{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 120151013H","title":"TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE COMPANY — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2015-06-12","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120151013h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120151013h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120151013h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/120151013H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE COMPANY. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2015-06-12 and is reported as closed as of 2018-12-12. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n120151013H_Closure Letter_12122018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120151013H/120151013H_Closure%20Letter_12122018.pdf\n\n120151013H_Closure Letter_12122018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120151013H/120151013H_Closure%20Letter_12122018_text.pdf\n\n120151013H_Corrective Action Order_06122015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120151013H/120151013H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_06122015.pdf\n\n120151013H_Corrective Action Order_06122015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120151013H/120151013H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_06122015_text.pdf\n\n120151013H_Corrective Action Order_06122015_text.pdf\n\nJune 12, 2015\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: [918-573-4900]\nMr. Alan S. Armstrong\nDirector, Chief Executive Officer, and President\nWilliams Partners, L.P.\nOne Williams Center\nTulsa, Oklahoma 74172\nRe: CPF No. 1-2015-1013H\nDear Mr. Armstrong:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It requires Williams\nPartners, L.P. to take certain corrective actions with respect to Line B that failed on June 9, 2015,\nin Lycoming County, Pennsylvania. Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile.\nService of the Corrective Action Order by electronic transmission is deemed complete upon\ntransmission and acknowledgement of receipt, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon completion of service.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Byron Coy, Director, Eastern Region, OPS\nMs. Stephanie Timmermeyer, Vice President, Environmental, Health and Safety,\nAccess Midstream Partners, L.P., 525 Central Park Oklahoma City, OK 73105\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nWilliams Partners, L.P., ) CPF No. 1-2015-1013H\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background:\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112,\nto require Williams Partners, L.P. (Williams or Respondent), to take the necessary corrective\naction to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with\nthe recent failure on William’s Transcontinental Leidy Line B (Leidy Line B).\nOn June 9, 2015, a reportable accident occurred on Leidy Line B, resulting in the release of an\nundetermined amount of natural gas (the Failure). Leidy Line B is a 24-inch diameter pipeline\n194.06 miles in length that originates at Station 505 (MP 0.14) and terminates at the Leidy\nStorage Field located in Tammerack, Pennsylvania. Line B passes through Potter, Clinton,\nLycoming, Columbia, Luzerne, and Monroe Counties in Pennsylvania and Warren, Hunterdon,\nand Somerset Counties in New Jersey. The cause of the Failure has not yet been determined.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. The\npreliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are as follows.\nPreliminary Findings:\n• Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co. LLC, an affiliate of Williams Partners, L.P., is a\n10,500-mile interstate natural gas pipeline system extending from Texas, Louisiana,\nMississippi, and the Gulf of Mexico through Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North\nCarolina, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey to the New York City\nmetropolitan area. The system’s total delivery capacity is approximately 8.4 million\ndekatherms.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-1013H\nPage 2\n• Leidy Line B originates at station 505 (MP 0.14) and terminates at the Leidy Storage\nField located in Tammerack, PA. The majority of the pipeline is located in a Class 1 or 2\nareas, with some Class 3 areas between Station 515 and Station 505 and in the\nWilliamsport, PA area. The risk or threat to life and property is the greatest in areas\nwhere the pipeline is in close proximity to homes and dwellings.\n• The “Affected Segment” is the segment of Leidy B Line from Compressor Station 517\nmain line valve MLV517LB0 (MP 115.19) to Leidy Storage Field (MP 194.06). The\nlength of “Affected Segment” is 78.9 miles.\n• The \"Isolated Segment\" is the 14.3-mile segment of the Trancontinental 24-inch Leidy\nLine B from Compressor Station 517 main line valve MLV 517LB0 (Mile Post .19) to\nmain line valve MLV 517LB10 (Mile Post 129.52). The Isolated Segment is the portion\nof the \"Affected Segment\" that was shut-in after the failure on June 9, 2015, by closing\nmain line valves MLV 517LB0 (upstream of the failure) and MLVLB10 (downstream\nof the failure) and that must remain shut-in until a restart plan is approved by the\n“Director.”\n• On June 9, 2015, at approximately 10:41 p.m. (EST), Williams reported that Line B\nfailed to the National Response Center (NRC #119244). The incident occurred\napproximately three miles from Unityville, Pennsylvania (Mile Post 118.6). At the time\nof the failure, the pipeline was operating at a pressure of 1141 psig and a Maximum\nAllowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) of 1200 psig. The failed pipe section exhibited a\n34-foot longitudinal fracture originating at the one-o’clock position on the pipeline. The\nfailure occurred in a rural Class 1 location. While 190,832 MSCF escaped at the failure\nsite, the gas failed to ignite. No injuries, fatalities, or other significant property damage\noccurred.\n• The failed pipeline is a 24-inch diameter line that transports natural gas from\nTranscontinental Compressor Station 515 to the Leidy Storage Field, spanning a distance\nof approximately 88-miles (Affected Segment). The Failure occurred approximately\nthree miles from Unityville, Pennsylvania, (Failure Site) near milepost 118.6.\n• The failure occurred in a section of pipeline that was constructed in 1963. This section\nconsists of 24-inch diameter, 0.344 wall thickness, Grade X60, EFW (Electric Flash\nWelded) seam pipe.\n• The Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of the pipeline is 1200 psig, as established by\na 1987 hydrostatic test. At the time of the Failure, the actual operating pressure of the\npipeline was 1141 psig.\n• Upon determining a pressure drop, Williams notified Gas Control staff and shut mainline\nvalve 517LB10. Operations staff verified that isolation valves 517LB0 and S4 valves\nwere also promptly closed at station 517. By 9:30 p.m. EST the line pressure was at 0\npsig.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-1013H\nPage 3\n• The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Eastern Region responded to the scene. In addition,\na total of 7 local fire departments responded, at varying times.\n• The cause of the failure is unknown and both Williams and OPS are continuing to\ninvestigate the cause of this failure. The failed pipe section is being transported to an\nindependent metallurgist for examination and failure analysis. Preliminary findings\nindicate that there was a material failure. The rupture initiated at the one o’clock, facing\neast. The length of the longitudinal pipe rupture was approximately 34 feet in length. At\npresent, the pipeline is out of service.\n• The accident did not cause any injuries or fatalities, but approximately 150 people were\nevacuated following the failure.\n• State Routes 118 and 42 were temporarily closed to traffic in the affected area.\n• In September 2010, Williams performed an in-line inspection (ILI) of Line B from\nCompressor Station 515 to Station 520, a distance of approximately 88 miles. A total of\n29 locations were selected for remediation. The work was completed in 2011.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set\nforth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order, without prior notice and opportunity for hearing, upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,\nproperty, or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing and expedited review\nwill be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the\npipeline without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the\nenvironment. Additionally, having considered the unknown cause of the failure, the fact that\nrecent in line inspections found no issues that could explain this failure, and the resultant risk to\nthe area surrounding Leidy Line B, I find that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to\nrequire immediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,\nproperty, or the environment.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-1013H\nPage 4\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may contest its issuance obtain expedited\nreview either by answering in writing or requesting a hearing under 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, to be\nheld as soon as practicable under the terms of such regulation, by notifying the Associate\nAdministrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Eastern, PHMSA\n(Director). If Respondent requests a hearing, it will be held telephonically or in-person in the\nEastern Region office or Washington, D.C.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, PHMSA will notify\nRespondent of any additional measures that are required and an amended Order issued, if\nnecessary. To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an\nopportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions:\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Williams Partners, L.P. to immediately take the\nfollowing corrective actions for the Affected Segment:\nCORRECTIVE ACTIONS\n1. 2. Williams must not operate the Isolated Segment until authorized to do so by the Director.\nOperating Pressure Restriction. Williams must reduce and maintain a twenty percent (20%)\npressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the Affected\nSegment such that the operating pressure along the Affected Segment will not exceed eighty\npercent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the failure on\nJune 9, 2015.\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the\nDirector.\nb. c. d. By June 16, 2015, Williams must provide the Director the actual operating pressures of\neach compressor station and each main line pressure regulating station on the Affected\nSegment at the time of failure and the reduced pressure restriction set-points at these same\nlocations.\nThis pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to be\nadjusted accordingly.\nWhen determining the pressure restriction set-points, Williams must take into account\nany in-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected Segment to\nprovide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions are completed.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-1013H\nPage 5\n3. 4. e. Williams must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating\npressure data. Take into account any in-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies\npresent in the Affected Segment and immediately reduce the operating pressure to\nmaintain the safe operations of the Affected Segment, if warranted by the monthly review.\nSubmit the results of the monthly review to the Director. The results must include, at a\nminimum, the current discharge set-points (including any additional pressure reductions),\nand any pressure exceedance at discharge set-points.\nf. Since Lines A, B and C share a common right of way in the area of the failure, Williams\nmust also maintain a 20% pressure in Lines A and C, until excavation determines if those\nlines were damaged as a result of the proximity of Line B.\nRestart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Isolated Segment develop and submit a\nwritten Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\na. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the entire\nplan but the Isolated Segment cannot resume operation until the Restart Plan is approved\nin its entirety.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference into\nthis Order.\nc. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Isolated Segment during the\nrestart process and must include incremental pressure increases during start up, with each\nincrement to be held for at least 2 hours.\nd. e. f. g. h. The Restart Plan must include sufficient surveillance of the pipeline during each pressure\nincrement to ensure that no leaks are present when operation of the line resumes.\nThe Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance communications\nwith local emergency response officials.\nThe Restart Plan must provide for a review of the Isolated Segment for conditions similar\nto those of the failure including a review of construction, operating and maintenance\n(O&M) and integrity management records such as in-line inspection (ILI) results,\nhydrostatic tests, root cause failure analysis of prior failures, aerial and ground patrols,\ncorrosion, cathodic protection, excavations and pipe replacements. Williams must\naddress any findings that require remedial measures to be implemented prior to restart.\nThe Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all mandated\nactions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all procedural modifications are\nincorporated into William’s operations and maintenance procedures manual.\nThe Restart Plan must provide for an integrity verification for the Isolated Segment, as\nyet to be determined\nPrior to restart, submit to the Director a contingency plan to operate and monitor the\nIsolated Segment during flooding conditions, including enhanced patrolling and\nsurveillance.\nReturn to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, Williams may return the\nIsolated Segment to service but the operating pressure must not exceed eighty percent (80%)\nof the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the failure on June 9, 2015.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-1013H\nPage 6\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction.\na. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction upon a\nwritten request from Williams demonstrating that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure\noperating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the\npressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies, and operating\nparameters of the pipeline.\n6. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restrictions\nupon a written request from Williams demonstrating that temporary mitigative and\npreventive measures are implemented prior to and during the temporary removal or\nmodification of the pressure restriction. The Director's determination will be based on the\nfailure cause and provision of evidence that preventative and mitigative actions taken by the\nWilliams provide for the safe operation of the Affected Segment during the temporary\nremoval or modification of the pressure restriction. Appeals to determinations of the Director\nin this regard will be decided by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n7. Instrumented Leakage Survey. Within 3 days after the Affected Segment is returned to\nservice, Williams must perform an aerial or ground instrumented leakage survey of the\nAffected Segment. Williams must investigate all leak indications and remedy all leaks\ndiscovered. Williams must submit documentation of this survey to the Director within [10]\ndays after restart.\n8. Records Verification. As recommended in PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 2012-06, verify the\nrecords for the Affected Segment to confirm the maximum operating pressure (MOP) or\nmaximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP). Williams must submit documentation of\nthis record verification to the Director within 45 days of receipt of this Order.\n9. Review of Prior Inline Inspection (ILI) Results. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order,\nconduct a review of any previous inline inspection (ILI) results of the Affected Segment. Re-\nevaluate all ILI results from the past 10 calendar years, include a review of the ILI vendors'\nraw data and analysis. Determine whether any features were present in the failed pipe joint\nand/or any other pipe removed. Also, determine if any features with similar characteristics\nare present elsewhere on the Affected Segment. Williams must submit documentation of this\nILI review to the Director within 45 days of receipt of this Order as follows:\na. List all ILI tool runs, tool types, and the calendar years of the tool runs.\nb. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures present in the failed joint and/or other pipe removed.\nc. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures with similar characteristics present elsewhere on the Affected Segment.\nd. Explain the process used to review the ILI results and the results of the reevaluation.\n10. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, complete\nmechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including an\nanalysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. The testing and failure analysis must be\ncompleted by an independent laboratory or expert. Complete the testing and analysis as\nfollows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe section\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-1013H\nPage 7\nand other evidence from the failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and the\nproposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director with the\nscheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS representative to\nwitness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their entirety\nto the Director at the same time they are made available to Williams.\n11. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, complete a\nroot cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the Director.\nThe RCFA must be supplemented/facilitated by an independent third-party acceptable to the\nDirector and must document the decision making process and all factors contributing to the\nfailure. The final report must include findings and any lessons learned and whether the\nfindings and any lessons learned are applicable to other locations within William’s pipeline\nsystem.\n12. Emergency Response Plan and Training Review. Williams must review and assess the\neffectiveness of its emergency response plan with regards to the failure. Include in the\nreview and assessment the on-scene response and support, coordination, and communication\nwith emergency responders and public officials. Also, include a review and assessment of the\neffectiveness of its emergency training program. Williams must amend its emergency\nresponse plan and emergency training, if necessary, to reflect the results of this review. The\ndocumentation of this Emergency Response Plan and Training Review must be available for\ninspection by OPS or provided to the Director, if requested.\n13. Public Awareness Program Review. Williams must review and assess the effectiveness of\nits Public Awareness Program with regards to the failure. Williams must amend its Public\nAwareness Program, if necessary, to reflect the results of this review. The documentation of\nthis Public Awareness Program Review must be available for inspection by OPS or provided\nto the Director, if requested.\n14. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within [90] days following receipt of this Order, Williams must submit a Remedial Work\nPlan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. c. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire RWP.\nOnce approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. e. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and remedial\nmeasures Williams will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segment. It must\naddress all known or suspected factors and causes of the June 9, 2015 failure. Williams\nshould consider both the risk of another failure and the consequence of another failure to\ndevelop a prioritized schedule for RWP related work along the Affected Segment.\nThe RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the contributing\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-1013H\nPage 8\nii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. factors identified for the June 9, 2015failure.\nGather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and pressure test\nfailures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written report containing all the\navailable information such as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and failures.\nIntegrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis, and other\ncorrective actions required by this Order with all relevant pre-existing operational and\nassessment data for the Affected Segment. Pre-existing operational data includes, but\nis not limited to, construction, operations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior\nmetallurgical analyses, and any third party consultation information. Pre-existing\nassessment data includes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure\ntesting, direct assessments, close interval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.\nDetermine if conditions similar to those contributing to the failure on June 9, 2015,\nare likely to exist elsewhere on the Affected Segment.\nConduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and/or evaluations, as to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the failure on\nJune 9, 2015, and other failures from the failure history (see [(e)(ii)] above) or any\nother integrity threats are present elsewhere on the Affected Segment. At a minimum,\nthis process must consider all failure:\n1) Inline inspection (ILI) tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the\npipeline system based on the cause of failure on June 9, 2015,] and that can\nreliably detect and identify anomalies,\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing,\n3) Close-interval surveys,\n4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in coordination with\nother utilities (e.g. underground utilities, overhead power lines, etc.) in the area,\n5) Coating surveys,\n6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys,\n7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and,\n8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for the failure\ncauses.\nNote: Williams may use the results of previous tests, inspections, assessments, and\nevaluations if approved by the Director, provided the results of the tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations are analyzed with regard to the factors known or\nsuspected to have caused the June 9, 2015 failure.\nDescribe the inspection and repair criteria Williams will use to prioritize, excavate,\nevaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified integrity threats.\nInclude a description of how any defects will be graded and a schedule for repairs or\nreplacement.\nBased on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment, describe the\nmethods Williams will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective measures to\nremediate the conditions associated with the pipeline failure on [date] and to address\nother known integrity threats along the Affected Segment. The repair, replacement, or\n\n\n\n15. CPF No: 1-2015-1013H\nPage 9\nother corrective measures must meet the criteria specified in [1(d)(vi)] above.\nviii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification measures\nto ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segment considering the results\nof the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective measures undertaken\npursuant to the Order.\nf. g. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\nWilliams must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of actions\nundertaken pursuant to this Order, and/or to incorporate modifications required by the\nDirector.\ni. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.\nii. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\niii. Any and all revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by\nreference into this Order will be fully described and documented in the CAO\nDocumentation Report (CDR).\nh. Implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to the plan.\nCAO Documentation Report (CDR). Williams must create and revise, as necessary, a CAO\nDocumentation Report (CDR). When Williams has concluded all the items in this Order it will\nsubmit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the Director to complete a\nthorough review of all actions taken by Williams with regards to this Order prior to approving\nthe closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to summarize all activities and\ndocumentation associated with this Order in one document.\na. b. c. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire CDR.\nOnce approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this Order.\nThe CDR must include but not be limited to:\nii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. viii. i. Table of Contents;\nSummary of the pipeline failure of June 9, 2015, and the response activities;\nSummary of pipe data/properties and all prior assessments of the Affected Segment;\nSummary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis required by\nthe Order;\nSummary of the Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing as required by the Order;\nSummary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Order;\nDocumentation of all actions taken by Williams to implement the RWP, the results of\nthose actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\nDocumentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to incorporate\nthe results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and whenever necessary to\nincorporate new information obtained during the failure investigation and remedial\nactivities;\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-1013H\nPage 10\nix. x. Lessons learned while completing this Order;\nA path forward describing specific actions Williams will take on its entire pipeline\nsystem as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Order; and\nxi. Appendices (if required).\nOther Requirements:\n1. 2. 3. 4. Reporting. Submit reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and results\nof the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress of the\nrepairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report is due on\nSeptember 1, 2015. The Director may change the interval for the submission of these\nreports.\nDocumentation of Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Order. Include in each\nmonthly report the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of\nprocedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure,\nincluding repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental\nremediation, if applicable.\nApprovals. With respect to each submission requiring the approval of the Director, the\nDirector may: (a) approve the submission in whole or in part; (b) approve the submission\non specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)\ndisapprove the submission in whole or in part and direct Respondent to modify the\nsubmission; or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\nrequired by the submission, as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of a submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\nExtensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted and demonstrating\ngood cause for an extension.\nThe actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 192, under any\nother order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq., or under any\nother provision of Federal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-1013H\nPage 11\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60120.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 1-2015-1013H and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nThe terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.\n__________________________________ _______________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n120151013H_Closure Letter_12122018_text.pdf\n\nDecember 12, 2018\nMr. Alan S. Armstrong\nDirector, Chief Executive Officer, and President\nWilliams Partners, L.P.\nOne Williams Center\nTulsa, Oklahoma 74172\nCPF 1-2015-1013H\nDear Mr. Armstrong:\nOn June 12, 2015, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline\nSafety, issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) requiring Williams Partners, L.P. to take certain\ncorrective actions with respect to its Transcontinental Leidy Line B that failed on June 9, 2015, in\nLycoming County, Pennsylvania.\nWe have received a letter and CAO Documentation Report dated September 13, 2018 from\nMs. Amy Shank, Williams Pipeline Safety and Compliance. The Documentation Report was\nsubmitted as part of the final Corrective Action deliverable, required under item 15 of the CAO.\nBased on our review of the documentation provided in the CAO Documentation Report, it has\nbeen determined that Williams Partners, L.P. has complied with the terms of this order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nRobert Burrough\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","truncated":false,"body_characters":33167}