{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 120155002H","title":"ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2015-01-29","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120155002h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120155002h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120155002h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/120155002H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2015-01-29 and is reported as closed as of 2016-02-23. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n120155002H_Amended Corrective Action Order_03122015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120155002H/120155002H_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_03122015.pdf\n\n120155002H_Amended Corrective Action Order_03122015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120155002H/120155002H_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_03122015_text.pdf\n\n120155002H_Closure Letter_02232016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120155002H/120155002H_Closure%20Letter_02232016.pdf\n\n120155002H_Closure Letter_02232016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120155002H/120155002H_Closure%20Letter_02232016_text.pdf\n\n120155002H_Corrective Action Order_01292015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120155002H/120155002H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_01292015.pdf\n\n120155002H_Corrective Action Order_01292015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120155002H/120155002H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_01292015_text.pdf\n\n120155002H_Amended Corrective Action Order_03122015_text.pdf\n\nMarch 12, 2015\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (281)887-7000\nMr. Michael A. Creel\nChief Executive Officer\nEnterprise Products Partners, LP\n1100 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 1-2015-5002H\nDear Mr. Creel:\nEnclosed is an Amended Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It\nrequires your subsidiary, Enterprise Products Operating, LLC, to take certain corrective actions\nwith respect to the ATEX-1 pipeline that failed on January 26, 2015, near Follansbee, West\nVirginia. Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Service of the Amended\nCorrective Action Order by electronic transmission is deemed complete upon transmission and\nacknowledgement of receipt, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and\nconditions of this Order are effective upon completion of service.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Byron Coy, Regional Director, Eastern Region, OPS\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\nIn the Matter of )\nEnterprise Products Operating LLC, ) CPF No. 1-2015-5002H\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nAMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background:\nThis Amended Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60112, to require Enterprise Products Operating LLC (Enterprise or Respondent), to take the\nnecessary corrective action to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential\nhazards associated with the recent failure on Enterprise’s ATEX-1 pipeline.\nOn January 26, 2015, a reportable accident occurred on the ATEX-1 pipeline, resulting in the\nrelease of approximately 23,901 barrels of liquid ethane (Failure). This pipeline is\napproximately 1,265 miles in length and transports product from Washington County,\nPennsylvania, to Mont Belvieu, Texas (ATEX-1). The accident occurred on a 255-mile unit of\nATEX -1 that runs from Washington County, Pennsylvania to Seymour, Indiana. Based on a\nvisual inspection of the ruptured pipe, the failure occurred in or very near a circumferential girth\nweld on the pipe. The cause of the Failure has not yet been determined. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §\n60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of\nPipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. On January 29, 2015, OPS\nissued a Corrective Action Order requiring Enterprise to take certain corrective actions.\nEnterprise filed a Request for Hearing on February 26, 2015, and a telephonic hearing was held\non March 3, 2015. The preliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are as follows.\nPreliminary Findings:\n• Respondent is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Enterprise Products Partners, LP, which\noperates roughly 50,000 miles of natural gas, natural gas liquid, crude oil, refined\nproducts and petrochemical pipelines throughout the United States.1\n• The failed pipeline is a 20-inch diameter line segment that is part of the company’s\nGreensburg- Pennsylvania/West Virginia (liquid) unit that transports liquid ethane, and\n1 http://www.enterpriseproducts.com/corpProfile/businessProfile.shtm.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 3\nruns from the Mark West Processing Facility in Houston, Pennsylvania to the Ohio River,\na distance of approximately 26 miles. The Affected Segment, as that term is defined\nbelow on page 4 (under “Definitions”) and used throughout this Order, means the\nsegment from Houston, Pennsylvania to Seymour, Indiana. The Failure occurred near\nmilepost 23.1, and near Follansbee, West Virginia (Failure Site).\n• The Affected Segment was constructed in November 2013 and is composed of 20-inch\ndiameter, 0.312” wall thickness (generally), API-5L pipe, Grade X-70 and is high\nfrequency electric resistance welded (HF ERW) pipe manufactured by American Pipe.\n• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the pipeline in the Affected Segment is 1440\npsig, as established by hydrostatic testing in 2013. At the time of the Failure, the actual\noperating pressure of the Affected Segment was 1150 psi g.\n• At approximately 9:40 a.m. C.S.T. on January 26, 2015, the Respondent’s ATEX-1\npipeline failed near Follansbee, West Virginia, resulting in the release of approximately\n23,901 barrels of liquid ethane into a wooded area. There was no impact to people or to\nwaterways, though the explosion and resulting fire burned approximately five acres of\nwoodlands. The fire in the surrounding area was extinguished at 7:10 p.m. E.S.T., in the\nevening of January 27, 2015. Enterprise reported the Failure to the National Response\nCenter (NRC Report No. 1106602) on January 26, 2015, at 11:38 a.m.\n• After observing a sudden drop in pressure in its control room, Enterprise closed the\nautomated block valves MOV-2001 (mile post 4.05) and MOV-2004 (mile post 25.28) in\norder to isolate the segment. Thereafter, the control room notified Enterprise personnel,\nwho responded to the rupture location and manually closed Main Line Valve (ML\nV)2002 (mile post 13.01) and MLV-2003 (mile post 16.42) in an attempt to further\nrestrict product flow to the failure location (mile post 23.1). As a precaution, Line A-1,\nwhich shares a right-of-way with ATEX-1, was also isolated. Since Line A-1 is several\nhundred feet from the Failure Site, Line A-1 was later returned to normal service.\n• The Wellsburg Fire Department and Follansbee Police Department responded to the\nrupture.\n• An OPS investigator arrived at the Failure Site on January 26, 2015.\n• Based on a visual examination of the pipeline at the rupture location, OPS has\npreliminarily determined that the rupture occurred in or very near a circumferential girth\nweld. However, the cause of the failure is still undetermined and the investigation is\nongoing. The pipe at the location of the Failure has not been excavated, as of\nJanuary 28, 2015.\n• The accident caused no known injuries, but burned approximately five acres of\nwoodland. One residence, approximately 2,000 feet from the rupture location, sustained\nexternal damage to the house siding from radiant heat.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 4\n• The ATEX-1 pipeline from block valve MOV-2001 (mile post 4.05) to MOV-2004 (mile\npost 25.28) is currently out-of-service.\n• PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 2010-6528 (75 FED. RES. BULL. 56 (Mar. 2010) provided\nnotification to owners and operators of recently constructed large diameter, high strength\n(API SL X70 and X80) hazardous liquid pipeline systems of potential girth weld failures\ndue to welding quality issues.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set\nforth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order, without prior notice and opportunity for hearing, upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,\nproperty, or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing and expedited review\nwill be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the\npipeline without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the\nenvironment. As noted in the preliminary findings above, operators of newly constructed large\ndiameter pipelines were advised of potential girth weld failures due to welding quality issues.\nThe bulletin advised operators to review these girth welds, particularly in terrains involving\nsloping hill sides with potentially unstable soils. Given that the location of the rupture appears to\nbe at a circumferential weld and that the pipeline runs across hilly terrain, there is an increased\nrisk that other vulnerabilities exist. While no definitive explanation for the Failure exists at this\ntime, I find that failure to issue this Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious\nharm to life, property, or the environment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may contest its issuance obtain expedited\nreview either by answering in writing or requesting a hearing under 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, to be\nheld as soon as practicable under the terms of such regulation, by notifying the Associate\nAdministrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Eastern Region,\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 5\nPHMSA (Director). in the Eastern Region or Washington, D.C.\nIf Respondent requests a hearing, it will be held telephonically or in-person\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, PHMSA will notify\nRespondent of any additional measures that are required and an amended Order issued, if\nnecessary. To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an\nopportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions:\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Enterprise to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions for the Affected Segment and Isolated Segment:\nDefinitions\nThe term “Affected Segment” means the segment that runs from the Mark West Processing\nFacility in Houston, Pennsylvania to Seymour, Indiana.\nThe term “Isolated Segment” means the 21.23 mile segment of ATEX-1 20-inch line from main\nline valve MOV-2001 (mile post 4.05) to MOV-2004 (mile post 25.28).\nThe “Director” means the Director, Eastern Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety.\nCorrective Actions\n1. Shut-In Segment. Enterprise may not restart or operate the Isolated Segment until it\nreceives prior written authorization from the Director.\n2. Repair Plan. Enterprise must establish a plan to repair the Failure Site in accordance\nwith applicable pipeline safety regulations. The plan must be submitted to the Director\nfor approval. Enterprise may not restart the Isolated Segment until it receives written\nnotification from the Director that the Repair Plan has been approved in its entirety.\n3. Restart Plan. Before resuming operation of the Isolated Segment, Enterprise must\ndevelop and submit a written “Restart Plan” to the Director for approval.\na. Approval. The Director may approve certain portions of the Restart Plan before\napproving the entire plan. However, Enterprise may not resume operation of the\nIsolated Segment until it receives written notification from the Director that the\nRestart Plan has been approved in its entirety.\nb. Incorporated by Reference. The Restart Plan, once approved by the Director, will\nbe incorporated by reference into this Order.\n\n\n\nc. CPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 6\nRequired Elements. The Restart Plan must include the following elements: (1)\nProvide for adequate patrolling of the Isolated Segment during the restart process;\n(2) Include incremental pressure increases during start up, with each increment to\nbe held for at least two hours; (3) Include sufficient surveillance of the pipeline\nduring each pressure increment to ensure that no leaks are present when operation\nof the line resumes; (4) Specify a start time between the hours of 8 a.m. and 3\np.m. and provide twenty-four hour notice to local emergency response officials;\n(5) Provide for a review of construction, operating and maintenance (O&M) and\nintegrity management records (e.g. ILI results), hydrostatic tests, root cause\nfailure analyses of prior failures, aerial and ground patrols, corrosion, cathodic\nprotection, excavations and pipe replacements, and address any findings that\nrequire remedial measures to be implemented prior to restart; (6) Documentation\nof the completion of all mandated actions, and a management of change plan to\nensure that all procedural modifications are incorporated into Enterprise’s O&M\nmanual; (7) Enterprise will run an ILI tool with longitudinal Magnetic Flux\nLeakage (MFL), Deformation, and Inertial Mapping (IMU) capability in an effort\nto identify potential overstress areas that may warrant further investigation. The\ndeformation and IMU data from the tool run should be used to detect curvature of\nthe pipe (caused by bending strain) and should allow the Company to detect areas\nof concentrated external loading. As soon as practical after the restart of the\npipeline in ethane service, but no later than April 1, 2015, Enterprise will schedule\nand complete the 45 mile ILI assessment and initiate the ILI analysis on the\nHouston, PA to Hopedale, OH segment. Enterprise will complete the remaining\nILI assessment between Hopedale, OH and Seymour, IN within 120 days of\nrestart. Restart is established at the time the Affected Segment has been fully\nloaded and flowing with liquid ethane; (8) In addition to the ILI assessment in\nItem 7, Enterprise will develop a detailed ATEX Remedial Work Plan (RWP) to\nidentify conditions similar to those contributing to the January 26, 2015 failure\nthat could potentially exist elsewhere in the Affected Segment. The ILI data will\nbe correlated with other criteria to establish a matrix to determine where to\nperform field investigative digs for further analysis. Enterprise must perform a\nspecified number2 of field investigative digs along the Affected Segment. These\nRWP activities will be completed on the Affected Segment to ensure the integrity\nand safe operation of the pipeline. Restoring operating pressure to the original\nMOP will be pending PHMSA’s approval once all ILI runs, analysis, excavations\nand remediation activities have been completed.; and (9) Enterprise will prepare a\nPatrol Plan to be implemented on the Houston, PA to Hopedale, OH segment until\nsuccessful ILI tool runs are completed, meaning good data has been collected\nfrom the ILI tools, for the entire said segment, to include weekly patrolling of all\n2 In order to determine the total number of investigative digs, Enterprise must perform an engineering analysis..\nEnterprise must perform at least three (3) digs. Enterprise must submit the total number of digs with supporting\nanalysis for approval by the Director by May 1, 2015.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 7\nmainline valve stations and all public road crossings to inspect for leaks and\nvisual ground movement. 3\n4. Contingency Plan. Prior to restart, Enterprise must submit to the Director a contingency\nplan to operate and monitor the Isolated Segment, including enhanced patrolling and\nsurveillance. This contingency plan must be submitted to the Director and approved by\nthe Director.\n5. Return to Service. Following approval of the Restart Plan, Enterprise may return the\nIsolated Segment to service, but the operating pressure may not exceed 80% of the actual\noperating pressure that was in effect immediately prior to the Failure.\n6. Removal of Pressure Restriction. Upon written request from Enterprise, the Director may\nallow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction when a reliable engineering\nanalysis demonstrates that the pressure increase is safe, taking into consideration all\nknown defects, anomalies, and the operating parameters of the pipeline.\n7. Temporary Removal or Modification. The Director may allow the pressure restrictions to\nbe temporarily removed or modified upon written application from Enterprise. In order\nto justify such a removal or modification, Enterprise must demonstrate that mitigative\nand preventive measures will have been implemented prior to and during the temporary\nremoval or modification of the pressure restriction. Enterprise may appeal any\ndetermination of under this Section to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n8. Records Verification. Verify the records for the Affected Segment to confirm the\nmaximum operating pressure (MOP). Enterprise must submit documentation of this\nrecord verification to the Director within 45 days of receipt of this Order.4\n9. Review of Prior ln-line Inspection (ILI) Results. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order,\nconduct a review of the previous construction caliper ILI results of the Affected Segment,\nincluding a review of the ILI vendors’ raw data and analysis. Determine whether any\nfeatures were present in the failed pipe joint and/or any other pipe removed. Also,\ndetermine if any features with similar characteristics are present elsewhere on the\nAffected Segment. Enterprise must submit documentation of this ILI review to the\nDirector within 45 days of receipt of this Order as follows:\na. Identify the calendar dates of the completion of the construction caliper tool run.\n3 Enterprise must develop a plan for patrolling and conducting leak inspections. This plan must reference relevant\nprocedures from Enterprise’s Operations and Maintenance procedures, and include specific references to the method\nof patrolling, the personnel involved, and the maintenance of patrolling records. Enterprise must submit these\nprocedures for approval by the Director and obtain approval prior to March 13, 2015.\n4 See PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 2012-06.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 8\nb. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all\nILI MOP-impacting, crack, dent, or other integrity-impacting features present in\nthe failed joint and/or pipe in the Affected Segment.\nc. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all\nILI features with similar characteristics present elsewhere on the Affected\nSegment.\nd. Explain the process used to review the ILI results and the results of the\nreevaluation.\n10. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order,\ncomplete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe,\nincluding an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Complete the testing and\nanalysis as follows:\na. Document the chain of custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and any other evidence from the Failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol\nand the proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. One business day prior to beginning any mechanical and metallurgical testing,\nprovide the Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to\nallow for OPS to attend the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory sends all reports, whether in draft or final form to\nthe Director, in their entirety at the same time these reports are made available to\nthe Operator.\n11. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, complete a\nroot cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the Director.\nThe RCFA must be supplemented/facilitated by an independent third-party acceptable to\nthe Director and must document the decision making process and all factors contributing\nto the failure. The final report must evaluate any causal or contributing factors identified\nin Enterprise’s Accident Investigation Report, and if so, create a detailed plan for\naddressing such issues.\n12. Emergency Response Plan and Training Review. Enterprise must review and assess the\neffectiveness of its emergency response plan with regards to the failure. Include in the\nreview and assessment the on-scene response and support, coordination, and\ncommunication with emergency responders and public officials. Also, include a review\nand assessment of the effectiveness of its emergency training program. Enterprise must\namend its emergency response plan and emergency training, if necessary, to reflect the\nresults of this review. The documentation of this plan and review must be available for\ninspection by OPS or provided to the Director, if requested.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 9\n13. Public Awareness Program Review. Enterprise must review and confirm whether its\nmost recent Public Awareness Program notifications were mailed to the Affected Public\nwithin the buffer (as defined in Enterprise’s Public Awareness Program) of the Houston,\nPA to Hopedale, OH segment within 90 days following receipt of this Order. This\nreview must also determine whether Enterprise’s most recent Public Awareness Program\nnotification was mailed to the residence that sustained external damage.5 If this review\nfinds that Enterprise failed to notify the Affected Public within the buffer or the resident\nwhose home sustained damage in this accident (constituencies), Enterprise must amend\nits program so that these constituencies are covered by their Public Awareness Program\nin the future.. Documentation of this review must be made available to OPS upon request\nand to the Director.\n14. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. b. c. d. e. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, Enterprise must submit an RWP to\nthe Director for approval.\nThe Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire\nRWP.\nOnce approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nThe RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and\nremedial measures Enterprise will use to verify the integrity of the Affected\nSegment. It must address all known or suspected factors and causes of the Failure.\nEnterprise should consider both the risk of another failure and the consequence of\nanother failure to develop a prioritized schedule for RWP related work along the\nAffected Segment.\nThe RWP must include a procedure or process to:\n1. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the Failure.\n2. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and pressure\ntest failures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written report containing\nall the available information such as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and\nfailures.\n3. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, RCFA, and other corrective\nactions required by this Order with all relevant pre-existing operational and\nassessment data for the Affected Segment. Pre-existing operational data\n5 CPF No.: 1-2015-5002H at 2.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 10\n4. 5. 6. 7. includes, but is not limited to, construction, operations, maintenance, testing,\nrepairs, prior metallurgical analyses, and any third party consultation\ninformation. Pre-existing assessment data includes, but is not limited to, ILI tool\nruns, hydrostatic pressure testing, direct assessments, close interval surveys, and\nDCVG/ACVG surveys.\nDetermine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Failure are likely to\nexist elsewhere on the Affected Segment.\nConduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and/or evaluations to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the\nFailure and other failures from the operating history or any other integrity\nthreats are present elsewhere on the Affected Segment. At a minimum, this\nprocess must consider all failure causes and specify the use of one or more of\nthe following:\na. ILI tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the pipeline system\nbased on the cause of failure and that can reliably detect and identify\nanomalies;\nb. Hydrostatic pressure testing;\nc. Close-interval surveys;\nd. Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in\ncoordination with other utilities (e.g. underground utilities, overhead\npower lines, etc.) in the area;\ne. Coating surveys;\nf. Stress corrosion cracking surveys;\ng. Selective seam corrosion surveys; and\nh. Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for the\nfailure causes.\nNote: Respondent may include the results of previous tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations, if approved by the Director, provided the\nresults of the tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations are analyzed\nwith regard to the factors known or suspected to have caused the January\n26, 2015 failure.\nDescribe the inspection and repair criteria Enterprise will use to prioritize,\nexcavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified\nintegrity threats. Include a description of how any defects will be graded and a\nschedule for repairs or replacement.\nImplement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification\nmeasures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segment\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 11\nconsidering the results of the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective\nmeasures undertaken pursuant to this Order.\n8. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\n9. Enterprise must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information\nobtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate\nthe results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and/or to incorporate\nmodifications required by the Director.\na. b. c. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.\nThe Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\nAny and all revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and\nincorporated by reference into this Order will be fully described and\ndocumented in the CAO Documentation Report (CDR).\n10. Implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to\nthe plan.\n15. CAO Documentation Report. Enterprise must create and revise, as necessary, a CAO\nDocumentation Report (CDR). When Enterprise has concluded all the items in this Order\nit will submit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the Director to\ncomplete a thorough review of all actions taken by Enterprise with regards to this Order\nprior to approving the closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to summarize all\nactivities and documentation associated with this Order in one document.\na. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire\nCDR.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into\nthis Order.\nc. The CDR must include but not be limited to:\ni. A Table of Contents;\nii. A summary of the Failure events and the response activities;\niii. A summary of pipe data/properties and all prior assessments of the\nAffected Segment;\niv. A summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis\nrequired by this Order;\nv. A summary of the Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing as required by\nthis Order;\nvi. A summary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by this Order;\nvii. Documentation of all actions taken by Enterprise to implement the RWP,\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 12\nviii. the results of those actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\nDocumentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to\nincorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and\nwhenever necessary to incorporate new information obtained during the\nfailure investigation and remedial activities; and\nix. Appendices (if required).\nOther Requirements:\n1. Reporting. Submit monthly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and\nresults of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress\nof the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report is due\non March 31, 2015. The Director may change the interval for the submission of these\nreports.\n2. Documentation of Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Order. Include in each\nmonthly report the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of\nprocedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure,\nincluding repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental\nremediation, if applicable.\n3. Approvals. With respect to each submission requiring the approval of the Director, the\nDirector may: (a) approve the submission in whole or in part; (b) approve the submission\non specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)\ndisapprove the submission in whole or in part and direct Respondent to modify the\nsubmission; or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\nrequired by the submission, as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of a submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n4. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted and demonstrating\ngood cause for an extension.\nThe actions required by this Amended Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not\nwaive any requirements that apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 195,\nunder any other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq., or\nunder any other provision of Federal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 13\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60120.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 1-2015-5002H and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nThe terms and conditions of this Amended Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.\n__________________________________ ___March 12, 2015_________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n120155002H_Closure Letter_02232016_text.pdf\n\nOVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY\nFebruary 23, 2016\nMr. Graham Bacon\nGroup SVP, Operations and EHS&T\nEnterprise Products Operating LLC\n1100 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 1-2015-5002H\nDear Mr. Bacon:\nOn January 29, 2015, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline\nSafety, issued to Enterprise Products Operating LLC (Enterprise) a Corrective Action Order following the\nrupture and fire that occurred on its ATEX-1 pipeline near Follansbee, West Virginia. An amended Order\nwas later issued on March 12, 2015. This Order included requirements to take corrective actions on the\nATEX-1 pipeline from the Mark West Processing Facility in Houston, Pennsylvania to Seymour, Indiana.\nBased on our review of the documentation you provided in the CAO Documentation Report dated\nJanuary 25, 2016, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order. We are\nreturning the USB drive containing supporting documents that were submitted with the CAO\nDocumentation Report, as our review has been completed and the USB drive is no longer needed.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the matters\ninvolved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nByron Coy, PE\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosure: USB drive\n\n120155002H_Corrective Action Order_01292015_text.pdf\n\nJanuary 29, 2015\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (281)887-7000\nMr. Michael A. Creel\nChief Executive Officer\nEnterprise Products Partners, LP\n1100 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 1-2015-5002H\nDear Mr. Creel:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It requires your\nsubsidiary, Enterprise Products Operating, LLC, to take certain corrective actions with respect to\nthe ATEX-1 pipeline that failed on January 26, 2015, near Follansbee, West Virginia. Service is\nbeing made by certified mail and facsimile. Service of the Corrective Action Order by electronic\ntransmission is deemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of receipt, or as\notherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon completion of service.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Byron Coy, Regional Director, Eastern Region, OPS\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nEnterprise Products Operating LLC, ) CPF No. 1-2015-5002H\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background:\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112,\nto require Enterprise Products Operating LLC (Enterprise or Respondent), to take the necessary\ncorrective action to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards\nassociated with the recent failure on Enterprise’s ATEX-1 pipeline.\nOn January 26, 2015, a reportable accident occurred on the ATEX-1 pipeline, resulting in the\nrelease of approximately 23,901 barrels of liquid ethane (Failure). This pipeline is\napproximately 1,265 miles in length and transports product from Washington County,\nPennsylvania, to Mont Belvieu, Texas (ATEX-1). The accident occurred on a 255-mile unit of\nATEX 1 that runs from Washington County, Pennsylvania to Seymour, Indiana. Based on a\nvisual inspection of the ruptured pipe, the failure occurred in or very near a circumferential girth\nweld on the pipe. The cause of the Failure has not yet been determined. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §\n60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of\nPipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. The preliminary findings of the\nongoing investigation are as follows.\nPreliminary Findings:\n• Respondent is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Enterprise Products Partners, LP, which\noperates roughly 50,000 miles of natural gas, natural gas liquid, crude oil, refined\nproducts and petrochemical pipelines throughout the United States.1\n• The failed pipeline is a 20-inch diameter line segment that is part of the company’s\nGreensburg – Pennsylvania/West Virginia (liquid) unit that transports liquid ethane, and\nruns from the MarkWest Processing Facility in Houston, Pennsylvania to the Ohio River,\n1 http://www.enterpriseproducts.com/corpProfile/businessProfile.shtm.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 1-2015-5002H\nPage 2\na distance of approximately 26 miles (Affected Segment). The Failure occurred near\nmilepost 23.1, and near Follansbee, West Virginia (Failure Site).\n• The Affected Segment was constructed in November 2013 and is composed of 20-inch\ndiameter, 0.312” wall thickness (generally), API-5L pipe, and is high frequency electric\nresistance welded (HF ERW) pipe manufactured by American Pipe.\n• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the pipeline in the Affected Segment is 1440\npsig, as established by hydrostatic testing in 2013. At the time of the Failure, the actual\noperating pressure of the Affected Segment was 1150 psig.\n• At approximately 9:40 a.m. C.S.T. on January 26, 2015, the Respondent’s ATEX-1\npipeline failed near Follansbee, West Virginia, resulting in the release of approximately\n23,901 barrels of liquid ethane into a wooded area. There was no impact to people or to\nwaterways, though the explosion and resulting fire burned approximately five acres of\nwoodlands. The fire in the surrounding area was extinguished at 7:10 p.m. E.S.T., in the\nevening of January 27, 2015. Enterprise reported the Failure to the National Response\nCenter (NRC Report No. 1106602) on January 26, 2015, at 11:38 a.m.\n• After observing a sudden drop in pressure in its control room, Enterprise closed the\nautomated block valves MOV-2001 (mile post 4.05) and MOV-2004 (mile post 25.28) in\norder to isolate the segment. Thereafter, the control room notified Enterprise personnel,\nwho responded to the rupture location and manually closed Main Line Valve (MLV)2002\n(mile post 13.01) and MLV-2003 (mile post 16.42) in an attempt to further restrict\nproduct flow to the failure location (mile post 23.1). As a precaution, Line A-1, which\nshares a right-of-way with ATEX-1, was also isolated. Since Line A-1 is several hundred\nfeet from the Failure Site, Line A-1 was later returned to normal service.\n• The Wellsburg Fire Department and Follansbee Police Department responded to the\nrupture.\n• An OPS investigator arrived at the Failure Site on January 26, 2015.\n• Based on a visual examination of the pipeline at the rupture location, OPS has\npreliminarily determined that the rupture occurred in or very near a circumferential girth\nweld. However, the cause of the failure is still undetermined and the investigation is\nongoing. The pipe at the location of the Failure has not been excavated, as of\nJanuary 28, 2015.\n• The accident caused no known injuries, but burned approximately five acres of\nwoodland. One residence, approximately 2,000 feet from the rupture location, sustained\nexternal damage to the house siding from radiant heat.\n• The ATEX-1 pipeline fr","truncated":true,"body_characters":61628}