{"operation":"document","citation":"P-19-016","title":"NTSB Safety Recommendation P-19-016","source_type":"guidance","agency":"National Transportation Safety Board","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"2019-10-24","effective_on":"2019-10-24","summary":"TO THE 31 STATES THAT ALLOW EXEMPTIONS TO PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER APPROVAL AND STAMPING FOR NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS (ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, CALIFORNIA, COLORADO, CONNECTICUT, FLORIDA, GEORGIA, IDAHO, ILLINOIS, IOWA, KENTUCKY, LOUISIANA, MAINE, MARYLAND, MINNESOTA, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, NEW YORK, NORTH CAROLINA, PENNSYLVANIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, TEXAS, UTAH,","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-19-016.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-19-016.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-19-016","source_url":"https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-19-016","body":"NTSB safety recommendation P-19-016.\n\nTO THE 31 STATES THAT ALLOW EXEMPTIONS TO PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER APPROVAL AND STAMPING FOR NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS (ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, CALIFORNIA, COLORADO, CONNECTICUT, FLORIDA, GEORGIA, IDAHO, ILLINOIS, IOWA, KENTUCKY, LOUISIANA, MAINE, MARYLAND, MINNESOTA, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, NEW YORK, NORTH CAROLINA, PENNSYLVANIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, TEXAS, UTAH, VIRGINIA, AND WYOMING): Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping.\n\nPriority: CLASS II\n\nOverall Status: Open - Await Response\n\nIssued Date: 2019-10-24\n\nAdopted Date: 2019-09-24\n\nSynopsis: On September 13, 2018, about 4:00 p.m. local time, a series of structure fires and explosions occurred after high-pressure natural gas was released into a low-pressure natural gas distribution system in the northeast region of the Merrimack Valley in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The natural gas distribution system was owned and operated by Columbia Gas of Massachusetts, a subsidiary of NiSource, Inc. Columbia Gas of Massachusetts delivers natural gas to about 325,000 customers in Massachusetts. One person was killed and 22 individuals, including three firefighters, were transported to local hospitals due to injuries; seven other firefighters incurred minor injuries. The fires and explosions damaged 131 structures, including at least 5 homes that were destroyed in the city of Lawrence and the towns of Andover and North Andover. Most of the damage occurred from fires ignited by natural gas-fueled appliances; several of the homes were destroyed by natural gas-fueled explosions. Fire departments from the three municipalities were dispatched to the fires and explosions. First responders initiated the Massachusetts fire-mobilization plan and received mutual aid from neighboring districts in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine. Emergency management officials had the electric utility shut down electrical power in the area, the state police closed local roads, and freight and passenger railroad operations in the area were suspended. Columbia Gas of Massachusetts shut down the low-pressure natural gas distribution system, affecting 10,894 customers, including some outside the area who had their service shut off as a precaution. The National Transportation Safety Board made new recommendations to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration; the 31 states with an industrial exemption for natural gas infrastructure projects; the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security; and NiSource, Inc.\n\nProbable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the overpressurization of the natural gas distribution system and the resulting fires and explosions was Columbia Gas of Massachusetts’ weak engineering management that did not adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee the construction project that led to the abandonment of a cast iron main without first relocating regulator sensing lines to the new polyethylene main. Contributing to the accident was a low-pressure natural gas distribution system designed and operated without adequate overpressure protection.\n\nKeywords: Hazmat\n\nNtsbnumber: PLD18MR003\n\nReport Number: PAR-19-02\n\nAddressee Name: Commonwealth of Virginia\n\nAddressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nAddressee Date Closed: 2020-08-26\n\nAddressee Acronym: VA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2023-10-27\n\nCommunication Type: NPRM Response\n\nCommunication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.\n\nAddressee Acronym: VA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2019-10-24\n\nCommunication Type: Transmittal Letter\n\nCommunication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the Commonwealth of Virginia to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the Commonwealth of Virginia. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.\n\nAddressee Acronym: VA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2020-06-30\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: -From Mark C. Christie, Chairman: Please accept this in response to your letter of August 15, 2019, regarding recommendations arising from the National Transportation Safety Board (\"NTSB\" or \"Board\") investigation into the 2018 gas pipeline tragedy in the Merrimack Valley region of Massachusetts. The purpose of this correspondence is to provide the Board with an update as to Virginia's response to NTSB Recommendation P-19-16 and, in particular, legislative action taken in response to the recommendation. During the 2020 Legislative Session of the Virginia General Assembly, at the request of the Virginia State Corporation Commission (\"Commission\" or \"SCC\"), Senator Jeremy McPike of Alexandria introduced legislation eliminating the statutory exemption for professional engineering licensure relative to engineering services rendered in connection with natural gas project facilities subject to regulation by the SCC. Among other things, Senate Bill 385 amended and reenacted Virginia Code § 54.1-401. The bill as enacted principally created a new statute in the Virginia Code directing the Commission to promulgate regulations requiring that a licensed professional engineer exercise responsible charge over engineering projects involving gas pipeline facilities that may present a risk to public safety. In response, on May 29, 2020, the SCC issued an Order Establishing Proceeding in Case Number URS-2020-00052 (\"Order\") that directs the Commission's Utility and Railroad Safety Division (\"Staff\") to establish and coordinate a Stakeholder Group to develop and propose to the Commission recommendations concerning such regulations.2 The first meeting of the Stakeholder Group is tentatively scheduled for Wednesday, July 8, 2020. The Order further directs the Staff to submit a Report to the Commission by December 1, 2020, presenting draft regulations, findings, and recommendations responsive to the directives established by Senate Bill 385 and the Commission's Order. I trust that the Board will find responsive to this NTSB Recommendation, the Virginia General Assembly's passage of SB 385, together with the Commission's recent actions to implement this important legislation. Please do not hesitate to contact me directly with additional questions, concerns, or suggestions regarding this or any other matter related to the work of the Virginia SCC.\n\nAddressee Acronym: VA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2020-08-26\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: We are pleased that you have passed a new state statute that requires a licensed professional engineer to directly control and supervise engineering projects involving gas pipeline facilities that may present a risk to public safety in Virginia. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified, CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ACTION.\n\nAddressee Name: State of Nevada\n\nAddressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nAddressee Date Closed: 2022-06-30\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2023-10-27\n\nCommunication Type: NPRM Response\n\nCommunication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety Initiatives,” published at 88 Federal Register 61746 on September 7, 2023. The NPRM proposes amendments to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191, 192, and 198 in response to congressional mandates in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act and an NTSB safety recommendation aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents resulting from overpressurization of low pressure gas distribution systems. The NTSB investigated two natural gas accidents that resulted in recommendations that are applicable to this NPRM. We describe these investigations and offer comments on the following topic areas: Clarifications and Updates to Distribution Integrity Management Program Plans, Updates to Emergency Response Communications, Updates to Operations and Maintenance Procedural Manuals, and Requirements for New Regulator Stations. Related NTSB Investigations In February 2018, the NTSB investigated a natural gas fueled explosion in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in 1 fatality; 4 injuries; a destroyed home; and the evacuation of 300 homes, 250 apartment units, and 600 students. In the 2 days before the explosion, two gas related incidents occurred on the same block at houses that were served by the same natural gas main, each resulting in one injury and significant structural damage. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition of natural gas that leaked from a gas main that was damaged 23 years earlier and was undetected by the operator’s investigation of the two related incidents that occurred in the 2 days before the explosion. In September 2018, the NTSB investigated the overpressurization of a natural gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, which resulted in fires and explosions, 1 fatality, 22 individuals being taken to local hospitals, 5 destroyed homes, 131 damaged structures, and the evacuation of 50,000 residents. We determined that the probable cause of the accident was the operator’s failure to adequately plan, review, sequence, and oversee a pipeline construction project. Updates to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Procedural Manuals NPRM Commentary In the NPRM, PHMSA proposes updates to O&M procedural manuals to (1) account for the response and correction of overpressurization indications, (2) ensure a management of change process when an operator makes certain changes that could impact the integrity or safety of a gas distribution system, and (3) require that operators ensure qualified personnel review and certify certain construction plans. In the discussion for the third proposed update, the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation P 19 16, which recommends that states require professional engineer (PE) approval for natural gas infrastructure projects. The NPRM expresses concern that the lack of PEs in states could cause delays in critical construction projects; therefore, PHMSA proposes to allow individuals other than licensed PEs to be considered qualified to review construction plans. NTSB Comment We focus on the third proposed change, which would add a requirement that operators ensure qualified personnel review certain construction projects. Our Merrimack Valley investigation indicated that PE approval should be an essential component of construction plans that affect public safety. In the investigation, we noted that had the comprehensive constructability review of the operator’s pipeline construction project plan required a PE’s seal, it would have likely identified a critical omission in the plan and prevented the error that led to the accident. Our investigation recognized that a PE license is a valued credential, especially for engineering projects affecting public safety. The investigation report provides several reasons that we value the PE credential, noting that (1) it conveys that the holder maintains and demonstrates technical competency; (2) PEs are bound to a code of ethics, which creates a duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount and to perform services only in the areas of their competence; and (3) PEs are personally accountable for the work they approve and stamp, and they must exercise responsible charge over all aspects of the work. As a result of our investigation, we issued three safety recommendations on this topic. We issued Safety Recommendation P 18 5 to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate the PE licensure exemption for public utility work and require a PE’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. After Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that licensed PEs review and approve engineering plans developed by or on behalf of natural gas companies, we classified the recommendation as Closed—Acceptable Action. We also issued Safety Recommendation P 18 6 to the operator to revise its engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure that all applicable departments review construction plans and that a PE seals these plans before starting work. After the operator developed criteria for when PE approval is necessary and when it is not, we classified the recommendation as Closed—?Acceptable Action. Finally, we issued Safety Recommendation P 19 16 to 31 states that allow exemptions to PE approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, calling for them to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed PE approval and stamping. One of the three states that has satisfied this recommendation, Maryland, did so by removing the PE exemption and developing criteria for “covered” projects, which require PE approval, and for “noncovered” projects, which can be reviewed by a relevant, qualified person. The NTSB believes that the NPRM’s third proposed change to O&M procedural manuals, which would require that qualified personnel, rather than PEs, review and certify certain construction plans, does not address the intent of our safety recommendations on this topic. We acknowledge that not all projects may require PE approval, such as those that do not pose a risk to public safety. Therefore, in our view, PHMSA and state regulators should develop specific criteria for determining the types of projects that require PE approval and those that do not. We encourage PHMSA to include this approach in the final rule. Summary The NTSB supports many of the NPRM’s proposed revisions to its pipeline safety regulations. However, we believe that the proposal has some shortcomings and encourage PHMSA to address our comments in its final rulemaking. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this notice.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2019-10-24\n\nCommunication Type: Transmittal Letter\n\nCommunication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. The attached letter from the NTSB Chairman provides information about the NTSB’s September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendation may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. For more information about NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply exceeds 20 megabytes, including attachments, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response. All communications regarding safety recommendations will be stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov or call (202) 314-6290 and ask to be directed to the Safety Recommendations Division. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge the State of Nevada to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents. For more information about the NTSB and our recommendation process, please see the attached one-page summary. This letter provides information about our September 24, 2019, report Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, September 13, 2018, NTSB/PAR-19/02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov. As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues: • Adequacy of natural gas regulations • Project documentation • Constructability review • Project management • Risk assessment • Safety management systems ??Licensed professional engineer approval of natural gas projects • Emergency response Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the 31 states that allow exemptions to professional engineer approval and stamping for natural gas infrastructure projects, including the State of Nevada. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. (P-19-16) (See section 3.4.) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (for example, P-19-16). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2021-03-04\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: -From Susan Fisher, Senior Vice President, McDonald Carano, Government Affairs & Advocacy Group: In response to your Feb 12, 2021 letter to Nevada Governor Steve Sisolak, I would like to respond on behalf of the Nevada State Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors. The recommendation was issued October 24, 2019. The Nevada Legislature meets biennial in odd numbered years for the period of time between February 1 and June 1. So, we have only recently had the opportunity to introduce a bill to address the issue raised in your letter; to remove the exemption so that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require licensed professional engineer approval and stamping. Immediately upon receipt of your letter in October 2019, the Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors pulled together meetings with stakeholders including the Public Utilities Association of Nevada (PUCN), Southwest Gas and NV Energy which has a natural gas franchise in the Reno/Sparks area as well as natural gas operations in several of its energy plants. The stakeholder meetings were productive as were public meetings conducted with our licensed PEs. The result is a bill to be heard next Monday 3/8 for the first time, Assembly Bill 174 (attached). We have spoken with committee members in advance to help answer any questions they may have and, knock on wood, sans any surprises, I feel comfortable we will have this bill on the books soon. I would be happy to answer any questions, if needed.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2021-05-20\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: -From Susan Fisher, Senior Vice President, McDonald Carano Government Affairs and Advocacy Group: The Nevada Legislature has passed AB173 unanimously from both houses. This bill contains the language to eliminate the PE Exemption for natural gas utilities. It is now on the Governor’s desk where he may take one of two actions; sign it immediately, or do nothing to let it go into effect, which it will do within five (5) days after passage. If he chooses the latter, the bill will go into effect on Saturday May 22. The bill goes into effect immediately upon passage and approval for most provisions and July 1 of this year for preparatory administrative purposes. I have attached a copy of the bill. We thank the NTSB for its advocacy on this important legislation.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2021-04-14\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: -From Susan Fisher, McDonald Carano, Government Affairs and Advocacy Group: AB173 was heard this morning in Senate Commerce & Labor. The bill had passed unanimously from the Assembly committee and full Assembly in Floor vote and I anticipate smooth sailing through the Senate as well. Thank you for the letter.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2022-05-10\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: -From David Noble, Hearing Officer, State of Nevada, Public Utilities Commission: Pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes 233B.063, the Legislative Counsel Bureau ('LCB\") examined the Commission's proposed regulation in Docket No. 21-06039 and returned it in revised form. Attached hereto is the revised regulation, designated by LCB as File No. R073-21, which was electronically transmitted to the Commission on January 11, 2022. Also attached hereto is the electronic mail from the LCB transmitting the revised regulation. If you have any questions, please contact me.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2022-05-12\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: -From Susan Fisher, Senior Vice President, Government Affairs and Advocacy Group: McDonald Carano: Please note that the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada (PUCN) has just posted its official Order on the regulations mentioned in my May 10 communication to Chair Homendy. I have attached it for your records.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2021-02-12\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over a year since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your state’s actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that Nevada has completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2021-04-20\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: Staff level email response: Thank you for your April 14, 2021, update regarding Safety Recommendation P-19-16. We note that AB173 passed the Assembly and you anticipate that it will pass the Senate as well. Please keep us apprised of your progress to implement safety recommendation P-19-16 in Nevada.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2021-04-14\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: We note that, on March 8, 2021, the Nevada Assembly’s Committee on Commerce and Labor held a hearing on Assembly Bill 173 that, if enacted, would remove the exemption for licensed PE approval and stamping of natural gas infrastructure projects if a public utility company employee is engaged in work that the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada has determined requires licensure. This approach satisfies the intent of our recommendation when a state’s public utilities commission requires licensed PEs to directly control and supervise engineering work on natural gas infrastructure projects that may present a risk to public safety. Pending an update on your legislative and regulatory proceedings, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2021-07-09\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: We note that your state legislature passed Nevada Assembly Bill No. 173 and, as a result, Nevada law has now been amended to eliminate the blanket exemption from PE approval and stamping for all natural gas infrastructure work completed by public utility company employees. The new law directs the Nevada Public Service Commission (PSC) to adopt regulations that prescribe the types of work for which a public utility employee must have a PE license. We have consistently found this approach to be acceptable when state regulations ensure that potentially dangerous natural gas infrastructure projects are done with a licensed PE’s management, review, and approval. Pending adoption by the Nevada PSC of regulations that require PE approval and stamping for gas infrastructure projects that present a material risk to public safety, Safety Recommendation P 19 16 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov regarding your actions to address this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NV\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 2022-06-30\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: We note that, on May 10, 2022, the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada adopted a requirement that all future natural gas infrastructure projects require approval and stamping by a licensed PE. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-19-16 is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION. Thank you for your commitment to safety.\n\nAddressee Name: State of Maryland\n\nAddressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nAddre","truncated":true,"body_characters":494156}