# NTSB Safety Recommendation P-90-034

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** P-90-034
- **title:** NTSB Safety Recommendation P-90-034
- **source type:** guidance
- **agency:** National Transportation Safety Board
- **status:** guidance
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 1990-10-01
- **effective on:** 1990-10-01
- **summary:** THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE: ASSIST THE RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION WITH THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFECTIVE METHODS AND REQUIREMENTS TO BURY, PROTECT, INSPECT THE BURIAL DEPTH OF, AND MAINTAIN ALL SUBMERGED PIPELINES IN AREAS SUBJECT TO DAMAGE BY SURFACE VESSELS AND THEIR OPERATIONS. (Supersedes P-90-002)
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- **source url:** https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-90-034
**body:**

NTSB safety recommendation P-90-034.

THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE: ASSIST THE RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION WITH THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFECTIVE METHODS AND REQUIREMENTS TO BURY, PROTECT, INSPECT THE BURIAL DEPTH OF, AND MAINTAIN ALL SUBMERGED PIPELINES IN AREAS SUBJECT TO DAMAGE BY SURFACE VESSELS AND THEIR OPERATIONS. (Supersedes P-90-002)

Priority: CLASS II

Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Issued Date: 1990-10-01

Adopted Date: 1990-09-11

Overall Date Closed: 2002-03-25

Synopsis: ON OCTOBER 3, 1989, THE UNITED STATES FISHING VESSEL NORTHUMBERLAND STRUCK AND RUPTURED A 16-INCH-DIAMETER NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION PIPELINE ABOUT 1/2 NAUTICAL MILE OFFSHORE IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND ABOUT 5 1/3 NAUTICAL MILES WEST OF THE JETTIES AT THE ENTRANCE TO SABINE PASS, TEXAS. NATURAL GAS UNDER A PRESSURE OF 835 PSIG WAS RELEASED. AN UNDETERMINED SOURCE ON BOARD THE VESSEL IGNITED THE GAS, AND WITHIN SECONDS, THE ENTIRE VESSEL WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES. THE FIRE ON THE VESSEL BURNED ITSELF OUT ON OCTOBER 4. LEAKING GAS FROM THE PIPELINE ALSO CONTINUED TO BURN UNTIL OCTOBER 4. OF THE 14 CREW MEMBERS, 11 DIED AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT.

Ntsbnumber: DCA90MM001

Report Number: PAR-90-02

Addressee Name: United States Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service

Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Action

Addressee Date Closed: 2002-03-25

Addressee Acronym: MMS

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 1990-10-25

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: MMS continues to play a significant role in these efforts even though the pipelines in the more hazardous areas fall outside MMS's area of jurisdiction. Since RSPA's Office of Pipeline Safety is taking the lead in all these actions, it is appropriate that OPS keeps you appraised concerning the progress of these efforts.

Addressee Acronym: MMS

Addressee Organization Type: G-Federal Government

Communication Date: 2002-03-25

Communication Type: Official Correspondence

Communication Contents: On January 4, 1991, based on information provided in the MMS letter of October 25, 1990, Safety Recommendations P-90-34 through -36 were classified "Open--Acceptable Response," pending receipt of further information from MMS. In addition, the Safety Board issued companion safety recommendations to other agencies. Safety Recommendation P-90-29 was issued to RSPA to take the lead in implementing these initiatives with the assistance of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) (P-90-37), the U.S. Coast Guard (P-90-32), and the MMS. On July 23, 2001, based on information provided in the Coast Guard's letter of April 3, 2001, to the Safety Board, Safety Recommendation P-90-32 was classified "Closed--Acceptable Action," noting that RSPA's Office of Pipeline Safety had met regularly with the MMS, the U.S. Coast Guard, and other organizations to discuss pipeline safety matters and that RSPA planned to continue to attend Coast Guard advisory committee meetings and regional response team meetings. Safety Board staff confirmed with MMS staff that MMS had participated in this project. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation P-90-34 is also classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."
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