{"operation":"document","citation":"P-81-017 through P-81-019","title":"NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter P-81-017 through P-81-019","source_type":"guidance","agency":"National Transportation Safety Board","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"1981-07-28","effective_on":"1981-07-28","summary":"Official NTSB transmittal letter for safety recommendations P-81-017 through P-81-019, issued 1981-07-28.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-transmittal-letter-p81-17-19.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-transmittal-letter-p81-17-19.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/ntsb-transmittal-letter-p81-17-19","source_url":"https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/P81_17_19.pdf","body":"Page 1\nNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOA WASHINGTON, D.C. I S S U E D : J u l y 28, 1981 ------------____________I_______________- Forwarded t o : \\ Mr. K. E. Bailey President Williams Pipe Line Company P.O. Drawer 3448 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74101 S A F E T Y R E C O M M E N D A T I O N ( S ) P-81-17 through -19 ---_-------------_______________________- A t 4:45 p.m., c.s.t., on April 16, 1980, gasoline a t the Williams Pipe Line Company's Minneapolis terminal in Roseville, iilinnesota, sprayed from the fractured cast-iron base of a station booster pump a t 7 2 psig pressure, vaporized, and exploded after it was ignited by the arcing of an electric switch in the mainline pump control room 50 feet downwind of the booster pump. - 1/ The explosion killed one person and the following fire burned three other persons and destroyed the receiving manifold valves and piping, the station pumping equipment, and four vehicles. About 3,500 barrels (147,000 gallons) of petroleum products burned and property damage was estimated a t $ 3 million. The newly installed pump together with its valves and fittings had not been hydrostatically tested as a completed facility prior to this accident. The electric switch in the mainline pump control room which was located 50 feet away from the failed station booster pump was not explosion-proof and it arced when disengaged. Additionally, Williams did not have written emergency procedures a t the time of the accident t o deal with this type of situation. Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Williams Pipe Line Company: Revise its equipment installation procedures to include hydrostatic tests in accordance w i t h the provisions of 49 CFR 195.302, General Requirements, and 49 CFR 195.304, Testing of Components. (Class 11, Priority Action) (P-81-17) - 1/ For more information, read Pipeline Accident Report--\"Williams Pipe Line Company, Gasoline Explosion and Fire, Roseville, Minnesota, April 16, 1980\" (NTSB-PAR-81-3). 3298\n\nPage 2\n-2- Evaluate its existing facilities to determine the need for explosi electrical equipment. (Class 11, Prioritv Action) (P-81-18) Provide appropriate written instructions to its emplo precautionary safety measures t o be taken in a hazard0 particularly in regard to emergency shutdown procedures Priority Action) (P-81-19) K I N G , Chairman, DRIVER, Vice Chairman, McADAMS, GOLDMAN, and Me mbers, concurred in these recommendations.","truncated":false,"body_characters":2448}