# BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 120095002
- **title:** BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2009-06-26
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.401(b), 195.402(a), 195.403(b), 195.406(b), 195.412(a), 195.438, 195.452(b)(2), 195.452(f)(3), 195.452(f)(6), 195.452(i)(2), 195.452(i)(4), 195.452(j)(2), 195.557(a), 195.561, 195.571, 195.573(c), 195.573(e), 195.583(a).
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**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.401(b),  195.402(a),  195.403(b),  195.406(b),  195.412(a),  195.438,  195.452(b)(2),  195.452(f)(3),  195.452(f)(6),  195.452(i)(2),  195.452(i)(4),  195.452(j)(2),  195.557(a),  195.561,  195.571,  195.573(c),  195.573(e),  195.583(a). The case was opened on 2009-06-26 and is reported as closed as of 2013-06-17. Proposed civil penalty: $645,200. Assessed civil penalty: $524,900. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

120095002_ Operator Response to Notice letter_09252009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_%20Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20letter_09252009.pdf

120095002_Closure Letter_06172013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_Closure%20Letter_06172013.pdf

120095002_Closure Letter_06172013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_Closure%20Letter_06172013_text.pdf

120095002_Final Order _05302012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_Final%20Order%20_05302012.pdf

120095002_Final_Order_05302012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_Final_Order_05302012_text.pdf

120095002_NOPV-PCP-PCO_06262009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_NOPV-PCP-PCO_06262009.pdf

120095002_NOPV-PCP-PCO_06262009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120095002/120095002_NOPV-PCP-PCO_06262009_text.pdf

120095002_NOPV-PCP-PCO_06262009_text.pdf

U.S. Department 820 Bear Tavern Road. Suite 306
of Transportation West Trenton, N.J. 08628
Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION
NOTICE OF PROBABLE CIVIL PENALTY
AND
NOTICE OF PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
June 26, 2009
Mr. Lawrence Shelton
Vice President, Field Operations
Buckeye Partners, L.P.
5 TEK Park
9999 Hamilton Blvd
Breinigsville, PA 18031
CPF 1-2009-5002
Dear Mr. Shelton:
From May to December 2008, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) and the New York Public Service Commission pursuant to Chapter
601 of 49 United States Code inspected Buckeye Partners, L.P. (BPL)’s procedures and
records for Operations and Maintenance, Operator Qualification, and Integrity Management at
BPL’s Headquarters office, and field inspection of pipeline facilities in the states of
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan and Colorado.
As a result of the inspection, it appears that BPL has committed probable violations of the
Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The probable violations
are:



1. § 195.401 General requirements.
(b) Whenever an operator discovers any condition that could adversely
affect the safe operation of its pipeline system, it shall correct it within a
reasonable time. However, if the condition is of such a nature that it
presents an immediate hazard to persons or property, the operator may not
operate the affected part of the system until it has corrected the unsafe
condition….
The inspection team discovered that 1) a block of wood was being used as support for a
control valve in the Greensburg Station; 2) a support device at the tank farm in Toledo,
Ohio was installed on the 16-inch manifold where pipe modifications had been made, but
no associated concrete foundation was present under the pipe support; 3) at the Malvern
Station, the pipeline was found to be in contact with a cutoff section of pipe near a line
tank; and 4) at the Greensburg Station, the pipeline was found to be in non-intentional
contact with a concrete block at the pig receiver. Buckeye failed to correct these adverse
conditions within a reasonable time, as required by the regulation.
2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall
be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted....
At the time of the inspection, BPL could not demonstrate that required reviews of the
operations, maintenance, and emergency manuals had been performed once per calendar year
at intervals not exceeding 15 months.
3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective…
BPL failed to follow its O&M procedures which require a root cause analysis for accident
reports. The PHMSA inspection team identified 25 accident reports that did not include a root
cause analysis as required by company procedures.
2



4. §195.403 Emergency Response Training.
(a) Each operator shall establish and conduct a continuing training
program to instruct emergency response personnel…
(b) At the intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each
calendar year, each operator shall:
(1) Review with personnel their performance in meeting the objectives of
the emergency response training program set forth in paragraph (a) of this
section; and
(2) Make appropriate changes to the emergency response training program
as necessary to ensure that it is effective….
At the time of the inspection, BPL could not demonstrate that the company had reviewed the
performance of personnel during emergencies at the required intervals.
5. §195.412 Inspection of rights-of-way and crossing under navigable
waters.
(a) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 3 weeks, but at least 26
times each calendar year, inspect the surface conditions on or adjacent to
each pipeline right-of-way. Methods of inspection include walking, driving,
flying or other appropriate mean of traversing the right-of-way….
BPL uses aerial patrols to inspect surface conditions. However, at the time of the inspection,
excessive vegetation and overgrowth was found at 1) the Perryville Station, PA;
2) near stations 814+59, 1290+71 and 128+60 on the Laurel pipeline, in PA; and 3) and near
Strawberry Mansion (station 1049+72) in PA. Therefore, detrimental conditions or leaks could
not be adequately observed by aerial patrols due to the overgrowth.
6. § 195.557 Which pipelines must have coating for external corrosion control?
Except bottoms of aboveground breakout tanks, each buried or submerged
pipeline must have an external coating for external corrosion control if the
pipeline is—
(a) Constructed, relocated, replaced, or otherwise changed after the applicable
date in §195.401(c), not including the movement of pipe covered by §195.424….
At the time of the inspection, soil-to-air interface on the 301 Line pump discharge pipe and two
sample lines at the BPL Toledo Station in Ohio were not coated as required by the regulation.
7. § 195.583 What must I do to monitor atmospheric corrosion control?
(a) You must inspect each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the
atmosphere for evidence of atmospheric corrosion, as follows:
3



If the pipeline
is
located: Then the frequency of inspection is:
Onshore At least once every 3 calendar years, but with intervals not exceeding 39
months.
Offshore At least once each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15
months.
BPL records indicated that atmospheric corrosion control inspection for the above ground
piping of Mantua Station exceeded the required intervals. Inspections were conducted on
5/4/2004 and 1/29/2008 which exceeded the 39 months interval.
8. § 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?
(c) Rectifiers and other devices. You must electrically check for proper
performance each device in the first column at the frequency stated in the second
column.
Device Check frequency
Rectifier
Reverse current switch.
Diode.
Interference bond whose failure
Would jeopardize structural
protection.
At least six times each
calendar year, but with
intervals not exceeding 2
1/2 months.
Other interference bond At least once each
calendar year, but with
intervals not exceeding 15
months.
BPL failed to check multiple rectifiers at the required frequencies to ensure proper
performance. Specifically, a review of the BPL Rectifier Output History Report for 1/1/2006
to 5/1/2008 indicated that inspection intervals for the Harristown Shell system exceeded the 2-
1/2 month maximum interval between May and September 2006) by approximately 1-1/2
months for three rectifiers.
A review of the Rectifier Output History Report for 1/1/2006 to 5/1/2008 demonstrates that
rectifiers (No.1, No.2, No.3, PM-0.01) in the BPL Trans PA, Malvern Station Tank farm,
Paulsboro Deep Well, and Chester Park were not checked at least six times in the 2006 - 2007
calendar period.
4



A review of the Rectifier Output History Report for 1/1/2006 to 5/1/2008 indicated that
inspections for the Booth Rectifier LP-07 for Tank #15 exceeded the maximum 2-1/2 month
interval between 03/05/2006 to 05/26/2006.
A review of the Rectifier Output History Report for 1/1/2006 to 5/1/2008 indicated that BPL
did not inspect the rectifier at Booth LP-08 STA40009 BH724SK between 9/5/2006 and
1/12/2007, exceeding the maximum 2 ½ month interval.
9. § 195.571 What criteria must I use to determine the adequacy of cathodic
protection?
Cathodic protection required by this subpart must comply with one or more of the
applicable criteria and other considerations for cathodic protection contained in
paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3 of NACE Standard RP 0169 (incorporated by reference,
see §195.3).
BPL could not demonstrate that the cathodic protection for the facilities at the Philadelphia, PA
airport complied with the applicable criteria. According to BPL’s representative, the company
does not know if there are adequate levels of cathodic protection for BPL facilities at the
Philadelphia, PA Airport apparently due to access limitations. BPL has not taken any pipe-to-
soil readings since October 2006.
10. § 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?
(e) Corrective action. You must correct any identified deficiency in corrosion
control as required by §195.401(b). However, if the deficiency involves a pipeline
in an integrity management program under §195.452, you must correct the
deficiency as required by §195.452(h).
BPL did not correct identified corrosion control deficiencies within a reasonable time period,
as required by the regulation. A review of Test Point Survey Reports, for 920 NGL, identified
inadequate levels of cathodic protection. Specifically, the CP survey at the test point location
I-70 XING South, for 920 NGL, indicated inadequate levels of CP in the 2006 and 2007 annual
surveys but were not corrected until February 2008.
11. § 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?
(e) Corrective action. You must correct any identified deficiency in corrosion
control as required by §195.401(b). However, if the deficiency involves a pipeline
in an integrity management program under §195.452, you must correct the
deficiency as required by §195.452(h).
The inspection team’s review of the BPL work orders demonstrated that several locations with
low CP readings were not corrected by the next inspection cycle. Under §195.401(b), BPL
was required to correct the deficiency within a reasonable time. Although BPL had an
5



obligation to correct the deficiency within the time period set in the regulation, the company
records reflected that the work at the twelve locations was scheduled to start between years
2005-2007 and yet had not been completed by the time the PHMSA inspection occurred.
12. § 195.438 Smoking or open flames.
Each operator shall prohibit smoking and open flames in each pump station area
and each breakout tank area where there is a possibility of the leakage of a
flammable hazardous liquid or of the presence of flammable vapors.
BPL did not prohibit smoking and open flames in the designated areas. Buckeye could have
posted signs identifying potential hazards and prohibiting smoking and open flames. During
the field inspection, it was noted that the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
hazardous diamond placards, indicating that the tanks contain flammable liquid and vapors,
were not posted on tanks at the Chelsea or the Booth facilities in PA. It was also noted that
“No Smoking” signs were not posted at the entrance to tank dikes at Booth Station. Although
some of the Booth area tanks were marked as a “No Smoking” area, others were not
appropriately marked.
13. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall
be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar
year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is
effective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline
system commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where
operations and maintenance activities are conducted….
On March 22, 2005, on BPL’s 209 Line in Wayne, Michigan, personnel failed to follow
Buckeye’s repair procedures for dents. Per Buckeye’s procedure MA E-08 and associated
Exhibit H, all “sharp” dents shall be repaired using a sleeve. However, the dent at Sta. 913+96
was not repaired using a sleeve.
On June 1, 2005, BPL’s personnel failed to repair a wrinkle bend in conformance with
Buckeye’s repair procedures. At the listed MOP of 1233 psig, the wrinkle bend would require
repair per Procedure MA E-08, MA E-08 Exhibit I. Instead, Buckeye’s management decided
that since the line does not normally operate above 900 psig, no repair was necessary.
However, Buckeye did not re-establish the MOP of the line to the lower 900 psig. BPL did not
initiate an engineering evaluation of the wrinkle bend until 2008, after the issue was brought to
BPL’s attention during the PHMSA inspection.
14. §195.452 (j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain
a pipeline's integrity?
6



(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as
needed to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the frequency of
evaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the factors specified in
paragraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider the results of the
baseline and periodic integrity assessments, information analysis (paragraph (g) of
this section), and decisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative
actions (paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).
At the time of inspection, BPL could not demonstrate that periodic evaluations of the pipeline
integrity program were performed as required by the integrity management regulations. The
BPL Integrity Management Plan manages approximately 3,558 miles of HCA piping.
15. §195.452(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage pipeline
integrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section must:
(2) Include in the program an identification of each pipeline or pipeline segment
in the first column of the following table not later than the date in the second
column:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pipeline Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category 1................................ December 31, 2001.
Category 2................................ November 18, 2002.
Category 3................................ Date the pipeline begins
operation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the time of inspection, BPL failed to identify in its Baseline Assessment Plan idle pipelines
intersecting with HCAs. BPL’s identification of facilities that could affect HCAs was to be
completed by Dec. 31, 2001, per the regulation. Identification of idle pipelines is necessary to
consider risks which could affect an HCA.
16. §195.452(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage pipeline
integrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section must:
(2) Include in the program an identification of each pipeline or pipeline segment
in the first column of the following table not later than the date in the second
column:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pipeline Date
7



------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category 1................................ December 31, 2001.
Category 2................................ November 18, 2002.
Category 3................................ Date the pipeline begins
operation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Buckeye did not identify all facilities affecting HCAs. Buckeye did not consider the
contribution of tank volumes from tank farms to overland spread, nor was an overland spread
analysis performed at facilities greater than ¼ mile from HCAs. After identification of this
issue by the PHMSA inspection team in 2008, Buckeye subsequently identified 6 additional
facilities with the potential to affect HCAs using overland spread analysis.
17. §195.452(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An
integrity management program begins with the initial framework. An operator
must continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions
drawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and
surveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high
consequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following
elements in its written integrity management program:
(6) Identification of preventive and mitigative measures to protect the high
consequence area (see paragraph (i) of this section);
Buckeye failed to include a process to identify potential preventive and mitigative actions in its
written integrity management program. Buckeye operates 5,576 miles of pipe of which 3,558
miles could affect an HCA. Therefore, it is particularly important for Buckeye to consider and
identify preventive and mitigative measures to provide further protection to these areas.
18. §195.452(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to
protect the high consequence area?
(2) Risk analysis criteria. In identifying the need for additional preventive and
mitigative measures, an operator must evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline release
occurring and how a release could affect the high consequence area. This
determination must consider all relevant risk factors, including, but not limited to:
(i) Terrain surrounding the pipeline segment, including drainage systems such as
small streams and other smaller waterways that could act as a conduit to the high
consequence area;
(ii) Elevation profile;
(iii) Characteristics of the product transported;
(iv) Amount of product that could be released;
(v) Possibility of a spillage in a farm field following the drain tile into a waterway;
(vi) Ditches along side a roadway the pipeline crosses;
(vii) Physical support of the pipeline segment such as by a cable suspension
bridge;
8



(viii) Exposure of the pipeline to operating pressure exceeding established
maximum operating pressure….
Buckeye failed to evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline release occurring and how such an event
could affect the HCAs in order to determine the need for additional preventive and mitigative
measures. This determination must consider all relevant risk factors including but not limited
to the criteria listed in §195.452(i)(2)(i)-(viii). Buckeye failed to assess these risk factors.
19. §195.452(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to
protect the high consequence area?
(4) Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD). If an operator determines that
an EFRD is needed on a pipeline segment to protect a high consequence area in
the event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release, an operator must install the
EFRD. In making this determination, an operator must, at least, consider the
following factors–the swiftness of leak detection and pipeline shutdown
capabilities, the type of commodity carried, the rate of potential leakage, the
volume that can be released, topography or pipeline profile, the potential for
ignition, proximity to power sources, location of nearest response personnel,
specific terrain between the pipeline segment and the high consequence area, and
benefits expected by reducing the spill size.
At the time of inspection, Buckeye had not performed EFRD evaluations since 2005. BPL’s
Integrity Management Plan, Section 15, issued 12/2005, requires annual review of pipelines
scheduled for integrity assessment during that year to determine whether impact to an HCA
can be mitigated by adding an EFRD. Buckeye also did not have a technical justification
explaining why the EFRDs recommended in 2002 had not been installed.
20. §195.452 (f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An
integrity management program begins with the initial framework. An operator
must continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions
drawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and
surveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high
consequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following
elements in its written integrity management program:
(3) An analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of the
entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure (see paragraph (g) of this section)
Buckeye did not change its integrity management program to reflect relevant operating
experience. In May 2005, Buckeye’s Risk Management Team determined that the risk analysis
program did not provide the necessary insight for the risks associated with the analyzed
pipeline segments. However, actions to improve the risk analysis model were not initiated
until 2008.
21. § 195.561 When must I inspect pipe coating used for external corrosion control?
9



(a) You must inspect all external pipe coating required by § 195.557 just prior to
lowering the pipe into the ditch or submerging the pipe.
(b) You must repair any coating damage discovered.
Buckeye did not properly repair coating damage when inspecting pipe coating. During the
NORCO pipe replacement project in 2008, PHMSA staff observed that Buckeye's contractor
personnel were improperly applying patchstick repairs to fusion bonded epoxy coating. In lieu
of having BPL procedures in place, personnel were not properly following the manufacturer's
instructions.
22.
§ 195.406 Maximum operating pressure.
(b) No operator may permit the pressure in a pipeline during surges or other
variations from normal operations to exceed 110 percent of the operating pressure
limit established under paragraph (a) of this section. Each operator must provide
adequate controls and protective equipment to control the pressure within this
limit.
According to BPL's Abnormal Operating Condition (AOC) forms, BPL exceeded 110 percent
of the operating pressure limit established in §195.406(a) on three separate occasions. The
AOC forms dated May 11, 2006, November 5, 2007, and June 3, 2007 document the three
events.
Proposed Civil Penalty
Under 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed
$100,000 for each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of $1,000,000
for any related series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances
and supporting documentation involved in the above probable violation(s) and has
recommended that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $645,200 as follows:
Item number
PENALTY
#3
$
41,500
#4
$
29,000
#7
$
#8
14,000
$
14,000
#9
$
35,300
#11
$
29,000
#13
$
41,500
#14
$
120,300
#17
$
200,300
#19
$
120,300
10



Warning Items
With respect to item #1, #2, #5, #6, #10, #12, #15, #16, #18, #20, #21, and #22 we have
reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents involved in this case and have decided
not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time.
We advise you to promptly correct these items. Be advised that failure to do so may result in
Buckeye Partners, L.P. being subject to additional enforcement action.
Proposed Compliance Order
With respect to items #3, #9, #17, #19, pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to
Buckeye Partners, L.P. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and
made a part of this Notice.
Response to this Notice
Enclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators
in Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be
advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies
for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document
you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for
confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted
information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond
within 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the
allegations in this Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find
facts as alleged in this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 1-2009-5002 and for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Sincerely,
Byron E. Coy, P.E.
Director, Eastern Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Enclosures: Proposed Compliance Order
Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings
11



PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
Pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Buckeye Partners, L.P. a Compliance Order
incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of Buckeye
Partners, L.P.(BPL) with the pipeline safety regulations:
1. In regard to Item Number 3 of the Notice pertaining to the numerous accident
reports that did not include documentation of the required root cause analysis (from
BPL’s Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Manual). BPL shall develop a plan to
ensure that a root cause analysis is conducted and documented for all accidents that
occur as required by BPL’s O&M Manual, and that recommended corrective
action(s) from the root cause analysis is implemented.
2. In regard to Item Number 9 of the Notice, BPL must establish and implement a plan
to correct access problems to BPL cathodic protection test point facilities at the
Philadelphia, PA airport area. Any outstanding remedial problems with those test
points must also be included in the plan.
3. In regard to Item Number 17 of the Notice, BPL must establish and implement
processes to evaluate their pipeline segments for additional preventive and
mitigative actions. Upon completion of the evaluation of pipeline segments, a
schedule for implementing additional preventive and mitigative measures must be
submitted.
4. In regard to Item Number 19 of the Notice, BPL must establish an improved
process to evaluate the need for additional EFRDs. Upon establishment of the
improved process, BPL must perform EFRD evaluations on its pipeline segments
and develop a schedule for installing EFRDs where necessary and document the
logic where EFRDs are not necessary for all locations BPL considered.
5. BPL shall submit a plan and schedule for completing the Proposed Compliance
Order Items above to PHMSA for review and approval within 60 days after receipt
of the Final Order. Upon receiving approval of the plan and schedule, BPL shall
submit evidence of completion for the Proposed Compliance Order Items above to
PHMSA within 180 days after receipt of the Final Order. Submit all correspondence
for review and approval to Mr. Byron Coy Director, Eastern Region, Office of
Pipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 409 3rd
Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20024.
6. BPL shall maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs associated with
fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to Mr. Byron Coy, Director,
Eastern, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Costs shall be
reported in two categories: 1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of
plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with
replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.
12

120095002_Closure Letter_06172013_text.pdf

U.S. Department Of Transportation Pipeline and 609.989.2171
Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
820 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 103
West Trenton, NJ 08628
OVERNIGHT EXPRESS MAIL
June 17, 2013
Mr. Thomas S. Collier,
VP Performance Assurance & Asset Integrity
Buckeye Partners, L.P.
Five TEK Park
9999 Hamilton Boulevard
Breinigsville, PA 18031
CPF 1-2009-5002
Dear Mr. Collier:
On May 30, 2012, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued
to Buckeye Partners, L.P. a Final Order in the above-referenced case. This Order included a
Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based on our review of the documentation you
provided, and confirmation of payment of the civil penalty, it has been determined that you have
complied with the terms of this Order.
Accordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the
matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Byron Coy, PE
Director, Eastern Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

120095002_Final Order _05302012.pdf

U.S. Department
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
of Transportation
Washington. DC 20590
Materials Safety
Pipeline and Hazardous
Administration
MAY 3 0 2012
Mr. Clark Smith
President and CEO
Buckeye Partners, LP
One Greenway Plaza, Suite 600
Houston, TX 77046
Re: CPF No. 1-2009-5002
Dear Mr. Smith:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It withdraws one of
the allegations of violation, makes other findings of violation, assesses a civil penalty of
$524,900, and specifies actions that need to be taken by Buckeye Partners, LP, to comply with
the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order.
When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed, as
determined by the Director, Eastern Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of
the Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise
provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
/
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
Cc:
Mr. Byron Coy, PE, Director, Eastern Region, OPS
Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS
Ir. Scott Collier, Vice President, Buckeye Partners, LI
TEK Park, 9999 Hamilton Boulevard. Breiniasville PA 1803
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
In the Matter of
Buckeye Partners, LP,
CPF No. 1-2009-5002
Respondent.
FINAL ORDER
During the period from May to December, 2008, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives
of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline
Safety (OPS), and the New York Public Service Commission conducted on-site pipeline safety
inspections of the facilities and records of Buckeye Partners, LP (BPL or Respondent), in several
states, including Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan. BPL owns and operates approximately
6,000 miles of pipelines transporting refined petroleum products and highly volatile liquids,
principally in the Northeastern and upper Midwestern states.' Approximately 3,558 of those
pipeline miles are in or could affect High Consequence Areas (HCAs) and are covered by
BPL's integrity management program.
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Eastern Region, PHMSA (Director), issued to
Respondent, by letter dated June 26, 2009, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil
Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the
Notice proposed finding that BPL had committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195,
assessing a civil penalty of $645,200 for the alleged violations, and ordering Respondent to take
certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed finding that
Respondent had committed other probable violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and warning the
company to take appropriate corrective action or be subject to future enforcement action.
BPL responded to the Notice by letters dated September 25, 2009 (Response), and
January 6, 2010 (Supplemental Response). The company contested some of the allegations of
violation and requested reduction or elimination of the associated penalties. BPL did not contest
other allegations and provided information concerning the corrective actions it had taken.
Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.
'http://www.buckeye.com/BusinessOperations/tabid/56/Default.aspx and
http://www.buckeye.com/AboutUs/tabid/54/Default.aspx (last accessed on March 22, 2012).
= 49 C.F.R. $ 195.450.
* 19 C.F.R. $ 195.452.



2
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:
Operations and Maintenance Items:
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states in
relevant part:
$ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
emergencies.
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations anc
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes
made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective....
The Notice alleged that BPL violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance (O&M) activities and
handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, it alleged that BPL had failed to
conduct root-cause analyses in 25 accident reports, as required by its own O&M procedures.
The BPL Safety Manual, Section A-04, required that a root cause analysis be conducted for each
product release that required regulatory reporting.
In its Response, BPL did not contest the allegation of violation but contended that in August
positions was to conduct root cause analyses for accidents. BPL also stated that the 25 accident
2006, it had created six new positions within the company and that one of the duties of these new
positions.® BPL stated that it had "recognized that there was a need to ensure that root cause
reports which lacked a root cause analysis had all been performed before the creation of the new
that the penalty associated with this Item be "rescinded."" Since this argument relates to a
analyses were conducted... almost two years prior to the integrated inspection" and requested
potential reduction in the amount of the penalty, it is discussed in the "Assessment of Penalty"
section below.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated
49 C.F.R. $ 195.402(a) by failing to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting
normal O&M activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.403(b), which states:
* Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report), Exhibit A (on file with PHMSA).
" Response at 2.
" Id.
1 Id.



3
$ 195.403 Emergency response training.
(a) Each operator shall establish and conduct a continuing training
program to instruct emergency response personnel...
(b) At the intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each
calendar year, each operator shall:
(1) Review with personnel their performance in meeting the
objectives of the emergency response training program set forth in
paragraph (a) of this section; and
(2) Make appropriate changes to the emergency response training
program as necessary to ensure that it is effective.
The Notice alleged that BPL violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.403(b) by failing to review with company
personnel their performance in meeting the objectives of the company's emergency response
training program, at intervals not exceeding 15 months but at least once each calendar year.
In its Response, BPL did not explicitly contest the allegation but argued that it had reviewed the
performance of its employees in responding to emergencies through the use of a form which had
been "approved by the government" and which had documented personnel "responses and follow
up actions to emergencies."* The company further explained that its Training Manual called for
a critique of employee responses after all emergencies and response drills but acknowledged that
it did not "specifically document the review of the performance of its employees on the form."
Notwithstanding these existing procedures, BPL indicated that it had revised the form to include
a check box to document specifically that the performance of company personnel had been
reviewed. The company provided OPS with a blank copy of the revised form.?
While BPL indicated that the form had been approved by the government, there is no indication
that the form had ever been approved by PHMSA for purposes of satisfying this regulatory
requirement. In addition, BPL did not provide any completed forms to demonstrate that the
required reviews had actually been conducted. Therefore, it is impossible to tell whether the
reviews were properly completed in a timely manner.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated
49 C.F.R. $ 195.403(b) by failing to review with company personnel, at the required intervals.
their performance in meeting the objectives of BPL's emergency response training program.
Item 13: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), as quoted above,
by failing to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal O&M activities and
handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, it alleged that BPL failed to follow
its Maintenance Manual, Procedure E-08, Dama
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