# BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 120145003
- **title:** BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2014-09-04
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(3).
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120145003.json
- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120145003.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120145003
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/120145003
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.402(c)(3). The case was opened on 2014-09-04 and is reported as closed as of 2016-01-13. Proposed civil penalty: $302,200. Assessed civil penalty: $302,200. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

120145003_Closure Letter_01132016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_Closure%20Letter_01132016.pdf

120145003_Closure Letter_01132016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_Closure%20Letter_01132016_text.pdf

120145003_Final Order_10062015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_Final%20Order_10062015.pdf

120145003_Final Order_10062015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_Final%20Order_10062015_text.pdf

120145003_NOPV PCP PCO_09042014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_09042014.pdf

120145003_NOPV PCP PCO_09042014_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_09042014_text.pdf

120145003_Operator Response to Notice_09232014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120145003/120145003_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_09232014.pdf

120145003_NOPV PCP PCO_09042014_text.pdf

U.S. Department Of Transportation Pipeline and 609.989.2171
Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
820 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 103
West Trenton, NJ 08628
NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION
PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY
and
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
OVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY
September 04, 2014
T. Scott Collier
Vice President, Performance Assurance & Asset Integrity
Buckeye Partners, L.P.
Five TEK Park
9999 Hamilton Boulevard
Breinigsville, PA 18031
CPF 1-2014-5003
Dear Mr. Collier:
On August 21, 2012, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, conducted
an on-site investigation into an accident that occurred on June 17, 2012, at Buckeye Partners, L.P.’s
(Buckeye) Emmaus, Pennsylvania station and tank farm complex (Macungie Station).
On June 17, 2012, at 5:52 a.m. EST, Tank 228, a steel aboveground tank, overfilled at the Macungie
Station spilling approximately 100 barrels of gasoline (26.5 barrels were recovered) in a high
consequence area (HCA)1, resulting in costs of $87,000. The accident resulted in no injuries or fatalities.
1 An HCA is defined as: (1) a commercially navigable waterway, which means a waterway where a substantial
likelihood of commercial navigation exists; (2) a high population area, which means an urbanized area, as defined
and delineated by the Census Bureau, that contains 50,000 or more people and has a population density of at least
1,000 people per square mile; (3) an other populated area, which means a place, as defined and delineated by the
Census Bureau, that contains a concentrated population, such as an incorporated or unincorporated city, town,
village, or other designated residential or commercial area; and (4) an unusually sensitive area, as defined in
§ 195.6. 49 C.F.R. § 195.450.



1-2014-5003
Buckeye performs tank operations and batch changes at the Macungie Station. At 11 p.m. on June 16,
2012, Tank 228 was simultaneously receiving product from Line 620 and pumping product into Line 7142
(an operational process performed at the Macungie Station called “Tank Floating”).3 By 1:55 a.m. on
June 17, 2012, Tank 228 had discontinued pumping product to Line 714 but continued to receive product
from Line 620. At 5:50 a.m., the Night Shift Operator was outside preparing to manually move incoming
product to Tank 222 when he heard an independent Hi Hi Alarm.
4
Even though he registered the independent Hi Hi Alarm, by 5:52 a.m., the Night Shift Operator completed
the tank swing in the manifold from Tank 228 to Tank 222. Between 5:55 a.m. and 6:15 a.m., the Night
Shift Operator acknowledged the Safe Fill Alarm on the tank gauging system and the independent Hi Hi
Alarm on the Tank Farm Master Operator Interface Panel. At 6:50 a.m., both the Macungie Night Shift
Operator and the incoming Day Operator reviewed the Safe Fill Alarm and volume reading on the tank
gauging system that showed 3,000 barrels below the overfill level. Reassured by the volume reading,
both operators disregarded the independent Hi Hi Alarm.
On June 18, 2012 at 9:00 a.m., a Macungie Pipeliner went to Tank 228 to prepare for an outbound
movement. He smelled gasoline, so he inspected the tank shell gate valve pit and discovered product in
the pit. He notified the Macungie Day Shift Operator to report a potential release. At 2:18 p.m., Buckeye
filed a report with the National Response Center (NRC Report # 1014928).
Buckeye submitted two accident reports to PHMSA, the last of which was submitted on August 24, 2012
(Accident Report). The Accident Report stated the cause of the accident was the failure of Buckeye
personnel to follow its procedures.
As a result of the investigation, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the Pipeline
Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the probable
violations are:
1. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling
abnormal operations and emergencies. . .
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and normal
operations: . . .
2 Buckeye’s 20” Line 620 pumps product from the Linden Station in Linden, New Jersey to the Macungie Station.
From Macungie Station, Buckeye’s 14” Line 714 pumps product to the Sinking Springs Station, in Sinking Springs,
Pennsylvania. Both lines are controlled by a Control Center located in Breinigsville, Pennsylvania.
3 Buckeye’s incident investigation report dated August 20, 2012 (Internal Report).
4 Both the tank gauging system and an independent Hi Hi Level Switch initiate certain tank alarms. The tank
gauging system has three alarm level settings: Hi Hi Alarm, Hi Alarm, and Safe Fill Alarm. When product reaches
certain levels in a tank, alarms should be triggered. As the tank fills, the safe fill alarm should sound first, followed
by the Hi Alarm and then the Hi Hi Alarm, if the level of product exceeds safe levels. In a separate process, a level
switch located on the roof of the tank can trigger the independent Hi Hi Alarm, which is an alarm system separate
from the tank gauging system. When the independent Hi Hi Alarm is triggered, it is displayed on the “Tank Farm
Master” Operator Interface Panel. This alarm setting is set to match the Hi Hi setting of the tank gauging system.
120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 2 of 9
(140297)



1-2014-5003
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the
requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
Buckeye failed to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, Buckeye failed
to follow the procedure in its Operating Manual, B-10- Filling Tanks Issued: 06/08, which requires that
tanks be filled in a safe and controlled manner.
According to this procedure:
2.10.2 If the tank volume causes the annunciation of a high-high alarm,
immediately shut down the incoming stream and notify the Control Center. . .
2.13 Operators and Controllers share responsibility for monitoring tank alarms in
SCADA. If a critical Hi Hi alarm is received from a physical device or SCADA5
software alarm, both parties are responsible for investigating and shutting down a
receipt into the tank if a cause is not verified immediately. Controller will
respond if a Field Operator is not available, immediately. . .
The Night Shift Operator failed to immediately shut down the incoming product stream to Tank 228 and
notify the Control Center when the Hi Hi alarm sounded. Also, once the Controller was aware of the Hi
Hi alarm, he failed to immediately shut down the line and investigate the cause of the alarm. According
to the Internal Report, the independent Hi Hi alarm was received into SCADA and the Controller was
prepared to shut down the Macungie Station and Linden pumps. However, because the Controller saw
that the next scheduled tank, Tank 222, was being filled, he decided to not interrupt the schedule by
shutting down the line. Furthermore, in the Internal Report, Buckeye acknowledges the failure of its
employees to follow its procedures in its internal report, which states that the “Macungie Night Shift
Operator did not respond appropriately to Hi Hi alarm received at 05:52 a.m., as per Operating Manual B-
10 Filling Tanks, Section 2.13. . . .”
Buckeye did not respond to the Hi-Hi alarm in accordance with B-10- Filling Tanks.
2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling
abnormal operations and emergencies. . .
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and normal
operations: . . .
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the
requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
Buckeye failed to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, Buckeye failed
to follow its inspection and testing procedure H-09 – Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment, Issued: 9/10.
According to this procedure, “[o]n each tank, the level alarm/shutdown systems and tank volume gauging
equipment, including the associated transmitting-receiving units for remote monitoring, shall be inspected
5 SCADA software here is referring to the tank gauging system.
120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 3 of 9
(140297)



1-2014-5003
and a functional test shall be conducted within the time frequency listed on the comprehensive scheduling
chart6 . . . .”
Buckeye personnel are required to inspect and test at intervals not exceeding 15 months but at least once a
calendar year by manually gauging the tank volume and adjusting the gauge to match the manual hand
line gauge. From 2010 to 2011, Buckeye did not manually gauge Tank 228. As a result, the side gauge
and tank gauging system were inaccurate and the Tank 228 overfilled on June 17, 2012.
Subsection 3.2 Tank Gauging System for H-09 – Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment, states:
3.2.1 Manually gauge the tank using a hand line.
3.2.2 Adjust the side gauge to agree with the manual hand line gauge.
3.2.3 Set the transmitter unit7 to the corresponding side gauge reading and
confirm that the proper level is shown on control panel at the remote monitoring
location.
3.2.4 Restore all equipment to the proper operating condition. Contact local
Operations and the Control Center. Have them verify that they have the same tank
level as is being observed in the Field and that all alarms from testing have been
cleared (emphasis added).
In its Internal Report, Buckeye acknowledges that, contrary to its procedure, “in the past year, Macungie
Station suspended hand gauging tank volumes . . . [and that] this practice [was] not compliant with
Company policy as per 195 O & M Manual F-35 Tank Alarm and Gauging Equipment, Section 3.2.”8
Although Buckeye acknowledged that it failed to conduct the required hand gauging, the PHMSA
inspector requested additional records for Tank 228. In response, Buckeye produced work orders for
Tank 228. However, these work orders did not indicate whether or not hand gauging was conducted on
Tank 228 from 2010 to 2011or include any measurements, calculations, confirmations or determinations.
6/30/2010
After reviewing the Internal Report in conjunction with these work orders, the PHMSA inspector
arranged a conference call with Buckeye to determine the extent of testing and inspection that occurred on
Tank 228. On February 10, 2014, during a conference call with PHMSA representatives, Buckeye
explained that its’ accident investigation revealed that its personnel failed to perform hand gauging on
Tank 228.
Work Order Number Completion Date
1 660304 2 746764 7/18/2011
6 Buckeye’s Comprehensive Scheduling Chart – Regulatory Inspection sheet requires “Breakout Tank Overfill
Protection Inspections” to be conducted “At Least 1 Time per Calendar Year Not to Exceed 15 months.”
7 Transmitter unit refers to the tank gauging system.
8 F-35: Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment (CFR TITLE 49: PART 195.428(d)), Issued: 12/11, Subsection 3.2
Tank Gauging System is a replica of H-09 – Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment, Issued: 9/10, Subsection 3.2
Tank Gauging System.
120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 4 of 9
(140297)



1-2014-5003
Buckeye’s Internal Report confirmed that there were deficiencies that affected both the trigger and the
tank gauging system. “The trigger for the independent Hi Hi Alarm was improperly set 7 inches too high.
. . [and the]Tank Side Gauge and tank gauging system [was] reading approximately 18” lower than actual
level in tank (emphasis added).” The Accident Report also confirmed that Tank 228 gauge system was
reading approximately 18 inches lower than the actual level in the tank. Moreover, the Accident Report
stated that the tank gauge was showing the tank level to be at “MAX SAFE FILL” while the tank was
overfilling.9
Buckeye provided a spreadsheet that recorded “Year 2012,” “ZG Tank 228,” and “SF 74223.”10 In this
spreadsheet, Buckeye wrote 73,884 net barrels at the time of the accident. According to Buckeye, it read
the tank gauging system which showed 3,000 barrels room available before overfill. However, Tank 228
contained more than 73,884 net barrels at the time of the accident. This further illustrates that the side
gauge and tank gauging system were inaccurate.
Following the accident, Buckeye recalculated and adjusted the tank gauge level and alarm level for Tank
228. Based on the information in the Internal Report and the new measurements, Buckeye had the
incorrect alarm settings for Tank 228 since at least 2003.
Therefore, Buckeye failed to follow its procedure H-09 – Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment, Issued:
9/10.
3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling
abnormal operations and emergencies. . .
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and normal
operations: . . .
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the
requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
Buckeye failed to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, Buckeye failed
to follow a procedure in its Operations and Maintenance Manual titled 195 O and M Manual, F-37:
Aboveground Tanks (In-Service) (CFR Title 49: PARTS 195.432(a), 195.432(b)) Issued: 9/12, which
requires an external inspection of an in-service aboveground breakout tanks at interval at least one time
per month and not to exceed one month.11 Buckeye did not inspect the local level gauge and hand gauge
at Tank 228 from July 2011 to May 2012, as required by the procedure12
.
9 Accident Report at 14.
10 Per Buckeye, “SF 74223” stands for Safe Fill 74223 barrels.
11 Buckeye’s Comprehensive Scheduling Chart – Regulatory Inspection sheet requires “Breakout Tank Inspections”
to be conducted “At Least 1 Time per Month Not to Exceed 1 month.”
12 During the investigation, Buckeye provided a copy of 195 O and M Manual, F-37: Aboveground Tanks (In-
Service) (CFR Title 49: PARTS 195.432(a), 195.432(b)) Issued: 9/12. 195 O and M Manual, F-37: Aboveground
Tanks (In-Service) (CFR Title 49: PARTS 195.432(a), 195.432(b)) Issued: 9/12, Subsection 3 requires personnel to
120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 5 of 9
(140297)



1-2014-5003
A portion of the form specifically inquires as to whether the “Local level gauge [matches the] hand
gauge.”
Buckeye also provided copies of Form B (Monthly Tank Inspection Report Form) for Tank 228 from July
2011 to May 2012. Those records indicated that there was no deficiency with the local level gauge. But,
in fact, the local level gauge was incorrect prior to the accident.
Buckeye’s Internal Report states that the “Tank Side Gauge and GSI Tracking System [read]
approximately 18” lower than actual level in tank.”13 Also, during the conference call PHMSA
representatives had with Buckeye, Buckeye explained that its personnel did not perform hand gauging on
Tank 228.14 Lastly, in the Internal Report, Buckeye stated that “Monthly Tank Hand Gauging [was] not
performed at Macungie Station, as per: . . . 195 O & M Manual, F-37, Subsection 3, Form B, Line 22. . .”
Buckeye could not demonstrate that it followed its procedure titled: 195 O & M Manual, F-37, Subsection
3, Form B, Line 22.
Following the accident, Buckeye recalculated and adjusted the tank gauge level and alarm level for Tank
228.
4. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a manual of
written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling
abnormal operations and emergencies. . .
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include procedures for the following to provide safety during maintenance and normal
operations: . . .
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the
requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
Buckeye failed to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, Buckeye failed
to follow Section 16.0 Stock Variations of its Measurement Manual, A-01 – Measurement Issued: 11/11
because it did not investigate a volume discrepancy regarding Tank 228.
According to Section 16.0:
16.1 Transportation Variations
Transportation variation shall be reviewed for each Tender receipt. Variations
greater than +/-0.25% for pipeline and marine receipts (vessel to shore) shall be
investigated and the results documented.
It is strongly recommended that variations be reviewed immediately after the
receipt/delivery has terminated. . .
use Form B (Monthly Tank Inspection Report Form) to record information. Form B (Monthly Tank Inspection
Report Form) instructs personnel to inspect an item and note whether or not there is a deficiency.
13 Internal Report at 5.
14 PHMSA representatives had a conference call with Buckeye on February 10, 2014.
120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 6 of 9
(140297)



1-2014-5003
In the Internal Report, Buckeye stated that Tank 228 was emptied for Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP)
turnover on March 31, 2012, and then filled with Summer Grade Product on April 1, 2012. Buckeye
stated that there was a 1,299 barrel discrepancy on the refill movement and that it was not investigated,
per Measurement Manual A-01, 16.1 Transportation Stock Variation.
The PHMSA inspector requested that Buckeye provide records and/or documentation that showed this
volume discrepancy as well as documentation of an investigation that was conducted as a result of this
volume discrepancy. In response, Buckeye provided a copy of a Batch Change Report and Daily Activity
Report dated April 1, 2012, and a spreadsheet that recorded “Year 2012,” “ZG Tank 228,” and “SF
74223.” This spreadsheet showed dates ranging from March 28 through April 11, 2012. However,
Buckeye could not produce any documentation of an investigation.
During a conference call PHMSA representatives had with Buckeye, PHMSA requested further
information about this volume discrepancy and Buckeye described the following calculation:15
Calculation:
72,509 barrels (net meter) - 71,345 barrels (gross meter) = 1,164
Started empty but showed 135 barrels
1,164 barrels + 135 barrels = 1,299 barrels
Therefore, on April 1, 2012, there was a 1.8% variation at Tank 228 (calculation shown below).
(1,299) / (72,509) = .018 or .018 * 100 = 1.8 % variation
In accordance with Section 16.0 Stock Variations, variations greater than +/-0.25% must be investigated
and the results documented. However, Buckeye could not produce documentation of an investigation and
the results of the volume discrepancy at Tank 228 that occurred on April 1, 2012. Thus, Buckeye failed
to follow its procedure, Section 16.0 Stock Variations of Measurement Manual, A-01 – Measurement,
Issued: 11/11.
Proposed Civil Penalty
Under 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $200,000 per
violation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for a related series of violations.
For violations occurring prior to January 4, 2012, the maximum penalty may not exceed $100,000 per
violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $1,000,000 for a related series of violations.
The Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and supporting documentation involved in the
above probable violations and has recommended that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of
$ 302,200 as follows:
Item number PENALTY
1 $ 54,700
2 $ 100,000
3 $ 100,000
4 $ 47,500
15 PHMSA representatives had a conference call with Buckeye on January 31, 2014.
120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 7 of 9
(140297)



1-2014-5003
Proposed Compliance Order
With respect to items 1 and 2 pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to Buckeye. Please refer to the
Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and made a part of this Notice.
Response to this Notice
Enclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in
Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. All material you
submit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly available. If you believe that any
portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with
the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you
believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted
information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond within 30
days of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this
Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this
Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.
Please submit all correspondence in this matter to Byron Coy, PE, Director, PHMSA Eastern Region, 820
Bear Tavern Road, Suite 103, W. Trenton, NJ 08628. Please refer to CPF 1-2014-5003 on each
document you submit and please, whenever possible, provide a signed PDF copy in electronic format.
Smaller files may be emailed to Byron.Coy@dot.gov. Larger files should be sent on a CD accompanied
by the original paper copy to the Eastern Region Office.
Additionally, if you choose to respond to this (or any other case), please ensure that any response letter
pertains solely to one CPF case number.
Sincerely,
Byron Coy, PE
Director, Eastern Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Enclosures: Proposed Compliance Order
Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings
120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 8 of 9
(140297)



1-2014-5003
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
Pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) proposes to issue to Buckeye Partners, L.P. (Buckeye) a Compliance Order incorporating the
following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of Buckeye with the pipeline safety
regulations:
1. With respect to Item Number 1 of the Notice, Buckeye must amend its operations and
maintenance (O & M) manual to include a detailed process for investigating an annunciation
of a tank alarm that consists of, but is not limited to: inspecting on-site, communicating with
appropriate personnel, and documenting the cause/results of the investigation and any other
pertinent information.
2. With respect to Item Number 2 of the Notice, Buckeye must:
A. Amend its O & M manual to include a process for recording pertinent information to
ensure the overfill protection system inspection and testing have been completed in
accordance with applicable procedure(s) and federal pipeline safety regulations.
B. Establish and implement a program that ensures all Department of Transportation
jurisdictional breakout tanks at the Macungie Station have the proper/correct tank
level and alarm settings for operations.
3. Within sixty (60) days after receipt of a Final Order, Buckeye must submit documentation to
the Director, Eastern Region, demonstrating that Items 1 and 2(A) have been completed.
4. Within one hundred and eighty (180) days after receipt of a Final Order, Buckeye must
submit documentation to the Director, Eastern Region, demonstrating that Item 2(B) has been
completed.
5. It is requested (not mandated) that Buckeye maintain documentation of the safety
improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to
Byron Coy, PE, Director, Eastern Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: 1) total cost
associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total
cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.
120145003_NOPV_PCP_PCO_09042014 Page 9 of 9
(140297)

120145003_Closure Letter_01132016_text.pdf

OVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY
January 13, 2016
T. Scott Collier
VP, Performance Assurance and Asset Integrity
Buckeye Partners, L.P.
Five TEK Park
9999 Hamilton Boulevard
Breinigsville, PA 18031
CPF 1-2014-5003
Dear Mr. Collier:
On October 6, 2015, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
issued to Buckeye Partners, L.P. a Final Order in the above-referenced case. This Order
included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based on our review of the
documentation you provided and confirmation of payment of the civil penalty, it has been
determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order.
Accordingly, this case is now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the
matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Byron Coy, PE
Director, Eastern Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

120145003_Final Order_10062015_text.pdf

October 6, 2015
Mr. Clark C. Smith
President & CEO
Buckeye Partners, LP
One Greenway Plaza
Houston, Texas 77046
Re: CPF No. 1-2014-5003
Dear Mr. Smith:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation, assesses a civil penalty of $302,200, and specifies actions that need to be taken by
Buckeye Partners, LP, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations.
This is also to acknowledge receipt of payment of the full penalty amount, by wire transfer dated
October 2, 2014. When the terms of the compliance order have been completed, as determined
by the Director, Eastern Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final
Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided
under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Byron Coy, P.E., Director, Eastern Region, OPS
Mr. Thomas S. Collier, Vice President, Performance & Asset Integrity,
Buckeye Partners, LP
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
Buckeye Partners, LP, ) CPF No. 1-2014-5003
)
)
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
On August 21, 2012, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),
conducted an investigation of an accident involving the pipeline system operated by Buckeye
Partners, LP (Buckeye or Respondent), in Emmaus, Pennsylvania. Respondent owns and
operates liquid petroleum-product pipeline systems throughout the United States, with over
6,000 miles of pipeline. Respondent also owns approximately 100 liquid petroleum products
terminals, with a storage capacity of more than 70 million barrels.1
The investigation arose out of an accident at Respondent’s Emmaus, Pennsylvania station and
tank farm complex (Macungie Station) on June 17, 2012, when it is alleged that a steel
aboveground tank overfilled and spilled approximately 100 barrels of gasoline in a “High
Consequence area” (HCA), resulting in costs of approximately $87,000.
As a result of the investigation, the Director, Eastern Region, OPS (Director), issued to
Respondent, by letter dated September 4, 2014, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil
Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the
Notice proposed finding that Buckeye had committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195
and proposed assessing a civil penalty of $302,200 for the alleged violations. The Notice also
proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.
Buckeye responded to the Notice by letter dated September 23, 2014 (Response). The company
did not contest the allegations of violation and stated that it would adhere to the proposed
compliance order upon receipt of the Final Order. Buckeye paid the proposed penalty of
$302,200, as provided in 49 C.F.R. § 190.227, which serves to close the case with prejudice to
Respondent.
1 Buckeye Partners, LP, website, available at http://www.buckeye.com/BusinessOperations/tabid/56/Default.aspx
(last accessed March 16, 2015).



CPF No. 1-2014-5003
Page 2
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
In its Response, Buckeye did not contest the allegations in the Notice that it violated 49 C.F.R.
Part 195, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3), which states:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each
pipeline system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations
and emergencies . . . .
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following
to provide safety during maintenance and normal operations: . . .
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in
accordance with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H
of this part.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3) by failing to follow its
own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities
and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, the Notice alleged that
Respondent failed to follow procedures in the company’s Operating Manual (O&M Manual), B-
10 - Filling Tanks (B-10),
2 which required that tanks be filled in a safe and controlled manner.
O&M Manual, B-10, section 2.10.2 states:
If the tank volume causes the annunciation of a high-high alarm,
immediately shut down the incoming stream and notify the Control
Center.
O&M Manual, B-10, section 2.13 states:
Operators and Controllers share responsibility for monitoring tank
alarms in SCADA. If a critical Hi Hi alarm is received from a physical
device or SCADA software alarm, both parties are responsible for
investigating and shutting down a receipt into the tank if a cause is not
verified immediately. Controllers will respond if a Field Operator is not
available, immediately.
According to the Notice, on June 17, 2012, Buckeye’s Night Shift Operator failed to
immediately shut down the incoming product stream to Tank 228 and notify the Control Center
2 Issued September 2010.



CPF No. 1-2014-5003
Page 3
once the “Hi Hi” alarm3 sounded. Moreover, it alleged that once the Controller was aware of the
Hi Hi alarm, the Controller failed to immediately shut down the line and investigate the cause of
the alarm.
The Notice further alleged that Respondent’s August 20, 2012 Incident Investigation Report
(Report) of the accident found that the Macungie Night Shift Operator did not appropriately
respond to the Hi Hi alarm. According to the Report, the independent Hi Hi alarm was received
into the SCADA system, at which point the Controller was prepared to shut down the Macungie
Station and Linden pumps; however, the Controller did not do so because he was aware that
Tank 222 was being filled. Because of this circumstance, the Controller did not want to interrupt
the schedule by shutting down the line. According to the Notice, the Report allegedly found that
the “Macungie Night Shift Operator did not respond appropriately to [the] Hi Hi alarm received
at 05:52 .am., . . . as per Operating Manual B-10 Filling Tanks, Section 2.13.”
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3) by failing to follow
its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3), as quoted
above, by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to follow its inspection and testing
procedure contained in O&M Manual, H-09 – Tank Alarms and Gauging Equipment.
4 This
procedure stated, in relevant part:
1. Policy
1.1 On each tank, the level alarm/shutdown systems and tank
volume gauging equipment, including the associated transmitting-
receiving units for remote monitoring, shall be inspected and a
functional test shall be conducted within the time frequency listed
on the comprehensive scheduling chart . . . .
The Notice further alleged that Respondent’s Comprehensive Scheduling Chart – Regulatory
Inspection sheet required “Breakout Tank Overfill Protection Inspections” to be conducted at
intervals not in excess of 15 months, but at least once per calendar year, by manually gauging the
tank volume and adjusting the gauge to match the manual hand-line gauge. PHMSA alleged that
Buckeye did not manually gauge Tank 228 from 2010 to 2011, resulting in inaccuracies in the
side gauge and tank gauging system that contributed to the overfill of Tank 228 on June 17,
2012.
The company’s procedure, O&M Manual, Tank Gauging System for H-09 – Tank Alarms and
3 A “Hi Hi” alarm is one level of alarm utilized by a SCADA system and configured during installation.
4 Issued September 2010.



CPF No. 1-2014-5003
Page 4
Gauging Equipment, Subsection 3.2, states, in relevant part:
3.2. Tank Gauging System
3.2.1 Manually gauge the tank using a hand line.
3.2.2 Adjust the side gauge to agree with the manual hand line
gauge.
3.2.3 Set the transmitter unit5 to the corresponding side gauge
reading and confirm that the proper level is shown on
control panel at the remote monitoring location.
3.2.4 Restore all equipment to the proper operating condition.
Contact local Operations and the Control Center. Have
them verify that they have the same tank level as is
being observed in the Field and all alarms from testing
have been cleared.
The Notice further alleged that the Report acknowledged that “in the past year, Macungie Station
suspended hand gauging tank volumes . . .[and that] this practice [was] not compliant with
Company policy as per 195 O&M Manual F-35 Tank Alarm and Gauging Equipment, Section
3.2.”
Additionally, PHMSA asserted its investigation revealed that Respondent’s employees did not
perform hand gauging on Tank 228. Moreover, the Report indicated that there were deficiencies
that affected both the trigger and the tank gauging system, such as the independent Hi Hi Alarm
being set too high and both the tank side gauge and tank gauging system being set too low.
The Notice also alleged that following the accident, Respondent recalculated and adjusted the
tank gauge level and the alarm level for Tank 228. Based on the Report and the company’s new
measurements, Respondent allegedly had had incorrect alarm settings for Tank 228 since 2003.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3) by failing to follow
its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3), as quoted
above, by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to follow a procedure in its Operations
and Maintenance Manual (O&M) entitled, 195 O& M Manual, F-37: Aboveground Tanks (In-
5 Transmitter unit refers to the tank gauging system.



CPF No. 1-2014-5003
Page 5
Service) (CFR Title 49: PARTS 195.432(a), 195.432(b)),
6 which required an external inspection
of in-service aboveground breakout tanks at least one time per month but not to exceed one
month. The Notice also asserted that Respondent did not inspect the local level gauge and hand
gauge at Tank 228 from July 2011 to May 2012, despite the fact that a portion of the inspection
form specifically asked whether the “Local level gauge [matches the] hand gauge.”
The Notice further alleged that PHMSA’s inspectors discovered that Respondent’s Form B7 for
Tank 228 incorrectly indicated there was no local level gauge deficiency from July 2011 to May
2012, yet Respondent’s own Report indicated there was no monthly tank hand gauging at
Macungie Station, as required by Respondent’s procedures.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a)(c)(3) by failing to follow
its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
act
- **truncated:** true
- **body characters:** 49516