{"operation":"document","citation":"P-78-018 through P-78-019","title":"NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-78-018 through P-78-019","source_type":"guidance","agency":"National Transportation Safety Board","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"1978-07-06","effective_on":"1978-07-06","summary":"Official NTSB transmittal letter for safety recommendations P-78-018 through P-78-019, issued 1978-07-06.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-transmittal-letter-p78-18-19.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-transmittal-letter-p78-18-19.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-transmittal-letter-p78-18-19","source_url":"https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/P78_18_19.pdf","body":"Page 1\nNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. Forwarded t o : M r . A. J. Clark President George Hyman Construction Company 4930 D e l Ray Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20014 SAFETY RECOMMENDAT I O N ( S ) P-78-18 and 1 9 A t 1 p.m., e.s.t., on December 1, 1977, a 12-inch, cast-iron, high- pressure gas main owned by the Atlanta Gas Light Company (AGL) w a s ruptured by a n 8-inch s t e e l I-beam p i l e , which was driven through the pipe a t a construction s i t e i n downtown Atlanta, Georgia. L/ Within minutes, n a t u r a l gas a t 10-psig pressure migrated through t h e ground, entered sewer l i n e s and e l e c t r i c conduit systems, and spread i n t o nearby buildings. The gas did not i g n i t e , b u t thousands of people were evacuated from nearby o f f i c e buildings. A valve was closed a t 2:45 p.m. t o s h u t off t h e flow of gas t o the ruptured main, and t h e a r e a was declared s a f e a t 4 p.m. The George Hyman Construction Company was the contractor a t t h e construction site and had c a l l e d the U t i l i t i e s Protection Center (UPC), a l o c a l one-call n o t i f i c a t i o n system, t o n o t i f y AGL of proposed excavation work at the s i t e . The UPC i n s t r u c t e d AGL t o meet with t h e contractor a t t h e construction site. The L P C asked t h e contractor t o c a l l back if an AGL r e p r e s e n t a t i v e did n o t s e e him at the construction site. The contractor did not meet with a representative from AGL and did not c a l l WC t o v e r i f y another meeting . The AGL d i d send a \"locator\" man t o t h e site; however, he did not meet with t h e contractor and did not l o c a t e and mark a l l of the gas l i n e s around the site. Because t h e r e were markings showing the l o c a t i o n s of p a r t of t h e underground gas f a c i l i t i e s , the contractor d i d n o t determine before excavation work began t h a t t h e gas f a c i l i t i e s were completely located f o r t h i s p r o j e c t . - 1/ For more d e t a i l e d information read \"Pipeline Accident Report -- Atlanta Gas Light Company, High-pressure Gas Main Rupture, Atlanta, Georgia, December L, 1977\" (NTSB-PAR-78-3). 2360\n\nPage 2\n- 2 - I Although AGL d i d not mark t h e locations of a l l t h e i r underground f a c i l i t i e s , t h e contractor did have plans showing t h e location of t h e gas l i n e along t h e southwestside of t h e p r o j e c t . The contractor should have heeded t h i s information. A s a r e s u l t of its i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h i s accident, t h e National Transportation Safety Board recommends t h a t t h e George Hyman Construction Company: Require i t s employees t o follow completely the i n s t r u c t i o n s given by one-call n o t i f i c a t i o n (Class 11, P r i o r i t y Action)(P-78-18) systems. l n s t r u c t its employees t o a s c e r t a i n by a l l p o s s i b l e means the locations of underground f a c i l i t i e s before excavating a t a construction s i t e . (Class TI, P r i o r i t y Action)(P-78-19) KING, Chairman, McADAMS, HOGUE, and DRIVER, Members, concurred i n t h e above recommendations.","truncated":false,"body_characters":3161}