{"operation":"document","citation":"P-76-095","title":"NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-76-095","source_type":"guidance","agency":"National Transportation Safety Board","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"1977-01-31","effective_on":"1977-01-31","summary":"Official NTSB transmittal letter for safety recommendation P-76-095, issued 1977-01-31.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-transmittal-letter-p76-95.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-transmittal-letter-p76-95.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-transmittal-letter-p76-95","source_url":"https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/P76_95.pdf","body":"Page 1\ns WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR RELEASE: 6:30 P.M,, E , S , T . / JANUARY 31, 1977 (202) 426-8787 ISSUED: January 31, 1977 ---_-______________________l__l_ F o r w a r d e d to: I M r . George G r i f f i t h I Pr es iden t The G r i f f i t h Company 1 SAFETY RECOMMENDAT I O N ( S ) 3650 Cherry Avenue I P . 0 . Box 980 I P-76-95 I Long Beach, California 90801 I I I I I M r . Charles U. Poss President C . W . P o s s , Inc. 7459 Large Circle Huntington Beach, California _________________I__----_--- A t 1 0 : 3 2 a.m., P . d . t . , on June 1 6 , 1976, a piece of construction equipment excavating f o r a s t r e e t widening project on Venice Boulevard i n Los Angeles, California, struck and punctured an 8-inch petroleum products pipeline owned by the Standard O i l Company of California. The escaping gasoline sprayed on nearby buildings and ignited 90 seconds l a t e r . A s a r e s u l t of t h i s accident 9 persons were k i l l e d , 1 4 persons were injured, 7 buildings were destroyed, other buildings were damaged by f i r e and heat, and 1 5 vehicles were destroyed. The intense f i r e melted powerlines and t e l e - phone l i n e s . &/ The California Department of Transportation, designers and originators of the construction project; the G r i f f i t h Company, the prime contractor f o r the project; C . W . Poss, I n c . , the sub- contractor; and the Standard O i l Company of California were a l l aware of the existence of the 8-inch pipeline. However, the precise depth of the pipeline within the accident area was not known, although preconstruction meetings had been held, testholes t o determine t h e pipeline depth had been dug a t other locations, and the pipeline i n another area had been lowered because of i t s insufficient depth. - 11 For more detailed information on t h i s accident, read \"Standard O i l Company of Califarnia, 8-Inch Pipeline Rupture, Venice Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, June 1 6 , 1976.\" NTSB-PAR,-76-8 . 1939\n\nPage 2\n- 2 - P-76-95 No \"one-call'' n o t i f i c a t i o n system was i n e f f e c t i n the Los Angeles area at the time of the accident which would have enabled the contractor t o request and receive specific infoma- t i o n concerning the depth and location of buried u t i l i t i e s . Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends t h a t the G r i f f i t h Company and C . W. Poss, Inc.: Cooperate and coordinate with 'those groups attempting t o establish a \"one-call'' system i n areas i n which they conduct excavation a c t i v i t i e s . (Class 11, P r i o r i t y F o l l o ~ p ) (P-76-95) TODD, Chairman, BAILEY, Vice Chairman, HOGUE and HALEY, Members, concurred i n the above recommendation. McADAMS, Member, did not p a r t i c i p a t e . By: Chairman THIS RECOMMENDATION WILL BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC ON THE ISSUE DATE SHOWN ABOVE. NO PUBLIC DISSEMINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE MADE PRIOR TO THAT DATE.","truncated":false,"body_characters":2932}