# TransCanada Corporation Pipeline (Keystone Pipeline) Rupture

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** PLD18LR001
- **title:** TransCanada Corporation Pipeline (Keystone Pipeline) Rupture
- **source type:** incident
- **agency:** National Transportation Safety Board
- **status:** current
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2021-05-18
- **effective on:** 2017-11-16
- **summary:** Accident. in Amherst, SD, USA. on 2017-11-16. Keystone Pipeline. Rupture
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- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-case-pld18lr001
- **source url:** https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD18LR001.aspx
**body:**

NTSB investigation PLD18LR001.

Event Type: Accident

Event Date: 2017-11-16

Event City: Amherst

Event State Or Region: SD

Event Country: USA

Pipeline Operator: Keystone Pipeline

Pipeline Type: Hazardous Liquid - Regulated

Accident Type: Rupture

Completion Status: Completed

Report Number: PAB1801

Report Date: 2018-07-05

Probable cause: The NTSB determines that the probable cause of the failure of the Keystone Pipeline was a fatigue crack, likely originating from mechanical damage to the pipe exterior by a metal-tracked vehicle during pipeline installation, that grew and extended in-service to a critical size, resulting in the rupture of the pipeline.

Tier1Name: Pigging

Tier2Name: Pressure/flow/temp event

Tier1Name: System operating, changing flow/pressure

Tier2Name: Pipe structural malfunction/failure

Tier1Name: System operating

Tier2Name: Pressure/flow/temp event

Tier1Name: System shutdown

Tier2Name: Emergency shutoff

Tier1Name: Emergency response

Tier2Name: Emergency response

Tier1Name: System operating

Tier2Name: Product leak/release

Tier1Name: System operating

Tier2Name: Inspection event

Tier1Name: System not operating

Tier2Name: External/third-party damage

Finding Tier1Name: Personnel

Finding Tier2Name: Action/decision

Finding Tier3Name: Action

Finding Modifier Name: Other/unknown

Finding Report Text: Personnel - Action/decision - Action - Other/unknown

Finding Tier1Name: Pipeline

Finding Tier2Name: Pipeline handling/service

Finding Tier3Name: Maintenance/inspection

Finding Modifier Name: Not inspected

Finding Report Text: Pipeline - Pipeline handling/service - Maintenance/inspection - Not inspected

Finding Tier1Name: Pipeline

Finding Tier2Name: Pipeline structure

Finding Tier3Name: Pipe

Finding Modifier Name: Fatigue/wear/corrosion

Finding Report Text: Pipeline - Pipeline structure - Pipe - Fatigue/wear/corrosion

Finding Tier1Name: Pipeline

Finding Tier2Name: Pipeline structure

Finding Tier3Name: Pipe

Finding Modifier Name: Damaged/degraded

Finding Report Text: Pipeline - Pipeline structure - Pipe - Damaged/degraded

Official NTSB investigation data. NTSB findings determine probable cause and make safety recommendations; they do not adjudicate civil liability or regulatory violations.

What Happened
On November 16, 2017, at 4:34 a.m. mountain daylight time, a TransCanada Corporation, Keystone Pipeline (Keystone) ruptured near Amherst, South Dakota, between the Ludden, North Dakota, (Ludden) and Ferney, South Dakota, (Ferney) pump stations. Keystone's Operational Control Center (OCC), in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, was monitoring Keystone's Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system that detected the leak and shut down the pipeline. Keystone's field staff traveled to the indicated leak location, confirmed that the pipeline had ruptured, and initiated their spill response plan. The approximate spill area was comprised of about 5,000 barrels of crude oil.

What We Found
We determined that the probable cause of the failure of the Keystone Pipeline was a fatigue crack, likely originating from mechanical damage to the pipe exterior by a metal-tracked vehicle during pipeline installation, that grew and extended in-service to a critical size, resulting in the rupture of the pipeline.

PAB-18-01
<<<PAGE 1>>>

National Transportation Safety Board
Pipeline Accident Brief
TransCanada Corporation Pipeline (Keystone Pipeline)
Rupture
Amherst, South Dakota
The Accident
On November 16, 2017, at 4:34 a.m. mountain daylight time, a TransCanada Corporation,
Keystone Pipeline (Keystone) ruptured near Amherst, South Dakota, between the Ludden, North
Dakota, (Ludden) and Ferney, South Dakota, (Ferney) pump stations. Keystone’s Operational
Control Center (OCC), in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, was monitoring Keystone’s Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition system that detected the leak and shut down the pipeline. Keystone’s
field staff traveled to the indicated leak location, confirmed that the pipeline had ruptured, and
initiated their spill response plan. The approximate spill area was comprised of about 5,000 barrels
of crude oil. (See figure 1.)
Figure 1. Accident scene in Amherst, South Dakota taken on November 16, 2017.
(source: https://twitter.com/TransCanada)
When notified about the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
coordinated with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) to
conduct a metallurgical examination of the pipe to establish a probable cause of the pipeline
NTSB/PAB-18/01

<<<PAGE 2>>>

TransCanada Corporation Pipeline (Keystone Pipeline) Rupture
rupture. As part of its comprehensive investigation of Keystone’s operations and practices leading
up to the pipeline rupture, PHMSA provided oversight of Keystone’s excavation, removal, and
shipment of the failed pipe section to the NTSB laboratory in Washington, DC.
1
At the time of the pipeline rupture, Keystone was conducting an in-line inspection (ILI)
using a cleaning tool (pig) and an acoustic leak detection tool (SmartBall).
2 Prior to the rupture,
both the cleaning pig and the SmartBall leak detection tool had traveled past the nearest block
valve downstream of the rupture location (Ludden + 28). The tools were run in a light-sweet blend
batch of crude oil, followed by a batch of sour crude. In preparation for the tools to bypass the next
downstream pump station in Ferney, a bypass operation of the Ferney pump station was initiated
at 5:03 a.m. The bypass of the Ferney pump station was fully executed at 5:24 a.m. The pump
station bypass resulted in a gradual and anticipated pressure increase at the discharge of the
upstream station in Ludden. The pressure records from Ludden indicated that the pressure had
increased from 1,170 pounds per square inch gage (psig) to 1,352 psig when the rupture occurred.
Since the pipeline installation, no ILI tools for detecting cracks had been used.
The first indication of the pipeline rupture occurred at 5:33 a.m., when an abrupt drop in
discharge pressure and a corresponding increase in flow rate were observed at the Ludden pump
station. In addition, at 5:34 a.m., a corresponding pressure drop was observed at the Ferney pump
station. The controller at Keystone’s OCC initiated an emergency shutdown of the pipeline at
5:36 a.m. and commenced isolation of the pipeline. By 5:45 a.m., the failure location had been
isolated by using remotely operated valves. Keystone personnel were dispatched to investigate the
pipeline right-of-way for signs of a release and confirmed oil on the ground about 9:15 a.m.
Keystone personnel then notified Marshall County emergency services; the Britton Fire
Department and Marshall County Sheriff responded within minutes of notification. The incident
commander established and maintained a 1-mile safety zone during the response.
The Pipeline System
The Keystone Pipeline originates in Hardisty, Alberta, Canada, and delivers crude oil to
terminals in Patoka, Illinois, and Cushing, Oklahoma. The rupture occurred downstream of the
Ludden pump station, at milepost 234.2, in Marshall County, South Dakota. The pipe at the rupture
location was constructed during the fall of 2008 and was commissioned in 2010. The ruptured pipe
was 30 inches in diameter with a 0.386-inch wall thickness and was manufactured by Berg Pipe to
American Petroleum Institute Specification 5L grade X-70 product specification level 2, using a
double submerged arc-welded (DSAW) longitudinal weld seam and fusion bonded epoxy (FBE)
coating. The pipeline was constructed and operated under a special permit, which allowed
operation at pressures up to 80 percent of specified minimum yield strength (SMYS).3
When the pipe was excavated, concrete weights installed during construction were found
at the rupture location. The ruptured pipe piece along with a portion of one concrete weight were
1 As of the date of this report, PHMSA has not yet completed its investigation.
2 Registered trademark of Xylem Inc. Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.
3 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Special Permit PHMSA-2006-26617
(Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration, 2006)
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/TC_Keystone_2007-04-30_508compliant.pdf
2

<<<PAGE 3>>>

TransCanada Corporation Pipeline (Keystone Pipeline) Rupture
shipped to the NTSB materials laboratory for examination. Figure 2 shows the ruptured pipe after
excavation and prior to shipment to the NTSB.
Figure 2. Ruptured pipe.
At the NTSB materials laboratory, the ruptured pipe piece was cleaned and visually
examined. The metallurgists found midway along the length of the fracture face (a region of
5.52 inches long), ratchet marks, crack arrest lines, and other features consistent with a
multiple-origin fatigue fracture that originated at an external groove in the pipe wall. (See figure 3.)
The fatigue origin area was located near the top of the pipe about 6.5 inches away from the
longitudinal seam. The pipe exterior exhibited areas of exposed metal and grooves formed by
sliding contact that aligned nearly parallel to the pipe axis on the exterior surface coinciding and
adjacent to the length of the fracture. Coating material was present and intermixed with the sliding
contact marks, and many edges of the remaining coating adjacent to individual contact marks were
curled and rounded consistent with sliding contact deformation. As shown on the right side of
figure 3, a larger cluster of grooves was present toward the upstream end of the fracture.
3

<<<PAGE 4>>>

TransCanada Corporation Pipeline (Keystone Pipeline) Rupture
FLOW Girth
weld
Fatigue
fracture
region
Groove
features
Figure 3. Overview of the pipe fracture with mating sides of the fracture placed adjacent to each
other. The inset image shows a closer view of the fatigue facture initiation region and a colony of
sliding-contact grooves.
Compositional analysis of the grooved surfaces and of cross-sections through the grooves
near the fatigue crack origin area revealed that smeared metal in the trough of the sliding
contact-grooves contained higher concentrations of chromium than the pipe material (as
determined by energy dispersive spectroscopy and backscattered electron microscopy). This was
consistent with the presence of a deposited layer.
The composition of the deposited metal in the grooves, and the morphology of the groove
colonies is consistent with damage that would result from the pipe being run over by a metal-
tracked construction vehicle. The composition of the concrete weights was examined and ruled out
as a source of the mechanical damage to the pipe. A full report of the metallurgical examination
can be found in accident docket PLD18LR001.
4

<<<PAGE 5>>>

TransCanada Corporation Pipeline (Keystone Pipeline) Rupture
Probable Cause
The NTSB determines that the probable cause of the failure of the Keystone Pipeline was
a fatigue crack, likely originating from mechanical damage to the pipe exterior by a metal-tracked
vehicle during pipeline installation, that grew and extended in-service to a critical size, resulting
in the rupture of the pipeline.
For more details about this accident, visit www.ntsb.gov/investigations/dms.html and search for
NTSB accident identification PLD18LR001.
Adopted: July 5, 2018
The NTSB has authority to investigate and establish the facts, circumstances, and cause or
probable cause of a pipeline accident in which there is a fatality or substantial property damage,
or significant injury to the environment. (49 U.S. Code, Section 1131 - General authority)
The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident: rather, as specified by NTSB
regulation, “accident/incident investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues
and no adverse parties…and are not conducted for the purpose of determining the rights or
liabilities of any person.” Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 831.4. Assignment of
fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB’s statutory mission to improve transportation
safety by investigating accidents and incidents and issuing safety recommendations. In addition,
statutory language prohibits the admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report
related to an accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.
49 U.S. Code, Section 1154(b).
5
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