{"operation":"document","citation":"P-75-009","title":"NTSB Safety Recommendation P-75-009","source_type":"guidance","agency":"National Transportation Safety Board","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"1975-05-28","effective_on":"1975-05-28","summary":"REQUIRE TRANSCO TO: REVIEW ITS EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR THE ENTIRE PIPELINE SYSTEM, USING SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES, AND CORRECT ANY UNRELIABLE OR INADEQUATE SHUTDOWN PROCESSES.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-75-009.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-75-009.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-75-009","source_url":"https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-75-009","body":"NTSB safety recommendation P-75-009.\n\nREQUIRE TRANSCO TO: REVIEW ITS EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR THE ENTIRE PIPELINE SYSTEM, USING SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES, AND CORRECT ANY UNRELIABLE OR INADEQUATE SHUTDOWN PROCESSES.\n\nPriority: CLASS II\n\nOverall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nIssued Date: 1975-05-28\n\nAdopted Date: 1975-05-28\n\nOverall Date Closed: 1979-02-02\n\nSynopsis: ON JUNE 9, 1974, THE TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE CORPORATION'S 30-INCH NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION PIPELINE RUPTURED IN A RURAL AREA NEAR BEALETON, VIRGINIA. NATURAL GAS ESCAPED, IGNITED, AND FUELED FLAMES WHICH WERE VISIBLE TO AIRLINE PILOTS OVER 100 MILES AWAY. NO DEATHS OR INJURIES RESULTED, NO LIVESTOCK WERE AFFECTED, AND PROPERTY DAMAGE AMOUNTED ONLY TO A SCORCHED FIELD AND SOME BURNED TREES.\n\nNtsbnumber: PLD74XR006\n\nReport Number: PAR-75-02\n\nAddressee Name: RSPA\n\nAddressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nAddressee Date Closed: 1979-02-02\n\nAddressee Acronym: RSPA\n\nAddressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government\n\nCommunication Date: 1976-05-10\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: 5/24/76 - LTR FROM TRANSCO TO NTSB, ENCLOSING 10/27/75 LTR TO OPSO: AS A RESPONSE TO OPSO RECOMMENDATION, TRANSCO HAS: PROVIDED WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS TO STATION OPERATING PERSONNEL; INSTRUCTED COMPRESSOR STATION IMMEDIATELY UPSTREAM OF LINE FAILURE TO SHUT DOWN UPON DISCOVERY OF SUCH FAILURE; CLOSED CROSSOVERS WHEREVER POSSIBLE (80% ARE CLOSED); CONTROLS ON ALL AUTOMATIC VALVES HAVE BEEN RESET TO THE LOWEST RATE-OF-PRESSURE DROP POSSIBLE WITHOUT CAUSING INADVERTENT NORMAL OPERATION FLUCTUATION CLOSING; AND CHANGING THE INSTRUMENTATION OF AUTOMATIC CLOSING CROSSOVER VALVES TO SEPARATE THEM FROM THE MAIN LINE BLOCK VALVE RATE-OF PRESSURE DROP INSTRUMENTATION; THIS WILL CLOSE THE CROSSOVERS QUICKLY.","truncated":false,"body_characters":1819}