{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 120161004H","title":"TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP) — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2016-05-03","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120161004h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120161004h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120161004h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/120161004H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP). The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2016-05-03 and is reported as closed as of 2019-09-23. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n120161004H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07192016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_07192016.pdf\n\n120161004H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07192016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_07192016_text.pdf\n\n120161004H_Closure Letter_09232019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Closure%20Letter_09232019.pdf\n\n120161004H_Closure Letter_09232019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Closure%20Letter_09232019_text.pdf\n\n120161004H_Corrective Action Order_05032016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_05032016.pdf\n\n120161004H_Corrective Action Order_05032016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_05032016_text.pdf\n\n120161004H_Corrective Action Order_05032016_text.pdf\n\nMay 3, 2016\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO:\nMr. J. Andrew Drake\nVice President, Operations and Emergency, Health & Safety\nSpectra Energy Corp\n5400 Westheimer Court\nHouston, TX 77056\nRe: CPF No. 1-2016-1004H\nDear Mr. Drake:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case to your subsidiary,\nTexas Eastern Transmission, LP, to take certain corrective actions with respect to the Delmont\nCompressor Station pipeline section of Texas Eastern Transmission, LP’s Penn Jersey System\nthat failed on April 29, 2016, near Delmont, Pennsylvania. Service is being made by certified\nmail and facsimile. Service of the Corrective Action Order by electronic transmission is deemed\ncomplete upon transmission and acknowledgement of receipt, or as otherwise provided under 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon completion of service.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan Mayberry\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Byron Coy, P.E., Director, Eastern Region, OPS\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nTexas Eastern Transmission, LP, ) CPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n)\na subsidiary of Spectra Energy Corp, )\n)\nRespondent. )\n)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background:\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112,\nto require Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (TET or Respondent), to take the necessary corrective\naction to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with\nthe recent gas transmission pipeline failure on TET’s Penn Jersey System (PJS).\nOn April 29, 2016, a reportable accident occurred on Line 27 of the PJS, resulting in the release\nof an as-yet-undetermined quantity of natural gas which ignited, destroying one home and\ncausing severe injuries to one individual (Failure). The PJS transports natural gas from the\ndischarge of the Delmont Compressor Station near Delmont, Pennsylvania, to Lambertville, New\nJersey, a distance of approximately 263 miles. Near the site of the Failure, the PJS consists of\nfour pipelines (Lines 12, 19, 27, and 28) between 24 and 36 inches in diameter. The cause of the\nFailure has not yet been determined. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an\ninvestigation of the accident. The preliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are as\nfollows.\nPreliminary Findings:\n• Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (TET), is a limited partnership subsidiary of Spectra\nEnergy Corp (Spectra). TET operates approximately 9096 miles of natural gas\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n2\ntransmission pipeline and approximately 74 Bcf of natural gas storage capacity in the\neastern United States.1\n• The failed pipeline (Line 27) is a 30-inch diameter line that transports natural gas from\nthe discharge of the Delmont, Pennsylvania Compressor Station, to Lambertville, New\nJersey, and is one of four PJS pipelines near the scene of the incident (collectively the\nAffected Segment). Three of the lines, including Line 27, share a single right-of-way\nfrom Delmont to Lambertville, for a total distance of 263 miles. A fourth line is a 6.8 -\nmile loop line that begins at the Delmont Station discharge. The Failure occurred near\nmilepost 2.0621 east of Delmont, Pennsylvania (Failure Site). At the Failure Site, the\ndistances between each of the four lines range approximately from 25 to 28 feet. All four\nlines of the Affected Segment are linked with crossover interconnects; accordingly,\npressure is usually equal across all four lines.\n• Line 27 was constructed in 1981. The portion of Line 27 near the Failure Site consists of\n0.404-inch wall thickness, X65 grade double submerged arc -welded pipe, manufactured\nby US Steel.\n• Line 27 is coated with Fusion Bond Epoxy (FBE), with tape-coat coating at girth weld\njoints.\n• The Affected Segment has a Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) of 1050\npsig, as measured by a pressure transducer on the discharge header at the Delmont\nCompressor Station, established by hydrostatic testing in 1981. TET initially reported\nthat the line pressure was approximately 1039 psig immediately prior to the Failure.\n• Prior to the Failure, three of the four lines (Lines 19, 27, and 28) on the PJS, including the\nAffected Segment, were in normal operating status with gas flowing north on the system.\nThe fourth line (Line 12) had been taken out of service days prior to the incident and\nblown down for maintenance work.\n• The Failure occurred at approximately 8:13 a.m. EST on April 29, 2016. At that time,\nTET personnel located at the Delmont Compressor Station heard a loud explosion and the\nsound of natural gas being released from an undetermined location. The Failure resulted\nin the release of an as-yet-undetermined quantity of natural gas, which ignited, producing\na crater approximately 30 feet wide, 50 feet in length, and 12 feet deep and a burn zone of\napproximately ¼ mile radius. The explosion resulted in the ejection of approximately\n24.5 feet of 30-inch pipe, which landed approximately 100 feet from the rupture site. The\nFailure occurred in a rural class 1 area. The Failure was reported to the National\nResponse Center (NRC Report No. 1146495) on April 29, 2016, at approximately 9:15\nEST.\n1 http://www.spectraenergy.com/Operations/US-Natural-Gas-Operations/US-Pipelines/Texas-Eastern-\nTransmission/ (last accessed May 3, 2016).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n3\n• The TET personnel contacted Spectra’s Pipeline Control Center (PCC) located in\nHouston, Texas, to alert them to the situation. PCC personnel observed a pressure drop\non the four pipelines on the discharge side of the Delmont Compressor Station and\nordered a complete shutdown of all pipelines. TET personnel were dispatched to begin\nclosing mainline block valves within the Delmont Compressor Station to isolate the lines.\nAs a result of the valve closures, TET personnel identified Line 27 as the failed pipeline.\nDirect observations were made in the field and confirmed that the Failure had occurred\non Line 27. The Affected Segment is currently shut-in and isolated between the Delmont\nCompressor Station at MP 0.41 and the Conemaugh River Valves at MP 15.45. The\nAffected Segment was shut-in after the Failure by closing main line valve MLV 27-263\nand crossover valves 27-917 and 27-273 downstream of the Failure Site at the\nConemaugh River Valves and at the Delmont Compressor Station mainline valve MLV\n27-289 upstream of the Failure Site.\n• PHMSA, along with various state and local emergency responders responded to the scene\non the day of the Failure. A third-party metallurgist (DNV GL), contracted by Spectra,\nwas also at the scene of the Failure later the same day.\n• The cause of the Failure is unknown at this time, and the investigation is ongoing. The\nfailed pipe section is being transported to an independent metallurgist for examination\nand failure analysis. The preliminary investigation has identified evidence of corrosion\nalong two of the circumferential welds: one at the point of failure and another excavated\nafter PHMSA’s response to the Failure Site. The pattern of corrosion indicates a possible\nflaw in the coating material applied to girth weld joints following construction welding\nprocedures in the field at that time. Line 27 and the other three lines of the Affected\nSegment remain shut-in and out of service pending integrity assessment.\n• The incident caused one known injury to a man residing near the Failure Site, with third-\ndegree burns over 75% of his body. The injured person was admitted to a local hospital\nfor treatment.\n• Emergency responders evacuated nine homes in the area and closed nearby roads,\nincluding Route 819. Three homes within a quarter mile of the Failure Site received\nexternal damage due to the radiant heat from the fire and one home was destroyed. The\nfire burned an area approximately one -quarter of a mile in radius, burning trees and\nvegetation. Beaver Run Creek near the Failure Site was not impacted. The other three\nlines of the Affected Segment running in the same right-of-way as Line 27 were not\nexposed by the explosion.\n• Recent in-line inspections (ILI) of Line 27 occurred in 2005 and 2012, using high-\nresolution magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and inertial measurement unit (IMU) tools.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n4\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set\nforth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order, without prior notice and opportunity for hearing, upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,\nproperty, or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing and expedited review\nwill be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the\nAffected Segment without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the\nenvironment. In addition to the failed Line 27, there are three other lines in the Affected\nSegment that could potentially have been affected by the Failure and that, accordingly, should\nnot be restarted without further investigation. Having considered the uncertainties of the cause\nof the Failure, the location of the Failure, and the great risk of fire to the environment and\npopulated areas in the vicinity of the Affected Segment, I find that a failure to issue this Order\nexpeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious\nharm to life, property, or the environment.\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued without prior notice and\nopportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may contest its issuance and obtain\nexpedited review either by answering in writing or requesting a hearing under 49 C.F.R. §\n190.211, to be held as soon as practicable under the terms of such regulation, by notifying the\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Eastern\nRegion, PHMSA (Region Director). If Respondent requests a hearing, it will be held\ntelephonically or in-person in Trenton, New Jersey, or Washington, D.C.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA\nmay identify other corrective measures that need to be taken on the Affected Segment or\nother pipelines in the PSJ. In that event, PHMSA will notify Respondent of any additional\nmeasures that are required and an amended Order will be issued, if necessary. To the extent\nconsistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior\nto the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions:\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Texas Eastern Transmission, LP to immediately\ntake the following corrective actions for the Affected Segment:\n1. Assessment, Remediation and Restart Plans. Prior to resuming operation of the section of the\nPJS running between the Delmont Compressor Station at MP 0.41 and the Conemaugh River\nValves at MP 15.45, develop and submit written assessment, remediation and re-start plans\nfor prior approval by the Region Director, PHMSA. The plans must include:\n\n\n\n(A) (B) CPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n5\nProcedures for the exposure, testing, and repair of Line 27:\ni. Exposure of Line 27 extending for at least two girth welds on either side of the\nFailure Site to examine for corrosion, coating condition, concussive damage, and\nthermally -impacted areas. If damage to the exposed pipe is discovered, additional\npipe must be exposed until at least ten feet of undamaged pipe is exposed and\nexamined. Perform safe operating -pressure calculations and remediation for any\npits or other forms of anomalies found, using engineering permanent repair methods\nand design factors based upon 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.713 and 192.111 and using\nASME/ANSI B31G or R-STRENG methods. Repair or replace pipe or coating, as\nnecessary. Upon completion of pipe replacement and repairs, ensure proper\nbackfill and protection from stones and rocks, pursuant to procedures developed\nunder this Order;\nii. Establishment of adequate cathodic protection for the area where the Failure\noccurred. Replace any damaged rectifier(s) and establish a permanent electrical test\nstation with an above-grade test point in a protected location. Once backfill and\nland settling have occurred, ensure pipe-to-soil readings are within applicable\ncriteria; and\niii. Development of additional requirements for remediation and the eventual restart for\nLine 27 as the investigation yields more information about the cause of the Failure\nand the condition of the Affected Segment.\nProcedures for the exposure, examination, remediation, and restart of Lines 12, 19, and\n28:\ni. Development of assessment, remediation, and restart plans that are aligned with the\ncriteria show immediately below;\nii. Exposure of Lines 12, 19, and 28, extending for at least two girth welds in both\ndirections from the Failure location. Examine the girth welds and pipeline coating\nmaterials for damage caused by thermal and concussive forces. Continue a broader\nexposure of each line if associated damage is discovered, until 10 feet of\nundamaged pipe is reached and verified. Any needed repairs are to be guided by\nestablished Spectra procedures and safe operating -pressure calculations and\nremediation for any pits or other forms of anomalies found, using engineering\npermanent repair methods and design factors based upon 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.713 and\n192.111 and using ASME/ANSI B31G or R-STRENG methods. Repair or replace\npipe or coating, as necessary. Upon completion of pipe replacement and repairs,\nensure proper backfill and protection from stones and rocks, all pursuant to\nSpectra’s established procedures;\niii. Restarts for each individual line in pressure increments, at 25%, 50%, and 80%, to\nbe held for at least one hour after pressure stabilization. After reaching 80%\npressure, Respondent must obtain specific individual written approval from the\nRegion Director to increase pressure to pre-Failure normal pressure. Respondent\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n6\n2. (A) (B) (C) (D) 4. must obtain separate approval for each pipe (Lines 12, 19, and 28) before increasing\npressure to the final normal operating pressure; and\niv. A ground-level, hydrogen flame ionization (HFI) leak survey on Lines 12, 19, and\n28, for a distance of two miles in both directions from the Failure Site. Investigate\nany elevated readings and make all appropriate repairs.\nTesting and Failure Analysis. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order, complete mechanical\nand metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including analysis of soil\nsamples and any foreign materials. The testing and analysis shall be completed as follows:\nDocument the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe section\nand other evidence from the Failure Site;\nUtilize the mechanical and metallurgical testing protocols, including the testing\nlaboratory approved by the Region Director;\nPrior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Region\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a PHMSA\nrepresentative to witness the testing; and\nEnsure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety\n(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Region Director at the same time as\nthey are made available to Respondent.\nAvailability of Prior ILI Assessments. Make any results or information received from the ILI\ntool runs performed in 2005 and 2012 on the Affected Segment, including information\nobtained from any resulting excavations and all associated re-coats and repairs, available to\nPHMSA or its representative in their entirety (including all media). Within 60 days of\ndetermining whether any anomalies were present that could have contributed to the Line 27\nFailure and whether any other anomalies of a similar magnitude are present elsewhere in\nLines 12, 19, 27, or 28 in the Affected Segment. Make the results of this analysis available\nto PHMSA.\nIncorporation by Reference. The work plans will be incorporated into this Order and shall be\nrevised as necessary when additional information becomes available which may influence\nchanges. Submit any such plan revisions to the Region Director for prior approval. The\nRegion Director may approve plan elements incrementally.\nImplementation of Work Plans. Implement the work plans as approved by the Region\nDirector, including any revisions to the work plan.\nOther Requirements:\nReporting. Submit monthly reports to the Region Director that: (1) include all available data\nand results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress\nof the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first monthly report for the\n3. 5. 6.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n7\nperiod April 29 through May 31 is due on June 10, 2016. The Region Director may change\nthe interval for the submission of these reports.\n7. Documentation of Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Order. Include in each\nmonthly report the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of\nprocedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including\nrepairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if\napplicable.\n8. Approvals. With respect to each submission requiring the approval of the Region Director,\nthe Region Director may: (a) approve the submission in whole or in part; (b) approve the\nsubmission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)\ndisapprove the submission in whole or in part and direct Respondent to modify the\nsubmission; or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Region Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all\naction required by the submission, as approved or modified by the Region Director. If the\nRegion Director disapproves all or any portion of a submission, Respondent must correct all\ndeficiencies within the time specified by the Region Director and resubmit it for approval.\n9. Extensions of Time. The Region Director may grant an extension of time for compliance\nwith any of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted and\ndemonstrating good cause for an extension.\nThe actions required by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that\napply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 192, under any other order issued to\nRespondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq., or under any other provision of\nFederal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Region Director to the Associate Administrator for\nPipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60120.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 1-2016-1004H and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n8\nThe terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.\n__________________________________ __________________\nAlan Mayberry Date Issued\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n120161004H_Closure Letter_09232019_text.pdf\n\nOVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY\nSeptember 23, 2019\nMr. William T. Yardley\nExecutive VP and President\nGas Transmission and Midstream\nEnbridge Inc.\n1100 Louisiana Street, Suite 300\nHouston, Texas 77002\nCPF 1-2016-1004H\nDear Mr. Yardley:\nOn April 29 of 2016, and on July 19, 2016, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) and\nan Amended Corrective Action Order (ACAO), respectively, with regard to a pipeline failure\nincident of your subsidiary, Texas Eastern Transmission, LP. The ACAO included a list of various\nrequired Corrective Actions.\nWe have received a letter and CAO Documentation Report dated July 8, 2019 from Mr. Rick\nKivela, Manager, Operational Compliance. The Documentation Report was submitted as part of\nthe final Corrective Action deliverable, required under item 10 of the ACAO. Subsequently, a\nletter from Mr. Kivela was received on September 3, 2019 requesting closure of the ACAO.\nBased on our review of the documentation, it has been determined that Texas Eastern\nTransmission, LP has complied with the terms of the order.\nThis letter is to inform you no further action is necessary, and this case is now closed. Thank you\nfor your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nRobert Burrough\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nCc (via electronic mail):\nMr. Rick Kivela, Manager, Operational Compliance, Enbridge Inc.\n\n120161004H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07192016_text.pdf\n\nJuly 19, 2016\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO:\nMr. J. Andrew Drake\nVice President, Operations and Emergency, Health & Safety\nSpectra Energy Partners, LP\n5400 Westheimer Court\nHouston, TX 77056\nRe: CPF No. 1-2016-1004H\nDear Mr. Drake:\nEnclosed is an Amended Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case to your\nsubsidiary, Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, containing new and amended preliminary findings\nand requiring TET to take additional corrective actions with respect to the Delmont Compressor\nStation pipeline section of TET’s Penn Jersey System that failed on April 29, 2016, near\nDelmont, Pennsylvania. This Amended Corrective Action Order supersedes and replaces the\noriginal Corrective Action Order issued to TET on May 4, 2016. Service is being made by\ncertified mail and facsimile. Service of the Amended Corrective Action Order by electronic\ntransmission is deemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of receipt, or as\notherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Amended Order\nare effective upon completion of service.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Byron Coy, P.E., Director, Eastern Region, OPS\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\nIn the Matter of )\nTexas Eastern Transmission, LP, ) CPF No. 1-2016-1004H\na subsidiary of Spectra Energy Partners, LP, )\nRespondent. )\n)\n)\n)\n)\nAMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background:\nThis Amended Corrective Action Order (Amended Order) is being issued under the authority of\n49 U.S.C. § 60112, to require Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (TET or Respondent), to take the\nnecessary corrective action to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential\nhazards associated with the recent gas transmission pipeline failure on TET’s Penn-Jersey\nSystem (PJS). The PJS is owned by Spectra Energy Partners, LP (Spectra) and is operated by\nTET.\nOn April 29, 2016, a reportable accident occurred on Line 27 of the PJS, resulting in the release\nof 208,425 thousand cubic feet (MCF)of natural gas which ignited, destroying one home and\ncausing severe injuries to one individual (Failure). The PJS transports natural gas from the\ndischarge of the Delmont Compressor Station in Salem Township, Pennsylvania, to Lambertville\nStation near Lambertville, New Jersey, a distance of approximately 263 miles. Near the site of\nthe Failure, the PJS consists of four pipelines (Lines 12, 19, 27, and 28 loop) between 24 and 36\ninches in diameter. Field investigations conducted by PHMSA indicated that the preliminary\ncause of the rupture was external corrosion due to coating failure of the girth weld. Pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),\nOffice of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident.\nOn May 4, 2016, PHMSA issued the original Corrective Action Order (CAO) in this case,\nordering TET to take necessary corrective actions and to provide additional information to\nPHMSA. After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation,\nPHMSA has amended the preliminary findings in the CAO and identified other corrective\nmeasures that need to be taken on pipelines in the PSJ, as more fully described below.\nAccordingly, PHMSA is notifying Respondent of additional measures that are required and is\nissuing this Amended Order. The Preliminary Findings and Required Corrective Actions\ncontained in this Amended Order supersede and replace those contained in the original CAO.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n2\nAmended Preliminary Findings:\n Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (TET), is a limited partnership subsidiary of Spectra\nEnergy Partners, LP (Spectra). TET operates approximately 9,096 miles of natural gas\ntransmission pipeline and approximately 74 Bcf of natural gas storage capacity in the\neastern United States.1\n The failed pipeline (Line 27) is a 30-inch diameter line that transports natural gas from\nthe discharge of the Delmont Compressor Station (MP 0.41) in Salem Township,\nPennsylvania, to Lambertville Station (MP 263.39), and is one of four PJS pipelines in a\ncommon right-of-way near the scene of the Failure.\n \"Isolated Segment\" refers to the 15-mile segment of Line 27 running from the discharge\nof the Delmont Compressor Station (MP 0.41) in Delmont, Pennsylvania, to the\nConemaugh River Valves (MP 15.45). It is the portion of Line 27 that was shut-in after\nthe Failure by closing main line valve MLV 27-263 and cross-over valves 27-917 and 27-\n273 downstream of the Failure Site, and MLV 27-289 upstream of the Failure Site. The\nIsolated Segment will remain shut-in until a restart plan is approved by the “Director.”\n “Affected Segment” refers collectively to the four pipelines that make up the Penn Jersey\nSystem. (the 30-inch Line 27, the 24-inch Line 12, the 30-inch Line 19, and the 36-inch\nLine 28 loop) from Delmont Compressor Station to Lambertville Station. The Affected\nSegment generally runs east across Pennsylvania and passes through portions of\nWestmoreland, Indiana, Columbia, Blair, Huntingdon, Juniata, Perry, Dauphin, Lebanon,\nBerks, Chester, Lehigh, and Bucks Counties in Pennsylvania, and Hunterdon County in\nNew Jersey.\n “Adjacent Pipelines” refers to the other three Affected Segment pipelines (the 24-inch\nLine 12, the 30-inch Line 19, and the 36-inch Line 28 loop), which run parallel to Line 27\nin the vicinity of the Failure.\n Three of the lines on the Affected Segment, including Lines 27, 19, and 12, share a single\nright-of-way from Delmont to Lambertville, for the entire distance of 263 miles. The\nthird Adjacent Pipeline, Line 28 loop, ties into Line 27 at various points throughout the\nPenn Jersey System covering 104.12 miles between the Delmont and Lambertville\nStations. The Failure occurred near milepost 2.0621 east of Delmont, Pennsylvania\n(Failure Site). At the Failure Site, the distances between each of the four lines range\napproximately from 25 to 28 feet. All four lines of the Affected Segment are linked with\ncrossover interconnects; accordingly, pressure is usually equal across all four lines.\n The portion of Line 27 near the Failure Site was constructed in 1981 and consists of\n0.404-inch wall thickness, X65 grade double submerged arc-welded pipe, manufactured\n1 http://www.spectraenergy.com/Operations/US-Natural-Gas-Operations/US-Pipelines/Texas-Eastern-\nTransmission/ (last accessed June 30, 2016).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n3\nby US Steel. Line 27 is coated with Fusion Bond Epoxy (FBE), with tape-coat coating at\ngirth weld joints.\n The Affected Segment has a Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) of 1050\npsig, as measured by a pressure transducer on the discharge header at the Delmont\nCompressor Station, established for Line 27 by hydrostatic testing in 1981. TET initially\nreported that the line pressure was approximately 1,040 psig immediately prior to the\nFailure.\n Prior to the Failure, three of the four lines (Lines 19, 27, and 28) on the Affected Segment\nwere in normal operating status with gas flowing east towards Lambertville Station on\nthe system. The fourth line (Line 12) had been taken out of service days prior to the\nFailure and blown down for maintenance work from Delmont Station to Armaugh\nStation.\n The Failure occurred at approximately 8:13 a.m. EDT on April 29, 2016. At that time,\nTET personnel located at the Delmont Compressor Station heard a loud explosion and the\nsound of natural gas being released from an undetermined location. The Failure resulted\nin the release of 208,425 MCF of natural gas, which ignited, producing a crater\napproximately 30 feet wide, 50 feet in length, and 12 feet deep and a burn zone of\napproximately ¼ mile radius. The explosion resulted in the ejection of approximately\n24.5 feet of 30-inch pipe, which landed approximately 100 feet from the rupture site. The\nFailure occurred in a rural class 1 area. The Failure was reported to the National\nResponse Center (NRC Report No. 1146495) on April 29, 2016, at approximately 9:15\na.m. EDT.\n The TET personnel in Delmont contacted Spectra’s Pipeline Control Center (PCC)\nlocated in Houston, Texas, to alert them to the situation. PCC personnel observed a\npressure drop on the Affected Segment at the discharge side of the Delmont Compressor\nStation and ordered a complete shutdown of all PJS pipelines. TET personnel were\ndispatched to begin closing mainline block valves within the Delmont Compressor\nStation to isolate the lines. As a result of the valve closures, TET personnel identified\nLine 27 as the failed pipeline. Direct observations were made in the field and confirmed\nthat the Failure had occurred on Line 27. The Affected Segment is currently shut-in and\nisolated between the Delmont Compressor Station at MP 0.41 and the Conemaugh River\nValves at MP 15.45. The Affected Segment was shut-in after the Failure by closing main\nline valve (MLV) 27-263 and crossover valves 27-917 and 27-273 downstream of the\nFailure Site at the Conemaugh River Valves, and MLV 27-289 upstream of the Failure\nSite at the Delmont Compressor Station.\n PHMSA, along with various state and local emergency responders responded to the scene\non the day of the Failure. A third-party metallurgist (DNV GL), contracted by Spectra,\nwas also at the scene of the Failure later the same day.\n The cause of the Failure is unknown at this time, and the investigation is ongoing. The\nfailed pipe section has been transported to an independent metallurgist for examination\nand failure analysis. The preliminary investigation has identified evidence of external\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n4\ncorrosion at circumferential welds at the Failure Site. The pattern of corrosion indicates\ndisbondment of the coating material applied to the girth weld joints. The Isolated\nSegment and the portions of Lines 12 and 28 between Delmont and Armaugh Stations\nremain shut-in and out of service pending integrity assessment. The remainder of Line\n27 from Armaugh Station to Lambertville Station, along with the rest of the Affected\nSegment, was reduced to 80% of the operating pressure at the time of failure. This\nreduction in pressure was initiated by Spectra to provide an additional level of safety\nduring the integrity assessment work that is being conducted throughout the PJS.\n On May 9, 2016, upon completion of integrity assessments, TET requested approval to\nreturn Line 19 to normal operating service between Delmont Station and Armaugh\nStation. On May 9, 2016, PHMSA approved TET’s request and Line 19 was returned to\nnormal operating service on May 31, 2016. The rest of the Affected Segment, other than\nthe Isolated Segment and the portions of Lines 12 and 28 between Delmont and Armaugh\nStations, continues to operate at the reduced 80% operating pressure.\n The Failure caused one known injury to a man residing near the Failure Site, with third-\ndegree burns over 75% of his body. The injured man was admitted to a local hospital.\n Emergency responders evacuated nine homes in the area and closed nearby roads,\nincluding Route 819. Three homes within a quarter mile of the Failure Site received\nexternal damage due to the radiant heat from the fire and one home was destroyed. The\nfire burned an area approximately one-quarter of a mile in radius, burning trees and\nvegetation. Beaver Run Creek near the Failure Site was not impacted. The other three\nlines of the Affected Segment running in the same right-of-way as Line 27 were not\nexposed by the explosion.\n Recent in-line inspections (ILI) of Line 27 of the Isolated Segment occurred in 2005 and\n2012, using high-resolution magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and inertial measurement unit\n(IMU) tools.\n A review of previous operating history, ILI, and remediation records for the segment of\nLine 12 between Delmont and Armaugh Stations has shown a pattern of external\ncorrosion with characteristics similar to the condition that caused the failure on Line 27.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set\nforth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order or Amended Order, without prior notice and opportunity for hearing,\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2016-1004H\n5\nupon a finding that failure to issue the Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of\nserious harm to life, property, or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing\nand expedited review will be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the\nAffected Segment from Delmont Station to MP 15.45 without corrective measures is or would be\nhazardous to life, property, or the environment. In addition to the failed Line 27, subsequent\ninvestigation by Respondent and PHMSA has demonstrated that Lines 12, 19, and 28 could\npotentially have been damaged or adversely affected by the explosion and fire at the Failure Site\nand pose a serious risk to life, property or the environment if returned to normal operation unless\nRespondent takes certain corrective actions in addition to those required under the original CAO.\nHaving considered the uncertainties of the cause of the Failure, the location of the Failure, the\nrecent discovery of additional external corrosion on other portions of the Affected Segment\nbesides Line 27, and the risk of fire or harm to the environment and populated areas in the\nvicinity of the Affected Segment, I further find that a failure to issue this Amended Order\nexpeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious\nharm to life, property, or the environment.\nAccordingly, this Amended Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued without prior\nnotice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Amended Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Amended Order, Respondent may contest its issuance and\nobtain expedited review either by answering in writing or requesting a hearing under 49 C.F.R. §\n190.211, to be held as soon as practicable under the terms of such regulation, by notifying the\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Eastern\nRegion, OPS, PHMSA (Director). The Director’s address is 820 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 103,\nWest Trenton, NJ 08628. If Respondent requests a hearing, it will be held telephonically or in-\nperson in Trenton, New Jersey, or Washington, D.C.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA\nmay identify other corrective measures that need to be taken on the Affected Segment or\nother pipelines in the PSJ. In that event, PHMSA will notify Respondent of any additional\nmeasures that are required and another amended Order will be issued, if necessary. To the extent\nconsistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior\nto the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corre","truncated":true,"body_characters":60162}