{"operation":"document","citation":"P-00-022","title":"NTSB Safety Recommendation P-00-022","source_type":"guidance","agency":"National Transportation Safety Board","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"2000-12-15","effective_on":"2000-12-15","summary":"THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE ALABAMA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION: INFORM ALABAMA NATURAL GAS PIPELINE OPERATORS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 1/22/99, ACCIDENT IN BRIDGEPORT, AL. FURTHER, ADVISE THOSE OPERATORS TO REVIEW THEIR EMERGENCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO GAS PIPELINE EMERGENCIES AND MODIFY THEM AS NECESSARY. THE REVIEW SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE PROCEDURES PROMPT THE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS FOR GAS LEA","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-00-022.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-00-022.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-00-022","source_url":"https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-00-022","body":"NTSB safety recommendation P-00-022.\n\nTHE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE ALABAMA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION: INFORM ALABAMA NATURAL GAS PIPELINE OPERATORS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 1/22/99, ACCIDENT IN BRIDGEPORT, AL. FURTHER, ADVISE THOSE OPERATORS TO REVIEW THEIR EMERGENCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO GAS PIPELINE EMERGENCIES AND MODIFY THEM AS NECESSARY. THE REVIEW SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE PROCEDURES PROMPT THE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS FOR GAS LEAKS CAUSED BY EXCAVATION DAMAGE NEAR BUILDINGS AND WHETHER THE PROCEDURES ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE POSSIBILITY OF MULTIPLE LEAKS AND THE UNDERGROUND MIGRATION OF GAS INTO NEARBY BUILDINGS.\n\nPriority: CLASS II\n\nOverall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nIssued Date: 2000-12-15\n\nAdopted Date: 2000-12-07\n\nOverall Date Closed: 2001-05-25\n\nSynopsis: ON 1/22/99, WHILE DIGGING A TRENCH BEHIND A BUILDING AT 406 ALABAMA AVENUE, A BACKHOE OPERATOR DAMAGED A 3/4-INCH STEEL NATURAL GAS SERVICE LINE AND A 1-INCH WATER SERVICE LINE, BOTH OF WHICH WERE UNDERGROUND. THIS RESULTED IN TWO LEAKS IN THE NATURAL GAS SERVICE LINE, WHICH WAS OPERATED AT 35 PSIG. ONE LEAK OCCURRED WHERE THE BACKHOE BUCKET HAD CONTACTED AND PULLED THE NATURAL GAS SERVICE LINE. THE OTHER WAS A PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF THE GAS SERVICE LINE AT AN UNDERGROUND JOINT NEAR THE METER, WHICH WAS CLOSE TO THE BUILDING. GAS MIGRATED INTO THE BUILDING AT 406 ALABAMA AVENUE, WHERE IT IGNITED ABOUT 10.02 A.M. AN EXPLOSION FOLLOWED, DESTROYING THREE BUILDINGS: 404, 406, AND 408 ALABAMA AVENUE. OTHER BUILDINGS WITHIN A TWO-BLOCK AREA OF THE EXPLOSION WERE SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGED. THREE FATALITIES, FIVE SERIOUS INJURIES, AND ONE MINOR INJURY RESULTED FROM THIS ACCIDENT. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE FAILURE OF R&B CONSTRUCTION (R&B) TO ESTABLISH AND FOLLOW SAFE PROCEDURES FOR EXCAVATION ACTIVITIES, RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO A 3/4-INCH GAS SERVICE LINE, AND THE FAILURE OF THE UTILITIES BOARD OF THE CITY OF BRIDGEPORT (UTILITIES BOARD) TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO THE SUBSEQUENT NATURAL GAS LEAK.\n\nProbable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of R&B Construction (R&B) to establish and follow safe procedures for excavation activities, resulting in damage to a 3/4-inch gas service line, and the failure of the Utilities Board of the City of Bridgeport (Utilities Board) to provide appropriate emergency response to the subsequent natural gas leak.\n\nNtsbnumber: DCA99MP004\n\nReport Number: PAB-00-01\n\nAddressee Name: State of Alabama, Public Service Commission\n\nAddressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nAddressee Date Closed: 2001-05-25\n\nAddressee Acronym: APSC\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2001-03-13\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: Letter Mail Controlled 03/26/2001 7:10:51 PM MC# 2010250 On March 12, 2001, an Alert Notice was mailed to each natural gas operator (204) in the state. The Notice referenced emergency procedures and response and summarized the Bridgeport incident and cause. The Notice also addressed the review and updating, as needed, of the operators emergency procedures and advised to determine whether the procedures prompt the appropriate actions for gas leaks caused by excavation damage near buildings to include the possibility of multiple leaks and migration of gas into nearby buildings. The Alert Notice also advises that this Commission will review each operator’s emergency procedures to evaluate the adequacy of the plan. If the plan is in non-compliance, the operator will be required to modify the procedures accordingly. The Gas Pipeline Safety Section has modified its Field Evaluation Report to expand item No. 4 “emergency plan requirements” from ten to thirteen essentials [Reference 192.6151. The form will be utilized during comprehensive or specialized inspections to ensure compliance with CFR 49, Part 192 and includes NTSBs safety recommendations as expressed in your docket P-00-22 and -23.\n\nAddressee Acronym: APSC\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2001-05-25\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: Accordingly, as the Commission has taken the requested actions, Safety Recommendations P-00-22 and -23 are classified “Closed--Acceptable Action.” We appreciate your prompt response and your efforts to address in detail the intent of the Board’s recommendations.","truncated":false,"body_characters":4539}