{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 120141010","title":"COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2014-10-06","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.605(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120141010.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120141010.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120141010","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/120141010","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulation as 192.605(a). The case was opened on 2014-10-06 and is reported as closed as of 2016-05-11. Proposed civil penalty: $40,300. Assessed civil penalty: $40,300. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n120141010_Final Order_04272016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120141010/120141010_Final%20Order_04272016.pdf\n\n120141010_Final Order_04272016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120141010/120141010_Final%20Order_04272016_text.pdf\n\n120141010_NOPV PCP_10062014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120141010/120141010_NOPV%20PCP_10062014.pdf\n\n120141010_NOPV PCP_10062014_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120141010/120141010_NOPV%20PCP_10062014_text.pdf\n\n120141010_Operator Response to Notice_11072014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120141010/120141010_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_11072014.pdf\n\n120141010_Final Order_04272016_text.pdf\n\nApril 27, 2016\nMr. Robert C. Skaggs, Jr.\nChairman of the Board and CEO\nColumbia Pipeline Group, Inc.\n5151 San Felipe, No. 2500\nHouston, TX 77056\nRe: CPF No. 1-2014-1010\nDear Mr. Skaggs:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case to your subsidiary,\nColumbia Gas Transmission, LLC. It makes a finding of violation and assesses a civil penalty of\n$40,300. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. This enforcement action\ncloses automatically upon receipt of payment. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is\ndeemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Byron Coy, P.E., Director, Eastern Region, OPS\nMr. Perry M. Hoffman, Manager- System Integrity, Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc.,\n1700 MacCorkle Avenue SE, Charleston, West Virginia 25314\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\nIn the Matter of )\nColumbia Gas Transmission, LLC, ) CPF No. 1-2014-1010\na subsidiary of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc., )\nRespondent. )\n)\n)\n)\n)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn June 10, 2013, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), and state inspectors\nfrom the West Virginia Public Service Commission (WV PSC) inspected Columbia Gas\nTransmission Corp.’s Clendenin, Glenville, and Smithfield compressor stations and Line 1740\nrecords in Charleston, West Virginia.1 Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC (CGT or Respondent)\nis a subsidiary of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc., which owns and operates more than 15,000\nmiles of natural gas pipelines and one of the largest underground storage systems in North\nAmerica.2\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Eastern Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,\nby letter dated October 6, 2014, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty\n(Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that CGT had\nviolated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) and assessing a civil penalty of $40,300 for the alleged violation.\nCGT responded to the Notice by letter dated November 7, 2014 (Response). It contested the\nallegation and requested that the proposed civil penalty be withdrawn. Respondent did not\nrequest a hearing and, therefore, has waived its right to one.\nFINDING OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a), which states:\n1 The Notice of Probable Violation in this case was issued to Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., now operating as\nColumbia Gas Transmission, LLC, a subsidiary of Columbia Pipelines Group, Inc.\n2 Columbia Pipelines Group, Inc. website, available at https://www.cpg.com/ (last accessed February 17, 2016).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2014-1010\n2\n§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline,\na manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance\nactivities and for emergency response. For transmission lines, the manual\nmust also include procedures for handling abnormal operations. This\nmanual must be reviewed and updated by the operator at intervals not\nexceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year. This manual\nmust be prepared before operations of a pipeline system commence.\nAppropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations where operations\nand maintenance activities are conducted.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(a) by failing to follow for each\npipeline a manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance activities.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that CGT failed to follow its own procedure, Plan Number\n110.01.10, Lockout Tagout, effective April 29, 2013 (Plan Number 110.01.10), when conducting\nmaintenance work on Compressor Unit 3,3 located in Compressor Building 3 at the Clendenin\nCompressor Station. Respondent’s procedure required the operator to eliminate or minimize\nhazards by locking out/tagging out (LOTO) energy sources during maintenance work.\nDuring the inspection, the WV PSC inspector observed that Compressor Unit 3 was partially\ndisassembled for maintenance repairs. The inspector asked CGT to identify the locations of the\nenergy sources that CGT had locked out on June 3, 2013, the date that company records\nindicated CGT had completed the LOTO for Unit 3. The Notice alleged that CGT personnel\ncould not demonstrate that they had locked out either the electrical or compressed-air energy\nsources. According to the Notice, the breaker for Compressor Unit 3 was in the “on” position\nand a photograph for the electrical switch for the compressor showed that the switch was tagged\nbut not locked. The Notice further alleged that CGT personnel had acknowledged the electrical\npanel was not locked out, that the compressed-air line connected to the compressor did not have\nany shutoff valve, and that the compressed-air system was still in service.\nIn its Response, CGT disputed that a violation had occurred. The company contended that\nisolation of the electrical and compressed-air energy sources was not “germane to the isolation of\nUnit 3 for the work being conducted,” namely, removal and replacement of the exhaust\nmanifold.\n4 According to CGT:\nUnit 3 engine can be switched on and off by a control panel located\nnext to the unit. The control panel is provided with 24 volt electrical\nservice and compressed air. As noted above, Unit 3 is a natural gas\npowered compressor unit. There is no outside electrical service\nprovided to the Unit 3 engine itself. The 24 volt electrical service only\nservices the control panel and not the engine. As the engine was\n3 Unit 3 is a 3,000 horsepower Cooper-Bessemer LSV-12 natural gas-powered four-cycle engine installed in 1967.\nResponse, at 2.\n4 Id. at 3.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2014-1010\n3\nalready disabled through engagement of the turning gear and as\nelectrical service was only provided to the control panel, and not the\nengine itself, isolation of the electrical service to the engine panel was\nnot relevant to work on the exhaust manifold of the engine….[T]he\ncompressed air is used in the control panel and to start the engine.\nHowever, there was no exposure to any compressed air energy sources\nfrom the engine associated with the removal and replacement of the\nexhaust manifold.\n… [The] Unit 3 exhaust system was isolated from all relevant energy\nsources during the removal and replacement of the exhaust manifold in\nJune 2013 and no hazard to Columbia Gas employees or the public\nexisted as a result of that work.\n5\nIn sum, CGT stated that it had isolated all energy sources relevant to the work being conducted\non Unit 3. CGT further contended that it had also engaged a worm gear to ensure that the\ncompressor engine was completely disabled during the maintenance work.\nUpon review of all the evidence, I find that CGT failed to follow its own LOTO procedures set\nforth in Plan Number 110.01.10 when it performed maintenance work on Unit 3. The\ncompany’s Procedure 3.2, Primary Work Categories that will Require Lockout/Tagout,\nprominently provides “an outline of typical situations that subject employees to hazards that can\nbe eliminated or minimized by the locking/tagging out of energy sources.” The procedure\nexplains that the list, which included “equipment installation, maintenance, lubrication and\nrepair,” was “not intended to be an all inclusive listing of work situations requiring locking and\ntagging” but merely an outline. It is clear that the maintenance work being performed on\nCompressor Unit 3 constituted a maintenance or repair that required LOTO.\nIn the subsequent section of the plan, Procedure 3.3 Lockout vs. Tagout (Procedure 3.3), a\ndistinction is made between situations where both lockout and tagout are needed and those where\ntagging only is permitted:\nLocks and tags will be used in all cases where equipment is capable of\nbeing locked out. If a device is incapable of being locked out, a \"tagout\nonly\" procedure will be employed. Tagout procedural methods must\nprovide a level of safety equivalent to that obtained by using a lockout\nprocedure.\nProcedure 3.3 provides additional instructions on how to effectively provide safety where only\ntagging is feasible:\nWhen using the “tagout only” method for isolating energy sources, the\nauthorized employee will adhere to the following guidelines:\n5 Id.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2014-1010\n4\n• Additional elements must be considered as are necessary to provide\nthe equivalent safety available from the use of a lockout device.\nAdditional means include the implementation of additional safety\nmeasures such as the removal of an isolating circuit element, blocking\nof a controlling switch, opening of an extra disconnecting device, or the\nremoval of a valve handle to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent\nenergization.6\nThe record shows that CGT employees recognized the need for LOTO on this job and completed\na specific LOTO checklist (Checklist), indicating how energy isolation was going to be achieved.\nThe checklist required that CGT employees list all “SOURCES AND MAGNITUDE OF\nENERGY FOR THIS EQUIPMENT” (caps in original). The completed form shows three\nenergy sources that required isolation as part of this maintenance job: electrical, compressed air,\nand gas. The form also required that as each isolating step was completed, the employee would\ncheck off that particular task on the form. The completed checklist reflects that in performing\nthis job, the employees supposedly had performed each LOTO task, including “isolat[ing]\nequipment from ALL energy sources relevant to the scope of work” and “lock[ing] and tag[ing]\nthe energy-isolating devices.7\nDuring the WV PSC inspection, however, CGT personnel could not demonstrate that they had\nlocked out the electrical or compressed air energy sources.8 In fact, CGT personnel\nacknowledged that the electrical panel had not been locked out and that the compressed air\nsystem was still in service.9 There was also photographic evidence showing that energy sources\nwere not isolated during the maintenance work on Unit 3.10\nCGT stated in its Response that the isolation of electrical and compressed air energy sources was\nnot relevant to the scope of work being performed on Unit 3. This argument, however, is\ninconsistent with CGT’s own checklist for the job, which clearly indicated that gas, compressed\nair, and electrical energy were all sources of energy for Unit 3 requiring isolation.11 CGT also\nfailed to address in its Response what method, if any, was used to isolate the compressed-air\nsources that were used to start the compressor engine, including if and how those energy sources\nwere vented to comply with CGT procedures.12\n6 Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report), (October 6, 2014) (on file with PHMSA), Exhibit A-02, at 4.\n7 Id. at Exhibit A-03.\n8 Id. at 6.\n9 Id.\n10 See id. at 6, stating that “[p]hotographs of the breaker for Compressor Unit 3 show the breaker in the ‘on’\nposition and a photograph for the electrical switch for the compressor shows that the switch was tagged but not\nlocked; see also Violation Report, Exhibit A-01.\n11 Id., Exhibit A-03.\n12 Id. at Exhibit A-02, at 6.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2014-1010\n5\nAs for the turning gear, CGT argued that the gear had been engaged to render the unit inoperable\nand was also tagged.\n13 However, it is still evident that CGT personnel failed to note that the gear\nhad been engaged as part of the LOTO, as required by its own procedures.14 Although a turning\ngear could potentially qualify as an energy-isolating device under CGT’s procedures, (1) the\nChecklist did not mention it as part of the steps being taken for LOTO on this specific job; (2)\nthe Checklist did not explain how the gear was protected from being activated or removed during\nmaintenance; and (3) the tag did not appear to be physically placed on the gear in such a manner\nthat other employees would know that it had been installed as part of LOTO.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.605(a) by failing to follow for each pipeline, a manual of written procedures for\nconducting operations and maintenance activities. This finding of violation will be considered a\nprior offense in any subsequent enforcement action taken against Respondent.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations. In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,\ncircumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the\ndegree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; and any effect\nthat the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of\nRespondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may\nconsider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of\nsubsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total\ncivil penalty of $40,300 for the violation cited above.\nItem 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $40,300 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.605(a), for failing to follow for each pipeline a manual of written procedures for\nconducting operations and maintenance activities. As discussed above, I found that CGT failed\nto follow its own LOTO procedure for isolating energy sources during repairs. By failing to take\nappropriate action to comply with a requirement in its own procedures that was clearly\napplicable, CGT potentially compromised the safety of the Compressor Unit 3 maintenance\nwork. Respondent has not presented any evidence that would warrant reduction or elimination\nof the proposed penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the\nassessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $40,300 for violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.605(a).\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations\n(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal\n13 See Response, at 3 (“The turning gear is a worm gear integral to the [compressor] unit which, once engaged,\nlocks the engine drive shaft making it physically impossible for the unit to operate.”).\n14 Violation Report, Exhibit A-03 at 2.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2014-1010\n6\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation Administration, 6500\nS MacArthur Blvd., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 79169. The Financial Operations Division\ntelephone number is (405) 954-8845.\nFailure to pay the $40,300 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate\nin accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district\ncourt of the United States.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent has the right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. The petition must be sent to: Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline\nSafety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC\n20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. PHMSA\nwill accept petitions received no later than 20 days after receipt of service of the Final Order by\nthe Respondent, provided they contain a brief statement of the issue(s) and meet all other\nrequirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a petition automatically stays the payment of\nany civil penalty assessed but does not stay any other provisions of the Final Order, including\nany required corrective actions. If Respondent submits payment of the civil penalty, the Final\nOrder becomes the final administrative decision and the right to petition for reconsideration is\nwaived.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n_________________________________ _________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n\n\nPayment Instructions\nCivil Penalty Payments of Less Than $10,000\nPayment of a civil penalty of less than $10,000 proposed or assessed, under Subpart B of\nPart 190 of the Pipeline Safety Regulations can be made by certified check, money order\nor wire transfer. Payment by certified check or money order (containing the CPF Number\nfor this case) should be made payable to the \"Department of Transportation\" and should\nbe sent to:\nFederal Aviation Administration\nFinancial Operations Division (AMK-325)\nATTN: Shelby Jones\n6500 S MacArthur Blvd.,\nOklahoma City, OK 79169\nWire transfer payments of less than $10,000 may be made through the Federal Reserve\nCommunications System (Fedwire) to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are provided below. Questions concerning wire transfer should be directed to\nthe Financial Operations Division at (405) 954-8845, or at the above address.\nCivil Penalty Payments of $10,000 or more\nPayment of a civil penalty of $10,000 or more proposed or assessed under Subpart B of\nPart 190 of the Pipeline Safety Regulations must be made wire transfer (49 C.F.R. §\n89.21 (b)(3)), through the Federal Reserve Communications System (Fedwire) to the\naccount of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed instructions are provided below. Questions\nconcerning wire transfers should be directed to the Financial Operations Division at\n(405) 954-8845, or at the above address.\n\n\n\nINSTRUCTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS\n(1) RECEIVER ABA NO.\n021030004\n(2) TYPE/SUB-TYPE\n(Provided by sending bank)\n(3) SENDING BANK ABA NO.\n(Provided by sending bank)\n(4) SENDING BANK REF NO.\n(Provided by sending bank)\n(5) AMOUNT (6) SENDING BANK NAME\n(Provided by sending bank)\n(7) RECEIVER NAME\nTREAS NYC\n(8) PRODUCT CODE\n(Normally CTR, or as provided by sending bank)\n(9) BENEFICIAL (BNF) = AGENCY\nLOCATION CODE\nBNF = /ALC-69-14-0001\n(10) REASONS FOR PAYMENT\nExample: PHMSA - CPF # / Ticket Number/Pipeline\nAssessment number\nINSTRUCTIONS: You, as sender of the wire transfer, must provide the sending bank with the\ninformation for blocks (1), (5), (7), (9), and (10). The information provided in Blocks (1), (7),\nand (9) are constant and remain the same for all wire transfers to the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration, Department of Transportation.\nBlock #1 - RECEIVER ABA NO. - \"021030004\". Ensure the sending bank enters this 9-digit\nidentification number; it represents the routing symbol for the U.S. Treasury at the Federal\nReserve Bank in New York.\nBlock #5 - AMOUNT - You as the sender provide the amount of the transfer. Please be sure the\ntransfer amount is punctuated with commas and a decimal point. EXAMPLE: $10,000.00\nBlock #7 - RECEIVER NAME - \"TREAS NYC\". Ensure the sending bank enters this\nabbreviation. It must be used for all wire transfers to the Treasury Department.\nBlock #9 - BENEFICIAL - AGENCY LOCATION CODE - \"BNF=/ALC-69-14-0001\". Ensure\nthe sending bank enters this information. This is the Agency Location Code for the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration, Department of Transportation.\nBlock #10 - REASON FOR PAYMENT - “AC-payment for PHMSA Case # / To ensure your\nwire transfer is credited properly, enter the case number/ticket number or Pipeline Assessment number,\nand country.”\nNOTE: A wire transfer must comply with the format and instructions or the Department cannot\naccept the wire transfer. You as the sender can assist this process by notifying the Financial\nOperations Division (405) 954-8845 at the time you send the wire transfer.","truncated":false,"body_characters":21747}