# Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire - **operation:** document - **citation:** DCA00MP009 - **title:** Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire - **source type:** incident - **agency:** National Transportation Safety Board - **status:** current - **official:** true - **published on:** 2026-01-30 - **effective on:** 2000-08-19 - **summary:** Accident. in Pecos, NM, USA. on 2000-08-19. El Paso Natural Gas Company. Rupture/fire - **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-case-dca00mp009.json - **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-case-dca00mp009.md - **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-case-dca00mp009 - **source url:** https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA00MP009.aspx **body:** NTSB investigation DCA00MP009. Event Type: Accident Event Date: 2000-08-19 Event City: Pecos Event State Or Region: NM Event Country: USA Pipeline Operator: El Paso Natural Gas Company Pipeline Type: Gas Transmission - Regulated Accident Type: Rupture/fire Completion Status: Completed Report Number: PAR-03-01 Probable cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the August 19, 2000, natural gas pipeline rupture and subsequent fire near Carlsbad, New Mexico, was a significant reduction in pipe wall thickness due to severe internal corrosion. The severe corrosion had occurred because El Paso Natural Gas Company’s corrosion control program failed to prevent, detect, or control internal corrosion within the company’s pipeline. Contributing to the accident were ineffective Federal preaccident inspections of El Paso Natural Gas Company that did not identify deficiencies in the company’s internal corrosion control program. Tier1Name: System operating Tier2Name: Fire/explosion (post-release) Tier1Name: System operating Tier2Name: Pipe structural malfunction/failure Finding Tier1Name: Organizational Finding Tier2Name: Support/oversight/monitoring Finding Tier3Name: Oversight Finding Modifier Name: Federal agency Finding Report Text: Organizational - Support/oversight/monitoring - Oversight - Federal agency Finding Tier1Name: Organizational Finding Tier2Name: Support/oversight/monitoring Finding Tier3Name: Oversight Finding Modifier Name: Other institution/organization Finding Report Text: Organizational - Support/oversight/monitoring - Oversight - Other institution/organization Finding Tier1Name: Pipeline Finding Tier2Name: Pipeline structure Finding Tier3Name: Pipe Finding Modifier Name: Fatigue/wear/corrosion Finding Report Text: Pipeline - Pipeline structure - Pipe - Fatigue/wear/corrosion Official NTSB investigation data. NTSB findings determine probable cause and make safety recommendations; they do not adjudicate civil liability or regulatory violations. What Happened At 5:26 a.m., mountain daylight time, on Saturday, August 19, 2000, a 30-inch diameter natural gas transmission pipeline operated by El Paso Natural Gas Company ruptured adjacent to the Pecos River near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The released gas ignited and burned for 55 minutes. Twelve persons who were camping under a concrete-decked steel bridge that supported the pipeline across the river were killed and their three vehicles destroyed. Two nearby steel suspension bridges for gas pipelines crossing the river were extensively damaged. According to El Paso Natural Gas Company, property and other damages or losses totaled $998,296. What We Found We determined that the probable cause of the August 19, 2000, natural gas pipeline rupture and subsequent fire near Carlsbad, New Mexico, was a significant reduction in pipe wall thickness due to severe internal corrosion. The severe corrosion had occurred because El Paso Natural Gas Company's corrosion control program failed to prevent, detect, or control internal corrosion within the companyís pipeline. Contributing to the accident were ineffective Federal preaccident inspections of El Paso Natural Gas Company that did not identify deficiencies in the companyís internal corrosion control program. The major safety issues identified in this investigation are as follows: The design and construction of the pipeline, The adequacy of El Paso Natural Gas Companyís internal corrosion control program, The adequacy of Federal safety regulations for natural gas pipelines, and The adequacy of Federal oversight of the pipeline operator What We Recommended As a result of this investigation, we made the following new safety recommendations. To the Research and Special Programs Administration: Revise 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 192 to require that new or replaced pipelines be designed and constructed with features to mitigate internal corrosion. At a minimum, such pipelines should (1) be configured to reduce the opportunity for liquids to accumulate, (2) be equipped with effective liquid removal features, and (3) be able to accommodate corrosion monitoring devices at locations with the greatest potential for internal corrosion. (P-03-1) Develop the requirements necessary to ensure that pipeline operators' internal corrosion control programs address the role of water and other contaminants in the corrosion process. (P-03-2) Evaluate the Office of Pipeline Safetyís pipeline operator inspection program to identify deficiencies that resulted in the failure of inspectors, before the Carlsbad, New Mexico, accident, to identify the inadequacies in El Paso Natural Gas Companyís internal corrosion control program. Implement the changes necessary to ensure adequate assessments of pipeline operator safety programs. (P-03-3) To NACE International: Establish an accelerated schedule for completion of an industry standard for the control of internal corrosion in steel pipelines that will replace or update NACE standard RP0175-75. (P-03-4). PAR-03-01 <<>> NTSB/PAR-03/01 PB2003-916501 Pipeline Accident Report Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire Near Carlsbad, New Mexico August 19, 2000 T R A N F A S E N A T I O N A L P L U R I B U S U N U M E T Y B O R T A T I O N D P R S A O National Transportation Safety Board Washington, D.C. <<>> this page intentionally left blank <<>> Pipeline Accident Report Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire Near Carlsbad, New Mexico August 19, 2000 NTSB/PAR-03/01 PB2003-916501 National Transportation Safety Board Notation 7310B 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W. Adopted February 11, 2003 Washington, D.C. 20594 <<>> National Transportation Safety Board. 2003. Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire Near Carlsbad, New Mexico, August 19, 2000. Pipeline Accident Report NTSB/PAR-03/01. Washington, D.C. Abstract: At 5:26 a.m., mountain daylight time, on Saturday, August 19, 2000, a 30-inch-diameter natural gas transmission pipeline operated by El Paso Natural Gas Company ruptured adjacent to the Pecos River near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The released gas ignited and burned for 55 minutes. Twelve persons who were camping under a concrete-decked steel bridge that supported the pipeline across the river were killed and their three vehicles destroyed. Two nearby steel suspension bridges for gas pipelines crossing the river were extensively damaged. According to El Paso Natural Gas Company, property and other damages or losses totaled $998,296. The major safety issues identified in this investigation are the design and construction of the pipeline, the adequacy of El Paso Natural Gas Companyís internal corrosion control program, the adequacy of Federal safety regulations for natural gas pipelines, and the adequacy of Federal oversight of the pipeline operator. As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes safety recommendations to the Research and Special Programs Administration and NACE International. The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews. Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at . Other information about available publications also may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting: National Transportation Safety Board Public Inquiries Section, RE-51 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 (800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551 Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To purchase this publication, order report number PB2003-916501 from: National Technical Information Service 5285 Port Royal Road Springfield, Virginia 22161 (800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000 The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. <<>> iii Pipeline Accident Report Contents Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Accident Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Pipeline Operations After the Rupture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Postaccident On-Site Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Toxicological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Metallurgical Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Corrosion Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Pipeline 1103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Pipeline Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Gas Suppliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Pigging Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Tests and Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 EPNGís Internal Corrosion Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Internal Corrosion Control Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Internal Audit Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Regulatory Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Federal Safety Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Preaccident Federal Inspections of EPNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Federal Safety Standards and EnforcementÊMaps and Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Postaccident Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Pipeline Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Pipeline Integrity Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Federal Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Pipeline Integrity ManagementÊFederal Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 NACE Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 ASME Code for Gas Piping (B31.8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Guide for Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Previous EPNG Internal Corrosion Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Emergency Training and Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Internal Corrosion in Steel Gas Pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Internal Corrosion in Line 1103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Physical Features of Line 1103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 EPNG Internal Corrosion Control Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 <<>> Contents iv Pipeline Accident Report Federal Safety Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Federal Oversight of the Pipeline Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Industry Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Appendixes A: Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 B: Summary of Office of Pipeline Safety Corrective Action Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 C: Research and Special Programs Administration Advisory Bulletin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 <<>> v Pipeline Accident Report Executive Summary At 5:26 a.m., mountain daylight time, on Saturday, August 19, 2000, a 30-inch- diameter natural gas transmission pipeline operated by El Paso Natural Gas Company ruptured adjacent to the Pecos River near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The released gas ignited and burned for 55 minutes. Twelve persons who were camping under a concrete-decked steel bridge that supported the pipeline across the river were killed and their three vehicles destroyed. Two nearby steel suspension bridges for gas pipelines crossing the river were extensively damaged. According to El Paso Natural Gas Company, property and other damages or losses totaled $998,296. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the August 19, 2000, natural gas pipeline rupture and subsequent fire near Carlsbad, New Mexico, was a significant reduction in pipe wall thickness due to severe internal corrosion. The severe corrosion had occurred because El Paso Natural Gas Companyís corrosion control program failed to prevent, detect, or control internal corrosion within the companyís pipeline. Contributing to the accident were ineffective Federal preaccident inspections of El Paso Natural Gas Company that did not identify deficiencies in the companyís internal corrosion control program. The major safety issues identified in this investigation are as follows: ï The design and construction of the pipeline, ï The adequacy of El Paso Natural Gas Companyís internal corrosion control program, ï The adequacy of Federal safety regulations for natural gas pipelines, and ï The adequacy of Federal oversight of the pipeline operator. As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes safety recommendations to the Research and Special Programs Administration and NACE International. <<>> this page intentionally left blank <<>> 1 Pipeline Accident Report Factual Information Accident Synopsis At 5:26 a.m., mountain daylight time, on Saturday, August 19, 2000, a 30-inch- diameter natural gas transmission pipeline operated by El Paso Natural Gas Company (EPNG) ruptured adjacent to the Pecos River near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The released gas ignited and burned for 55 minutes. Twelve persons who were camping under a concrete-decked steel bridge that supported the pipeline across the river were killed and their three vehicles destroyed. Two nearby steel suspension bridges for gas pipelines crossing the river were extensively damaged. According to EPNG, property and other damages or losses totaled $998,296. Accident Narrative The EPNG pipeline system (figure 1) transported gas west from Texas and New Mexico to Arizona and California. A portion of the pipeline system crossed the Pecos River about 4 1/2 miles north of the Texas-New Mexico State line and 30 miles south of Carlsbad, New Mexico. (See figure 2.) About 1 mile west of the river crossing was the Pecos River compressor station, which received gas from four natural gas transmission pipelines26-inch-diameter line 1100, 30-inch-diameter line 1103, 30-inch-diameter line 1110, and 16-inch-diameter line 3191. Three of these lines (1100, 1103, and 1110) ran parallel to Whitethorn Road (also known as Pipeline Road) from the Pecos River to the Pecos River compressor station. Lines 1103 and 1110 were supported at the river crossing by a one-lane concrete-decked steel service bridge that was not open to the public. (See figure 3.) (This bridge, which had been built by EPNG in 1950, also supported a water pipeline and a gas gathering pipeline. EPNG, which was at the time of the accident a subsidiary of El Paso Energy, owned and operated the water pipeline but not the gas gathering pipeline.) Line 1100 was supported across the river on a pipeline suspension bridge approximately 70 feet northeast of the service bridge. Another EPNG pipeline, 16- inch-diameter line 1000, was supported by a separate suspension bridge in this area, but this line had been removed from service and was filled with nitrogen at the time of the accident. The fourth pipeline, line 3191, ran from EPNGís South Carlsbad compressor station to the Pecos River compressor station. <<>> Factual Information 2 Pipeline Accident Report Figure 1. El Paso Natural Gas system. Figure 2. Accident area. <<>> Factual Information 3 Pipeline Accident Report Figure 3. Accident site. At the time of the accident, 12 members of an extended family were camping on the east bank of the Pecos River near the service bridge.1 (See figure 4.) A locked wire rope and a ìPrivate Right of WayNo Trespassingî sign at each entrance to the bridge restricted access to the bridge above the campsite. Two ìCautionHigh Pressure Gas Lineî signs were posted near the east entrance to the service bridge. Also, a sign reading as follows: Warning - No Trespassing - This road and right of way is private property and is not for public use. This pipeline carries natural gas under high pressure and is dangerous. All persons are warned of the danger to person and property. KEEP OFF had been posted alongside the right-of-way road (near the intersection with the county road) leading past the block valves and pig receivers to the service bridge on the east side of the river.The pipeline system was operated from EPNGís gas control center in El Paso, Texas, as a north system and a south system. The gas control center was equipped with three supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)2 system work consoles, each of which was capable of displaying data for both pipeline systems. On the morning of August 19, 2000, three EPNG employees, a coordinator of pipeline control (who was in charge of the shift) and two gas controllers, were nearing the 1 At the time of the accident, a private landowner owned the accident site. After the accident, EPNG purchased this property and installed fencing to restrict access to the area. 2 Pipeline controllers use a computer-based SCADA system to remotely monitor and control movement of gas through pipelines. The system makes it possible to monitor operating parameters critical to pipeline operations, such as flow rates, pressures, equipment status, control valve positions, and alarms indicating abnormal conditions. <<>> Factual Information 4 Pipeline Accident Report Figure 4. Aerial view of accident site looking east. end of their 12-hour shifts at the gas control center. One of the controllers was operating the north system and the other the south, while the coordinator assisted the two controllers and performed administrative oversight and served as a backup controller when needed. The two controllers were working at separate SCADA terminals to monitor and control pipeline operations. The employees said they had noted no unusual operating conditions during their shift, and no unusual conditions had been noted during the previous 12-hour shift. The south system controller, at 5:26 a.m.,3 received SCADA rate-of-change4 alarms for the speed of compressor unit No. 3 at the Pecos River compressor station.5 Less than a minute later, compressor unit No. 1 at the station shut down, quickly followed by the automatic closing and opening of station valves, as appropriate, to isolate the compressor station from the pipeline. Emergency lubricating oil pumps were also automatically activated at the station. A few seconds later, additional alarms from the station displayed on the controllerís monitor, including a rate-of-change alarm for falling 3 Times in this section are based on SCADA event data recorder records, controller logs, and personnel statements and interviews. 4 Rate-of-change alarms indicate that a measured variable, such as compressor speed or compressor suction pressure, is increasing or decreasing at a rate exceeding what would be expected under normal operating conditions. 5 The unattended Pecos River compressor station had three turbine compressors. <<>> Factual Information 5 Pipeline Accident Report suction (inlet) pressure at the station. (Unknown to the controller at the time, pressure on the inlet side of the station dropped because pipeline 1103 had ruptured near the river crossing.) Noting the alarms, the south controller began to request SCADA data for the Pecos River compressor station instead of waiting for the data to appear from the automatic data scans, which occurred at 4-minute intervals.6 At about this time, the transmission of SCADA data between the gas control center and the Pecos River compressor station was briefly interrupted. According to the south controller, he was immediately alerted to the data interruption by the display of inverse video on his SCADA monitor. Inverse video indicated that a proper reply to a request for data from the SCADA system had not been received and that the displayed data were not being updated. Although not recorded in the SCADA system event log, this interruption lasted about 30 seconds. At approximately 5:30 a.m., the controller telephoned the Pecos River district station lead operations specialist7 at home and asked him to send people to the Pecos River compressor station. The south controller later stated: I noted that we did have a low suction pressure, and generally when our plants go down, the suction pressure goes up instead of down. I told [the station lead operations specialist], ëWe need to get somebody out there right away because I think we have a problem.í The station lead operations specialist called two operations specialists that he supervised and who were on duty and told them to go to the Pecos River compressor station. About the same time the station lead operations specialist was making this call, an EPNG operations specialist from the Carlsbad complex, who was at his home south of the city of Carlsbad, noticed a glow in the sky to the south. (See figure 5.) He said he immediately suspected that an EPNG pipeline may be involved. He called the gas control center and asked if its personnel had noticed any sudden pressure changes at the Pecos River compressor station. He told center personnel of the glow in the sky and said that he suspected a rupture. The north controller informed him that EPNG had lost a compressor at the Pecos River compressor station. The operations specialist then telephoned his supervisor (the pipeline lead operations specialist), and informed him of the glow in the sky and of his call to the gas control center. He then told the pipeline lead operations specialist that he was on his way to the Pecos River compressor station. 6 This SCADA system logged operational data and transferred it to the gas control center via modem. 7 EPNG had two employees in the Pecos River district with the official title ìlead operations specialist.î One lead operations specialist supervised operations specialists responsible for operating and maintaining compressor and meter stations. Another lead operations specialist supervised operations specialists responsible for operating and maintaining pipelines. This report refers to the two employees, respectively, as the station lead operations specialist and the pipeline lead operations specialist. <<>> Factual Information 6 Pipeline Accident Report Figure 5. Post-rupture fire. At lower left of fireball can be seen the 85-foot-tall support structures for the pipeline suspension bridges. At 5:31 a.m., the gas control center in El Paso again experienced an interruption in SCADA data transmission from the Pecos River compressor station, which prevented the controllerís receiving any additional information from the station. The interruption occurred when the emergency shutdown system at the Pecos River compressor station activated, which caused a loss of power to the local SCADA computer and modem. The station was equipped with an uninterruptible power supply, but the station SCADA computer and modem were not connected to it.8 SCADA communications with the Pecos River compressor station were restored at 9:04 a.m. on August 19. At 5:35 a.m., the south controller again telephoned the station lead operations specialist at home and told him that he suspected a possible line blowout. At this time, the south controller did not know which pipeline was involved. The station lead operations specialist said that after looking out a window of his home in the direction of the Pecos River compressor station, he told the south controller that he could see a fire and that he was on his way to the Pecos River compressor station. 8 The station was equipped with an uninterruptible power supply to maintain AC power to the station computer and hazardous gas and fire detection equipment. A 24-volt DC backup system maintained power to oil pumps, nozzle cooling water equipment, and other emergency equipment in the event of a station power failure. <<>> Factual Information 7 Pipeline Accident Report At 5:44 a.m., the south controller called the Keystone compressor station9 and asked the operator to take down three compressor units. About a minute later, he called the Eunice plant10 and made the same request. At 5:50 a.m., the south controller called El Paso Field Services to make sure that personnel there would shut down all compressor units at the South Carlsbad compressor station.11 The south controllerís shift ended at 6:00 a.m., but he stayed at the gas control center until 8:00 a.m. to provide assistance as necessary. During this time, he notified the El Paso Energy public relations department in Houston, Texas.12 Emergency Response Within 5 minutes of the rupture, at 5:31 a.m., the local 911 operator received numerous calls from residents reporting a fire and the sound of an explosion. An off-duty EPNG employee who lived near the site also called 911 and reported the fire. The gas control center was called by an off-duty operations specialist when he saw light in the sky from the fire, and he also called the pipeline lead operations specialist for the local section of the pipeline. That pipeline lead operations specialist was the first to arrive at the accident site, at about 5:45 a.m. He said that while he was en route, he had spoken with the gas control center and the EPNG general dispatcher from his truck and had asked the control center to call managers for the Jal and Carlsbad complexes. He recalled that as he neared the Pecos River compressor station, the fire was so bright that he had trouble seeing the road. He then went to the pipeline on the west side of the Pecos River compressor station and began closing valves that were downstream from the fire. As he closed block (shutoff) valve No. 6 3/4 on line 1100, the operations specialist who had telephoned him earlier arrived, and the two men closed block valves No. 6 3/4 on lines 1103 and 1110. They also closed the pig launcher valves on these pipelines.13 The pipeline lead operations specialist and the operations specialist then drove their trucks to the west side of the service bridge and viewed the fire across the river, but 9 The Keystone compressor station, an attended station about 57 miles east and upstream of the Pecos River compressor station, supplied gas to the Pecos River compressor station through lines 1103 and 1110. 10 The Eunice plant, an attended station about 53 miles northeast and upstream of the Pecos River River station, supplied gas to the Pecos River compressor station through line 1100. 11 The South Carlsbad compressor station, an attended station about 25 miles north and upstream of the Pecos station, supplied gas to the Pecos River compressor station through line 3191. 12 Notifying the public relations department, which was responsible for responding to inquiries regarding events involving the company, was part of EPNGís emergency response procedures. 13 Pig refers to any of a variety of mechanical devices that can be introduced into a pipeline system either to clean the pipeline or, through use of various detection technologies, to identify possible pipeline defects. Pig launchers and pig receivers in lines 1100, 1103, and 1110 at the time of the accident were used only for cleaning pigs. <<>> Factual Information 8 Pipeline Accident Report they could not determine which line had ruptured. The pipeline lead operations specialist said he then told the operations specialist to go around to the other side of the river and attempt to determine which line had failed. The operations specialist said he drove across the river at the low-water crossing and viewed the scene, but because of the proximity of the lines to one another and the fire, he could not determine which line had ruptured. The operations specialist said that as he was returning to where he left the pipeline lead operations specialist, he thought he may have seen vehicles in the fire area just south of the bridge. He continued back across the river to assist the pipeline lead operations specialist and also told him about the possibility of vehicles in the fire area. The pipeline lead operations specialist said he told the operations specialist that they had to get the fire contained and that until that time, there was nothing they could do. Both employees knew community emergency responders were waiting at the entrance of the compressor station. The two men then drove toward the low-water crossing, proceeding down the right-of-way road toward the fire. The pipeline lead operations specialist later recalled that when they arrived at the location where they were going to try to close the block valves upstream of the fire, he carefully opened the door of his truck to confirm that he could tolerate the heat. About 6:05 a.m., the two employees left their vehicles and proceeded to the block valves. The pipeline lead operations specialist closed the No. 5 valve on line 1100, but closing this valve did not reduce the intensity of the fire. Together they closed block valve No. 6 on line 1103, and the operations specialist closed block valve No. 6 on line 1110. The fireís intensity was noticeably reduced after valve No. 6 on line 1103 was closed, but the fire continued to burn at the lowered intensity. The pipeline lead operations specialist told the operations specialist to check the bypass valve on the pig receiver14 on line 1103 and after it was closed, the fire subsided altogether over a period of several minutes. At about 6:21 a.m., the pipeline lead operations specialist called the gas control center and reported the status of the valves and that the fire was out. The pipeline lead operations specialist then told the operations specialist to go back to the west side of the river and prevent traffic from entering the area. The operations specialist said that as he passed where he thought he may have seen the vehicles during the fire, he now clearly saw burned pickup trucks. He stopped and called the pipeline lead operations specialist to tell him there were casualties. The pipeline lead operations specialist then notified his supervisor and told him to call for more ambulances. The operations specialist took a first-aid kit from his truck and started down on foot to check on survivors. At this time, the station lead operations specialist pulled up behind his truck. He knew where the operations specialist was because he had been monitoring radio traffic. After the two men discussed the situation, the operations specialist went to assist the victims while the station lead operations specialist drove back to where he knew fire and emergency medical personnel were waiting. He then led an ambulance to the fire area. The pipeline lead operations specialist said he drove to the 14 The pig receiver is an arrangement of pipe and valves connected to the pipeline that allows a pig to be removed from the pipeline. <<>> Factual Information 9 Pipeline Accident Report location of the No. 6 3/4 block valves and, with the assistance of two other EPNG employees, closed a valve that double-blocked line 1110 (to prevent gas from entering the station in case one of the block valves on the line was leaking). The station pipeline specialist had been called by the gas control center as soon as the Pecos River compressor station shut down at about 5:30 a.m. to determine if the problem was at the station. When he arrived at the entrance road to the compressor station off Whitethorn Road at about 6:10 a.m., he met the two operations specialists he had telephoned earlier and saw the Loving Fire Department vehicles on Whitethorn Road at the entrance driveway to the compressor station. He turned into the entrance road, entered the compressor station, and went to the control room to inspect the equipment. He said he knew that power was off at the station because no lights were available in the control room. He said that the automatic emergency shutdown system had vented gas from the station, shut off electrical service, and started the battery-powered cool-down pumps on the compressors. He and the two operations specialists then crossed the road to the 3191 block valve for the South Carlsbad line. This valve was just outside the east fence of the compressor station where line 3191 connects to lines 1103 and 1110. They finished closing the block valve at about 6:16 a.m., thereby isolating the South Carlsbad compressor station from the Pecos River station and from lines 1103 and 1110. The station lead operations specialist telephoned the gas control center and informed personnel there that the valve was closed and that the South Carlsbad compressor station should be taken off line. The station lead operations specialist sent the other two employees back to Whitethorn Road to help with crowd control as needed. At about 5:51, the first emergency responders arrived on scene and staged on Whitethorn Road where the driveway into the Pecos River compressor station intersects the road. Additional emergency responders also staged at this location, which is about 3/4 mile from the accident site. The Carlsbad Fire Departmentís medic units had responded to the initial call and proceeded as far as the Pecos River compressor station. They remained there until an ambulance was directed to the victims and EPNG employees admitted the smaller fire vehicles.15 When one of the fire engines entered the unpaved road from the west during the fire before the No. 6 block valves were closed, the station lead pipeline operations specialist stopped them from going farther. He told fireman to stand by while he shut more valves. As police cars arrived at that location, he told them to go back to the railroad tracks and let only EPNG vehicles or vehicles with flashing red lights through. Emergency vehicles were admitted as needed to the accident scene after the fire at the ruptured line was out. The victims were camped about 675 feet from the crater, between the crater and the river. Emergency personnel located victims with the assistance of the operations specialist. Six victims were found at the camping area; six others had gone into the river and were either in the river or had been assisted to the banks by the operations specialist. Paramedics and emergency medical technicians worked to treat the injuries. Volunteer 15 The station lead operations specialist was concerned that the larger fire fighting equipment would become stuck on the sandy access road. <<>> Factual Information 10 Pipeline Accident Report firefighters and the crews of Carlsbad medic units then evacuated the six victims to hospital burn centers in Texas. None of the victims survived. The New Mexico State Police responded to the accident and assumed responsibility for emergency management of the incident. Police personnel also provided support to Safety Board personnel during the on-scene investigation. EPNG reported the accident to the National Response Center at 8:27 a.m. Pipeline Operations After the Rupture EPNG gas controllers called gas suppliers to inform them of the problem and to request that gas supplies into the affected part of the EPNG system be reduced or suspended due to the incident and the - **truncated:** true - **body characters:** 163805