{"operation":"document","citation":"P-70-013","title":"NTSB Safety Recommendation P-70-013","source_type":"guidance","agency":"National Transportation Safety Board","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"1969-12-04","effective_on":"1969-12-04","summary":"THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION: DETERMINE WHETHER NIPSCO'S EMERGENCY PLAN COMPLIES WITH SECTION 850.6 OF USAS B31.8 \"EMERGENCY PLAN.\" THIS PLAN SHOULD INCLUDE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN NIPSCO AND THE FIRE AND POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN EMERGENCIES.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-70-013.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-70-013.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-70-013","source_url":"https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-70-013","body":"NTSB safety recommendation P-70-013.\n\nTHE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION: DETERMINE WHETHER NIPSCO'S EMERGENCY PLAN COMPLIES WITH SECTION 850.6 OF USAS B31.8 \"EMERGENCY PLAN.\" THIS PLAN SHOULD INCLUDE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN NIPSCO AND THE FIRE AND POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN EMERGENCIES.\n\nPriority: CLASS II\n\nOverall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nIssued Date: 1969-12-04\n\nAdopted Date: 1969-12-04\n\nOverall Date Closed: 1976-07-20\n\nSynopsis: ON JUNE 3, 1969, A SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES OCCURRED IN THE NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN THE WESTERN HALF OF THE GLEN PARK RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISION OF GARY, INDIANA. THERE WERE NO FATALITIES, BUT NINE RESIDENTS AND FIVE FIREMEN WERE INJURED. SEVEN HOUSES WERE DESTROYED, AND 45 OTHERS INCURRED DAMAGE EXTENDING FROM MINOR TO VIRTUAL DESTRUCTION. TOTAL PROPERTY DAMAGE WAS ABOUT $350,000.\n\nProbable Cause: The Board finds that the probable cause of this accident was a combination of personnel error and system inadequacy. Involved were the inadvertent opening of a separation valve by a gas company employee allowing gas at 20 p.s.i.g. to flow into a 1/4 p.s,i,g. system and a system which could not control adequately such an increase in pressure owing to the lack of overpressure protection devices. Thereafter, the increase in pressure caused the failure of a regulator diaphragm which allowed an 80-fold overpressure in the low-pressure system to become continuous for 30 - 45 minutes. Significant contributing causal factors were: 1. The inaccessibility of the shutoff valve for the regulator which failed. 2. The lack of systematic review of the hazards in the conversion operation which could have revealed the hazardous condition in which one human error could produce catastrophe, coupled with the lack of a written plan for conversion. 3. The absence in Code B31.8 of any specification of safeguards to be employed at separation (isolation) valves during pressure conversions. 4. The lack of complete leakage surveys, before and during the pressure increase in the eastern area, which would have probably disclosed and leaking condition of the pipe and avoided the major leaks which occurred on June 3, 1969.\n\nNtsbnumber: DCA69FP004\n\nReport Number: PAR-UNNUMBERED\n\nAddressee Name: State of Indiana, Utility Regulatory Commission (formerly Public Service Commission)\n\nAddressee Status: Closed--No Longer Applicable\n\nAddressee Date Closed: 1976-07-20\n\nAddressee Acronym: IURC\n\nAddressee Organization Type: S-State Government\n\nCommunication Date: 1970-12-31\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE INDIANA P.S.C. A STAFF REPORT STATES, IN PART: THE COMPANY'S GAS OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS AND THEIR GAS STANDARDS COMPLY WITH SECTION 850.6 OF THE USAS B31.8 CODE. THEY HAVE MAINTAINED LIAISON WITH THE POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENTS, AND THIS LIAISON HAS BEEN REAFFIRMED TO ALL OF THEIR OPERATING DISTRICTS. CORRESPONDENCE DOCUMENTATION INCOMPLETE.","truncated":false,"body_characters":3024}