{"operation":"document","citation":"P-72-001","title":"NTSB Safety Recommendation P-72-001","source_type":"guidance","agency":"National Transportation Safety Board","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"1971-12-08","effective_on":"1971-12-08","summary":"THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT: THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION INITIATE AN AMENDMENT TO THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, TITLE 49, SECTION 195.206, MATERIAL INSPECTION, REQUIRING SPECIFIC INSPECTION CRITERIA. THIS RECOMMENDATION IS NOT INTENDED TO DELETE OR MITIGATE ANY VISUAL, MECHANICAL, OR NONDESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION PRACTICES ALREADY IN EXISTENCE, BUT TO PRESCRIBE A SYSTEM OF INSP","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-72-001.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-72-001.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-72-001","source_url":"https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-72-001","body":"NTSB safety recommendation P-72-001.\n\nTHE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT: THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION INITIATE AN AMENDMENT TO THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, TITLE 49, SECTION 195.206, MATERIAL INSPECTION, REQUIRING SPECIFIC INSPECTION CRITERIA. THIS RECOMMENDATION IS NOT INTENDED TO DELETE OR MITIGATE ANY VISUAL, MECHANICAL, OR NONDESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION PRACTICES ALREADY IN EXISTENCE, BUT TO PRESCRIBE A SYSTEM OF INSPECTION AT STRATEGIC POINTS IN THE MANUFACTURE, TRANSPORTATION, AND FURTHER PROCESSING OF THE PIPE BEFORE IT IS BURIED IN THE GROUND.\n\nPriority: CLASS II\n\nOverall Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action\n\nIssued Date: 1971-12-08\n\nAdopted Date: 1971-12-08\n\nOverall Date Closed: 1975-12-30\n\nSynopsis: ON SEPTEMBER 2, 1970, A PIPELINE LEAK OCCURRED IN THE COLONIAL PIPELINE SYSTEM NEAR JACKSONVILLE, MARYLAND. CONTRACTORS WORKED CONTINUOUSLY FOR 20 HOURS TO FIND THE LEAK, AND ON THE NEXT DAY AN EXPLOSION OCCURRED FOLLOWED BY A FIRE. THERE WERE NO FATALITIES, BUT FIVE WORKMEN WERE BURNED.\n\nProbable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the leak was a flaw of undetermined origin in the pipe wall, crater-like in appearance, wide at the surface and narrowing down to a thin metal membrane, which failed after a period of constantly fluctuating pumping pressures. The probable cause of the explosion and fires was the ingestion of the gasoline vapor-rich atmosphere by a diesel engine which resulted in the speeding up and backfiring of the engine, igniting the atmosphere.\n\nNtsbnumber: DCA70MP003\n\nReport Number: PAR-71-02\n\nAddressee Name: FRA\n\nAddressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action\n\nAddressee Date Closed: 1975-12-30\n\nAddressee Acronym: FRA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government\n\nCommunication Date: 1972-04-07\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: LETTER FROM FRA: SECTION 195.206 OF THE MINIMUM FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS FOR LIQUID PIPELINES REQUIRES THAT THE PIPELINE BE VISUALLY INSPECTED FOR ANY DAMAGE THAT COULD IMPAIR ITS STRENGTH OR REDUCE ITS SERVICEABILITY PRIOR TO INSTALLATION. THE OPERATOR IS REQUIRED TO INSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE COMPLETED FACILITY. IT IS OUR OPINION THAT A HIGHER DEGREE OF SAFETY CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH PERFORMANCE REGULATIONS THAT PRESCRIBE THE SAFETY GOAL TO BE ACHIEVED WHILE ALLOWING THE PIPELINE OPERATOR FLEXIBILITY IN CHOOSING THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL. WE WILL CONTINUALLY MONITOR THIS AREA OF THE REGULATIONS, HOWEVER AT THIS POINT, WE DO NOT FEEL THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS.","truncated":false,"body_characters":2631}