the time of the accident, Pepco was the owner of the Piney Point Oil Pipeline\nsystem. ST Services, a limited partnership of the Kaneb Pipe Line Company, operated the\npipeline and performed certain maintenance functions according to the terms of its\ncontract with Pepco.2 The pipeline was used to deliver heated No. 6 fuel oil from Piney\nPoint Terminal, in Maryland, through an intermediate station at Ryceville, Maryland, to\nPepcoís power generating stations at either Chalk Point or Morgantown, Maryland. (See\nfigure 2.)\nOn April 7, 2000, a pigging operation was being conducted on the pipeline to\nprepare the Chalk Point Station to Ryceville Station segment of the pipeline for an in-line\ninspection. The pipeline from the Chalk Point Station to the Ryceville Station was started\nin the reverse direction of normal flow with flushing oil3 in the system. (See figure 3 for a\nschematic of the pipeline.) Employees calculated the amount of oil in the Chalk Point\nflushing oil tank and the Ryceville receiving tank before the operation began. As the\noperation proceeded, they obtained tank level data that would typically be used to\ndetermine how much oil had been pumped from Chalk Point and how much had been\nreceived by Ryceville.\n1 Pipeline operators typically quantify their product using barrels rather than gallons. There are\n42 gallons in a barrel.\n2 In December 2000, Pepco sold some of its facilities, including the Piney Point Oil Pipeline and the\nChalk Point Generating Station, to Southern Energy, Inc., of Atlanta, Georgia. Southern Energy later became\nMirant Mid-Atlantic of Atlanta, Georgia. Currently, Mirant Piney Point, LLP, (Mirant) is the pipeline owner\nand operator.\n3 Flushing oil is a mixture of No. 2 and No. 6 fuel oil. No. 6 fuel oil is a thick, black petroleum liquid\nthat may become solid at cooler temperatures. No. 2 fuel oil is a light, refined petroleum product similar to\ndiesel fuel.\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nFactual Information 2 Pipeline Accident Report\nMARYLAND\nRt 301\nPRINCE GEORGE'S\nCOUNTY\nOil Spill Site\nCHARLES\nCOUNTY\nSwanson Creek\nPEPCO - Chalk Point\nGenerating Station\nCALVERT\nCOUNTY\nBenedict Route 231\nST. MARY'S\nCOUNTY\nPatuxent\nRiver\nN\nMajor Roads\nFigure 1. Map of accident site.\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nFactual Information 3 Pipeline Accident Report\nWaldorf\nOil\nSpill\nSite\nChalk Point\nStation\n5\n301\nLa Plata\n4\nHughesville\n231\nMorgantown\nStation Ryceville\nStation\n5\nMechanicsville\n301\n234\n5\n235\nNewburg\nPatuxent River\n4\n301\nWicomico River\nPotomac River\n234\n235\nLeonardtown\n5\nPEPCO\nPiney Point\nOil Pipeline\nValley Lee\nPiney Point\nStation\n5\nFigure 2. Locations of Piney Point Oil Pipeline Stations.\nAt 0715 eastern daylight time, ST Services employees (see figure 4) at the Chalk\nPoint Station started pumping and launched a cleaning pig. Before this operation began,\nthe estimated tank level that would indicate completion of the pigging process was\ncalculated for Chalk Point. The first pig was initially estimated to arrive at the Ryceville\nStation 7 hours after it had been launched. Before launching the cleaning pig, the ST\nServices Chalk Point operator walked through the tank and pipe manifold area and\nmeasured the actual level4 of the flushing oil tank. Within 15 to 25 minutes, a sizing pig5\nwas launched to follow the cleaning pig.\nThe ST Services Chalk Point operator measured the first tank level at 0910. He\npassed this information on to the crew at Ryceville, who had the tank volume conversion\ntables that were used to determine the volume in the tank and calculate the oil flow rate.\nThe first tank gauge was read at Ryceville shortly after the crew arrived, about 0837. The\n4 An operator obtains precise tank level measurements by climbing to the top of a tank carrying a\nweighted tape, which is used to determine the liquid level in the tank.\n5 The sizing pig was constructed to 90 percent of the pipelineís internal diameter to verify that the\npipeline did not have any internal restrictions that could damage or restrict the passage of an ultrasonic\ninspection tool.\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nPEPCO - Piney Point Oil Pipeline\nFlushing\nWicomico River Swanson Creek\nOil\nMorgantown Chalk Point\nTank\n12\" Pipeline 12\" Pipeline\nFlushing\nOil\nTank\nFuel Oil\nPump\nTransfer\nStation\nRyceville\nTransfer Station\nFuel Oil\nPump\nTransfer\nStation\nFlushing\nOil\nTank\nValve Pit #2\nValve Pit #1\nLeak\nSite\n#6\nOil\nTank\n#6\nOil\nTank\n16\" Pipeline\nLegend\nWater Crossing-\nnitrogen operated valves\nManual isolation Valve\nTank\nPiney Point\nTransfer\nStation\nST Services Terminal\nTank Tank\nPiney Point\nFigure 3. Piney Point Pipeline schematic.\nFactual Information 4 Pipeline Accident Report\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nST Services\nSenior Vice President, Mid-Atlantic Region\nDirector of Operations,\nEast Coast\nTerminal Manager\nAdministrative\nASSISTANT TERMINAL\nMANAGER\nTraffic Analyst\nMAINTENANCE\nFOREMAN\nPINEY POINT SHIFT SUPERVISORS\n(function as PINEY POINT PIPELINE CONTROLLERS)\nPlant Mechanics\n(function as CHALK POINT AND\nRYCEVILLE OPERATORS) Maintenance Workers-\nRelief Operators\nOperators (10 positions)\nFigure 4. Selective organizational chart for ST Services. Positions cited in accident narrative are in boldface and all capitals. (Note:\nThis chart was developed by the Safety Board for informational purposes. It is not intended to cover the full range of ST Services\npositions.)\nFactual Information 5 Pipeline Accident Report\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nFactual Information 6 Pipeline Accident Report\nST Services Ryceville operator determined that about 1,500 barrels (63,000 gallons) had\nbeen transferred into the Ryceville tank since the pumping started. The ST Services\nRyceville operator kept some notes during the pumping but did not record the time and\ntank level information in the station log.\nTank levels were taken at Chalk Point to be used to check the flow rate from the\nfacility at about 2-hour intervals for most of the pumping operation. The ST Services\nRyceville operator said he read the tank gauge at Ryceville, the receiving station, about\nevery 1 1/2 hours to determine the volume of product in the Ryceville tank. The operating\npersonnel did not provide tank volumes to the ST Services Chalk Point operator, and they\ndid not calculate the line balance6 periodically during the pigging operation. Further, they\ndid not communicate the tank level information to the ST Services Piney Point pipeline\ncontroller7 when it was obtained.\nAt 1119, another tank level measurement was made at Chalk Point, and the ST\nServices Chalk Point operator passed the information on to the ST Services Ryceville\noperator. A few minutes before 1200, the ST Services Chalk Point operator told Ryceville\nthat the pumping was going well and that the cleaning pig would arrive early, between\n1300 and 1330. At the same time, the ST Services Chalk Point operator asked Ryceville\nwhat it was getting for volume received, as he had not had any confirmation on the\nproduct pumped from his station to Ryceville. Ryceville told him the station was working\non it. As a normal check-in, the ST Services Chalk Point operator also called the ST\nServices Piney Point pipeline controller to inform him that he was at the station and that\nthings were going fine.\nThe next Chalk Point tank level measurement was taken at 1220 and reported to\nRyceville and Piney Point. The ST Services Chalk Point operator stood by the Chalk Point\npump starting about 1250 and was prepared to shut it down whenever he received a call\nfrom Ryceville stating that the cleaning pig had arrived. The tank gauge was checked at\nRyceville about 1300, but no information on the volume received was calculated or\nreported to the ST Services Chalk Point operator or the ST Services Piney Point pipeline\ncontroller. The ST Services Ryceville operator went outside to the Ryceville pipe manifold\nabout 1300 to await the cleaning pigís arrival. About 1412, the ST Services Chalk Point\noperator decided to double-check the Chalk Point tank level because the pig had not\narrived at Ryceville.\nAbout 1430, the Chalk Point pump started cavitating8 due to a low-pressure\ncondition at the pump inlet, because the level of product in the tank was not providing\nsufficient pressure for the pump to run properly. About the same time, the ST Services\nRyceville operator noticed that Rycevilleís meter noise suddenly stopped, indicating no\n6 Line balance is the difference between the volume of product pumped at the origin and the volume\nreceived at the destination. It is used for determining whether the pipeline operation is being conducted\nwithin certain limits in order to identify a possible leak.\n7 The ST Services Piney Point shift supervisors served as the pipeline controllers.\n8 Cavitation is an internal pump condition created by the sudden formation and collapse of bubbles in\na liquid, which makes a characteristic sound.\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nFactual Information 7 Pipeline Accident Report\nproduct flow. The ST Services Chalk Point operator kept the pump operating by partially\nclosing the pump outlet valve in an effort to avoid internal damage to the pump.\nThe ST Services Chalk Point operator talked to the ST Services maintenance\nforeman at Ryceville and was told that the meter noise had stopped and no pig had arrived.\nThe ST Services Chalk Point operator was then directed to close the valve as much as\npossible to maintain product flow. The ST Services Chalk Point operator had not taken a\nrecent tank level measurement but was now ordered by the ST Services maintenance\nforeman to determine the Chalk Point tank level. The ST Services Ryceville operator was\nalso directed to measure the Ryceville tank level so that the volume pumped could be\ncompared with the volume received. The ST Services assistant terminal manager was\nnotified about the situation, and he confirmed the need for an immediate tank level\nmeasurement of the pumping and receiving tanks.\nThe ST Services Chalk Point operator and the ST Services assistant terminal\nmanager had a phone conversation about 1440 and reviewed the situation. The ST\nServices assistant terminal manager instructed the ST Services Chalk Point operator to\ndouble-check which valves were closed to confirm that the No. 6 fuel system was isolated\nfrom the flushing oil system.\nTank levels were acquired for Chalk Point and Ryceville. The ST Services\nRyceville operator, using the tank volume tables, calculated that enough oil had been\npumped for the pigs to have reached the Ryceville Station. He said he thought that\nsomething was wrong because Ryceville did not receive all the oil pumped from Chalk\nPoint.\nThe ST Services assistant terminal manager later said that at the time he believed\nthat the tank volume discrepancy had been caused by a valve that was improperly aligned\n(open to another tank) or leaking (product leaking through a valve to another tank) and\nthat flushing oil was being transferred to the No. 6 fuel oil tank. He then directed ST\nServices employees to make a number of checks to confirm that the correct valves were\nopen, to obtain a reading of the No. 6 fuel oil meters at Chalk Point, and to measure the\ntanks at Piney Point. The ST Services assistant terminal manager had the ST Services\nPiney Point pipeline controller perform the line balance calculations, with the result that\n3,088.7 barrels (129,725 gallons) could not be accounted for.\nBy 1534, after receiving the additional information he had requested, the ST\nServices assistant terminal manager stated that the discrepancies could not be explained\nby tank inventory data. He had ruled out the possibility of the missing oil being anywhere\nit should be. During a phone call, the ST Services Chalk Point operator told the ST\nServices assistant terminal manager that the requested check had confirmed the isolation\nof the flushing oil system from the No. 6 fuel oil. The ST Services assistant terminal\nmanager told the ST Services Chalk Point operator to shut the Chalk Point pump down. At\n1538, the ST Services Chalk Point operator shut down the pump. The ST Services\nassistant terminal manager stated that he paged his Pepco pipeline contact, the Pepco\nChalk Point general supervisor for fuel and ash, three times using a ì911 codeî to indicate\nthe urgent need for a response. (See figure 5 for an organizational chart of Pepco\npersonnel involved in the accident.)\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nPEPCO Generation Organization\nVice President\nEnvironmental\nEngineering and\nMaintenance Services\nBulk Power\nManagement\nFuels and Business\nPlanning\nGeneration East-\nCHALK POINT\nGENERATING\nSTATION MANAGER\nDivision Manager\nENGINEERING\nSUPERVISOR\nEnvironmental Services\nManager\nOperations\nFuel and Ash\nSENIOR\nENVIRONMENTAL\nCOORDINATOR\nStation\nEngineering\nMaintenance\nand Planning\nGENERAL SUPERVISOR\nFOR OPERATIONS\nGENERAL SUPERVISOR\nFOR FUEL AND ASH\nENVIRONMENTAL\nCOORDINATOR\n(also QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL)\nCHALK POINT CONTROL ROOM\nOPERATIONS SUPERVISOR\nCHALK POINT SHIFT\nSUPERVISOR\nFigure 5. Selective and simplified organization chart for Pepco Generation Organization, intended only to\nshow the basic organizational relationships between the major positions cited in the accident narrative. Positions\ncited in the narrative are in boldface and all capitals. (Note: This chart was developed by the Safety Board for\ninformational purposes. It is not intended to cover the full range of Pepco Generation Organization positions.)\nFactual Information 8 Pipeline Accident Report\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nFactual Information 9 Pipeline Accident Report\nActions Taken After Pipeline Shutdown\nThe ST Services assistant terminal manager told the ST Services Chalk Point\noperator that he had pumped about 8,900 barrels (373,800 gallons) and that Ryceville had\nreceived about 5,900 barrels (247,800 gallons). The ST Services assistant terminal\nmanager then directed the ST Services Chalk Point operator to check the No. 1 valve pit\narea at Swanson Creek for a leak and to look across the creek at the No. 2 valve pit for\nsigns of a leak. (Valve pit No. 1 is on the north side of Swanson Creek, between the creek\nand the Chalk Point Station.) The ST Services Chalk Point operator also obtained the\nclosing tank level for the Chalk Point flushing oil tank.\nThe ST Services Chalk Point operator made the visual checks by 1545 and\nreported that he saw no sign of an oil leak at the creek. Next, the ST Services Chalk Point\noperator was directed to check all roads that the pipeline crossed back to Ryceville for an\noil leak. He called the Chalk Point Operations Center and stated that he was finished\npumping and that the pigs had not been received at Ryceville, indicating there was a\nproblem with the pipeline. He said he told the Chalk Point Operations Center that he was\nchecking road crossings and would contact the center if he noticed a leak or some other\nproblem.\nAt 1550, the ST Services assistant terminal manager called a Pepco Washington,\nD.C., headquarters oil procurement employee who confirmed the pager number for the\nPepco Chalk Point general supervisor for fuel and ash. The contact also provided the\nPepco engineering supervisorís phone number, because the Pepco engineering supervisor\nmight be able to locate other contacts needed by the ST Services assistant terminal\nmanager.\nThe ST Services assistant terminal manager contacted the Pepco engineering\nsupervisor, who advised him that the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for fuel and\nash was on vacation. The ST Services assistant terminal manager told him the details of\nthe 3,000-barrel line balance discrepancy and was advised to call the Pepco Chalk Point\ngeneral supervisor for operations. The ST Services assistant terminal manager also stated\nthat ST Services personnel were checking the levels of the flushing oil and No. 6 fuel oil\ntanks at Chalk Point, Morgantown, and Piney Point to determine the location of a 3,000-\nbarrel line balance discrepancy. The ST Services assistant terminal manager indicated that\nsimilar discrepancies had occurred in the past due to valve misalignment or valves not\nbeing fully closed, which allowed oil to be inadvertently directed into one of the other oil\nstorage tanks in the system.\nThe Pepco engineering supervisor said that about 1620, he called the Pepco Chalk\nPoint general supervisor for operations and informed him of a 2,000- to 3,000-barrel line\nbalance discrepancy, which the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations noted\nin his log as a discrepancy of 2,000 barrels. The Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for\noperations also noted in his log that ST Services personnel had initiated a ground\ninspection and were checking the pipeline at road crossings. At 1643, the Pepco Chalk\nPoint general supervisor for operations ordered a patrol flight of the pipeline right-of-way.\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nFactual Information 10 Pipeline Accident Report\nResponse to Accident\nNotifying Authorities and Containing Spill\nApril 7. About 1800 or shortly thereafter, the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor\nfor operations called the on-duty Pepco environmental coordinator, who was the\ndesignated Pepco qualified individual,9 at home to discuss the pipeline line balance\nshortage. He told the Pepco qualified individual what was being done at the pipeline,\nincluding the tank level measurement discrepancy found when oil had been pumped back\nto Ryceville. The Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations also said that he\nhad ordered a pipeline patrol flight.\nAt 1802, the ST Services assistant terminal manager learned that during the\npipeline patrol plane flight, an oil release from the Piney Point Oil Pipeline had been\nspotted in the Swanson Creek wetlands area. By 1807, the ST Services assistant terminal\nmanager had put the Chalk Point pipeline emergency response plan into effect by\ncontacting the Pepco qualified individual and an oil spill clean-up contractor. This plan\nlisted the criteria for notification of local response agencies as ìfire, explosion, personal\ninjury or release or significant threat of release off-site.î Local response agencies were not\nnotified. The ST Services assistant terminal manager called Piney Point to summon ST\nServices employees to assist at Chalk Point. (See appendix B for a timeline indicating\nsignificant developments as the leak occurred and was identified.)\nThe Pepco qualified individual called the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for\noperations back and reported that the pipeline patrol flight had found an oil spill. The\nPepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations then notified the Chalk Point control\nroom of the pipeline release.\nThe Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations sent the Pepco Chalk\nPoint shift supervisor to the pipeline crossing at Swanson Creek to assess the situation.\nDuring this period, the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations reviewed the\nthree Pepco spill response plans for the area to ensure that all emergency response\nrequirements were being met.10 Because each plan had a somewhat different purpose and\nfocus and the general supervisor for operations did not know the exact location of the\n(underground) spill, he did not know which plan applied to this accident. Consequently, he\nattempted to notify all response personnel identified in all three plans.\n9 As indicated under 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 194, the qualified individual is a\ncompany representative available on a 24-hour basis with full authority to: activate personnel and contract\nwith required oil spill removal organization(s); activate personnel and equipment maintained by the\noperator; act as liaison with the on-scene coordinator; and obligate funds needed to carry out all required or\ndirected oil response activities.\n10 The three plans were 1) the Pepco Oil Spill Emergency Response Plan for the Ryceville Pumping\nStation and Pipeline, 2) the Pepco Oil Spill Emergency Response Plan for the Chalk Point Generating\nStation, and 3) the Pepco Spill Prevention, Control, and Emergency Response Plan for the Chalk Point\nGenerating Station.\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\nFactual Information 11 Pipeline Accident Report\nAbout 1817, the Pepco Chalk Point shift supervisor called the Pepco Chalk Point\ngeneral supervisor for operations and reported that he would deploy an oil spill boom to\ncontain the oil in Swanson Creek.\nAt 1822, the ST Services assistant terminal manager asked the Pepco Chalk Point\ncontrol room operations supervisor to notify Federal and State agencies about the release,\nas required by the oil spill response plan for the Chalk Point Generating Station. About\n1827, the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations called the headquarters\nPepco senior environmental coordinator at home and discussed the oil spill, so that the\nPepco senior environmental coordinator could notify the National Response Center.11\nBetween 1830 and 1835, the Pepco qualified individual met the Pepco Chalk Point\nshift supervisor (who had been to the leak site) at the Chalk Point plant building and asked\nthe shift supervisor how much oil had spilled. When the Pepco Chalk Point shift\nsupervisor responded that he was not sure, the Pepco qualified individual pressed him for\nsome number because, he said, he believed that he would have to report a spill quantity\nwhen he called the responsible authorities. The Pepco qualified individual stated that,\nwhen pressed, the Pepco Chalk Point shift supervisor said, ì1,000 gallons, 2,000 gallons,\n[expletive] mess; tell them what you want.î\nThey reported together to the office of the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor\nfor operations about 1835, during his continuing telephone conversation with the Pepco\nsenior environmental coordinator. The Pepco qualified individual told the Pepco Chalk\nPoint general supervisor for operations that the estimated size of the spill was 1,000 to\n2,000 gallons. The Pepco senior environmental coordinator later told investigators that\nduring their phone conversation, he and the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for\noperations discussed that the ìbest guessî estimate of the release was 1,000 to\n2,000 gallons. He stated that he and the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for\noperations agreed to report a release of 2,000 gallons to the National Response Center.\nThe Pepco senior environmental coordinator stated that the Pepco Chalk Point general\nsupervisor for operations did not discuss the ST Services tank level readings with him.\nShortly thereafter, the Pepco senior environmental coordinator called the Pepco\nqualified individual for more information about the release. The Pepc","truncated":true,"body_characters":150597}