# Rupture of Piney Point Oil Pipeline and Release of Fuel Oil - **operation:** document - **citation:** DCA00MP006 - **title:** Rupture of Piney Point Oil Pipeline and Release of Fuel Oil - **source type:** incident - **agency:** National Transportation Safety Board - **status:** current - **official:** true - **published on:** 2026-01-30 - **effective on:** 2000-04-07 - **summary:** Accident. in Chalk Point, MD, USA. on 2000-04-07. Potomac Electric Power Company. Rupture - **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-case-dca00mp006.json - **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-case-dca00mp006.md - **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-case-dca00mp006 - **source url:** https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA00MP006.aspx **body:** NTSB investigation DCA00MP006. Event Type: Accident Event Date: 2000-04-07 Event City: Chalk Point Event State Or Region: MD Event Country: USA Pipeline Operator: Potomac Electric Power Company Pipeline Type: Hazardous Liquid - Regulated Accident Type: Rupture Completion Status: Completed Report Number: PAR-02-01 Probable cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the April 7, 2000, Piney Point Oil Pipeline accident at the Potomac Electric Power Company?s Chalk Point, Maryland, generating station was a fracture in a buckle in the pipe that was undiscovered because the data from an in-line inspection tool were interpreted inaccurately as representing a T-piece. Contributing to the magnitude of the fuel oil release were inadequate operating procedures and practices for monitoring the flow of fuel oil through the pipeline to ensure timely leak detection. Tier1Name: System operating Tier2Name: Product leak/release Tier1Name: System operating Tier2Name: Pipe structural malfunction/failure Finding Tier1Name: Organizational Finding Tier2Name: Support/oversight/monitoring Finding Tier3Name: Oversight Finding Modifier Name: Federal agency Finding Report Text: Organizational - Support/oversight/monitoring - Oversight - Federal agency Finding Tier1Name: Organizational Finding Tier2Name: Development Finding Tier3Name: Selection/testing Finding Modifier Name: Inspection organization Finding Report Text: Organizational - Development - Selection/testing - Inspection organization Finding Tier1Name: Pipeline Finding Tier2Name: Pipline systems/equipment Finding Tier3Name: (general) Finding Modifier Name: Inadequate inspection Finding Report Text: Pipeline - Pipline systems/equipment - (general) - Inadequate inspection Finding Tier1Name: Pipeline Finding Tier2Name: Pipeline structure Finding Tier3Name: Pipe Finding Modifier Name: Failure Finding Report Text: Pipeline - Pipeline structure - Pipe - Failure Official NTSB investigation data. NTSB findings determine probable cause and make safety recommendations; they do not adjudicate civil liability or regulatory violations. What Happened On the morning of April 7, 2000, the Piney Point Oil Pipeline system, which was owned by the Potomac Electric Power Company, experienced a pipe failure at the Chalk Point Generating Station in southeastern Prince Georgeís County, Maryland. The release was not discovered and addressed by the contract operating company, Support Terminal Services, Inc., until the late afternoon. Approximately 140,400 gallons of fuel oil were released into the surrounding wetlands and Swanson Creek and, subsequently, the Patuxent River as a result of the accident. No injuries were caused by the accident, which cost approximately $71 million for environmental response and clean-up operations. What We Found We determined that the probable cause of the April 7, 2000, Piney Point Oil Pipeline accident at the Potomac Electric Power Companyís Chalk Point, Maryland, generating station was a fracture in a buckle in the pipe that was undiscovered because the data from an in-line inspection tool were interpreted inaccurately as representing a T-piece. Contributing to the magnitude of the fuel oil release were inadequate operating procedures and practices for monitoring the flow of fuel oil through the pipeline to ensure timely leak detection. This report discusses the following major safety issues: The sufficiency of the evaluation procedures for pipe wrinkles; The efficiency of the leak notification procedures; and, The effectiveness of the incident command. In addition to these issues, our investigation addressed the leak detection procedures used on the Piney Point Oil Pipeline and the analysis of the pipeline in-line inspection results. What We Recommended As a result of this investigation, we made the following new safety recommendations. To the Research and Special Programs Administration: Establish quantitative criteria, based on engineering evaluations, for determining whether a wrinkle may be allowed to remain in a pipeline. (P02-01) Require pipeline owners and operators to provide follow-up telephone updates to the National Response Center when they discover that the information they initially reported contains significant errors or when they identify significant new information directly related to the reporting criteria. (P-02-02) To the Environmental Protection Agency: Require all your regions to integrate the principles contained in the National Response Team's Technical Assistance Document Incident Command System/Unified CommandóManaging Responses to Oil Discharges and Hazardous Substance Releases under the National Contingency Plan in their area contingency plans and require the regions to train all personnel who are assigned responsibility to implement the plans according to those principles. (P-02-03) PAR-02-01 <<>> NTSB/PAR-02/01 PB2002-916501 Pipeline Accident Report Rupture of Piney Point Oil Pipeline and Release of Fuel Oil Near Chalk Point, Maryland April 7, 2000 T R A N F A S E N A T I O N A L P L U R I B U S U N U M E T Y B O R T A T I O N D P R S A O National Transportation Safety Board Washington, D.C. <<>> this page intentionally left blank <<>> Pipeline Accident Report Rupture of Piney Point Oil Pipeline and Release of Fuel Oil Near Chalk Point, Maryland April 7, 2000 NTSB/PAR-02/01 PB2002-916501 National Transportation Safety Board Notation 7285A 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W. Adopted July 23, 2002 Washington, D.C. 20594 <<>> National Transportation Safety Board. 2002. Rupture of Piney Point Oil Pipeline and Release of Fuel Oil Near Chalk Point, Maryland, April 7, 2000. Pipeline Accident Report NTSB/PAR-02/01. Washington, DC. Abstract: On the morning of April 7, 2000, the Piney Point Oil Pipeline system, which was owned by the Potomac Electric Power Company, experienced a pipe failure at the Chalk Point Generating Station in southeastern Prince Georgeís County, Maryland. The release was not discovered and addressed by the contract operating company, Support Terminal Services, Inc., until the late afternoon. Approximately 140,400 gallons of fuel oil were released into the surrounding wetlands and Swanson Creek and, subsequently, the Patuxent River as a result of the accident. No injuries were caused by the accident, which cost approximately $71 million for environmental response and clean-up operations. The safety issues discussed in this report are the sufficiency of the evaluation procedures for pipe wrinkles; the efficiency of the leak notification procedures; and the effectiveness of the incident command. As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issued safety recommendations to the Research and Special Programs Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews. Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at . Other information about available publications also may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting: National Transportation Safety Board Public Inquiries Section, RE-51 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 (800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551 Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To purchase this publication, order report number PB2002-916501 from: National Technical Information Service 5285 Port Royal Road Springfield, Virginia 22161 (800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000 The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. <<>> iii Pipeline Accident Report Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Accident Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Actions Taken After Pipeline Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Response to Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Notifying Authorities and Containing Spill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Response to Escape From Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Personnel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Postaccident Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Piney Point Oil Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Pipeline Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Pipeline Maps and Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Pepco Oil Spill Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Postaccident Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Office of Pipeline Safety Postaccident Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Pipeline Safety Actions Since Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Incident Command System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Postaccident Assessments of Chalk Point Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 November 2000 Safety Board Hearing on Pipeline Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 The Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Pipeline In-line Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Evaluation of Pipe Wrinkles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Leak Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Leak-related Notifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Inaccurate National Response Center Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Limited Involvement of Local Response Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Incident Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 <<>> Contents iv Pipeline Accident Report Appendixes A: Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 B: Initial Incident Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 C: Significant Events From Leak Recognition to Loss of Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 D: Significant Environmental Response and Clean-up Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 <<>> v Pipeline Accident Report Acronyms and Abbreviations API -- American Petroleum Institute CFR -- Code of Federal Regulations EPA -- Environmental Protection Agency Mirant -- Mirant Piney Point, LLP Pepco -- Potomac Electric Power Company RSPA -- Research and Special Programs Administration SCADA -- supervisory control and data acquisition ST Services -- Support Terminal Services, Inc. <<>> vi Pipeline Accident Report Executive Summary On the morning of April 7, 2000, the Piney Point Oil Pipeline system, which was owned by the Potomac Electric Power Company, experienced a pipe failure at the Chalk Point Generating Station in southeastern Prince Georgeís County, Maryland. The release was not discovered and addressed by the contract operating company, Support Terminal Services, Inc., until the late afternoon. Approximately 140,400 gallons of fuel oil were released into the surrounding wetlands and Swanson Creek and, subsequently, the Patuxent River as a result of the accident. No injuries were caused by the accident, which cost approximately $71 million for environmental response and clean-up operations. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the April 7, 2000, Piney Point Oil Pipeline accident at the Potomac Electric Power Companyís Chalk Point, Maryland, generating station was a fracture in a buckle in the pipe that was undiscovered because the data from an in-line inspection tool were interpreted inaccurately as representing a T-piece. Contributing to the magnitude of the fuel oil release were inadequate operating procedures and practices for monitoring the flow of fuel oil through the pipeline to ensure timely leak detection. This report discusses the following major safety issues: ï The sufficiency of the evaluation procedures for pipe wrinkles; ï The efficiency of the leak notification procedures; and, ï The effectiveness of the incident command. In addition to these issues, the Safety Boardís investigation addressed the leak detection procedures used on the Piney Point Oil Pipeline and the analysis of the pipeline in-line inspection results. As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board makes safety recommendations to the Research and Special Programs Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. <<>> 1 Pipeline Accident Report Factual Information Accident Synopsis On the morning of April 7, 2000, the Piney Point Oil Pipeline system, which was owned by the Potomac Electric Power Company (Pepco), experienced a pipe failure at the Chalk Point Generating Station in southeastern Prince Georgeís County, Maryland. (See figure 1 for a map showing the location of the Chalk Point Generating Station and the spill site.) The release was not discovered and addressed by the contract operating company, Support Terminal Services, Inc., (ST Services) until the late afternoon. Approximately 140,400 gallons1 of fuel oil were released into the surrounding wetlands and Swanson Creek and, subsequently, the Patuxent River as a result of the accident. No injuries were caused by the accident, which cost approximately $71 million for environmental response and clean-up operations. The Accident At the time of the accident, Pepco was the owner of the Piney Point Oil Pipeline system. ST Services, a limited partnership of the Kaneb Pipe Line Company, operated the pipeline and performed certain maintenance functions according to the terms of its contract with Pepco.2 The pipeline was used to deliver heated No. 6 fuel oil from Piney Point Terminal, in Maryland, through an intermediate station at Ryceville, Maryland, to Pepcoís power generating stations at either Chalk Point or Morgantown, Maryland. (See figure 2.) On April 7, 2000, a pigging operation was being conducted on the pipeline to prepare the Chalk Point Station to Ryceville Station segment of the pipeline for an in-line inspection. The pipeline from the Chalk Point Station to the Ryceville Station was started in the reverse direction of normal flow with flushing oil3 in the system. (See figure 3 for a schematic of the pipeline.) Employees calculated the amount of oil in the Chalk Point flushing oil tank and the Ryceville receiving tank before the operation began. As the operation proceeded, they obtained tank level data that would typically be used to determine how much oil had been pumped from Chalk Point and how much had been received by Ryceville. 1 Pipeline operators typically quantify their product using barrels rather than gallons. There are 42 gallons in a barrel. 2 In December 2000, Pepco sold some of its facilities, including the Piney Point Oil Pipeline and the Chalk Point Generating Station, to Southern Energy, Inc., of Atlanta, Georgia. Southern Energy later became Mirant Mid-Atlantic of Atlanta, Georgia. Currently, Mirant Piney Point, LLP, (Mirant) is the pipeline owner and operator. 3 Flushing oil is a mixture of No. 2 and No. 6 fuel oil. No. 6 fuel oil is a thick, black petroleum liquid that may become solid at cooler temperatures. No. 2 fuel oil is a light, refined petroleum product similar to diesel fuel. <<>> Factual Information 2 Pipeline Accident Report MARYLAND Rt 301 PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY Oil Spill Site CHARLES COUNTY Swanson Creek PEPCO - Chalk Point Generating Station CALVERT COUNTY Benedict Route 231 ST. MARY'S COUNTY Patuxent River N Major Roads Figure 1. Map of accident site. <<>> Factual Information 3 Pipeline Accident Report Waldorf Oil Spill Site Chalk Point Station 5 301 La Plata 4 Hughesville 231 Morgantown Station Ryceville Station 5 Mechanicsville 301 234 5 235 Newburg Patuxent River 4 301 Wicomico River Potomac River 234 235 Leonardtown 5 PEPCO Piney Point Oil Pipeline Valley Lee Piney Point Station 5 Figure 2. Locations of Piney Point Oil Pipeline Stations. At 0715 eastern daylight time, ST Services employees (see figure 4) at the Chalk Point Station started pumping and launched a cleaning pig. Before this operation began, the estimated tank level that would indicate completion of the pigging process was calculated for Chalk Point. The first pig was initially estimated to arrive at the Ryceville Station 7 hours after it had been launched. Before launching the cleaning pig, the ST Services Chalk Point operator walked through the tank and pipe manifold area and measured the actual level4 of the flushing oil tank. Within 15 to 25 minutes, a sizing pig5 was launched to follow the cleaning pig. The ST Services Chalk Point operator measured the first tank level at 0910. He passed this information on to the crew at Ryceville, who had the tank volume conversion tables that were used to determine the volume in the tank and calculate the oil flow rate. The first tank gauge was read at Ryceville shortly after the crew arrived, about 0837. The 4 An operator obtains precise tank level measurements by climbing to the top of a tank carrying a weighted tape, which is used to determine the liquid level in the tank. 5 The sizing pig was constructed to 90 percent of the pipelineís internal diameter to verify that the pipeline did not have any internal restrictions that could damage or restrict the passage of an ultrasonic inspection tool. <<>> PEPCO - Piney Point Oil Pipeline Flushing Wicomico River Swanson Creek Oil Morgantown Chalk Point Tank 12" Pipeline 12" Pipeline Flushing Oil Tank Fuel Oil Pump Transfer Station Ryceville Transfer Station Fuel Oil Pump Transfer Station Flushing Oil Tank Valve Pit #2 Valve Pit #1 Leak Site #6 Oil Tank #6 Oil Tank 16" Pipeline Legend Water Crossing- nitrogen operated valves Manual isolation Valve Tank Piney Point Transfer Station ST Services Terminal Tank Tank Piney Point Figure 3. Piney Point Pipeline schematic. Factual Information 4 Pipeline Accident Report <<>> ST Services Senior Vice President, Mid-Atlantic Region Director of Operations, East Coast Terminal Manager Administrative ASSISTANT TERMINAL MANAGER Traffic Analyst MAINTENANCE FOREMAN PINEY POINT SHIFT SUPERVISORS (function as PINEY POINT PIPELINE CONTROLLERS) Plant Mechanics (function as CHALK POINT AND RYCEVILLE OPERATORS) Maintenance Workers- Relief Operators Operators (10 positions) Figure 4. Selective organizational chart for ST Services. Positions cited in accident narrative are in boldface and all capitals. (Note: This chart was developed by the Safety Board for informational purposes. It is not intended to cover the full range of ST Services positions.) Factual Information 5 Pipeline Accident Report <<>> Factual Information 6 Pipeline Accident Report ST Services Ryceville operator determined that about 1,500 barrels (63,000 gallons) had been transferred into the Ryceville tank since the pumping started. The ST Services Ryceville operator kept some notes during the pumping but did not record the time and tank level information in the station log. Tank levels were taken at Chalk Point to be used to check the flow rate from the facility at about 2-hour intervals for most of the pumping operation. The ST Services Ryceville operator said he read the tank gauge at Ryceville, the receiving station, about every 1 1/2 hours to determine the volume of product in the Ryceville tank. The operating personnel did not provide tank volumes to the ST Services Chalk Point operator, and they did not calculate the line balance6 periodically during the pigging operation. Further, they did not communicate the tank level information to the ST Services Piney Point pipeline controller7 when it was obtained. At 1119, another tank level measurement was made at Chalk Point, and the ST Services Chalk Point operator passed the information on to the ST Services Ryceville operator. A few minutes before 1200, the ST Services Chalk Point operator told Ryceville that the pumping was going well and that the cleaning pig would arrive early, between 1300 and 1330. At the same time, the ST Services Chalk Point operator asked Ryceville what it was getting for volume received, as he had not had any confirmation on the product pumped from his station to Ryceville. Ryceville told him the station was working on it. As a normal check-in, the ST Services Chalk Point operator also called the ST Services Piney Point pipeline controller to inform him that he was at the station and that things were going fine. The next Chalk Point tank level measurement was taken at 1220 and reported to Ryceville and Piney Point. The ST Services Chalk Point operator stood by the Chalk Point pump starting about 1250 and was prepared to shut it down whenever he received a call from Ryceville stating that the cleaning pig had arrived. The tank gauge was checked at Ryceville about 1300, but no information on the volume received was calculated or reported to the ST Services Chalk Point operator or the ST Services Piney Point pipeline controller. The ST Services Ryceville operator went outside to the Ryceville pipe manifold about 1300 to await the cleaning pigís arrival. About 1412, the ST Services Chalk Point operator decided to double-check the Chalk Point tank level because the pig had not arrived at Ryceville. About 1430, the Chalk Point pump started cavitating8 due to a low-pressure condition at the pump inlet, because the level of product in the tank was not providing sufficient pressure for the pump to run properly. About the same time, the ST Services Ryceville operator noticed that Rycevilleís meter noise suddenly stopped, indicating no 6 Line balance is the difference between the volume of product pumped at the origin and the volume received at the destination. It is used for determining whether the pipeline operation is being conducted within certain limits in order to identify a possible leak. 7 The ST Services Piney Point shift supervisors served as the pipeline controllers. 8 Cavitation is an internal pump condition created by the sudden formation and collapse of bubbles in a liquid, which makes a characteristic sound. <<>> Factual Information 7 Pipeline Accident Report product flow. The ST Services Chalk Point operator kept the pump operating by partially closing the pump outlet valve in an effort to avoid internal damage to the pump. The ST Services Chalk Point operator talked to the ST Services maintenance foreman at Ryceville and was told that the meter noise had stopped and no pig had arrived. The ST Services Chalk Point operator was then directed to close the valve as much as possible to maintain product flow. The ST Services Chalk Point operator had not taken a recent tank level measurement but was now ordered by the ST Services maintenance foreman to determine the Chalk Point tank level. The ST Services Ryceville operator was also directed to measure the Ryceville tank level so that the volume pumped could be compared with the volume received. The ST Services assistant terminal manager was notified about the situation, and he confirmed the need for an immediate tank level measurement of the pumping and receiving tanks. The ST Services Chalk Point operator and the ST Services assistant terminal manager had a phone conversation about 1440 and reviewed the situation. The ST Services assistant terminal manager instructed the ST Services Chalk Point operator to double-check which valves were closed to confirm that the No. 6 fuel system was isolated from the flushing oil system. Tank levels were acquired for Chalk Point and Ryceville. The ST Services Ryceville operator, using the tank volume tables, calculated that enough oil had been pumped for the pigs to have reached the Ryceville Station. He said he thought that something was wrong because Ryceville did not receive all the oil pumped from Chalk Point. The ST Services assistant terminal manager later said that at the time he believed that the tank volume discrepancy had been caused by a valve that was improperly aligned (open to another tank) or leaking (product leaking through a valve to another tank) and that flushing oil was being transferred to the No. 6 fuel oil tank. He then directed ST Services employees to make a number of checks to confirm that the correct valves were open, to obtain a reading of the No. 6 fuel oil meters at Chalk Point, and to measure the tanks at Piney Point. The ST Services assistant terminal manager had the ST Services Piney Point pipeline controller perform the line balance calculations, with the result that 3,088.7 barrels (129,725 gallons) could not be accounted for. By 1534, after receiving the additional information he had requested, the ST Services assistant terminal manager stated that the discrepancies could not be explained by tank inventory data. He had ruled out the possibility of the missing oil being anywhere it should be. During a phone call, the ST Services Chalk Point operator told the ST Services assistant terminal manager that the requested check had confirmed the isolation of the flushing oil system from the No. 6 fuel oil. The ST Services assistant terminal manager told the ST Services Chalk Point operator to shut the Chalk Point pump down. At 1538, the ST Services Chalk Point operator shut down the pump. The ST Services assistant terminal manager stated that he paged his Pepco pipeline contact, the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for fuel and ash, three times using a ì911 codeî to indicate the urgent need for a response. (See figure 5 for an organizational chart of Pepco personnel involved in the accident.) <<>> PEPCO Generation Organization Vice President Environmental Engineering and Maintenance Services Bulk Power Management Fuels and Business Planning Generation East- CHALK POINT GENERATING STATION MANAGER Division Manager ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR Environmental Services Manager Operations Fuel and Ash SENIOR ENVIRONMENTAL COORDINATOR Station Engineering Maintenance and Planning GENERAL SUPERVISOR FOR OPERATIONS GENERAL SUPERVISOR FOR FUEL AND ASH ENVIRONMENTAL COORDINATOR (also QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL) CHALK POINT CONTROL ROOM OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR CHALK POINT SHIFT SUPERVISOR Figure 5. Selective and simplified organization chart for Pepco Generation Organization, intended only to show the basic organizational relationships between the major positions cited in the accident narrative. Positions cited in the narrative are in boldface and all capitals. (Note: This chart was developed by the Safety Board for informational purposes. It is not intended to cover the full range of Pepco Generation Organization positions.) Factual Information 8 Pipeline Accident Report <<>> Factual Information 9 Pipeline Accident Report Actions Taken After Pipeline Shutdown The ST Services assistant terminal manager told the ST Services Chalk Point operator that he had pumped about 8,900 barrels (373,800 gallons) and that Ryceville had received about 5,900 barrels (247,800 gallons). The ST Services assistant terminal manager then directed the ST Services Chalk Point operator to check the No. 1 valve pit area at Swanson Creek for a leak and to look across the creek at the No. 2 valve pit for signs of a leak. (Valve pit No. 1 is on the north side of Swanson Creek, between the creek and the Chalk Point Station.) The ST Services Chalk Point operator also obtained the closing tank level for the Chalk Point flushing oil tank. The ST Services Chalk Point operator made the visual checks by 1545 and reported that he saw no sign of an oil leak at the creek. Next, the ST Services Chalk Point operator was directed to check all roads that the pipeline crossed back to Ryceville for an oil leak. He called the Chalk Point Operations Center and stated that he was finished pumping and that the pigs had not been received at Ryceville, indicating there was a problem with the pipeline. He said he told the Chalk Point Operations Center that he was checking road crossings and would contact the center if he noticed a leak or some other problem. At 1550, the ST Services assistant terminal manager called a Pepco Washington, D.C., headquarters oil procurement employee who confirmed the pager number for the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for fuel and ash. The contact also provided the Pepco engineering supervisorís phone number, because the Pepco engineering supervisor might be able to locate other contacts needed by the ST Services assistant terminal manager. The ST Services assistant terminal manager contacted the Pepco engineering supervisor, who advised him that the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for fuel and ash was on vacation. The ST Services assistant terminal manager told him the details of the 3,000-barrel line balance discrepancy and was advised to call the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations. The ST Services assistant terminal manager also stated that ST Services personnel were checking the levels of the flushing oil and No. 6 fuel oil tanks at Chalk Point, Morgantown, and Piney Point to determine the location of a 3,000- barrel line balance discrepancy. The ST Services assistant terminal manager indicated that similar discrepancies had occurred in the past due to valve misalignment or valves not being fully closed, which allowed oil to be inadvertently directed into one of the other oil storage tanks in the system. The Pepco engineering supervisor said that about 1620, he called the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations and informed him of a 2,000- to 3,000-barrel line balance discrepancy, which the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations noted in his log as a discrepancy of 2,000 barrels. The Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations also noted in his log that ST Services personnel had initiated a ground inspection and were checking the pipeline at road crossings. At 1643, the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations ordered a patrol flight of the pipeline right-of-way. <<>> Factual Information 10 Pipeline Accident Report Response to Accident Notifying Authorities and Containing Spill April 7. About 1800 or shortly thereafter, the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations called the on-duty Pepco environmental coordinator, who was the designated Pepco qualified individual,9 at home to discuss the pipeline line balance shortage. He told the Pepco qualified individual what was being done at the pipeline, including the tank level measurement discrepancy found when oil had been pumped back to Ryceville. The Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations also said that he had ordered a pipeline patrol flight. At 1802, the ST Services assistant terminal manager learned that during the pipeline patrol plane flight, an oil release from the Piney Point Oil Pipeline had been spotted in the Swanson Creek wetlands area. By 1807, the ST Services assistant terminal manager had put the Chalk Point pipeline emergency response plan into effect by contacting the Pepco qualified individual and an oil spill clean-up contractor. This plan listed the criteria for notification of local response agencies as ìfire, explosion, personal injury or release or significant threat of release off-site.î Local response agencies were not notified. The ST Services assistant terminal manager called Piney Point to summon ST Services employees to assist at Chalk Point. (See appendix B for a timeline indicating significant developments as the leak occurred and was identified.) The Pepco qualified individual called the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations back and reported that the pipeline patrol flight had found an oil spill. The Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations then notified the Chalk Point control room of the pipeline release. The Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations sent the Pepco Chalk Point shift supervisor to the pipeline crossing at Swanson Creek to assess the situation. During this period, the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations reviewed the three Pepco spill response plans for the area to ensure that all emergency response requirements were being met.10 Because each plan had a somewhat different purpose and focus and the general supervisor for operations did not know the exact location of the (underground) spill, he did not know which plan applied to this accident. Consequently, he attempted to notify all response personnel identified in all three plans. 9 As indicated under 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 194, the qualified individual is a company representative available on a 24-hour basis with full authority to: activate personnel and contract with required oil spill removal organization(s); activate personnel and equipment maintained by the operator; act as liaison with the on-scene coordinator; and obligate funds needed to carry out all required or directed oil response activities. 10 The three plans were 1) the Pepco Oil Spill Emergency Response Plan for the Ryceville Pumping Station and Pipeline, 2) the Pepco Oil Spill Emergency Response Plan for the Chalk Point Generating Station, and 3) the Pepco Spill Prevention, Control, and Emergency Response Plan for the Chalk Point Generating Station. <<>> Factual Information 11 Pipeline Accident Report About 1817, the Pepco Chalk Point shift supervisor called the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations and reported that he would deploy an oil spill boom to contain the oil in Swanson Creek. At 1822, the ST Services assistant terminal manager asked the Pepco Chalk Point control room operations supervisor to notify Federal and State agencies about the release, as required by the oil spill response plan for the Chalk Point Generating Station. About 1827, the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations called the headquarters Pepco senior environmental coordinator at home and discussed the oil spill, so that the Pepco senior environmental coordinator could notify the National Response Center.11 Between 1830 and 1835, the Pepco qualified individual met the Pepco Chalk Point shift supervisor (who had been to the leak site) at the Chalk Point plant building and asked the shift supervisor how much oil had spilled. When the Pepco Chalk Point shift supervisor responded that he was not sure, the Pepco qualified individual pressed him for some number because, he said, he believed that he would have to report a spill quantity when he called the responsible authorities. The Pepco qualified individual stated that, when pressed, the Pepco Chalk Point shift supervisor said, ì1,000 gallons, 2,000 gallons, [expletive] mess; tell them what you want.î They reported together to the office of the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations about 1835, during his continuing telephone conversation with the Pepco senior environmental coordinator. The Pepco qualified individual told the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations that the estimated size of the spill was 1,000 to 2,000 gallons. The Pepco senior environmental coordinator later told investigators that during their phone conversation, he and the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations discussed that the ìbest guessî estimate of the release was 1,000 to 2,000 gallons. He stated that he and the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations agreed to report a release of 2,000 gallons to the National Response Center. The Pepco senior environmental coordinator stated that the Pepco Chalk Point general supervisor for operations did not discuss the ST Services tank level readings with him. Shortly thereafter, the Pepco senior environmental coordinator called the Pepco qualified individual for more information about the release. The Pepc - **truncated:** true - **body characters:** 150597