{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 120095002","title":"BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2009-06-26","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.401(b), 195.402(a), 195.403(b), 195.406(b), 195.412(a), 195.438, 195.452(b)(2), 195.452(f)(3), 195.452(f)(6), 195.452(i)(2), 195.452(i)(4), 195.452(j)(2), 195.557(a), 195.561, 195.571, 195.573(c), 195.573(e), 195.583(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120095002.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120095002.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120095002","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/120095002","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.401(b),  195.402(a),  195.403(b),  195.406(b),  195.412(a),  195.438,  195.452(b)(2),  195.452(f)(3),  195.452(f)(6),  195.452(i)(2),  195.452(i)(4),  195.452(j)(2),  195.557(a),  195.561,  195.571,  195.573(c),  195.573(e),  195.583(a). The case was opened on 2009-06-26 and is reported as closed as of 2013-06-17. Proposed civil penalty: $645,200. Assessed civil penalty: $524,900. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n120095002_ Operator Response to Notice letter_09252009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_%20Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20letter_09252009.pdf\n\n120095002_Closure Letter_06172013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_Closure%20Letter_06172013.pdf\n\n120095002_Closure Letter_06172013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_Closure%20Letter_06172013_text.pdf\n\n120095002_Final Order _05302012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_Final%20Order%20_05302012.pdf\n\n120095002_Final_Order_05302012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_Final_Order_05302012_text.pdf\n\n120095002_NOPV-PCP-PCO_06262009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_NOPV-PCP-PCO_06262009.pdf\n\n120095002_NOPV-PCP-PCO_06262009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_NOPV-PCP-PCO_06262009_text.pdf\n\n120095002_NOPV-PCP-PCO_06262009_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department 820 Bear Tavern Road. Suite 306\nof Transportation West Trenton, N.J. 08628\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE CIVIL PENALTY\nAND\nNOTICE OF PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nJune 26, 2009\nMr. Lawrence Shelton\nVice President, Field Operations\nBuckeye Partners, L.P.\n5 TEK Park\n9999 Hamilton Blvd\nBreinigsville, PA 18031\nCPF 1-2009-5002\nDear Mr. Shelton:\nFrom May to December 2008, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) and the New York Public Service Commission pursuant to Chapter\n601 of 49 United States Code inspected Buckeye Partners, L.P. (BPL)’s procedures and\nrecords for Operations and Maintenance, Operator Qualification, and Integrity Management at\nBPL’s Headquarters office, and field inspection of pipeline facilities in the states of\nPennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan and Colorado.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that BPL has committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The probable violations\nare:\n\n\n\n1. § 195.401 General requirements.\n(b) Whenever an operator discovers any condition that could adversely\naffect the safe operation of its pipeline system, it shall correct it within a\nreasonable time. However, if the condition is of such a nature that it\npresents an immediate hazard to persons or property, the operator may not\noperate the affected part of the system until it has corrected the unsafe\ncondition….\nThe inspection team discovered that 1) a block of wood was being used as support for a\ncontrol valve in the Greensburg Station; 2) a support device at the tank farm in Toledo,\nOhio was installed on the 16-inch manifold where pipe modifications had been made, but\nno associated concrete foundation was present under the pipe support; 3) at the Malvern\nStation, the pipeline was found to be in contact with a cutoff section of pipe near a line\ntank; and 4) at the Greensburg Station, the pipeline was found to be in non-intentional\ncontact with a concrete block at the pig receiver. Buckeye failed to correct these adverse\nconditions within a reasonable time, as required by the regulation.\n2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes\nmade as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall\nbe prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted....\nAt the time of the inspection, BPL could not demonstrate that required reviews of the\noperations, maintenance, and emergency manuals had been performed once per calendar year\nat intervals not exceeding 15 months.\n3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes\nmade as necessary to insure that the manual is effective…\nBPL failed to follow its O&M procedures which require a root cause analysis for accident\nreports. The PHMSA inspection team identified 25 accident reports that did not include a root\ncause analysis as required by company procedures.\n2\n\n\n\n4. §195.403 Emergency Response Training.\n(a) Each operator shall establish and conduct a continuing training\nprogram to instruct emergency response personnel…\n(b) At the intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each\ncalendar year, each operator shall:\n(1) Review with personnel their performance in meeting the objectives of\nthe emergency response training program set forth in paragraph (a) of this\nsection; and\n(2) Make appropriate changes to the emergency response training program\nas necessary to ensure that it is effective….\nAt the time of the inspection, BPL could not demonstrate that the company had reviewed the\nperformance of personnel during emergencies at the required intervals.\n5. §195.412 Inspection of rights-of-way and crossing under navigable\nwaters.\n(a) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 3 weeks, but at least 26\ntimes each calendar year, inspect the surface conditions on or adjacent to\neach pipeline right-of-way. Methods of inspection include walking, driving,\nflying or other appropriate mean of traversing the right-of-way….\nBPL uses aerial patrols to inspect surface conditions. However, at the time of the inspection,\nexcessive vegetation and overgrowth was found at 1) the Perryville Station, PA;\n2) near stations 814+59, 1290+71 and 128+60 on the Laurel pipeline, in PA; and 3) and near\nStrawberry Mansion (station 1049+72) in PA. Therefore, detrimental conditions or leaks could\nnot be adequately observed by aerial patrols due to the overgrowth.\n6. § 195.557 Which pipelines must have coating for external corrosion control?\nExcept bottoms of aboveground breakout tanks, each buried or submerged\npipeline must have an external coating for external corrosion control if the\npipeline is—\n(a) Constructed, relocated, replaced, or otherwise changed after the applicable\ndate in §195.401(c), not including the movement of pipe covered by §195.424….\nAt the time of the inspection, soil-to-air interface on the 301 Line pump discharge pipe and two\nsample lines at the BPL Toledo Station in Ohio were not coated as required by the regulation.\n7. § 195.583 What must I do to monitor atmospheric corrosion control?\n(a) You must inspect each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the\natmosphere for evidence of atmospheric corrosion, as follows:\n3\n\n\n\nIf the pipeline\nis\nlocated: Then the frequency of inspection is:\nOnshore At least once every 3 calendar years, but with intervals not exceeding 39\nmonths.\nOffshore At least once each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths.\nBPL records indicated that atmospheric corrosion control inspection for the above ground\npiping of Mantua Station exceeded the required intervals. Inspections were conducted on\n5/4/2004 and 1/29/2008 which exceeded the 39 months interval.\n8. § 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(c) Rectifiers and other devices. You must electrically check for proper\nperformance each device in the first column at the frequency stated in the second\ncolumn.\nDevice Check frequency\nRectifier\nReverse current switch.\nDiode.\nInterference bond whose failure\nWould jeopardize structural\nprotection.\nAt least six times each\ncalendar year, but with\nintervals not exceeding 2\n1/2 months.\nOther interference bond At least once each\ncalendar year, but with\nintervals not exceeding 15\nmonths.\nBPL failed to check multiple rectifiers at the required frequencies to ensure proper\nperformance. Specifically, a review of the BPL Rectifier Output History Report for 1/1/2006\nto 5/1/2008 indicated that inspection intervals for the Harristown Shell system exceeded the 2-\n1/2 month maximum interval between May and September 2006) by approximately 1-1/2\nmonths for three rectifiers.\nA review of the Rectifier Output History Report for 1/1/2006 to 5/1/2008 demonstrates that\nrectifiers (No.1, No.2, No.3, PM-0.01) in the BPL Trans PA, Malvern Station Tank farm,\nPaulsboro Deep Well, and Chester Park were not checked at least six times in the 2006 - 2007\ncalendar period.\n4\n\n\n\nA review of the Rectifier Output History Report for 1/1/2006 to 5/1/2008 indicated that\ninspections for the Booth Rectifier LP-07 for Tank #15 exceeded the maximum 2-1/2 month\ninterval between 03/05/2006 to 05/26/2006.\nA review of the Rectifier Output History Report for 1/1/2006 to 5/1/2008 indicated that BPL\ndid not inspect the rectifier at Booth LP-08 STA40009 BH724SK between 9/5/2006 and\n1/12/2007, exceeding the maximum 2 ½ month interval.\n9. § 195.571 What criteria must I use to determine the adequacy of cathodic\nprotection?\nCathodic protection required by this subpart must comply with one or more of the\napplicable criteria and other considerations for cathodic protection contained in\nparagraphs 6.2 and 6.3 of NACE Standard RP 0169 (incorporated by reference,\nsee §195.3).\nBPL could not demonstrate that the cathodic protection for the facilities at the Philadelphia, PA\nairport complied with the applicable criteria. According to BPL’s representative, the company\ndoes not know if there are adequate levels of cathodic protection for BPL facilities at the\nPhiladelphia, PA Airport apparently due to access limitations. BPL has not taken any pipe-to-\nsoil readings since October 2006.\n10. § 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(e) Corrective action. You must correct any identified deficiency in corrosion\ncontrol as required by §195.401(b). However, if the deficiency involves a pipeline\nin an integrity management program under §195.452, you must correct the\ndeficiency as required by §195.452(h).\nBPL did not correct identified corrosion control deficiencies within a reasonable time period,\nas required by the regulation. A review of Test Point Survey Reports, for 920 NGL, identified\ninadequate levels of cathodic protection. Specifically, the CP survey at the test point location\nI-70 XING South, for 920 NGL, indicated inadequate levels of CP in the 2006 and 2007 annual\nsurveys but were not corrected until February 2008.\n11. § 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(e) Corrective action. You must correct any identified deficiency in corrosion\ncontrol as required by §195.401(b). However, if the deficiency involves a pipeline\nin an integrity management program under §195.452, you must correct the\ndeficiency as required by §195.452(h).\nThe inspection team’s review of the BPL work orders demonstrated that several locations with\nlow CP readings were not corrected by the next inspection cycle. Under §195.401(b), BPL\nwas required to correct the deficiency within a reasonable time. Although BPL had an\n5\n\n\n\nobligation to correct the deficiency within the time period set in the regulation, the company\nrecords reflected that the work at the twelve locations was scheduled to start between years\n2005-2007 and yet had not been completed by the time the PHMSA inspection occurred.\n12. § 195.438 Smoking or open flames.\nEach operator shall prohibit smoking and open flames in each pump station area\nand each breakout tank area where there is a possibility of the leakage of a\nflammable hazardous liquid or of the presence of flammable vapors.\nBPL did not prohibit smoking and open flames in the designated areas. Buckeye could have\nposted signs identifying potential hazards and prohibiting smoking and open flames. During\nthe field inspection, it was noted that the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)\nhazardous diamond placards, indicating that the tanks contain flammable liquid and vapors,\nwere not posted on tanks at the Chelsea or the Booth facilities in PA. It was also noted that\n“No Smoking” signs were not posted at the entrance to tank dikes at Booth Station. Although\nsome of the Booth area tanks were marked as a “No Smoking” area, others were not\nappropriately marked.\n13. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall\nbe reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar\nyear, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is\neffective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline\nsystem commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where\noperations and maintenance activities are conducted….\nOn March 22, 2005, on BPL’s 209 Line in Wayne, Michigan, personnel failed to follow\nBuckeye’s repair procedures for dents. Per Buckeye’s procedure MA E-08 and associated\nExhibit H, all “sharp” dents shall be repaired using a sleeve. However, the dent at Sta. 913+96\nwas not repaired using a sleeve.\nOn June 1, 2005, BPL’s personnel failed to repair a wrinkle bend in conformance with\nBuckeye’s repair procedures. At the listed MOP of 1233 psig, the wrinkle bend would require\nrepair per Procedure MA E-08, MA E-08 Exhibit I. Instead, Buckeye’s management decided\nthat since the line does not normally operate above 900 psig, no repair was necessary.\nHowever, Buckeye did not re-establish the MOP of the line to the lower 900 psig. BPL did not\ninitiate an engineering evaluation of the wrinkle bend until 2008, after the issue was brought to\nBPL’s attention during the PHMSA inspection.\n14. §195.452 (j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain\na pipeline's integrity?\n6\n\n\n\n(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as\nneeded to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the frequency of\nevaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the factors specified in\nparagraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider the results of the\nbaseline and periodic integrity assessments, information analysis (paragraph (g) of\nthis section), and decisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative\nactions (paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).\nAt the time of inspection, BPL could not demonstrate that periodic evaluations of the pipeline\nintegrity program were performed as required by the integrity management regulations. The\nBPL Integrity Management Plan manages approximately 3,558 miles of HCA piping.\n15. §195.452(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage pipeline\nintegrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section must:\n(2) Include in the program an identification of each pipeline or pipeline segment\nin the first column of the following table not later than the date in the second\ncolumn:\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nPipeline Date\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nCategory 1................................ December 31, 2001.\nCategory 2................................ November 18, 2002.\nCategory 3................................ Date the pipeline begins\noperation.\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nAt the time of inspection, BPL failed to identify in its Baseline Assessment Plan idle pipelines\nintersecting with HCAs. BPL’s identification of facilities that could affect HCAs was to be\ncompleted by Dec. 31, 2001, per the regulation. Identification of idle pipelines is necessary to\nconsider risks which could affect an HCA.\n16. §195.452(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage pipeline\nintegrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section must:\n(2) Include in the program an identification of each pipeline or pipeline segment\nin the first column of the following table not later than the date in the second\ncolumn:\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nPipeline Date\n7\n\n\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nCategory 1................................ December 31, 2001.\nCategory 2................................ November 18, 2002.\nCategory 3................................ Date the pipeline begins\noperation.\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nBuckeye did not identify all facilities affecting HCAs. Buckeye did not consider the\ncontribution of tank volumes from tank farms to overland spread, nor was an overland spread\nanalysis performed at facilities greater than ¼ mile from HCAs. After identification of this\nissue by the PHMSA inspection team in 2008, Buckeye subsequently identified 6 additional\nfacilities with the potential to affect HCAs using overland spread analysis.\n17. §195.452(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An\nintegrity management program begins with the initial framework. An operator\nmust continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(6) Identification of preventive and mitigative measures to protect the high\nconsequence area (see paragraph (i) of this section);\nBuckeye failed to include a process to identify potential preventive and mitigative actions in its\nwritten integrity management program. Buckeye operates 5,576 miles of pipe of which 3,558\nmiles could affect an HCA. Therefore, it is particularly important for Buckeye to consider and\nidentify preventive and mitigative measures to provide further protection to these areas.\n18. §195.452(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to\nprotect the high consequence area?\n(2) Risk analysis criteria. In identifying the need for additional preventive and\nmitigative measures, an operator must evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline release\noccurring and how a release could affect the high consequence area. This\ndetermination must consider all relevant risk factors, including, but not limited to:\n(i) Terrain surrounding the pipeline segment, including drainage systems such as\nsmall streams and other smaller waterways that could act as a conduit to the high\nconsequence area;\n(ii) Elevation profile;\n(iii) Characteristics of the product transported;\n(iv) Amount of product that could be released;\n(v) Possibility of a spillage in a farm field following the drain tile into a waterway;\n(vi) Ditches along side a roadway the pipeline crosses;\n(vii) Physical support of the pipeline segment such as by a cable suspension\nbridge;\n8\n\n\n\n(viii) Exposure of the pipeline to operating pressure exceeding established\nmaximum operating pressure….\nBuckeye failed to evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline release occurring and how such an event\ncould affect the HCAs in order to determine the need for additional preventive and mitigative\nmeasures. This determination must consider all relevant risk factors including but not limited\nto the criteria listed in §195.452(i)(2)(i)-(viii). Buckeye failed to assess these risk factors.\n19. §195.452(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to\nprotect the high consequence area?\n(4) Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD). If an operator determines that\nan EFRD is needed on a pipeline segment to protect a high consequence area in\nthe event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release, an operator must install the\nEFRD. In making this determination, an operator must, at least, consider the\nfollowing factors–the swiftness of leak detection and pipeline shutdown\ncapabilities, the type of commodity carried, the rate of potential leakage, the\nvolume that can be released, topography or pipeline profile, the potential for\nignition, proximity to power sources, location of nearest response personnel,\nspecific terrain between the pipeline segment and the high consequence area, and\nbenefits expected by reducing the spill size.\nAt the time of inspection, Buckeye had not performed EFRD evaluations since 2005. BPL’s\nIntegrity Management Plan, Section 15, issued 12/2005, requires annual review of pipelines\nscheduled for integrity assessment during that year to determine whether impact to an HCA\ncan be mitigated by adding an EFRD. Buckeye also did not have a technical justification\nexplaining why the EFRDs recommended in 2002 had not been installed.\n20. §195.452 (f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An\nintegrity management program begins with the initial framework. An operator\nmust continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(3) An analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of the\nentire pipeline and the consequences of a failure (see paragraph (g) of this section)\nBuckeye did not change its integrity management program to reflect relevant operating\nexperience. In May 2005, Buckeye’s Risk Management Team determined that the risk analysis\nprogram did not provide the necessary insight for the risks associated with the analyzed\npipeline segments. However, actions to improve the risk analysis model were not initiated\nuntil 2008.\n21. § 195.561 When must I inspect pipe coating used for external corrosion control?\n9\n\n\n\n(a) You must inspect all external pipe coating required by § 195.557 just prior to\nlowering the pipe into the ditch or submerging the pipe.\n(b) You must repair any coating damage discovered.\nBuckeye did not properly repair coating damage when inspecting pipe coating. During the\nNORCO pipe replacement project in 2008, PHMSA staff observed that Buckeye's contractor\npersonnel were improperly applying patchstick repairs to fusion bonded epoxy coating. In lieu\nof having BPL procedures in place, personnel were not properly following the manufacturer's\ninstructions.\n22.\n§ 195.406 Maximum operating pressure.\n(b) No operator may permit the pressure in a pipeline during surges or other\nvariations from normal operations to exceed 110 percent of the operating pressure\nlimit established under paragraph (a) of this section. Each operator must provide\nadequate controls and protective equipment to control the pressure within this\nlimit.\nAccording to BPL's Abnormal Operating Condition (AOC) forms, BPL exceeded 110 percent\nof the operating pressure limit established in §195.406(a) on three separate occasions. The\nAOC forms dated May 11, 2006, November 5, 2007, and June 3, 2007 document the three\nevents.\nProposed Civil Penalty\nUnder 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$100,000 for each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of $1,000,000\nfor any related series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances\nand supporting documentation involved in the above probable violation(s) and has\nrecommended that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $645,200 as follows:\nItem number\nPENALTY\n#3\n$\n41,500\n#4\n$\n29,000\n#7\n$\n#8\n14,000\n$\n14,000\n#9\n$\n35,300\n#11\n$\n29,000\n#13\n$\n41,500\n#14\n$\n120,300\n#17\n$\n200,300\n#19\n$\n120,300\n10\n\n\n\nWarning Items\nWith respect to item #1, #2, #5, #6, #10, #12, #15, #16, #18, #20, #21, and #22 we have\nreviewed the circumstances and supporting documents involved in this case and have decided\nnot to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time.\nWe advise you to promptly correct these items. Be advised that failure to do so may result in\nBuckeye Partners, L.P. being subject to additional enforcement action.\nProposed Compliance Order\nWith respect to items #3, #9, #17, #19, pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to\nBuckeye Partners, L.P. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and\nmade a part of this Notice.\nResponse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators\nin Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be\nadvised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies\nfor confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document\nyou must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted\ninformation qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond\nwithin 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the\nallegations in this Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find\nfacts as alleged in this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 1-2009-5002 and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nByron E. Coy, P.E.\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n11\n\n\n\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Buckeye Partners, L.P. a Compliance Order\nincorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of Buckeye\nPartners, L.P.(BPL) with the pipeline safety regulations:\n1. In regard to Item Number 3 of the Notice pertaining to the numerous accident\nreports that did not include documentation of the required root cause analysis (from\nBPL’s Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Manual). BPL shall develop a plan to\nensure that a root cause analysis is conducted and documented for all accidents that\noccur as required by BPL’s O&M Manual, and that recommended corrective\naction(s) from the root cause analysis is implemented.\n2. In regard to Item Number 9 of the Notice, BPL must establish and implement a plan\nto correct access problems to BPL cathodic protection test point facilities at the\nPhiladelphia, PA airport area. Any outstanding remedial problems with those test\npoints must also be included in the plan.\n3. In regard to Item Number 17 of the Notice, BPL must establish and implement\nprocesses to evaluate their pipeline segments for additional preventive and\nmitigative actions. Upon completion of the evaluation of pipeline segments, a\nschedule for implementing additional preventive and mitigative measures must be\nsubmitted.\n4. In regard to Item Number 19 of the Notice, BPL must establish an improved\nprocess to evaluate the need for additional EFRDs. Upon establishment of the\nimproved process, BPL must perform EFRD evaluations on its pipeline segments\nand develop a schedule for installing EFRDs where necessary and document the\nlogic where EFRDs are not necessary for all locations BPL considered.\n5. BPL shall submit a plan and schedule for completing the Proposed Compliance\nOrder Items above to PHMSA for review and approval within 60 days after receipt\nof the Final Order. Upon receiving approval of the plan and schedule, BPL shall\nsubmit evidence of completion for the Proposed Compliance Order Items above to\nPHMSA within 180 days after receipt of the Final Order. Submit all correspondence\nfor review and approval to Mr. Byron Coy Director, Eastern Region, Office of\nPipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 409 3rd\nStreet, S.W., Washington, DC 20024.\n6. BPL shall maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs associated with\nfulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to Mr. Byron Coy, Director,\nEastern, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Costs shall be\nreported in two categories: 1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of\nplans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with\nreplacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\n12\n\n120095002_Closure Letter_06172013_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department Of Transportation Pipeline and 609.989.2171\nHazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n820 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 103\nWest Trenton, NJ 08628\nOVERNIGHT EXPRESS MAIL\nJune 17, 2013\nMr. Thomas S. Collier,\nVP Performance Assurance & Asset Integrity\nBuckeye Partners, L.P.\nFive TEK Park\n9999 Hamilton Boulevard\nBreinigsville, PA 18031\nCPF 1-2009-5002\nDear Mr. Collier:\nOn May 30, 2012, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued\nto Buckeye Partners, L.P. a Final Order in the above-referenced case. This Order included a\nCompliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based on our review of the documentation you\nprovided, and confirmation of payment of the civil penalty, it has been determined that you have\ncomplied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nByron Coy, PE\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n120095002_Final Order _05302012.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\n1200 New Jersey Avenue SE\nof Transportation\nWashington. DC 20590\nMaterials Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous\nAdministration\nMAY 3 0 2012\nMr. Clark Smith\nPresident and CEO\nBuckeye Partners, LP\nOne Greenway Plaza, Suite 600\nHouston, TX 77046\nRe: CPF No. 1-2009-5002\nDear Mr. Smith:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It withdraws one of\nthe allegations of violation, makes other findings of violation, assesses a civil penalty of\n$524,900, and specifies actions that need to be taken by Buckeye Partners, LP, to comply with\nthe pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order.\nWhen the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed, as\ndetermined by the Director, Eastern Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of\nthe Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise\nprovided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\n/\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\nCc:\nMr. Byron Coy, PE, Director, Eastern Region, OPS\nMr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nIr. Scott Collier, Vice President, Buckeye Partners, LI\nTEK Park, 9999 Hamilton Boulevard. Breiniasville PA 1803\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\nIn the Matter of\nBuckeye Partners, LP,\nCPF No. 1-2009-5002\nRespondent.\nFINAL ORDER\nDuring the period from May to December, 2008, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives\nof the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline\nSafety (OPS), and the New York Public Service Commission conducted on-site pipeline safety\ninspections of the facilities and records of Buckeye Partners, LP (BPL or Respondent), in several\nstates, including Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan. BPL owns and operates approximately\n6,000 miles of pipelines transporting refined petroleum products and highly volatile liquids,\nprincipally in the Northeastern and upper Midwestern states.' Approximately 3,558 of those\npipeline miles are in or could affect High Consequence Areas (HCAs) and are covered by\nBPL's integrity management program.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Eastern Region, PHMSA (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated June 26, 2009, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the\nNotice proposed finding that BPL had committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195,\nassessing a civil penalty of $645,200 for the alleged violations, and ordering Respondent to take\ncertain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed finding that\nRespondent had committed other probable violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and warning the\ncompany to take appropriate corrective action or be subject to future enforcement action.\nBPL responded to the Notice by letters dated September 25, 2009 (Response), and\nJanuary 6, 2010 (Supplemental Response). The company contested some of the allegations of\nviolation and requested reduction or elimination of the associated penalties. BPL did not contest\nother allegations and provided information concerning the corrective actions it had taken.\nRespondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.\n'http://www.buckeye.com/BusinessOperations/tabid/56/Default.aspx and\nhttp://www.buckeye.com/AboutUs/tabid/54/Default.aspx (last accessed on March 22, 2012).\n= 49 C.F.R. $ 195.450.\n* 19 C.F.R. $ 195.452.\n\n\n\n2\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:\nOperations and Maintenance Items:\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states in\nrelevant part:\n$ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nemergencies.\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations anc\nemergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes\nmade as necessary to insure that the manual is effective....\nThe Notice alleged that BPL violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance (O&M) activities and\nhandling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, it alleged that BPL had failed to\nconduct root-cause analyses in 25 accident reports, as required by its own O&M procedures.\nThe BPL Safety Manual, Section A-04, required that a root cause analysis be conducted for each\nproduct release that required regulatory reporting.\nIn its Response, BPL did not contest the allegation of violation but contended that in August\npositions was to conduct root cause analyses for accidents. BPL also stated that the 25 accident\n2006, it had created six new positions within the company and that one of the duties of these new\npositions.® BPL stated that it had \"recognized that there was a need to ensure that root cause\nreports which lacked a root cause analysis had all been performed before the creation of the new\nthat the penalty associated with this Item be \"rescinded.\"\" Since this argument relates to a\nanalyses were conducted... almost two years prior to the integrated inspection\" and requested\npotential reduction in the amount of the penalty, it is discussed in the \"Assessment of Penalty\"\nsection below.\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n49 C.F.R. $ 195.402(a) by failing to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting\nnormal O&M activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.403(b), which states:\n* Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report), Exhibit A (on file with PHMSA).\n\" Response at 2.\n\" Id.\n1 Id.\n\n\n\n3\n$ 195.403 Emergency response training.\n(a) Each operator shall establish and conduct a continuing training\nprogram to instruct emergency response personnel...\n(b) At the intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each\ncalendar year, each operator shall:\n(1) Review with personnel their performance in meeting the\nobjectives of the emergency response training program set forth in\nparagraph (a) of this section; and\n(2) Make appropriate changes to the emergency response training\nprogram as necessary to ensure that it is effective.\nThe Notice alleged that BPL violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.403(b) by failing to review with company\npersonnel their performance in meeting the objectives of the company's emergency response\ntraining program, at intervals not exceeding 15 months but at least once each calendar year.\nIn its Response, BPL did not explicitly contest the allegation but argued that it had reviewed the\nperformance of its employees in responding to emergencies through the use of a form which had\nbeen \"approved by the government\" and which had documented personnel \"responses and follow\nup actions to emergencies.\"* The company further explained that its Training Manual called for\na critique of employee responses after all emergencies and response drills but acknowledged that\nit did not \"specifically document the review of the performance of its employees on the form.\"\nNotwithstanding these existing procedures, BPL indicated that it had revised the form to include\na check box to document specifically that the performance of company personnel had been\nreviewed. The company provided OPS with a blank copy of the revised form.?\nWhile BPL indicated that the form had been approved by the government, there is no indication\nthat the form had ever been approved by PHMSA for purposes of satisfying this regulatory\nrequirement. In addition, BPL did not provide any completed forms to demonstrate that the\nrequired reviews had actually been conducted. Therefore, it is impossible to tell whether the\nreviews were properly completed in a timely manner.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n49 C.F.R. $ 195.403(b) by failing to review with company personnel, at the required intervals.\ntheir performance in meeting the objectives of BPL's emergency response training program.\nItem 13: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), as quoted above,\nby failing to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal O&M activities and\nhandling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, it alleged that BPL failed to follow\nits Maintenance Manual, Procedure E-08, Dama","truncated":true,"body_characters":137106}