# PRODUCTS (SE) PIPE LINE CORPORATION — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 120055017
- **title:** PRODUCTS (SE) PIPE LINE CORPORATION — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2005-11-10
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(a), 195.402(d)(1)(iv), 195.404(a)(1)(iv).
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**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving PRODUCTS (SE) PIPE LINE CORPORATION. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195,  195.402(a),  195.402(d)(1)(iv),  195.404(a)(1)(iv). The case was opened on 2005-11-10 and is reported as closed as of 2009-04-14. Proposed civil penalty: $155,000. Assessed civil penalty: $155,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

120055017_FinalOrder_03272009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120055017/120055017_FinalOrder_03272009.pdf

120055017_FinalOrder_03272009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120055017/120055017_FinalOrder_03272009_text.pdf

120055017_FinalOrder_03272009_text.pdf

March 27, 2009
Mr. Thomas A. Bannigan
President, Plantation Pipe Line Company
500 Dallas Street, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77002
RE: CPF No. 1-2005-5017
Dear Mr. Bannigan:
Enclosed is the Final Order in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of violation
and assesses a civil penalty of $155,000. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final
Order. This enforcement action closes automatically upon payment. Your receipt of this Final
Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Ron McClain, Vice-President, Product Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc.
500 Dallas Street, Suite 1000, Houston, Texas 77002
Ms. Jessica Toll, Assistant General Counsel, Kinder Morgan, Inc.
P. O. Box 281304, Lakewood, Colorado 80228
Mr. Byron Coy, Director, Eastern Region, OPS
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 0390 0005 6163 7442]



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
________________________________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
)
Plantation Pipe Line Company, ) CPF No. 1-2005-5017
a subsidiary of Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., )
)
Respondent. )
________________________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
Between July 20-23, 2004, and July 27-30, 2004, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative
of the Virginia State Corporation Commission (SCC), as agent for the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an on-
site safety inspection of the hazardous liquid pipeline facilities and records of Plantation Pipe
Line Company (Plantation or Respondent), a subsidiary of Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P.,
at its Washington Station and Roanoke Terminal facilities in Virginia. Respondent operates a
3,100-mile petroleum pipeline system in the southeastern United States that runs from Louisiana
to Washington, D.C.
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Eastern Region OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,
by letter dated November 10, 2005, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty
(Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that Respondent
had committed certain violations 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.402(a), 195.402(d)(1)(iv), and
195.404(a)(1)(iv), and proposed assessing a civil penalty of $155,000 for the alleged violations.
By letter dated December 22, 2005, Respondent submitted a Response to the Notice (Response).
Plantation contested the allegations of violation, provided information to demonstrate its
compliance with the cited regulations, and requested withdrawal of the Notice and elimination of
the proposed civil penalties. Respondent also requested a hearing if OPS decided not to
withdraw the Notice. A hearing was subsequently held on June 7, 2006, in Washington, D.C.,
with Renita K. Bivins, Esquire, Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. At the hearing,
Respondent was represented by counsel. Respondent submitted a post-hearing statement by
letter dated June 29, 2006 (Closing).



2
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
Item 1 in the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §195.402(a), which states:
§ 195.402. Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding
15 months, but at least each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. . . .
Item 1 of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.402(a) by failing to review its
Facility Response Plan (Plan) at the Washington Station facility, at intervals not exceeding 15
months but at least each calendar year, and to make appropriate changes as necessary to insure
that the Plan was effective. Specifically, Section 1.4 of the Plan stated that personnel should, “at
least once per year, review and make appropriate revisions as required by changes in the names
and telephone numbers detailed in Section 2.” The Notice alleged that the last revision to this
section of the Plan prior to the July 2004 inspection was in November 2001 and that a discussion
with Plantation’s operating supervisor at the time of the inspection confirmed that the Plan had
not been properly reviewed and updated. During the hearing, an SCC representative testified
that the inspection revealed that the list of names and telephone numbers in the Plan failed to
reflect the current area code for the facility as of 2004; the area code changed between the end of
2001 and beginning of 2002.
Before and during the hearing, Respondent argued that the Plan had been reviewed each calendar
year, as required by § 195.402(a), and that it had conducted both a corporate and local review of
the Plan in years 2002 and 2003. Plantation personnel testified that the Plan had also been used
during its annual Hazwoper training in 2002 and 2003, which added an additional level of
review. The annual “tabletop exercise” conducted during the Hazwoper training was designed to
demonstrate Respondent’s readiness in executing the provisions of the Plan.
Respondent further argued that during the OPS inspection, approximately 5-10 emergency
responder telephone numbers from the Plan had been randomly selected and checked to verify
their accuracy. All the numbers dialed were correct. Although Respondent acknowledged that
the pages reviewed by the inspector had not been revised since November 2001, it contended that
the Plan had, in fact, been reviewed in 2002 and 2003. The local right-of-way technician for the
Washington Station stated that although he did not have any documentation substantiating the
dates of such reviews, he was sure that they had been conducted. According to Plantation, no
revisions had been made to the Plan’s telephone contact list because the contact numbers were
correct. Furthermore, the list was updated on an ongoing basis at the company’s Control Center
in Alpharetta, Georgia, and placed on Respondent’s intranet for access by field personnel.
I have given full consideration to all of the evidence and arguments presented by OPS and
Respondent. Despite Plantation’s contention that it conducted timely reviews of the Plan, the



3
record shows that no revisions had been made to the Plan since 2001, that the company failed to
document any reviews since that time, and that its operating supervisor acknowledged not having
reviewed the Plan. Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by
failing to review, at the required interval, its manual of written procedures for operations,
maintenance and emergencies to insure that the manual was effective.
Item 2 of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(d)(1)(iv), which
states:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) . . . .
(d) Abnormal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this
section must include procedures for the following to provide safety when
operating design limits have been exceeded:
(1) Responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of: . .
(iv) Operation of any safety device; . . . .
Item 2 of the Notice alleged that Plantation violated § 195.402(d)(1)(iv) by failing to follow its
own local operating procedures that provided for the operation of safety devices when the
operating design limits of its facilities were exceeded. Specifically, the Notice alleged that on
March 25, 2004, the interface tank at the Washington Station experienced a high tank level
alarm, indicating that the tank’s operating design limits had been exceeded and causing the
(incoming) block valve and pressure reducing valve to close.1
The Notice alleged that
Plantation’s Control Center Team Leader gave permission to bypass the high tank alarm, relieve
the line pressure, and restart the mainline, in violation of a company procedure entitled,
“Requisite Relief Capacity, Tank 113, Local Operating Procedures Washington Station,” dated
November 15, 2000 (Tank 113 Procedure). That procedure states,
“Under no circumstances,
during normal operating conditions, should the High Level Alarm, on Tank 113, be exceeded.”
According to the Notice, operating Tank 113 at a level above its operating design could have
caused a release of product.
In its written submissions and at the hearing, Respondent raised several defenses to this
allegation but argued primarily that the Tank 113 Procedure was not in effect at the time of the
incident.
2
On the contrary, Plantation contended that the local procedure “was a remnant of
historical operations when the facility was operated locally and no longer valid for current
operations.” The company presented evidence to show that the Washington Station had been
1 The Notice indicated that Tank 113 also served as relief flow for the company’s 14W mainline.
2 In its Response, Plantation also asserted that the high level tank alarm was not a “safety device”, as defined under
§ 195.402(d)(1)(iv), for Tank 113 and that during the March 25, 2004, incident, the capacity design limit of the tank
was never exceeded. Response, at 3, 4. It is unnecessary to reach these defenses because, as noted below,
Plantation treated the incident as a violation of the company’s own procedures for operating a safety device by
completing an Accident/Near Miss Notification report.



4
operated remotely by Plantation’s Control Center in Alpharetta, Georgia, since July 2003 and
contended that the Tank 113 Procedure should never have been provided to the SCC inspector.3
Among the documents submitted by Plantation were copies of Memorandum of Change (MOC)
Procedure #1529, and other related emails and paperwork, which, the company argued, showed
that certain operational changes at the Washington Station were in the process of taking place
when the March 25, 2004, incident occurred. According to Plantation, these procedures allowed
Respondent to bypass the high level alarm on Tank 113.
During the hearing, OPS responded by asserting that the agency had not received any
documentation showing that Plantation had actually implemented any procedure other than the
Tank 113 Procedure as of the date of the incident. As for the MOC Procedure #1529, OPS
personnel pointed out that the document lacked any effective date. Respondent eventually
acknowledged during the hearing and in its Closing that the MOC Procedure #1529 and other
changes at the Washington Station were still in the company’s approval process when the March
25, 2004, incident occurred and were not finally approved until March 26, 2004.
4
The company
never presented any documentation showing that the Tank 113 Procedure had been superseded
or had become obsolete as of the date of the incident.
On the contrary, the record shows that Plantation’s own personnel considered the incident to be
an abnormal operation under the company’s operating procedures. OPS produced an
“Accident/Near Miss Notification” report that Plantation personnel filed the day after the
incident, based upon the Control Center Team Leader’s action in overriding the Tank 113
Procedure.
5
On the same day that the report was filed, the company finally approved the
operational changes contained in MOC Procedure #1529.
Accordingly, upon consideration of all of the evidence and arguments presented during the
hearing and in Respondent’s Closing, I find that Plantation’s Tank 113 Procedure was in effect at
the time of the March 25, 2004, incident and that the company violated such policy by allowing
the high tank alarm on Tank 113 to be exceeded, bypassing the alarm, and continuing to operate
the line. Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.402(d)(1)(iv) by failing to
follow its own procedures providing for the operation of safety devices when the operating
design limits of its facilities were exceeded.
Item 3 of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.404(a)(1)(iv), which
states:
§ 195.404. Maps and records.
(a) Each operator shall maintain current maps and records of its
pipeline systems that include at least the following information:
(1) Location and identification of the following pipeline facilities: . . .
(iv) Pipeline valves . . . .
3 Response, at 3, 4.
4 Closing, at 5.
5 Violation Report, Exhibit 2.



5
Item 3 of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.404(a)(1)(iv) by failing to maintain
current maps and records of its pipeline systems. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Plantation
failed to depict block valves 1A and 1B for the PPL to KMST delivery line on the company’s
alignment sheets. The Notice alleged that during the inspection, the company’s Operations and
Maintenance Supervisor stated that he did not know why the valves were not shown on the
alignment sheets.
In its Response and at the hearing, Respondent acknowledged that the valves were not depicted
on the alignment sheets. The company argued, however, that the valves were shown on its
Delorme Maps, which were used by field personnel when responding to emergencies, and that
such maps were accessible to all personnel on the company’s intranet. In addition, Plantation
contended that the valves were included in its semi-annual valve inspections and also in its
annual Corrosion Survey. Therefore, the company contended that because the valves were
shown on other maps and records and the company included them in its routine inspection
programs, this constituted compliance with § 195.404(a)(1)(iv).
I disagree. Inherent in an operator’s obligation under § 195.404(a) to maintain “current maps
and records” is the need for such records to be complete and accurate. The last revision date on
this particular alignment sheet was October 21, 1991, which was after the date that the valves
were installed. Therefore, the alignment sheets being used by Plantation personnel were not
“current.” As OPS noted at the hearing, if company field personnel had an immediate need for
information regarding the location of block valves 1A and 1B, their ability to quickly locate,
drive to, and shut the valves could have been compromised by the lack of accurate alignment
sheets.
Furthermore, Respondent failed to produce any verifiable documentation or tangible evidence
that the alignment sheets were actually accessible to field personnel on Respondent’s intranet or
otherwise. A primary objective of § 195.404 is to ensure that operators are able to effectively
locate their pipeline facilities during emergencies. If alignment sheet are inaccurate, it may be
difficult for personnel to follow the proper procedures and techniques to prevent hazards.
Accordingly, upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§195.404(a)(1)(iv) by failing to maintain current alignment sheets of its pipeline systems that
showed the two block valves.
ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 per
violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any related series of
violations. 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225 require that, in determining the amount
of the civil penalty, I consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the
violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability;
the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; the Respondent’s ability to pay the penalty and any
effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of



6
Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may
consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of
subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total
civil penalty of $155,000 for violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195.
Item 1 of the Notice proposed a civil penalty of $5,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a),
for Respondent’s failure to review its Plan at the Washington Station facility in 2002 and 2003,
at intervals not exceeding 15 months but at least once each calendar year. As discussed above,
the record shows that despite Plantation’s contention that it conducted annual reviews of the
Plan, the company was unable to provide any verifiable contemporaneous documentation or
other persuasive evidence to show that it actually performed such reviews within the required
intervals. Sound recordkeeping serves to authenticate a company’s procedures, controls, and
reviews; they are an essential means of demonstrating compliance with regulatory requirements
and ensuring accountability within an operator’s organization. Respondent has not provided any
evidence that would justify mitigation or elimination of the proposed civil penalty. Accordingly,
having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil
penalty of $5,000 for its violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a).
Item 2 of the Notice proposed a civil penalty of $100,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§195.402(d)(1)(iv), for Respondent’s failure to follow its own Tank 113 Procedure on March 25,
2004, when the company allowed the high tank level alarm on Tank 113 to be exceeded. As
discussed above, I found that said procedure was in effect at the time of the incident and that
Respondent failed to comply with it, as required under § 195.402(d)(1)(iv). It is critical that
procedures dealing with abnormal operations be kept up-to-date and adequately communicated
to employees so that they can perform their assigned tasks without jeopardizing their own
personal safety or that of the pipeline. In this case, the company failed to follow its own
procedures for the operation of a critical safety device and even documented such failure by
filing a “Near Miss” report. The failure of the company to have and follow current safety
procedures could have resulted in potentially serious safety and environmental consequences.
Respondent has not provided any evidence that would justify mitigation or elimination of the
proposed civil penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment
criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $100,000 for its violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(d)(1)(iv).
Item 3 of the Notice proposed a civil penalty of $50,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§195.404(a)(1)(iv), for Respondent’s failure to maintain current maps and records of its pipeline
system. As discussed above, Respondent acknowledged that the two block valves in question
were not depicted on the alignment sheet for the PPL to KMST delivery line, but argued that
because the valves were shown on other maps that were available to company personnel, the
company demonstrated compliance with the regulation. I rejected this argument, finding that
Respondent violated § 195.404(a)(1)(iv) by failing to update the alignment sheets for this facility
to show the accurate location of the two block valves.
Respondent argued that the proposed penalties for Items 2 and 3 were excessive because: (1) the
alleged violations had not resulted in any adverse impact on the environment; (2) all of the



7
company’s actions were undertaken in a good faith effort to achieve compliance and Plantation
did not have a history of similar violations; (3) omission of the valves on the alignment sheets
was merely an oversight, since the company was well aware of the valves via inspections and
maintenance; and (4) accurate maps were accessible to its personnel via the company’s intranet.
I find all of these arguments unpersuasive. The fact that no safety or environmental harm
resulted from the violations may simply have been fortuitous. It is correct that PHMSA
recognizes the good faith efforts of operators to achieve compliance with the regulations; for
example, they may misinterpret a regulatory requirement in establishing their own policies and
procedures. In this case, however, Plantation failed to follow its own procedures for the
operation of the high tank level alarm and treated the incident as a “near miss.” Therefore, I
cannot consider this to constitute a good faith effort to achieve compliance with § 195.402(d)(1).
As for Respondent’s contention that the omission of the valves on the alignment sheets was a
mere oversight, that does not reduce its potential risk. PHMSA is aware of serious accidents on
other pipelines that could have either been prevented or greatly mitigated if field personnel had
had accurate alignment sheets readily available to them on their job sites. Even if company
personnel inspected the valves regularly and knew their location, this doesn’t reduce the need for
all personnel and contractors to have ready access to accurate maps and records in the event of
emergencies. In such situations, field personnel may not have sufficient time to check the
company’s intranet for the location of valves.
Respondent also failed to produce any verifiable documentation or evidence showing that
accurate alignment sheets were actually accessible to personnel in the field on Respondent’s
intranet or otherwise. Respondent has not shown any circumstance that would justify its failure
to maintain accurate alignment sheets that included valves 1A and 1B. Accordingly, having
reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of
$50,000 for its violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.404(a)(1)(iv).
In summary, having reviewed the entire record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess
Respondent a total civil penalty of $155,000. There is nothing in the record indicating that
payment of this penalty would adversely affect Respondent’s ability to continue in business.
Payment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations
(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require this payment be made by wire transfer, through the Federal
Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed
instructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be
directed to: Financial Operations Division (AMZ-341), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike
Monroney Aeronautical Center, P.O. Box 269039, Oklahoma City, OK 73125; (405) 954-8893.
Failure to pay the $155,000 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual
rate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. §901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to
those same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if
payment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty
may result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a United
States District Court.



8
Under 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of
this Final Order. The petition must be received within 20 days of Respondent's receipt of this
Final Order and must contain a brief statement of the issue(s). The filing of the petition
automatically stays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. All other terms of the order,
including any required corrective action, remain in full effect unless the Associate Administrator,
upon request, grants a stay. The terms and conditions of this Final Order shall be effective upon
receipt.
_________________________________ __________________
Jeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
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