{"operation":"document","citation":"P-87-010","title":"NTSB Safety Recommendation P-87-010","source_type":"guidance","agency":"National Transportation Safety Board","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"1987-03-24","effective_on":"1987-03-24","summary":"THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORROSION ENGINEERS: REVISE RECOMMENDED PRACTICE RP-01-69 TO INCORPORATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH EACH OF THE CATHODIC PROTECTION CRITERION SHOULD BE USED, ON THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE DROP SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN PIPE-TO-SOIL VOLTAGE POTENTIAL MEASUREMENTS, ON THE CONDITIONS WHICH MAY SHIELD BURIED PIPE FROM THE BENE","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-87-010.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-87-010.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-87-010","source_url":"https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-87-010","body":"NTSB safety recommendation P-87-010.\n\nTHE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORROSION ENGINEERS: REVISE RECOMMENDED PRACTICE RP-01-69 TO INCORPORATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH EACH OF THE CATHODIC PROTECTION CRITERION SHOULD BE USED, ON THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE DROP SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN PIPE-TO-SOIL VOLTAGE POTENTIAL MEASUREMENTS, ON THE CONDITIONS WHICH MAY SHIELD BURIED PIPE FROM THE BENEFITS OF CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEMS, ON THE EFFECTIVE USE OF AVAILABLE METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING AREAS OF ACTIVE CATHODIC AND ATMOSPHERIC CORROSION, AND ON EFFECTIVE METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING PREVIOUS CORROSION DAMAGE TO BURIED PIPELINES.\n\nPriority: CLASS III\n\nOverall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nIssued Date: 1987-03-24\n\nAdopted Date: 1987-02-18\n\nOverall Date Closed: 2003-03-27\n\nSynopsis: ON APRIL 27, 1985, NATURAL GAS UNDER 990 PSIG RUPTURED THE NO. 10 PIPELINE OF THE TEXAS GAS PIPELINE COMPANY SYSTEM. THE RUPTURE WAS IN AN AREA WEAKENED BY ATMOSPHERIC CORROSION THAT WAS LOCATED WITHIN THE PIPELINE'S CASING UNDER KENTUCKY STATE HIGHWAY 90 NEAR BEAUMONT, KENTUCKY. THE ENSUING FIRE KILLED FIVE PERSONS IN A HOUSE LOCATED NORTH OF THE RUPTURE, INJURED THREE PERSONS AS THEY FLED FROM THEIR HOUSE LOCATED SOUTH OF THE RUPTURE, AND DESTROYED SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF PROPERTY. ON FEBRUARY 21, 1986, NATURAL GAS UNDER 987 PSIG RUPTURED THE NO. 15 PIPELINE OF THE TEXAS EASTERN GAS PIPE LINE SYSTEM. THE RUPTURE WAS IN AN AREA WEAKENED BY GAL VANIC CORROSION AND WAS LOCATED SOUTH OF KENTUCKY STATE HIGHWAY 52 NEAR LANCASTER, KENTUCKY. THE FORCE OF THE ESCAPING GAS AND THE ENSUING FIRE INJURED THREE PERSONS AS THEY FLED FROM THEIR HOUSES, RESULTED IN THE EVACUATION OF 77 OTHER PERSONS, AND DESTROYED SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF PROPERTY.\n\nProbable Cause: None\n\nNtsbnumber: DCA85FP011\n\nReport Number: PAR-87-01\n\nAddressee Name: National Association of Corrosion Engineers\n\nAddressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action\n\nAddressee Date Closed: 2003-03-27\n\nAddressee Acronym: NACE\n\nAddressee Organization Type: A-Associations\n\nCommunication Date: 2002-11-22\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: Letter Mail Controlled 12/05/2002 4:03:21 PM MC# 2020996 The NTSB Safety Recommendation P-87-l0 contains a request that relates to the revision of the NACE Standard Practice RP-0169, Control of External Corrosion on Underground or Submerged Metallic Piping Systems, and effective methods for identifying previous corrosion damage to buried pipelines. The January 18, 1989 letter from NACE to NTSB, contained the following response: \"One method that is being recommended in the proposed revisions to RP0169 is the use of in-line inspection tools, but unfortunately, the current tools available cannot distinguish between active and previous corrosion damage unless previous inspections have conducted, thus permitting a comparison of the data to indicate where previous corrosion damage may be located on the pipe. The proposed revisions also will give guidance on the limitations of state-of-the-art-in-line inspection, which is not capable of detecting all types of corrosion damage. These tools also have limitations in their accuracy and may report as apparent anomalies some items that are not corrosion. For example, longitudinal seam corrosion and general corrosion may not be readily detected by in-line inspection, Also, pipe wall thickness variations, defects, dents, gouges and external ferritic objects may be reported as corrosion damage.\" \"NACE Unit Committee T-10E on Internal Corrosion has been requested to establish a Task Group to prepare a state-of-the-art report on intelligent pigging.\" Since January 18, 1989 RP0l69 has been revised and the above suggestions incorporated in section 6.3.3. In addition NACE has done the following: NACE Task Group 039 issued Technical Report #35100 \"In-Line Nondestructive Inspection of Pipelines\" in December 2000. Also, NACE Task Group 212 issued NACE Standard Recommended Practice RP0102-2002 \"In-Line Inspection of Pipelines\" in 2002. Furthermore, in-line inspection (ILI) tools have improved in accuracy and sensitivity. Data storage and processing has greatly improved and new tools for specific functions have been developed or improved. Tools are available that can locate corrosion (external & internal), cracks, dents, gouges, etc. However, they still cannot determine if corrosion is active or not, unless previous inspections have determined and located those areas to allow a comparison between two successive tool runs.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NACE\n\nAddressee Organization Type: A-Associations\n\nCommunication Date: 1989-01-18\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: PLEASE SEE LOG FILE FOR RESPONSE TO THIS RECOMMENDATION.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NACE\n\nAddressee Organization Type: A-Associations\n\nCommunication Date: 2003-03-27\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: NACE International reports that since January 18, 1989, Section 6.3.3 of RP-0l-69 has been revised to incorporate the Safety Board's recommendation. In addition, NACE International's Task Group 039 issued Technical Report #35100, In-Line Nondestructive Inspection of Pipelines, in December 2000, and Task Group 212 issued RP-01-02-2002, In-Line Inspection of Pipelines, in 2002. While it is still not possible to determine whether corrosion is active or not, NACE Unit Committee T-10E on Internal Corrosion has been requested to establish a task group to prepare a report on intelligent pigging. Although the referenced intelligent pigging project is just starting, NACE International has been active in addressing the recommendation, and by including the recommendation in RP-01-69, has completed the recommended action. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-87-10 is classified \"Closed--Acceptable Action.\" The Safety Board requests that NACE International keep us informed on the status of the activities of NACE Unit Committee T-10E and provide a copy of the report on intelligent pigging when completed.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NACE\n\nAddressee Organization Type: A-Associations\n\nCommunication Date: 2002-05-06\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: On April 27, 1989, in consideration of information in the January 18, 1989, letter from Mr. Dale Miller, NACE's Director of Public Affairs, Safety Recommendations P-87-10 and -11 were classified \"Open--Acceptable Response.\" To date, no further correspondence has been received from NACE concerning this issue. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NACE\n\nAddressee Organization Type: A-Associations\n\nCommunication Date: 2002-11-18\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nCommunication Contents: On April 27, 1989, in consideration of information in the January 18, 1989, letter from Mr. Dale Miller, NACE International's Director of Public Affairs, Safety Recommendations P-87-10 and -11 were classified \"Open-Acceptable Response.\" In response to the Safety Board's May 6, 2002, letter requesting information on the status of action to implement the recommendations, NACE International responded on July 9, 2002, advising that this issue had been forwarded to the NACE International Public Affairs Committee, Technical Resource Team, to address these issues. The Technical Resource Team, comprising a number of subject matter experts, would complete its work on these issues by September 15, 2002, and NACE International would provide a follow-on response to the Safety Board. On February 25, 1999, in response to information provided in NACE International's January 7, 1999, letter, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation P-98-40 \"Open--Acceptable Response,\" pending publication of the proposed NACE International standard, Detection and Control of Microbially Influenced External Corrosion for Buried, Partially Buried or Submerged Metallic Piping Systems. To date, the Safety Board has received no further information from NACE International on the status of activities related to these recommendations. The Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Carol J. Carmody, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. Copies of the recommendation letters and associated correspondence are enclosed for your reference.\n\nAddressee Acronym: NACE\n\nAddressee Organization Type: A-Associations\n\nCommunication Date: 1990-05-31\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nAddressee Acronym: NACE\n\nAddressee Organization Type: A-Associations\n\nCommunication Date: 1988-10-21\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence\n\nAddressee Acronym: NACE\n\nAddressee Organization Type: A-Associations\n\nCommunication Date: 1989-04-27\n\nCommunication Type: Official Correspondence","truncated":false,"body_characters":9775}