{"operation":"document","citation":"P-12-006","title":"NTSB Safety Recommendation P-12-006","source_type":"guidance","agency":"National Transportation Safety Board","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"2012-07-25","effective_on":"2012-07-25","summary":"TO THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: Issue an advisory bulletin to all hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators describing the circumstances of the accident in Marshall, Michigan—including the deficiencies observed in Enbridge Incorporated’s integrity management program—and ask them to take appropriate action to eliminate similar deficiencies.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-12-006.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-12-006.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-12-006","source_url":"https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-12-006","body":"NTSB safety recommendation P-12-006.\n\nTO THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: Issue an advisory bulletin to all hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators describing the circumstances of the accident in Marshall, Michigan—including the deficiencies observed in Enbridge Incorporated’s integrity management program—and ask them to take appropriate action to eliminate similar deficiencies.\n\nPriority: CLASS II\n\nOverall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nIssued Date: 2012-07-25\n\nAdopted Date: 2012-07-10\n\nOverall Date Closed: 2014-09-19\n\nSynopsis: On Sunday, July 25, 2010, about 5:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, a segment of a 30-inch-diameter pipeline (Line 6B), owned and operated by Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) ruptured in a wetland in Marshall, Michigan. The rupture occurred during the last stages of a planned shutdown and was not discovered or addressed for 17 hours. During the time lapse, Enbridge twice pumped additional oil (81 percent of the total release) into Line 6B during two startups; the total release was estimated to be 843,444 gallons of crude oil. The oil saturated the surrounding wetlands and flowed into the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. Local residents self-evacuated from their houses, and the environment was negatively affected. Cleanup efforts continue as of the adoption date of this report, with continuing costs exceeding $767 million. About 320 people reported symptoms consistent with benzene exposure. No fatalities were reported.\n\nProbable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause of the pipeline rupture was corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from crack and corrosion defects under disbonded polyethylene tape coating, producing a substantial crude oil release that went undetected by the control center for over 17 hours. The rupture and prolonged release were made possible by pervasive organizational failures at Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) that included the following: Deficient integrity management procedures, which allowed well-documented crack defects in corroded areas to propagate until the pipeline failed. Inadequate training of control center personnel, which allowed the rupture to remain undetected for 17 hours and through two startups of the pipeline. Insufficient public awareness and education, which allowed the release to continue for nearly 14 hours after the first notification of an odor to local emergency response agencies. Contributing to the accident was the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) weak regulation for assessing and repairing crack indications, as well as PHMSA’s ineffective oversight of pipeline integrity management programs, control center procedures, and public awareness. Contributing to the severity of the environmental consequences were (1) Enbridge’s failure to identify and ensure the availability of well-trained emergency responders with sufficient response resources, (2) PHMSA’s lack of regulatory guidance for pipeline facility response planning, and (3) PHMSA’s limited oversight of pipeline emergency preparedness that led to the approval of a deficient facility response plan.\n\nNtsbnumber: DCA10MP007\n\nReport Number: PAR-12-01\n\nAddressee Name: PHMSA\n\nAddressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nAddressee Date Closed: 2014-09-19\n\nAddressee Acronym: PHMSA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2014-01-03\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: In November 2012, PHMSA advised the NTSB that it would be issuing an ADB to all owners and operators of pipelines, alerting them to the circumstances of the 2010 Marshall, Michigan, accident, detailing the identified deficiencies with Enbridge’s integrity management program, and asking operators to take appropriate action to eliminate similar deficiencies. We are disappointed that, over a year later, PHMSA has yet to issue this ADB. Nevertheless, Safety Recommendation P-12-6 remains classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE pending timely completion of this action. We request that PHMSA issue the ADB without further delay.\n\nAddressee Acronym: PHMSA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2013-01-11\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: The NTSB notes that, upon completion of its action to address Safety Recommendation P-12-5, PHMSA plans to issue the requested AB. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-12-6 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.\n\nAddressee Acronym: PHMSA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2014-09-19\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: Advisory Bulletin 2014-02, issued on May 6, 2014, satisfies Safety Recommendation P 12-6. Accordingly, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.\n\nAddressee Acronym: PHMSA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2013-08-29\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: -From Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator: PHMSA is drafting an Advisory Bulletin to satisfy this recommendation.\n\nAddressee Acronym: PHMSA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2012-11-01\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: -From Cynthia Quarterman, Administrator: Following completion of the comprehensive inspection prescribed in P-12-5, PHMSA will issue an advisory bulletin to all pipeline owners and operators alerting them of the circumstances of the July 25, 2010 accident in Marshall, Michigan. The advisory bulletin will communicate the identified deficiencies with Enbridge’s integrity management program and ask operators to take appropriate action to eliminate similar deficiencies.\n\nAddressee Acronym: PHMSA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2014-08-18\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: -From Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator: Response: On May 6, 2014, PHMSA published an advisory bulletin, Lessons Learned from the Release at Marshall, Michigan, which describes the deficiencies in Enbridge’s integrity management (IM) program that contributed to the accident, and encourages owners and operators to review their own IM programs for similar deficiencies. https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/05/06/2014-10248/pipeline-safety-lessonslearned-from-the-release-at-marshall-michigan","truncated":false,"body_characters":6540}