{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 120176006W","title":"PHILADELPHIA ENERGY SOLUTIONS REFINING AND MARKETING, LLC — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2017-09-12","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 195.412(b), 195.452(b)(5), 195.452(j)(5)(iv), 195.452(l)(ii).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120176006w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120176006w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120176006w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/120176006W","body":"Warning Letter involving PHILADELPHIA ENERGY SOLUTIONS REFINING AND MARKETING, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.412(b),  195.452(b)(5),  195.452(j)(5)(iv),  195.452(l)(ii). The case was opened on 2017-09-12 and is reported as closed as of 2017-09-12. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n120176006W_Operator Response to Notice_10042017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120176006W/120176006W_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_10042017.pdf\n\n120176006W_Warning Letter_09122017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120176006W/120176006W_Warning%20Letter_09122017.pdf\n\n120176006W_Warning Letter_09122017_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120176006W/120176006W_Warning%20Letter_09122017_text.pdf\n\n120176006W_Warning Letter_09122017_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nOVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY\nSeptember 12, 2017\nJohn Pickering\nSenior Vice President, Manufacturing\nPhiladelphia Energy Solutions Refining and Marketing, LLC\n3144 Passyunk Avenue\nPhiladelphia, PA 19145\nCPF 1-2017-6006W\nDear Mr. Pickering:\nBetween October 14 and November 16, 2015, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) pursuant to Chapter\n601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) inspected certain procedures of Philadelphia Energy\nSolutions Refining and Marketing, LLC’s (PES) operation and maintenance manual and integrity\nmanagement program along with associated records in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected\nand the probable violations are:\n1. §195.412 Inspection of rights-of-way and crossings under navigable waters.\n(b) Except for offshore pipelines, each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding\n5 years, inspect each crossing under a navigable waterway to determine the condition\nof the crossing.\nPES failed to inspect each crossing under navigable waterways to determine the condition of the\ncrossing at intervals not exceeding 5 years.\nDuring this inspection, the PHMSA representative requested to review the most recent and\nprevious navigable waterway inspection reports, respectively\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2017-6006W\n1) PES presented a report titled Summary of Inspection Findings dated December 22, 2014\nfor an inspection conducted from September 18-19, 2014 at four Schuylkill River\nCrossings in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.\n2) PES presented a report titled Summary of Inspection Findings dated July 22, 2009 for\nan inspection conducted on March 11 and 23, 2009 at four Schuylkill River Crossings\nin Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.\nThe PHMSA representative requested a copy of the referenced drawings titled Sunoco Dwg.\nNo. 1-0-3H/85001D in the report. PES produced the drawings that showed the location and names\nof the jurisdictional pipelines at the four crossings.\nThe time interval between the September 19, 2014 and March 23, 2009 inspection of crossing\nunder four navigable waterways exceeded 5 years by 180 days. Therefore, PES failed to inspect\neach crossing under navigable waterways to determine the condition of the crossing at intervals\nnot exceeding 5 years as prescribed in § 195.412(b).\n2. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage pipeline integrity? Each\noperator of a pipeline covered by this section must:…\n(5) Implement and follow the program.\nPES failed to implement and follow its written integrity management program. Specifically, PES\ndid not utilize a leak detection system for detecting leaks on its FM1 pipeline between Schuylkill\nRiver Tank Farm (SRFT) and West Yard for 2 years and # 7 Line for an undetermined time frame\nin accordance with its Pipeline Integrity Management Plan, Revision Date: 3/6/2015, 5.6.2.\nPreventive and Mitigative Measures, 3) Leak Detection (Procedure).\nPursuant to § 195.452(f)(6), an operator must include the element of identifying preventive and\nmitigative measures to protect the high consequence area as seen in § 195.452(i). Section\n195.452(i)(3) states an operator must have a means to detect leaks on its pipeline system.\nAccording to the Procedure, PES utilizes a computational pipeline monitoring (computer based)\nsystem which was referred to as Siemens/Controlotron to, among other things, detect leaks on its\npipelines.\nDuring this inspection, the PHMSA representative requested PES to produce records of its leak\ndetection to review. Subsequently, PES presented an e-mail dated October 29, 2015 from the SRFT\nlead operator to the Inspection Superintendent stating, “[t]he following lines need to be addressed\nto repair the leak detection system at SRTF: 1) The FM1 line is not working at SRTF. Strap on\nequipment not functioning both at SRTF and N1 (Has not worked for 2 years)… 4) 7 Line reading\nbad….” PES’s Inspection Superintendent sent an e-mail to GP Instrument Reliability Engineer on\nNovember 13, 2015 stating “What do we need to do to correct these issues?” Therefore, PES was\nnot able to utilize a leak detection system to detect leaks on the pipeline FM1 and # 7 Line in\naccordance with the Procedure Section 5.6.2. Preventive and Mitigative Measures, 3) Leak\nDetection.\n120176006W_Warning Letter_09122017_text\nPage 2 of 5\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2017-6006W\nTherefore, PES failed to implement and follow its Procedure as prescribed in § 195.452(b)(5) and\nin accordance with § 195.452(f)(6).\n3. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a pipeline's\nintegrity? –\n(5) Assessment methods. An operator must assess the integrity of the line pipe by any\nof the following methods. The methods an operator selects to assess low frequency\nelectric resistance welded pipe or lap welded pipe susceptible to longitudinal seam\nfailure must be capable of assessing seam integrity and of detecting corrosion and\ndeformation anomalies.\n(iv) Other technology that the operator demonstrates can provide an equivalent\nunderstanding of the condition of the line pipe. An operator choosing this option must\nnotify OPS 90 days before conducting the assessment, by sending a notice to the\naddress or facsimile number specified in paragraph (m) of this section.\nPES failed to notify OPS 90 days before conducting an assessment using “other technology”, by\nsending a notice to the address or facsimile number specified in § 195.452(m).\nDuring this inspection, the PHSMA inspector requested to review PES’s integrity assessment\nschedule for its pipelines which are located in a high consequence area (HCA). PES provided the\nPHMSA representative with a copy of its DOT Inspection Schedule spreadsheet. The PHMSA\nrepresentative noted that the in-service Line ID Nos. 11178 and 11179 was assessed using guided\nwave ultrasonic (GWUT) in 2010 and then in 2015. GWUT is considered to be “other technology.”\nSubsequently, the PHMSA representative requested PES to provide records of submitting the\nnotification for using an “other technology” assessment method for Line ID Nos. 11178 and 11179\nin 2015. PES did not provide records to show it submitted notification to OPS 90 days prior to\nusing GWUT. In addition, the PHMSA representative confirmed with OPS that it did not receive\na notification from PES for using an “other technology” assessment method in 2015.\nTherefore, PES failed to notify OPS 90 days before conducting an assessment using “other\ntechnology”, by sending a notice to the address or facsimile number specified in § 195.452(m), as\nprescribed in § 195.452(j)(5)(iv).\n4. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(l) What records must an operator keep to demonstrate compliance? (1) An operator\nmust maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records that demonstrate compliance\nwith the requirements of this subpart. At a minimum, an operator must maintain the\nfollowing records for review during an inspection:\n(ii) Documents to support the decisions and analyses, including any modifications,\njustifications, deviations and determinations made, variances, and actions taken, to\nimplement and evaluate each element of the integrity management program listed in\nparagraph (f) of this section.\n120176006W_Warning Letter_09122017_text\nPage 3 of 5\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2017-6006W\nPES failed to maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, documents that support the decisions and\nanalyses, including any modifications, justifications, deviations and determinations made,\nvariances, and actions taken, to implement and evaluate each element of the integrity management\nprogram. Specifically, PES failed to maintain adequate documentation to support its decision for\ndetermining whether an emergency flow restricting device (EFRD) was needed, to implement and\nevaluate preventive and mitigative measures pursuant to § 195.452(f)(6).\nPursuant to § 195.452(f)(6), an operator must include in its written integrity management program\nidentification of preventive and mitigative measures to protect the high consequence area as seen\nin § 195.452(i).\nAccording to § 195.452(i)(4), an operator must determine whether an EFRD is needed on a\npipeline segment to protect a high consequence area in an event of a hazardous liquid pipeline\nrelease. The operator must, at least, consider the following factors in making the determination if\na EFRD is needed — the swiftness of leak detection and pipeline shutdown capabilities, the type\nof commodity carried, the rate of potential leakage, the volume that can be released, topography\nor pipeline profile, the potential for ignition, proximity to power sources, location of nearest\nresponse personnel, specific terrain between the pipeline segment and the high consequence area,\nand benefits expected by reducing the spill size.\nDuring this inspection, the PHMSA requested PES to produce records of the EFRD evaluation.\nSubsequently, PES presented its Pipeline Integrity Management Plan, Revision Date: 3/6/2015,\n5.6.2. Preventive and Mitigative Measures, a. Emergency Flow Restricting Devices which states\nin part:\n“Sunoco, Inc. R&M, and subsequently PES, considered the use of EFRD’s but\ndetermined the use of EFRD’s are not an appropriate course of action since they\ncould potentially cause more problems than they can solve. For this reason this\nspecific action is not included in the Risk Model. Most of the lines are within five\nmiles of the refinery, and a majority of the lines are short river crossings linking\none part of the refinery to the other. The closeness of the lines to the refinery and\nrefinery operations means that they are monitored frequently.”\nThe document did not include details about the consideration made to the factors listed in\n§ 195.452(i)(4). For instance, this document did not include information about considering type of\ncommodity carried, potential ignition, or proximity to power source. In addition, this document\ndid not include a detailed explaination for why EFRD was not needed or needed; instead of stating\nit will “cause more problems.” Furthermore, the document did not describe when the evaluation\nwas done, who was involved in the decision making, and other pertinent information.\nTherefore, PES failed to maintain adequate documentation to support its decision for determining\nwhether an EFRD was needed, to implement and evaluate § 195.452(f)(6), as prescribed in\n§ 195.452(l)(1)(ii).\nAs of April 27, 2017, under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil\npenalty not to exceed $209,002 per violation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of\n$2,090,022 for a related series of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and supporting\ndocuments involved in this case, and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action120176006W_Warning Letter_09122017_text\nPage 4 of 5\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2017-6006W\nor penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to correct the items identified in\nthis letter. Failure to do so will result in Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refining and Marketing,\nLLC being subject to additional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, please submit all correspondence in this\nmatter to Robert Burrough, Acting Director, PHMSA Eastern Region, 820 Bear Tavern Road,\nSuite 103, West Trenton, NJ 08628. Please refer to CPF 1- 2017-6006W on each document you\nsubmit, and whenever possible provide a signed PDF copy in electronic format. Smaller files may\nbe emailed to robert.burrough@dot.gov. Larger files should be sent on a CD accompanied by the\noriginal paper copy to the Eastern Region Office.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must\nprovide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nSincerely,\nRobert Burrough\nActing Director, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n120176006W_Warning Letter_09122017_text\nPage 5 of 5","truncated":false,"body_characters":13528}