# TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP) — Corrective Action Order

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 120161004H
- **title:** TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP) — Corrective Action Order
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2016-05-03
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED corrective action order.
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120161004h.json
- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120161004h.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120161004h
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/120161004H
**body:**

Corrective Action Order involving TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION, LP (SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP). The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2016-05-03 and is reported as closed as of 2019-09-23. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

120161004H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07192016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_07192016.pdf

120161004H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07192016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_07192016_text.pdf

120161004H_Closure Letter_09232019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Closure%20Letter_09232019.pdf

120161004H_Closure Letter_09232019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Closure%20Letter_09232019_text.pdf

120161004H_Corrective Action Order_05032016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_05032016.pdf

120161004H_Corrective Action Order_05032016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120161004H/120161004H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_05032016_text.pdf

120161004H_Corrective Action Order_05032016_text.pdf

May 3, 2016
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO:
Mr. J. Andrew Drake
Vice President, Operations and Emergency, Health & Safety
Spectra Energy Corp
5400 Westheimer Court
Houston, TX 77056
Re: CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
Dear Mr. Drake:
Enclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case to your subsidiary,
Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, to take certain corrective actions with respect to the Delmont
Compressor Station pipeline section of Texas Eastern Transmission, LP’s Penn Jersey System
that failed on April 29, 2016, near Delmont, Pennsylvania. Service is being made by certified
mail and facsimile. Service of the Corrective Action Order by electronic transmission is deemed
complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of receipt, or as otherwise provided under 49
C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon completion of service.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan Mayberry
Acting Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS
Mr. Byron Coy, P.E., Director, Eastern Region, OPS



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
)
In the Matter of )
)
Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, ) CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
)
a subsidiary of Spectra Energy Corp, )
)
Respondent. )
)
CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER
Purpose and Background:
This Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112,
to require Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (TET or Respondent), to take the necessary corrective
action to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with
the recent gas transmission pipeline failure on TET’s Penn Jersey System (PJS).
On April 29, 2016, a reportable accident occurred on Line 27 of the PJS, resulting in the release
of an as-yet-undetermined quantity of natural gas which ignited, destroying one home and
causing severe injuries to one individual (Failure). The PJS transports natural gas from the
discharge of the Delmont Compressor Station near Delmont, Pennsylvania, to Lambertville, New
Jersey, a distance of approximately 263 miles. Near the site of the Failure, the PJS consists of
four pipelines (Lines 12, 19, 27, and 28) between 24 and 36 inches in diameter. The cause of the
Failure has not yet been determined. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an
investigation of the accident. The preliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are as
follows.
Preliminary Findings:
• Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (TET), is a limited partnership subsidiary of Spectra
Energy Corp (Spectra). TET operates approximately 9096 miles of natural gas



CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
2
transmission pipeline and approximately 74 Bcf of natural gas storage capacity in the
eastern United States.1
• The failed pipeline (Line 27) is a 30-inch diameter line that transports natural gas from
the discharge of the Delmont, Pennsylvania Compressor Station, to Lambertville, New
Jersey, and is one of four PJS pipelines near the scene of the incident (collectively the
Affected Segment). Three of the lines, including Line 27, share a single right-of-way
from Delmont to Lambertville, for a total distance of 263 miles. A fourth line is a 6.8 -
mile loop line that begins at the Delmont Station discharge. The Failure occurred near
milepost 2.0621 east of Delmont, Pennsylvania (Failure Site). At the Failure Site, the
distances between each of the four lines range approximately from 25 to 28 feet. All four
lines of the Affected Segment are linked with crossover interconnects; accordingly,
pressure is usually equal across all four lines.
• Line 27 was constructed in 1981. The portion of Line 27 near the Failure Site consists of
0.404-inch wall thickness, X65 grade double submerged arc -welded pipe, manufactured
by US Steel.
• Line 27 is coated with Fusion Bond Epoxy (FBE), with tape-coat coating at girth weld
joints.
• The Affected Segment has a Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) of 1050
psig, as measured by a pressure transducer on the discharge header at the Delmont
Compressor Station, established by hydrostatic testing in 1981. TET initially reported
that the line pressure was approximately 1039 psig immediately prior to the Failure.
• Prior to the Failure, three of the four lines (Lines 19, 27, and 28) on the PJS, including the
Affected Segment, were in normal operating status with gas flowing north on the system.
The fourth line (Line 12) had been taken out of service days prior to the incident and
blown down for maintenance work.
• The Failure occurred at approximately 8:13 a.m. EST on April 29, 2016. At that time,
TET personnel located at the Delmont Compressor Station heard a loud explosion and the
sound of natural gas being released from an undetermined location. The Failure resulted
in the release of an as-yet-undetermined quantity of natural gas, which ignited, producing
a crater approximately 30 feet wide, 50 feet in length, and 12 feet deep and a burn zone of
approximately ¼ mile radius. The explosion resulted in the ejection of approximately
24.5 feet of 30-inch pipe, which landed approximately 100 feet from the rupture site. The
Failure occurred in a rural class 1 area. The Failure was reported to the National
Response Center (NRC Report No. 1146495) on April 29, 2016, at approximately 9:15
EST.
1 http://www.spectraenergy.com/Operations/US-Natural-Gas-Operations/US-Pipelines/Texas-Eastern-
Transmission/ (last accessed May 3, 2016).



CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
3
• The TET personnel contacted Spectra’s Pipeline Control Center (PCC) located in
Houston, Texas, to alert them to the situation. PCC personnel observed a pressure drop
on the four pipelines on the discharge side of the Delmont Compressor Station and
ordered a complete shutdown of all pipelines. TET personnel were dispatched to begin
closing mainline block valves within the Delmont Compressor Station to isolate the lines.
As a result of the valve closures, TET personnel identified Line 27 as the failed pipeline.
Direct observations were made in the field and confirmed that the Failure had occurred
on Line 27. The Affected Segment is currently shut-in and isolated between the Delmont
Compressor Station at MP 0.41 and the Conemaugh River Valves at MP 15.45. The
Affected Segment was shut-in after the Failure by closing main line valve MLV 27-263
and crossover valves 27-917 and 27-273 downstream of the Failure Site at the
Conemaugh River Valves and at the Delmont Compressor Station mainline valve MLV
27-289 upstream of the Failure Site.
• PHMSA, along with various state and local emergency responders responded to the scene
on the day of the Failure. A third-party metallurgist (DNV GL), contracted by Spectra,
was also at the scene of the Failure later the same day.
• The cause of the Failure is unknown at this time, and the investigation is ongoing. The
failed pipe section is being transported to an independent metallurgist for examination
and failure analysis. The preliminary investigation has identified evidence of corrosion
along two of the circumferential welds: one at the point of failure and another excavated
after PHMSA’s response to the Failure Site. The pattern of corrosion indicates a possible
flaw in the coating material applied to girth weld joints following construction welding
procedures in the field at that time. Line 27 and the other three lines of the Affected
Segment remain shut-in and out of service pending integrity assessment.
• The incident caused one known injury to a man residing near the Failure Site, with third-
degree burns over 75% of his body. The injured person was admitted to a local hospital
for treatment.
• Emergency responders evacuated nine homes in the area and closed nearby roads,
including Route 819. Three homes within a quarter mile of the Failure Site received
external damage due to the radiant heat from the fire and one home was destroyed. The
fire burned an area approximately one -quarter of a mile in radius, burning trees and
vegetation. Beaver Run Creek near the Failure Site was not impacted. The other three
lines of the Affected Segment running in the same right-of-way as Line 27 were not
exposed by the explosion.
• Recent in-line inspections (ILI) of Line 27 occurred in 2005 and 2012, using high-
resolution magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and inertial measurement unit (IMU) tools.
Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:
Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action
Order, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,
which may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,



CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
4
testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the
determination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set
forth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.
Section 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a
Corrective Action Order, without prior notice and opportunity for hearing, upon a finding that
failure to issue the Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,
property, or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing and expedited review
will be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.
After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the
Affected Segment without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the
environment. In addition to the failed Line 27, there are three other lines in the Affected
Segment that could potentially have been affected by the Failure and that, accordingly, should
not be restarted without further investigation. Having considered the uncertainties of the cause
of the Failure, the location of the Failure, and the great risk of fire to the environment and
populated areas in the vicinity of the Affected Segment, I find that a failure to issue this Order
expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious
harm to life, property, or the environment.
Accordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued without prior notice and
opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon receipt.
Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may contest its issuance and obtain
expedited review either by answering in writing or requesting a hearing under 49 C.F.R. §
190.211, to be held as soon as practicable under the terms of such regulation, by notifying the
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Eastern
Region, PHMSA (Region Director). If Respondent requests a hearing, it will be held
telephonically or in-person in Trenton, New Jersey, or Washington, D.C.
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA
may identify other corrective measures that need to be taken on the Affected Segment or
other pipelines in the PSJ. In that event, PHMSA will notify Respondent of any additional
measures that are required and an amended Order will be issued, if necessary. To the extent
consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior
to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.
Required Corrective Actions:
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Texas Eastern Transmission, LP to immediately
take the following corrective actions for the Affected Segment:
1. Assessment, Remediation and Restart Plans. Prior to resuming operation of the section of the
PJS running between the Delmont Compressor Station at MP 0.41 and the Conemaugh River
Valves at MP 15.45, develop and submit written assessment, remediation and re-start plans
for prior approval by the Region Director, PHMSA. The plans must include:



(A) (B) CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
5
Procedures for the exposure, testing, and repair of Line 27:
i. Exposure of Line 27 extending for at least two girth welds on either side of the
Failure Site to examine for corrosion, coating condition, concussive damage, and
thermally -impacted areas. If damage to the exposed pipe is discovered, additional
pipe must be exposed until at least ten feet of undamaged pipe is exposed and
examined. Perform safe operating -pressure calculations and remediation for any
pits or other forms of anomalies found, using engineering permanent repair methods
and design factors based upon 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.713 and 192.111 and using
ASME/ANSI B31G or R-STRENG methods. Repair or replace pipe or coating, as
necessary. Upon completion of pipe replacement and repairs, ensure proper
backfill and protection from stones and rocks, pursuant to procedures developed
under this Order;
ii. Establishment of adequate cathodic protection for the area where the Failure
occurred. Replace any damaged rectifier(s) and establish a permanent electrical test
station with an above-grade test point in a protected location. Once backfill and
land settling have occurred, ensure pipe-to-soil readings are within applicable
criteria; and
iii. Development of additional requirements for remediation and the eventual restart for
Line 27 as the investigation yields more information about the cause of the Failure
and the condition of the Affected Segment.
Procedures for the exposure, examination, remediation, and restart of Lines 12, 19, and
28:
i. Development of assessment, remediation, and restart plans that are aligned with the
criteria show immediately below;
ii. Exposure of Lines 12, 19, and 28, extending for at least two girth welds in both
directions from the Failure location. Examine the girth welds and pipeline coating
materials for damage caused by thermal and concussive forces. Continue a broader
exposure of each line if associated damage is discovered, until 10 feet of
undamaged pipe is reached and verified. Any needed repairs are to be guided by
established Spectra procedures and safe operating -pressure calculations and
remediation for any pits or other forms of anomalies found, using engineering
permanent repair methods and design factors based upon 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.713 and
192.111 and using ASME/ANSI B31G or R-STRENG methods. Repair or replace
pipe or coating, as necessary. Upon completion of pipe replacement and repairs,
ensure proper backfill and protection from stones and rocks, all pursuant to
Spectra’s established procedures;
iii. Restarts for each individual line in pressure increments, at 25%, 50%, and 80%, to
be held for at least one hour after pressure stabilization. After reaching 80%
pressure, Respondent must obtain specific individual written approval from the
Region Director to increase pressure to pre-Failure normal pressure. Respondent



CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
6
2. (A) (B) (C) (D) 4. must obtain separate approval for each pipe (Lines 12, 19, and 28) before increasing
pressure to the final normal operating pressure; and
iv. A ground-level, hydrogen flame ionization (HFI) leak survey on Lines 12, 19, and
28, for a distance of two miles in both directions from the Failure Site. Investigate
any elevated readings and make all appropriate repairs.
Testing and Failure Analysis. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order, complete mechanical
and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including analysis of soil
samples and any foreign materials. The testing and analysis shall be completed as follows:
Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe section
and other evidence from the Failure Site;
Utilize the mechanical and metallurgical testing protocols, including the testing
laboratory approved by the Region Director;
Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Region
Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a PHMSA
representative to witness the testing; and
Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety
(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Region Director at the same time as
they are made available to Respondent.
Availability of Prior ILI Assessments. Make any results or information received from the ILI
tool runs performed in 2005 and 2012 on the Affected Segment, including information
obtained from any resulting excavations and all associated re-coats and repairs, available to
PHMSA or its representative in their entirety (including all media). Within 60 days of
determining whether any anomalies were present that could have contributed to the Line 27
Failure and whether any other anomalies of a similar magnitude are present elsewhere in
Lines 12, 19, 27, or 28 in the Affected Segment. Make the results of this analysis available
to PHMSA.
Incorporation by Reference. The work plans will be incorporated into this Order and shall be
revised as necessary when additional information becomes available which may influence
changes. Submit any such plan revisions to the Region Director for prior approval. The
Region Director may approve plan elements incrementally.
Implementation of Work Plans. Implement the work plans as approved by the Region
Director, including any revisions to the work plan.
Other Requirements:
Reporting. Submit monthly reports to the Region Director that: (1) include all available data
and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress
of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first monthly report for the
3. 5. 6.



CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
7
period April 29 through May 31 is due on June 10, 2016. The Region Director may change
the interval for the submission of these reports.
7. Documentation of Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain
documentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Order. Include in each
monthly report the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of
procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including
repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if
applicable.
8. Approvals. With respect to each submission requiring the approval of the Region Director,
the Region Director may: (a) approve the submission in whole or in part; (b) approve the
submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)
disapprove the submission in whole or in part and direct Respondent to modify the
submission; or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon
conditions, or modification by the Region Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all
action required by the submission, as approved or modified by the Region Director. If the
Region Director disapproves all or any portion of a submission, Respondent must correct all
deficiencies within the time specified by the Region Director and resubmit it for approval.
9. Extensions of Time. The Region Director may grant an extension of time for compliance
with any of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted and
demonstrating good cause for an extension.
The actions required by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that
apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 192, under any other order issued to
Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq., or under any other provision of
Federal or State law.
Respondent may appeal any decision of the Region Director to the Associate Administrator for
Pipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.
Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you
must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for
confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information
qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to
the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
§ 60120.
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 1-2016-1004H and for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.



CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
8
The terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.
__________________________________ __________________
Alan Mayberry Date Issued
Acting Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety

120161004H_Closure Letter_09232019_text.pdf

OVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY
September 23, 2019
Mr. William T. Yardley
Executive VP and President
Gas Transmission and Midstream
Enbridge Inc.
1100 Louisiana Street, Suite 300
Houston, Texas 77002
CPF 1-2016-1004H
Dear Mr. Yardley:
On April 29 of 2016, and on July 19, 2016, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) and
an Amended Corrective Action Order (ACAO), respectively, with regard to a pipeline failure
incident of your subsidiary, Texas Eastern Transmission, LP. The ACAO included a list of various
required Corrective Actions.
We have received a letter and CAO Documentation Report dated July 8, 2019 from Mr. Rick
Kivela, Manager, Operational Compliance. The Documentation Report was submitted as part of
the final Corrective Action deliverable, required under item 10 of the ACAO. Subsequently, a
letter from Mr. Kivela was received on September 3, 2019 requesting closure of the ACAO.
Based on our review of the documentation, it has been determined that Texas Eastern
Transmission, LP has complied with the terms of the order.
This letter is to inform you no further action is necessary, and this case is now closed. Thank you
for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Robert Burrough
Director, Eastern Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Cc (via electronic mail):
Mr. Rick Kivela, Manager, Operational Compliance, Enbridge Inc.

120161004H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07192016_text.pdf

July 19, 2016
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO:
Mr. J. Andrew Drake
Vice President, Operations and Emergency, Health & Safety
Spectra Energy Partners, LP
5400 Westheimer Court
Houston, TX 77056
Re: CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
Dear Mr. Drake:
Enclosed is an Amended Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case to your
subsidiary, Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, containing new and amended preliminary findings
and requiring TET to take additional corrective actions with respect to the Delmont Compressor
Station pipeline section of TET’s Penn Jersey System that failed on April 29, 2016, near
Delmont, Pennsylvania. This Amended Corrective Action Order supersedes and replaces the
original Corrective Action Order issued to TET on May 4, 2016. Service is being made by
certified mail and facsimile. Service of the Amended Corrective Action Order by electronic
transmission is deemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of receipt, or as
otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Amended Order
are effective upon completion of service.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Acting Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS
Mr. Byron Coy, P.E., Director, Eastern Region, OPS



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
In the Matter of )
Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, ) CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
a subsidiary of Spectra Energy Partners, LP, )
Respondent. )
)
)
)
)
AMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER
Purpose and Background:
This Amended Corrective Action Order (Amended Order) is being issued under the authority of
49 U.S.C. § 60112, to require Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (TET or Respondent), to take the
necessary corrective action to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential
hazards associated with the recent gas transmission pipeline failure on TET’s Penn-Jersey
System (PJS). The PJS is owned by Spectra Energy Partners, LP (Spectra) and is operated by
TET.
On April 29, 2016, a reportable accident occurred on Line 27 of the PJS, resulting in the release
of 208,425 thousand cubic feet (MCF)of natural gas which ignited, destroying one home and
causing severe injuries to one individual (Failure). The PJS transports natural gas from the
discharge of the Delmont Compressor Station in Salem Township, Pennsylvania, to Lambertville
Station near Lambertville, New Jersey, a distance of approximately 263 miles. Near the site of
the Failure, the PJS consists of four pipelines (Lines 12, 19, 27, and 28 loop) between 24 and 36
inches in diameter. Field investigations conducted by PHMSA indicated that the preliminary
cause of the rupture was external corrosion due to coating failure of the girth weld. Pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident.
On May 4, 2016, PHMSA issued the original Corrective Action Order (CAO) in this case,
ordering TET to take necessary corrective actions and to provide additional information to
PHMSA. After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation,
PHMSA has amended the preliminary findings in the CAO and identified other corrective
measures that need to be taken on pipelines in the PSJ, as more fully described below.
Accordingly, PHMSA is notifying Respondent of additional measures that are required and is
issuing this Amended Order. The Preliminary Findings and Required Corrective Actions
contained in this Amended Order supersede and replace those contained in the original CAO.



CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
2
Amended Preliminary Findings:
 Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (TET), is a limited partnership subsidiary of Spectra
Energy Partners, LP (Spectra). TET operates approximately 9,096 miles of natural gas
transmission pipeline and approximately 74 Bcf of natural gas storage capacity in the
eastern United States.1
 The failed pipeline (Line 27) is a 30-inch diameter line that transports natural gas from
the discharge of the Delmont Compressor Station (MP 0.41) in Salem Township,
Pennsylvania, to Lambertville Station (MP 263.39), and is one of four PJS pipelines in a
common right-of-way near the scene of the Failure.
 "Isolated Segment" refers to the 15-mile segment of Line 27 running from the discharge
of the Delmont Compressor Station (MP 0.41) in Delmont, Pennsylvania, to the
Conemaugh River Valves (MP 15.45). It is the portion of Line 27 that was shut-in after
the Failure by closing main line valve MLV 27-263 and cross-over valves 27-917 and 27-
273 downstream of the Failure Site, and MLV 27-289 upstream of the Failure Site. The
Isolated Segment will remain shut-in until a restart plan is approved by the “Director.”
 “Affected Segment” refers collectively to the four pipelines that make up the Penn Jersey
System. (the 30-inch Line 27, the 24-inch Line 12, the 30-inch Line 19, and the 36-inch
Line 28 loop) from Delmont Compressor Station to Lambertville Station. The Affected
Segment generally runs east across Pennsylvania and passes through portions of
Westmoreland, Indiana, Columbia, Blair, Huntingdon, Juniata, Perry, Dauphin, Lebanon,
Berks, Chester, Lehigh, and Bucks Counties in Pennsylvania, and Hunterdon County in
New Jersey.
 “Adjacent Pipelines” refers to the other three Affected Segment pipelines (the 24-inch
Line 12, the 30-inch Line 19, and the 36-inch Line 28 loop), which run parallel to Line 27
in the vicinity of the Failure.
 Three of the lines on the Affected Segment, including Lines 27, 19, and 12, share a single
right-of-way from Delmont to Lambertville, for the entire distance of 263 miles. The
third Adjacent Pipeline, Line 28 loop, ties into Line 27 at various points throughout the
Penn Jersey System covering 104.12 miles between the Delmont and Lambertville
Stations. The Failure occurred near milepost 2.0621 east of Delmont, Pennsylvania
(Failure Site). At the Failure Site, the distances between each of the four lines range
approximately from 25 to 28 feet. All four lines of the Affected Segment are linked with
crossover interconnects; accordingly, pressure is usually equal across all four lines.
 The portion of Line 27 near the Failure Site was constructed in 1981 and consists of
0.404-inch wall thickness, X65 grade double submerged arc-welded pipe, manufactured
1 http://www.spectraenergy.com/Operations/US-Natural-Gas-Operations/US-Pipelines/Texas-Eastern-
Transmission/ (last accessed June 30, 2016).



CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
3
by US Steel. Line 27 is coated with Fusion Bond Epoxy (FBE), with tape-coat coating at
girth weld joints.
 The Affected Segment has a Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) of 1050
psig, as measured by a pressure transducer on the discharge header at the Delmont
Compressor Station, established for Line 27 by hydrostatic testing in 1981. TET initially
reported that the line pressure was approximately 1,040 psig immediately prior to the
Failure.
 Prior to the Failure, three of the four lines (Lines 19, 27, and 28) on the Affected Segment
were in normal operating status with gas flowing east towards Lambertville Station on
the system. The fourth line (Line 12) had been taken out of service days prior to the
Failure and blown down for maintenance work from Delmont Station to Armaugh
Station.
 The Failure occurred at approximately 8:13 a.m. EDT on April 29, 2016. At that time,
TET personnel located at the Delmont Compressor Station heard a loud explosion and the
sound of natural gas being released from an undetermined location. The Failure resulted
in the release of 208,425 MCF of natural gas, which ignited, producing a crater
approximately 30 feet wide, 50 feet in length, and 12 feet deep and a burn zone of
approximately ¼ mile radius. The explosion resulted in the ejection of approximately
24.5 feet of 30-inch pipe, which landed approximately 100 feet from the rupture site. The
Failure occurred in a rural class 1 area. The Failure was reported to the National
Response Center (NRC Report No. 1146495) on April 29, 2016, at approximately 9:15
a.m. EDT.
 The TET personnel in Delmont contacted Spectra’s Pipeline Control Center (PCC)
located in Houston, Texas, to alert them to the situation. PCC personnel observed a
pressure drop on the Affected Segment at the discharge side of the Delmont Compressor
Station and ordered a complete shutdown of all PJS pipelines. TET personnel were
dispatched to begin closing mainline block valves within the Delmont Compressor
Station to isolate the lines. As a result of the valve closures, TET personnel identified
Line 27 as the failed pipeline. Direct observations were made in the field and confirmed
that the Failure had occurred on Line 27. The Affected Segment is currently shut-in and
isolated between the Delmont Compressor Station at MP 0.41 and the Conemaugh River
Valves at MP 15.45. The Affected Segment was shut-in after the Failure by closing main
line valve (MLV) 27-263 and crossover valves 27-917 and 27-273 downstream of the
Failure Site at the Conemaugh River Valves, and MLV 27-289 upstream of the Failure
Site at the Delmont Compressor Station.
 PHMSA, along with various state and local emergency responders responded to the scene
on the day of the Failure. A third-party metallurgist (DNV GL), contracted by Spectra,
was also at the scene of the Failure later the same day.
 The cause of the Failure is unknown at this time, and the investigation is ongoing. The
failed pipe section has been transported to an independent metallurgist for examination
and failure analysis. The preliminary investigation has identified evidence of external



CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
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corrosion at circumferential welds at the Failure Site. The pattern of corrosion indicates
disbondment of the coating material applied to the girth weld joints. The Isolated
Segment and the portions of Lines 12 and 28 between Delmont and Armaugh Stations
remain shut-in and out of service pending integrity assessment. The remainder of Line
27 from Armaugh Station to Lambertville Station, along with the rest of the Affected
Segment, was reduced to 80% of the operating pressure at the time of failure. This
reduction in pressure was initiated by Spectra to provide an additional level of safety
during the integrity assessment work that is being conducted throughout the PJS.
 On May 9, 2016, upon completion of integrity assessments, TET requested approval to
return Line 19 to normal operating service between Delmont Station and Armaugh
Station. On May 9, 2016, PHMSA approved TET’s request and Line 19 was returned to
normal operating service on May 31, 2016. The rest of the Affected Segment, other than
the Isolated Segment and the portions of Lines 12 and 28 between Delmont and Armaugh
Stations, continues to operate at the reduced 80% operating pressure.
 The Failure caused one known injury to a man residing near the Failure Site, with third-
degree burns over 75% of his body. The injured man was admitted to a local hospital.
 Emergency responders evacuated nine homes in the area and closed nearby roads,
including Route 819. Three homes within a quarter mile of the Failure Site received
external damage due to the radiant heat from the fire and one home was destroyed. The
fire burned an area approximately one-quarter of a mile in radius, burning trees and
vegetation. Beaver Run Creek near the Failure Site was not impacted. The other three
lines of the Affected Segment running in the same right-of-way as Line 27 were not
exposed by the explosion.
 Recent in-line inspections (ILI) of Line 27 of the Isolated Segment occurred in 2005 and
2012, using high-resolution magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and inertial measurement unit
(IMU) tools.
 A review of previous operating history, ILI, and remediation records for the segment of
Line 12 between Delmont and Armaugh Stations has shown a pattern of external
corrosion with characteristics similar to the condition that caused the failure on Line 27.
Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:
Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action
Order, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,
which may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,
testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the
determination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set
forth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.
Section 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a
Corrective Action Order or Amended Order, without prior notice and opportunity for hearing,



CPF No. 1-2016-1004H
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upon a finding that failure to issue the Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of
serious harm to life, property, or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing
and expedited review will be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.
After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the
Affected Segment from Delmont Station to MP 15.45 without corrective measures is or would be
hazardous to life, property, or the environment. In addition to the failed Line 27, subsequent
investigation by Respondent and PHMSA has demonstrated that Lines 12, 19, and 28 could
potentially have been damaged or adversely affected by the explosion and fire at the Failure Site
and pose a serious risk to life, property or the environment if returned to normal operation unless
Respondent takes certain corrective actions in addition to those required under the original CAO.
Having considered the uncertainties of the cause of the Failure, the location of the Failure, the
recent discovery of additional external corrosion on other portions of the Affected Segment
besides Line 27, and the risk of fire or harm to the environment and populated areas in the
vicinity of the Affected Segment, I further find that a failure to issue this Amended Order
expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious
harm to life, property, or the environment.
Accordingly, this Amended Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued without prior
notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Amended Order are
effective upon receipt.
Within 10 days of receipt of this Amended Order, Respondent may contest its issuance and
obtain expedited review either by answering in writing or requesting a hearing under 49 C.F.R. §
190.211, to be held as soon as practicable under the terms of such regulation, by notifying the
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Eastern
Region, OPS, PHMSA (Director). The Director’s address is 820 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 103,
West Trenton, NJ 08628. If Respondent requests a hearing, it will be held telephonically or in-
person in Trenton, New Jersey, or Washington, D.C.
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA
may identify other corrective measures that need to be taken on the Affected Segment or
other pipelines in the PSJ. In that event, PHMSA will notify Respondent of any additional
measures that are required and another amended Order will be issued, if necessary. To the extent
consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior
to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.
Required Corre
- **truncated:** true
- **body characters:** 60162