# NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-76-014 through P-76-015

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** P-76-014 through P-76-015
- **title:** NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-76-014 through P-76-015
- **source type:** guidance
- **agency:** National Transportation Safety Board
- **status:** guidance
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 1976-06-22
- **effective on:** 1976-06-22
- **summary:** Official NTSB transmittal letter for safety recommendations P-76-014 through P-76-015, issued 1976-06-22.
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-transmittal-letter-p76-14-15.json
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- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-transmittal-letter-p76-14-15
- **source url:** https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/P76_14_15.pdf
**body:**

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s s WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR RELEASE: 6:30 AtMo, E , D , T ~ J JUNE 22, 1976 ( 2 0 2 ) 426-8787 ISSUED: June 22, 1976 President Mid-Valley Pipeline Company 430 N. Center S t r e e t P.O. Box 2.388 Longview, Texas 75601 i P-76-14 through P-76-15 About 3:OO p . m . on January 1 7 , 1975, a p i p e ruptured a t t h e Mid-Valley Pipeline Company’s Lima, Ohio, crude o i l terminal. A motor-operated valve within t h e terminal had been closed inadvert- e n t l y and pressure had b u i l t up. When the pressure exceeded the 720- p s i g working pressure r a t i n g of a substandard flange, a 14-inch long craclc developed. Crude o i l was sprayed from the crack, atomized, i g n i t e d , and burned; flames r e s u l t e d which were more than 100 feet high. Attempts t o extinguish t h e f i r e and t o s h u t off valves to the terminal were hampered when overhead high-tension power l i n e s burned, arced, and fell i n t o t h e p i p e l i n e terminal yard. The fire destroyed the terminal buildings and k i l l e d t h e terminal deliveryman. The pump s t a t i o n upstream from Lima a t Pyrmont, Ohio, closed down automatically when a discharge pressure of 1,240 p s i g was reached. The L i m a pressure reading a t Longview indicated i t s maximum possible reading of 522 p s i g when t h e p i p e l i n e ruptured. However, t h e a c t u a l pressure w a s between 522 p s i g and 1,240 psig; t h i s unrelieved, high pressure caused t h e t e r m i n a l pipe t o rupture. There were no adequately sized pressure-relief valves along t h e p i p e l i n e system between t h e discharge valves a t the Pyrmont pump s t a t i o n and t h e discharge valves a t t h e Lima terminal. Consequently, t h e 20-inch p i p e l i n e between Pyrmont and Lima was a l s o overpressured. 1534-A

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- 7 - - The s t a r t i n g of a company pickup truck p i g n i t e . This truck had been sprayed with a t ruptured. When t h e deliveryman s t a r t e d t h e meter building, he had t o d r i v e it through an extensive oil PO by the overflowing of t h r e e underground sump tanks. Therefore, t h e National Transportation Safety Board reco Mid-Valley Pipeline Company: 1. I n s t a l l pressure-relief devices not only t o pr terminal at Lima, b u t a l s o t o p r o t e c t t h e 20 and Lima. (P-76-14] (Class 11, P r i o r i t y Followup) 2 . Rewrite portions of i t s procedures manuals t o prohi routine parking of vehicles i n terminal or s products a r e handled. (P-76-15) (Class 11, P r i o r i t y Pollowup) TODD, Chairman, McADAMS, BURGESS, i n t h e above recommendations. Chairman THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC ON THE DATE SHOWN AB0 NO PUBLIC DISSEMINATION OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN SHOULD MADE BEFORE THAT DATE.
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