{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 120145003","title":"BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2014-09-04","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(3).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120145003.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120145003.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120145003","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/120145003","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.402(c)(3). The case was opened on 2014-09-04 and is reported as closed as of 2016-01-13. Proposed civil penalty: $302,200. Assessed civil penalty: $302,200. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n120145003_Closure Letter_01132016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_Closure%20Letter_01132016.pdf\n\n120145003_Closure Letter_01132016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_Closure%20Letter_01132016_text.pdf\n\n120145003_Final Order_10062015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_Final%20Order_10062015.pdf\n\n120145003_Final Order_10062015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_Final%20Order_10062015_text.pdf\n\n120145003_NOPV PCP PCO_09042014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_09042014.pdf\n\n120145003_NOPV PCP PCO_09042014_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_09042014_text.pdf\n\n120145003_Operator Response to Notice_09232014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_09232014.pdf\n\n120145003_NOPV PCP PCO_09042014_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department Of Transportation Pipeline and 609.989.2171\nHazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n820 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 103\nWest Trenton, NJ 08628\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nOVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY\nSeptember 04, 2014\nT. Scott Collier\nVice President, Performance Assurance & Asset Integrity\nBuckeye Partners, L.P.\nFive TEK Park\n9999 Hamilton Boulevard\nBreinigsville, PA 18031\nCPF 1-2014-5003\nDear Mr. Collier:\nOn August 21, 2012, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, conducted\nan on-site investigation into an accident that occurred on June 17, 2012, at Buckeye Partners, L.P.’s\n(Buckeye) Emmaus, Pennsylvania station and tank farm complex (Macungie Station).\nOn June 17, 2012, at 5:52 a.m. EST, Tank 228, a steel aboveground tank, overfilled at the Macungie\nStation spilling approximately 100 barrels of gasoline (26.5 barrels were recovered) in a high\nconsequence area (HCA)1, resulting in costs of $87,000. The accident resulted in no injuries or fatalities.\n1 An HCA is defined as: (1) a commercially navigable waterway, which means a waterway where a substantial\nlikelihood of commercial navigation exists; (2) a high population area, which means an urbanized area, as defined\nand delineated by the Census Bureau, that contains 50,000 or more people and has a population density of at least\n1,000 people per square mile; (3) an other populated area, which means a place, as defined and delineated by the\nCensus Bureau, that contains a concentrated population, such as an incorporated or unincorporated city, town,\nvillage, or other designated residential or commercial area; and (4) an unusually sensitive area, as defined in\n§ 195.6. 49 C.F.R. § 195.450.\n\n\n\n1-2014-5003\nBuckeye performs tank operations and batch changes at the Macungie Station. At 11 p.m. on June 16,\n2012, Tank 228 was simultaneously receiving product from Line 620 and pumping product into Line 7142\n(an operational process performed at the Macungie Station called “Tank Floating”).3 By 1:55 a.m. on\nJune 17, 2012, Tank 228 had discontinued pumping product to Line 714 but continued to receive product\nfrom Line 620. At 5:50 a.m., the Night Shift Operator was outside preparing to manually move incoming\nproduct to Tank 222 when he heard an independent Hi Hi Alarm.\n4\nEven though he registered the independent Hi Hi Alarm, by 5:52 a.m., the Night Shift Operator completed\nthe tank swing in the manifold from Tank 228 to Tank 222. Between 5:55 a.m. and 6:15 a.m., the Night\nShift Operator acknowledged the Safe Fill Alarm on the tank gauging system and the independent Hi Hi\nAlarm on the Tank Farm Master Operator Interface Panel. At 6:50 a.m., both the Macungie Night Shift\nOperator and the incoming Day Operator reviewed the Safe Fill Alarm and volume reading on the tank\ngauging system that showed 3,000 barrels below the overfill level. Reassured by the volume reading,\nboth operators disregarded the independent Hi Hi Alarm.\nOn June 18, 2012 at 9:00 a.m., a Macungie Pipeliner went to Tank 228 to prepare for an outbound\nmovement. He smelled gasoline, so he inspected the tank shell gate valve pit and discovered product in\nthe pit. He notified the Macungie Day Shift Operator to report a potential release. At 2:18 p.m., Buckeye\nfiled a report with the National Response Center (NRC Report # 1014928).\nBuckeye submitted two accident reports to PHMSA, the last of which was submitted on August 24, 2012\n(Accident Report). The Accident Report stated the cause of the accident was the failure of Buckeye\npersonnel to follow its procedures.\nAs a result of the investigation, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the Pipeline\nSafety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the probable\nviolations are:\n1. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling\nabnormal operations and emergencies. . .\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section\nmust include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and normal\noperations: . . .\n2 Buckeye’s 20” Line 620 pumps product from the Linden Station in Linden, New Jersey to the Macungie Station.\nFrom Macungie Station, Buckeye’s 14” Line 714 pumps product to the Sinking Springs Station, in Sinking Springs,\nPennsylvania. Both lines are controlled by a Control Center located in Breinigsville, Pennsylvania.\n3 Buckeye’s incident investigation report dated August 20, 2012 (Internal Report).\n4 Both the tank gauging system and an independent Hi Hi Level Switch initiate certain tank alarms. The tank\ngauging system has three alarm level settings: Hi Hi Alarm, Hi Alarm, and Safe Fill Alarm. When product reaches\ncertain levels in a tank, alarms should be triggered. As the tank fills, the safe fill alarm should sound first, followed\nby the Hi Alarm and then the Hi Hi Alarm, if the level of product exceeds safe levels. In a separate process, a level\nswitch located on the roof of the tank can trigger the independent Hi Hi Alarm, which is an alarm system separate\nfrom the tank gauging system. When the independent Hi Hi Alarm is triggered, it is displayed on the “Tank Farm\nMaster” Operator Interface Panel. This alarm setting is set to match the Hi Hi setting of the tank gauging system.\n120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 2 of 9\n(140297)\n\n\n\n1-2014-5003\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the\nrequirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.\nBuckeye failed to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, Buckeye failed\nto follow the procedure in its Operating Manual, B-10- Filling Tanks Issued: 06/08, which requires that\ntanks be filled in a safe and controlled manner.\nAccording to this procedure:\n2.10.2 If the tank volume causes the annunciation of a high-high alarm,\nimmediately shut down the incoming stream and notify the Control Center. . .\n2.13 Operators and Controllers share responsibility for monitoring tank alarms in\nSCADA. If a critical Hi Hi alarm is received from a physical device or SCADA5\nsoftware alarm, both parties are responsible for investigating and shutting down a\nreceipt into the tank if a cause is not verified immediately. Controller will\nrespond if a Field Operator is not available, immediately. . .\nThe Night Shift Operator failed to immediately shut down the incoming product stream to Tank 228 and\nnotify the Control Center when the Hi Hi alarm sounded. Also, once the Controller was aware of the Hi\nHi alarm, he failed to immediately shut down the line and investigate the cause of the alarm. According\nto the Internal Report, the independent Hi Hi alarm was received into SCADA and the Controller was\nprepared to shut down the Macungie Station and Linden pumps. However, because the Controller saw\nthat the next scheduled tank, Tank 222, was being filled, he decided to not interrupt the schedule by\nshutting down the line. Furthermore, in the Internal Report, Buckeye acknowledges the failure of its\nemployees to follow its procedures in its internal report, which states that the “Macungie Night Shift\nOperator did not respond appropriately to Hi Hi alarm received at 05:52 a.m., as per Operating Manual B-\n10 Filling Tanks, Section 2.13. . . .”\nBuckeye did not respond to the Hi-Hi alarm in accordance with B-10- Filling Tanks.\n2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling\nabnormal operations and emergencies. . .\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section\nmust include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and normal\noperations: . . .\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the\nrequirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.\nBuckeye failed to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, Buckeye failed\nto follow its inspection and testing procedure H-09 – Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment, Issued: 9/10.\nAccording to this procedure, “[o]n each tank, the level alarm/shutdown systems and tank volume gauging\nequipment, including the associated transmitting-receiving units for remote monitoring, shall be inspected\n5 SCADA software here is referring to the tank gauging system.\n120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 3 of 9\n(140297)\n\n\n\n1-2014-5003\nand a functional test shall be conducted within the time frequency listed on the comprehensive scheduling\nchart6 . . . .”\nBuckeye personnel are required to inspect and test at intervals not exceeding 15 months but at least once a\ncalendar year by manually gauging the tank volume and adjusting the gauge to match the manual hand\nline gauge. From 2010 to 2011, Buckeye did not manually gauge Tank 228. As a result, the side gauge\nand tank gauging system were inaccurate and the Tank 228 overfilled on June 17, 2012.\nSubsection 3.2 Tank Gauging System for H-09 – Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment, states:\n3.2.1 Manually gauge the tank using a hand line.\n3.2.2 Adjust the side gauge to agree with the manual hand line gauge.\n3.2.3 Set the transmitter unit7 to the corresponding side gauge reading and\nconfirm that the proper level is shown on control panel at the remote monitoring\nlocation.\n3.2.4 Restore all equipment to the proper operating condition. Contact local\nOperations and the Control Center. Have them verify that they have the same tank\nlevel as is being observed in the Field and that all alarms from testing have been\ncleared (emphasis added).\nIn its Internal Report, Buckeye acknowledges that, contrary to its procedure, “in the past year, Macungie\nStation suspended hand gauging tank volumes . . . [and that] this practice [was] not compliant with\nCompany policy as per 195 O & M Manual F-35 Tank Alarm and Gauging Equipment, Section 3.2.”8\nAlthough Buckeye acknowledged that it failed to conduct the required hand gauging, the PHMSA\ninspector requested additional records for Tank 228. In response, Buckeye produced work orders for\nTank 228. However, these work orders did not indicate whether or not hand gauging was conducted on\nTank 228 from 2010 to 2011or include any measurements, calculations, confirmations or determinations.\n6/30/2010\nAfter reviewing the Internal Report in conjunction with these work orders, the PHMSA inspector\narranged a conference call with Buckeye to determine the extent of testing and inspection that occurred on\nTank 228. On February 10, 2014, during a conference call with PHMSA representatives, Buckeye\nexplained that its’ accident investigation revealed that its personnel failed to perform hand gauging on\nTank 228.\nWork Order Number Completion Date\n1 660304 2 746764 7/18/2011\n6 Buckeye’s Comprehensive Scheduling Chart – Regulatory Inspection sheet requires “Breakout Tank Overfill\nProtection Inspections” to be conducted “At Least 1 Time per Calendar Year Not to Exceed 15 months.”\n7 Transmitter unit refers to the tank gauging system.\n8 F-35: Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment (CFR TITLE 49: PART 195.428(d)), Issued: 12/11, Subsection 3.2\nTank Gauging System is a replica of H-09 – Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment, Issued: 9/10, Subsection 3.2\nTank Gauging System.\n120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 4 of 9\n(140297)\n\n\n\n1-2014-5003\nBuckeye’s Internal Report confirmed that there were deficiencies that affected both the trigger and the\ntank gauging system. “The trigger for the independent Hi Hi Alarm was improperly set 7 inches too high.\n. . [and the]Tank Side Gauge and tank gauging system [was] reading approximately 18” lower than actual\nlevel in tank (emphasis added).” The Accident Report also confirmed that Tank 228 gauge system was\nreading approximately 18 inches lower than the actual level in the tank. Moreover, the Accident Report\nstated that the tank gauge was showing the tank level to be at “MAX SAFE FILL” while the tank was\noverfilling.9\nBuckeye provided a spreadsheet that recorded “Year 2012,” “ZG Tank 228,” and “SF 74223.”10 In this\nspreadsheet, Buckeye wrote 73,884 net barrels at the time of the accident. According to Buckeye, it read\nthe tank gauging system which showed 3,000 barrels room available before overfill. However, Tank 228\ncontained more than 73,884 net barrels at the time of the accident. This further illustrates that the side\ngauge and tank gauging system were inaccurate.\nFollowing the accident, Buckeye recalculated and adjusted the tank gauge level and alarm level for Tank\n228. Based on the information in the Internal Report and the new measurements, Buckeye had the\nincorrect alarm settings for Tank 228 since at least 2003.\nTherefore, Buckeye failed to follow its procedure H-09 – Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment, Issued:\n9/10.\n3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling\nabnormal operations and emergencies. . .\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section\nmust include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and normal\noperations: . . .\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the\nrequirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.\nBuckeye failed to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, Buckeye failed\nto follow a procedure in its Operations and Maintenance Manual titled 195 O and M Manual, F-37:\nAboveground Tanks (In-Service) (CFR Title 49: PARTS 195.432(a), 195.432(b)) Issued: 9/12, which\nrequires an external inspection of an in-service aboveground breakout tanks at interval at least one time\nper month and not to exceed one month.11 Buckeye did not inspect the local level gauge and hand gauge\nat Tank 228 from July 2011 to May 2012, as required by the procedure12\n.\n9 Accident Report at 14.\n10 Per Buckeye, “SF 74223” stands for Safe Fill 74223 barrels.\n11 Buckeye’s Comprehensive Scheduling Chart – Regulatory Inspection sheet requires “Breakout Tank Inspections”\nto be conducted “At Least 1 Time per Month Not to Exceed 1 month.”\n12 During the investigation, Buckeye provided a copy of 195 O and M Manual, F-37: Aboveground Tanks (In-\nService) (CFR Title 49: PARTS 195.432(a), 195.432(b)) Issued: 9/12. 195 O and M Manual, F-37: Aboveground\nTanks (In-Service) (CFR Title 49: PARTS 195.432(a), 195.432(b)) Issued: 9/12, Subsection 3 requires personnel to\n120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 5 of 9\n(140297)\n\n\n\n1-2014-5003\nA portion of the form specifically inquires as to whether the “Local level gauge [matches the] hand\ngauge.”\nBuckeye also provided copies of Form B (Monthly Tank Inspection Report Form) for Tank 228 from July\n2011 to May 2012. Those records indicated that there was no deficiency with the local level gauge. But,\nin fact, the local level gauge was incorrect prior to the accident.\nBuckeye’s Internal Report states that the “Tank Side Gauge and GSI Tracking System [read]\napproximately 18” lower than actual level in tank.”13 Also, during the conference call PHMSA\nrepresentatives had with Buckeye, Buckeye explained that its personnel did not perform hand gauging on\nTank 228.14 Lastly, in the Internal Report, Buckeye stated that “Monthly Tank Hand Gauging [was] not\nperformed at Macungie Station, as per: . . . 195 O & M Manual, F-37, Subsection 3, Form B, Line 22. . .”\nBuckeye could not demonstrate that it followed its procedure titled: 195 O & M Manual, F-37, Subsection\n3, Form B, Line 22.\nFollowing the accident, Buckeye recalculated and adjusted the tank gauge level and alarm level for Tank\n228.\n4. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling\nabnormal operations and emergencies. . .\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section\nmust include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and normal\noperations: . . .\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the\nrequirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.\nBuckeye failed to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, Buckeye failed\nto follow Section 16.0 Stock Variations of its Measurement Manual, A-01 – Measurement Issued: 11/11\nbecause it did not investigate a volume discrepancy regarding Tank 228.\nAccording to Section 16.0:\n16.1 Transportation Variations\nTransportation variation shall be reviewed for each Tender receipt. Variations\ngreater than +/-0.25% for pipeline and marine receipts (vessel to shore) shall be\ninvestigated and the results documented.\nIt is strongly recommended that variations be reviewed immediately after the\nreceipt/delivery has terminated. . .\nuse Form B (Monthly Tank Inspection Report Form) to record information. Form B (Monthly Tank Inspection\nReport Form) instructs personnel to inspect an item and note whether or not there is a deficiency.\n13 Internal Report at 5.\n14 PHMSA representatives had a conference call with Buckeye on February 10, 2014.\n120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 6 of 9\n(140297)\n\n\n\n1-2014-5003\nIn the Internal Report, Buckeye stated that Tank 228 was emptied for Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP)\nturnover on March 31, 2012, and then filled with Summer Grade Product on April 1, 2012. Buckeye\nstated that there was a 1,299 barrel discrepancy on the refill movement and that it was not investigated,\nper Measurement Manual A-01, 16.1 Transportation Stock Variation.\nThe PHMSA inspector requested that Buckeye provide records and/or documentation that showed this\nvolume discrepancy as well as documentation of an investigation that was conducted as a result of this\nvolume discrepancy. In response, Buckeye provided a copy of a Batch Change Report and Daily Activity\nReport dated April 1, 2012, and a spreadsheet that recorded “Year 2012,” “ZG Tank 228,” and “SF\n74223.” This spreadsheet showed dates ranging from March 28 through April 11, 2012. However,\nBuckeye could not produce any documentation of an investigation.\nDuring a conference call PHMSA representatives had with Buckeye, PHMSA requested further\ninformation about this volume discrepancy and Buckeye described the following calculation:15\nCalculation:\n72,509 barrels (net meter) - 71,345 barrels (gross meter) = 1,164\nStarted empty but showed 135 barrels\n1,164 barrels + 135 barrels = 1,299 barrels\nTherefore, on April 1, 2012, there was a 1.8% variation at Tank 228 (calculation shown below).\n(1,299) / (72,509) = .018 or .018 * 100 = 1.8 % variation\nIn accordance with Section 16.0 Stock Variations, variations greater than +/-0.25% must be investigated\nand the results documented. However, Buckeye could not produce documentation of an investigation and\nthe results of the volume discrepancy at Tank 228 that occurred on April 1, 2012. Thus, Buckeye failed\nto follow its procedure, Section 16.0 Stock Variations of Measurement Manual, A-01 – Measurement,\nIssued: 11/11.\nProposed Civil Penalty\nUnder 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $200,000 per\nviolation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for a related series of violations.\nFor violations occurring prior to January 4, 2012, the maximum penalty may not exceed $100,000 per\nviolation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $1,000,000 for a related series of violations.\nThe Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and supporting documentation involved in the\nabove probable violations and has recommended that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of\n$ 302,200 as follows:\nItem number PENALTY\n1 $ 54,700\n2 $ 100,000\n3 $ 100,000\n4 $ 47,500\n15 PHMSA representatives had a conference call with Buckeye on January 31, 2014.\n120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 7 of 9\n(140297)\n\n\n\n1-2014-5003\nProposed Compliance Order\nWith respect to items 1 and 2 pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to Buckeye. Please refer to the\nProposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and made a part of this Notice.\nResponse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. All material you\nsubmit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly available. If you believe that any\nportion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with\nthe complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you\nbelieve qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted\ninformation qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond within 30\ndays of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this\nNotice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.\nPlease submit all correspondence in this matter to Byron Coy, PE, Director, PHMSA Eastern Region, 820\nBear Tavern Road, Suite 103, W. Trenton, NJ 08628. Please refer to CPF 1-2014-5003 on each\ndocument you submit and please, whenever possible, provide a signed PDF copy in electronic format.\nSmaller files may be emailed to Byron.Coy@dot.gov. Larger files should be sent on a CD accompanied\nby the original paper copy to the Eastern Region Office.\nAdditionally, if you choose to respond to this (or any other case), please ensure that any response letter\npertains solely to one CPF case number.\nSincerely,\nByron Coy, PE\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 8 of 9\n(140297)\n\n\n\n1-2014-5003\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) proposes to issue to Buckeye Partners, L.P. (Buckeye) a Compliance Order incorporating the\nfollowing remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of Buckeye with the pipeline safety\nregulations:\n1. With respect to Item Number 1 of the Notice, Buckeye must amend its operations and\nmaintenance (O & M) manual to include a detailed process for investigating an annunciation\nof a tank alarm that consists of, but is not limited to: inspecting on-site, communicating with\nappropriate personnel, and documenting the cause/results of the investigation and any other\npertinent information.\n2. With respect to Item Number 2 of the Notice, Buckeye must:\nA. Amend its O & M manual to include a process for recording pertinent information to\nensure the overfill protection system inspection and testing have been completed in\naccordance with applicable procedure(s) and federal pipeline safety regulations.\nB. Establish and implement a program that ensures all Department of Transportation\njurisdictional breakout tanks at the Macungie Station have the proper/correct tank\nlevel and alarm settings for operations.\n3. Within sixty (60) days after receipt of a Final Order, Buckeye must submit documentation to\nthe Director, Eastern Region, demonstrating that Items 1 and 2(A) have been completed.\n4. Within one hundred and eighty (180) days after receipt of a Final Order, Buckeye must\nsubmit documentation to the Director, Eastern Region, demonstrating that Item 2(B) has been\ncompleted.\n5. It is requested (not mandated) that Buckeye maintain documentation of the safety\nimprovement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to\nByron Coy, PE, Director, Eastern Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: 1) total cost\nassociated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total\ncost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\n120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 9 of 9\n(140297)\n\n120145003_Closure Letter_01132016_text.pdf\n\nOVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY\nJanuary 13, 2016\nT. Scott Collier\nVP, Performance Assurance and Asset Integrity\nBuckeye Partners, L.P.\nFive TEK Park\n9999 Hamilton Boulevard\nBreinigsville, PA 18031\nCPF 1-2014-5003\nDear Mr. Collier:\nOn October 6, 2015, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to Buckeye Partners, L.P. a Final Order in the above-referenced case. This Order\nincluded a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based on our review of the\ndocumentation you provided and confirmation of payment of the civil penalty, it has been\ndetermined that you have complied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nByron Coy, PE\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n120145003_Final Order_10062015_text.pdf\n\nOctober 6, 2015\nMr. Clark C. Smith\nPresident & CEO\nBuckeye Partners, LP\nOne Greenway Plaza\nHouston, Texas 77046\nRe: CPF No. 1-2014-5003\nDear Mr. Smith:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a civil penalty of $302,200, and specifies actions that need to be taken by\nBuckeye Partners, LP, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations.\nThis is also to acknowledge receipt of payment of the full penalty amount, by wire transfer dated\nOctober 2, 2014. When the terms of the compliance order have been completed, as determined\nby the Director, Eastern Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final\nOrder by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided\nunder 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Byron Coy, P.E., Director, Eastern Region, OPS\nMr. Thomas S. Collier, Vice President, Performance & Asset Integrity,\nBuckeye Partners, LP\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nBuckeye Partners, LP, ) CPF No. 1-2014-5003\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn August 21, 2012, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\nconducted an investigation of an accident involving the pipeline system operated by Buckeye\nPartners, LP (Buckeye or Respondent), in Emmaus, Pennsylvania. Respondent owns and\noperates liquid petroleum-product pipeline systems throughout the United States, with over\n6,000 miles of pipeline. Respondent also owns approximately 100 liquid petroleum products\nterminals, with a storage capacity of more than 70 million barrels.1\nThe investigation arose out of an accident at Respondent’s Emmaus, Pennsylvania station and\ntank farm complex (Macungie Station) on June 17, 2012, when it is alleged that a steel\naboveground tank overfilled and spilled approximately 100 barrels of gasoline in a “High\nConsequence area” (HCA), resulting in costs of approximately $87,000.\nAs a result of the investigation, the Director, Eastern Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated September 4, 2014, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the\nNotice proposed finding that Buckeye had committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195\nand proposed assessing a civil penalty of $302,200 for the alleged violations. The Notice also\nproposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.\nBuckeye responded to the Notice by letter dated September 23, 2014 (Response). The company\ndid not contest the allegations of violation and stated that it would adhere to the proposed\ncompliance order upon receipt of the Final Order. Buckeye paid the proposed penalty of\n$302,200, as provided in 49 C.F.R. § 190.227, which serves to close the case with prejudice to\nRespondent.\n1 Buckeye Partners, LP, website, available at http://www.buckeye.com/BusinessOperations/tabid/56/Default.aspx\n(last accessed March 16, 2015).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2014-5003\nPage 2\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nIn its Response, Buckeye did not contest the allegations in the Notice that it violated 49 C.F.R.\nPart 195, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3), which states:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each\npipeline system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations\nand emergencies . . . .\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following\nto provide safety during maintenance and normal operations: . . .\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in\naccordance with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H\nof this part.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3) by failing to follow its\nown manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities\nand handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, the Notice alleged that\nRespondent failed to follow procedures in the company’s Operating Manual (O&M Manual), B-\n10 - Filling Tanks (B-10),\n2 which required that tanks be filled in a safe and controlled manner.\nO&M Manual, B-10, section 2.10.2 states:\nIf the tank volume causes the annunciation of a high-high alarm,\nimmediately shut down the incoming stream and notify the Control\nCenter.\nO&M Manual, B-10, section 2.13 states:\nOperators and Controllers share responsibility for monitoring tank\nalarms in SCADA. If a critical Hi Hi alarm is received from a physical\ndevice or SCADA software alarm, both parties are responsible for\ninvestigating and shutting down a receipt into the tank if a cause is not\nverified immediately. Controllers will respond if a Field Operator is not\navailable, immediately.\nAccording to the Notice, on June 17, 2012, Buckeye’s Night Shift Operator failed to\nimmediately shut down the incoming product stream to Tank 228 and notify the Control Center\n2 Issued September 2010.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2014-5003\nPage 3\nonce the “Hi Hi” alarm3 sounded. Moreover, it alleged that once the Controller was aware of the\nHi Hi alarm, the Controller failed to immediately shut down the line and investigate the cause of\nthe alarm.\nThe Notice further alleged that Respondent’s August 20, 2012 Incident Investigation Report\n(Report) of the accident found that the Macungie Night Shift Operator did not appropriately\nrespond to the Hi Hi alarm. According to the Report, the independent Hi Hi alarm was received\ninto the SCADA system, at which point the Controller was prepared to shut down the Macungie\nStation and Linden pumps; however, the Controller did not do so because he was aware that\nTank 222 was being filled. Because of this circumstance, the Controller did not want to interrupt\nthe schedule by shutting down the line. According to the Notice, the Report allegedly found that\nthe “Macungie Night Shift Operator did not respond appropriately to [the] Hi Hi alarm received\nat 05:52 .am., . . . as per Operating Manual B-10 Filling Tanks, Section 2.13.”\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3) by failing to follow\nits own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3), as quoted\nabove, by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to follow its inspection and testing\nprocedure contained in O&M Manual, H-09 – Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment.\n4 This\nprocedure stated, in relevant part:\n1. Policy\n1.1 On each tank, the level alarm/shutdown systems and tank\nvolume gauging equipment, including the associated transmitting-\nreceiving units for remote monitoring, shall be inspected and a\nfunctional test shall be conducted within the time frequency listed\non the comprehensive scheduling chart . . . .\nThe Notice further alleged that Respondent’s Comprehensive Scheduling Chart – Regulatory\nInspection sheet required “Breakout Tank Overfill Protection Inspections” to be conducted at\nintervals not in excess of 15 months, but at least once per calendar year, by manually gauging the\ntank volume and adjusting the gauge to match the manual hand-line gauge. PHMSA alleged that\nBuckeye did not manually gauge Tank 228 from 2010 to 2011, resulting in inaccuracies in the\nside gauge and tank gauging system that contributed to the overfill of Tank 228 on June 17,\n2012.\nThe company’s procedure, O&M Manual, Tank Gauging System for H-09 – Tank Alarms and\n3 A “Hi Hi” alarm is one level of alarm utilized by a SCADA system and configured during installation.\n4 Issued September 2010.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2014-5003\nPage 4\nGauging Equipment, Subsection 3.2, states, in relevant part:\n3.2. Tank Gauging System\n3.2.1 Manually gauge the tank using a hand line.\n3.2.2 Adjust the side gauge to agree with the manual hand line\ngauge.\n3.2.3 Set the transmitter unit5 to the corresponding side gauge\nreading and confirm that the proper level is shown on\ncontrol panel at the remote monitoring location.\n3.2.4 Restore all equipment to the proper operating condition.\nContact local Operations and the Control Center. Have\nthem verify that they have the same tank level as is\nbeing observed in the Field and all alarms from testing\nhave been cleared.\nThe Notice further alleged that the Report acknowledged that “in the past year, Macungie Station\nsuspended hand gauging tank volumes . . .[and that] this practice [was] not compliant with\nCompany policy as per 195 O&M Manual F-35 Tank Alarm and Gauging Equipment, Section\n3.2.”\nAdditionally, PHMSA asserted its investigation revealed that Respondent’s employees did not\nperform hand gauging on Tank 228. Moreover, the Report indicated that there were deficiencies\nthat affected both the trigger and the tank gauging system, such as the independent Hi Hi Alarm\nbeing set too high and both the tank side gauge and tank gauging system being set too low.\nThe Notice also alleged that following the accident, Respondent recalculated and adjusted the\ntank gauge level and the alarm level for Tank 228. Based on the Report and the company’s new\nmeasurements, Respondent allegedly had had incorrect alarm settings for Tank 228 since 2003.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3) by failing to follow\nits own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3), as quoted\nabove, by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to follow a procedure in its Operations\nand Maintenance Manual (O&M) entitled, 195 O& M Manual, F-37: Aboveground Tanks (In-\n5 Transmitter unit refers to the tank gauging system.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2014-5003\nPage 5\nService) (CFR Title 49: PARTS 195.432(a), 195.432(b)),\n6 which required an external inspection\nof in-service aboveground breakout tanks at least one time per month but not to exceed one\nmonth. The Notice also asserted that Respondent did not inspect the local level gauge and hand\ngauge at Tank 228 from July 2011 to May 2012, despite the fact that a portion of the inspection\nform specifically asked whether the “Local level gauge [matches the] hand gauge.”\nThe Notice further alleged that PHMSA’s inspectors discovered that Respondent’s Form B7 for\nTank 228 incorrectly indicated there was no local level gauge deficiency from July 2011 to May\n2012, yet Respondent’s own Report indicated there was no monthly tank hand gauging at\nMacungie Station, as required by Respondent’s procedures.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3) by failing to follow\nits own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nact","truncated":true,"body_characters":49516}