# NTSB Safety Recommendation P-93-017 - **operation:** document - **citation:** P-93-017 - **title:** NTSB Safety Recommendation P-93-017 - **source type:** guidance - **agency:** National Transportation Safety Board - **status:** guidance - **official:** true - **published on:** 1993-12-15 - **effective on:** 1993-12-15 - **summary:** THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY: DEVELOP GUIDANCE FOR COMMUNITIES ADJACENT TO HIGHLY VOLATILE LIQUID UNDERGROUND FACILITIES THAT IDENTIFY CONDITIONS THAT WARRANT AN EVACUATION, THAT IDENTIFY THE EXTENT OF THE AREA TO BE EVACUATED, AND THAT INCLUDE PROCEDURES FOR CARRYING OUT AN EVACUATION. - **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-93-017.json - **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-93-017.md - **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-recommendation-p-93-017 - **source url:** https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/P-93-017 **body:** NTSB safety recommendation P-93-017. THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY: DEVELOP GUIDANCE FOR COMMUNITIES ADJACENT TO HIGHLY VOLATILE LIQUID UNDERGROUND FACILITIES THAT IDENTIFY CONDITIONS THAT WARRANT AN EVACUATION, THAT IDENTIFY THE EXTENT OF THE AREA TO BE EVACUATED, AND THAT INCLUDE PROCEDURES FOR CARRYING OUT AN EVACUATION. Priority: CLASS II Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action Issued Date: 1993-12-15 Adopted Date: 1993-11-04 Overall Date Closed: 1995-06-02 Synopsis: ON APRIL 7, 1992, AN UNCONTROLLED RELEASE OF HIGHLY VOLATILE LIQUIDS (HVLS) FROM A SALT DOME STORAGE CAVERN IN THE SEMINOLE PIPELINE SYSTEM NEAR BRENHAM, TEXAS, FORMED A LARGE, HEAVIER-THAN-AIR GAS CLOUD THAT EXPLODED. THREE PEOPLE DIED FROM INJURIES SUSTAINED EITHER FROM THE BLAST OR IN THE FIRE. AN ADDITIONAL 21 PEOPLE WERE TREATED FOR INJURIES AT AREA HOSPITALS. DAMAGE FROM THE ACCIDENT EXCEEDED $9 MILLION. Probable Cause: None Ntsbnumber: DCA92MP006 Report Number: PAR-93-01 Addressee Name: State of Texas, Department of Public Safety Addressee Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action Addressee Date Closed: 1995-06-02 Addressee Acronym: DPS Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government Communication Date: 1994-03-14 Communication Type: Official Correspondence Communication Contents: THE DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT HAS FULFILLED THIS RESPONSIBILITY BY DEVELOPING A SERIES OF DOCUMENTS TO GUIDE LOCAL OFFICIALS IN DEVELOPING THEIR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLANS. THE RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS, THE STATE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR REGULATING HVL STORAGE FACILITIES, HAS ENACTED RULES REQUIRING EACH HVL STORAGE FACILITY TO DEVELOP A WRITTEN EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN. Addressee Acronym: DPS Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government Communication Date: 1995-04-10 Communication Type: Official Correspondence Communication Contents: This letter is a formal response to your letter of September 22, 1994, and addresses issues discussed between Ed Schaefer, Assistant State Coordinator, and Tom Lasseigne of your staff. Your letter suggested that we take additional action to “advise all Emergency Management Coordinators about the need to preplan and develop emergency response plans in coordination with pipeline companies. ” In addition, you suggested that an appendix might be developed to the Local Emergency Management Plan Development Handbook which has been published by this division. It was my contention, as expressed in my March 14, 1994, letter, that the existing language in the handbook, coupled with newly enacted regulations by the Railroad Commission of Texas (RRCT), the state agency which regulat.es pipelines and Highly Volatile Liquid (HVL) storage facilities, adequately addressed the concerns raised in the National Transportation Safety Board Recommendation P-93- 17. The referenced rules became effective January 1, 1994, and contained provisions requiring that, no later than July 1, 1994, (1) emergency plans be developed and provided to local officials; and (2) annual emergency drills be conducted with mandatory notice to the county’s emergency management coordinator and sheriff. Subsequent to his most recent conversation with Mr. Lasseigne, Mr. Schaefer contacted the personnel at the RRCT responsible for enforcement of these rules. He learned that compliance with these rules was being rigorously monitored by RRCT personnel and that no facilities are known to have failed to perform the required planning or conduct the required drills. In addition, Mr. Schaefer contacted Washington County, Texas, County Judge Dorothy Morgan to obtain her perspective concerning the efficacy of these rules. According to Judge Morgan, the pipeline company initiated coordinated planning and emergency drills with county officials early last year. These efforts continued until the firm made the decision to discontinue operation of its HVL facility. Judge Morgan said that these initiatives had substantially enhanced the county’s ability to coordinate effective warning and response activities.’ It seems readily apparent to me from these reports that the actions of the State of Texas in response to the April 7, 1992, explosion near Brenham, have been effective in addressing the concerns raised in NTSB Recommendation P-93-17. Accordingly, I request that the file on this recommendation be closed. If you have any questions concerning my positi0.n on this matter, please don’t hesitate to contact me at 512-465-2443 or Ed Schaefer, Assistant State Coordinator, at 512-465-2434. Addressee Acronym: DPS Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government Communication Date: 1994-09-22 Communication Type: Official Correspondence Communication Contents: THE BOARD HAS REVIEWED THE DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT'S LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK WHICH PROVIDES GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR PIPELINE COMPANIES IN DEVELOPING THEIR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLANS. ADDITIONALLY, BOARD HAS REVIEWED THE RAILRAOD COMMISSION OF TEXAS' NEWLY ENACTED RULES, WHICH WERE INCLUDED WITH YOUR RESPONSE, & REQUIRE EACH HIGHLY VOLATILE LIQUID STORAGE FACILITY TO DEVELOP A WRITTEN EMERGENCY PLAN. THE BOARD, HOWEVER, IS CONCERNED THAT THESE NEW RULES MAY NOT PROVIDE FOR A MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF INFO WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES. THE BOARD'S INVESTIGATION OF THE 4/7/92, ACCIDENT DISCLOSED THAT "ADEQUATE PLANNING BETWEEN MID-AMERICAN PIPELINE COMPANY & WASHINGTON COUNTY WOULD HAVE IMPROVED COORDINATION & INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS, INCLUDING NOTIFICATION OF PUBLIC RESPONSE AGENCIES & SECURING THE IMMEDIATE SITE AREA, & WOULD HAVE BETTER PREPARED THE RESPONDERS & THE PUBLIC FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A LARGE HVL RELEASE AT BRENHAM." PENDING YOUR REVIEW OF OUR COMMENTS, P-93-17 HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE." Addressee Acronym: DPS Addressee Organization Type: S-State Government Communication Date: 1995-06-02 Communication Type: Official Correspondence Communication Contents: The National Transportation Safety Board has received Mr. Tom Millwee’s April 10, 1995, response to Safety Recommendation P-93-17, which was issued to the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS) on December 15, 1993, as a result of the Safety Board’s investigation of the underground storage cavern volatile liquid release and explosion near Brenham, Texas, on April 7, 1992. Safety Recommendation P-93-17 asked the TDPS to develop guidance for communities adjacent to highly volatile liquid underground facilities that identifies conditions that warrant an evacuation, that identifies the extent of the area to be evacuated, and that includes procedures for carrying out an evacuation. In its letter of September 22, 1994, the Safety Board suggested that the TDPS take additional action to “advise all Emergency Management Coordinators about the need to preplan and develop emergency response plans in coordination with pipeline companies. ” The Safety Board recognizes that the State of Texas has enacted regulations requiring that emergency plans be developed and provided to local officials and that annual emergency drills be conducted with mandatory notice to the county’s emergency management coordinator and sheriff. In addition, the Board notes that compliance with rules is being monitored by the Railroad Commission of Texas. Based upon the strong assurances that the counties are complying with these rules, Safety Recommendation P-93-17 has been classified “Closed--Acceptable Alternate Action. ” - **truncated:** false - **body characters:** 7487