{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 120190005W","title":"RICHMOND, CITY OF — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2019-03-29","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 192.1007, 192.605(a), 192.751(a), 192.805(b).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120190005w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120190005w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120190005w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/120190005W","body":"Warning Letter involving RICHMOND, CITY OF. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.1007,  192.605(a),  192.751(a),  192.805(b). The case was opened on 2019-03-29 and is reported as closed as of 2019-03-29. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n120190005W_Warning Letter_03292019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120190005W/120190005W_Warning%20Letter_03292019.pdf\n\n120190005W_Warning Letter_03292019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120190005W/120190005W_Warning%20Letter_03292019_text.pdf\n\n120190005W_Warning Letter_03292019_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nOVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY\nMarch 29, 2019\nRobert Steidel\nDirector, Department of Public Utilities\nCity of Richmond\n730 East Broad St\nRichmond, VA 23219\nCPF 1-2019-0005W\nDear Mr. Steidel:\nOn February 1, 2018 to October 8, 2018, an inspector from the Virginia State Corporation\nCommission, Division of Pipeline Safety (VA SCC), acting as Agent for the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States\nCode (U.S.C.) inspected the City of Richmond’s (City) records and procedures.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected\nand the probable violations are:\n1. §192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline, a manual\nof written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance activities and\nfor emergency response. For transmission lines, the manual must also include\nprocedures for handling abnormal operations. This manual must be reviewed and\nupdated by the operator at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once\neach calendar year. This manual must be prepared before operations of a pipeline\nsystem commence. Appropriate parts of the manual must be kept at locations\nwhere operations and maintenance activities are conducted.\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2019-0005W\nThe City failed to follow for each pipeline, a manual of written procedures for conducting\noperations and maintenance activities and for emergency response. Specifically, the City failed to\nfollow its Leak Survey Procedures Manual, dated 07/22/2013 (Leak Survey Procedure),\nregarding performing leakage survey at or near ground level for buried gas facilities and adjacent\nto above-ground gas facilities with a gas detector system.\nDuring the inspection, the VA SCC inspector reviewed the City’s Leak Survey Procedure which\nstated in part:\n“Surface leak survey is conducted by use of Flame Ionization Survey or Infrared Optical\ngas detection equipment.\n1. This is a continuous sampling of the atmosphere at or near ground level for buried\ngas facilities and adjacent to aboveground gas facilities with a gas detector\nsystem…”\nThe VA SCC inspector observed the City perform business district leak survey activities in the\n4900 blocks of Augusta and Fitzhugh Avenues in Richmond, VA.\n 4900 Augusta Avenue, the City performed a leak survey at the meter set and over an older\ngas service and riser, but not the newer gas service.\n 4900 and 4902 Fitzhugh Avenue, two services run parallel to one another from the sidewalk\nto the building wall, and both meter sets are located next to each other. The City did\nperform a leakage check over the curb valves located in the sidewalk but not the remainder\nof the service lines or meter sets at the building wall.\nThe VA SCC issued a Notice of Investigation (NOI) to the City on June 11, 2018. In its response\nto the NOI on June 21, 2018, the City did not dispute the proposed violation and identified\nadditional measures it has taken to prevent reoccurrence of the violation.\nTherefore, the City failed to follow for each pipeline, a manual of written procedures for\nconducting operations and maintenance activities and for emergency response.\n2. §192.751 Prevention of accidental ignition.\nEach operator shall take steps to minimize the danger of accidental ignition of gas\nin any structure or area where the presence of gas constitutes a hazard of fire or\nexplosion, including the following:\n(a) When a hazardous amount of gas is being vented into open air, each potential\nsource of ignition must be removed from the area and a fire extinguisher must be\nprovided.\nThe City failed to provide a fire extinguisher when a hazardous amount of gas was being vented\ninto open air. Specifically, the City failed to provide a fire extinguisher during a March 5, 2018\npurging operation of a newly installed natural gas service.\n120190005W_Warning Letter_03292019_text\nPage 2 of 6\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2019-0005W\nDuring the inspection, the VA SCC inspector observed the City perform an in-service purge of a\nnewly installed natural gas service. The City performed the gas purging without a fire extinguisher\npresent. In the City's Prevention of Accident Ignition procedure, dated 11/27/2013, it stated in part\nIV.B.3.a.(2) for when gas is being vented into the open air:\n“A charged fire extinguisher shall be placed near the venting location and, if possible,\nupwind from the venting location.”\nThe City’s Notice of Investigation response, dated March 26, 2017, acknowledged that a fire\nextinguisher was not set nearby during the purge operations, but had a fully charged fire\nextinguisher at the job site.\nTherefore, the City failed to provide a fire extinguisher when a hazardous amount of gas was being\nvented into open air.\n3. §192.805 Qualification program.\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The\nprogram shall include provisions to:\n…\nqualified;\n(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are\nThe City failed to ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are\nqualified. Specifically, the City performed a leak investigation of its system without proper\noperator qualifications.\nDuring the inspection, the VA SCC inspector witnessed the City investigating a suspected gas leak\non Hobbs Lane in the City of Richmond. The City was performing bar hole Combustible Gas\nIndicator (CGI) readings. No one present at the time of the readings, including the individual\nperforming the readings, was qualified to perform covered task 1202, “Outside Leak Investigation,\nPinpointing, and Grading”.\nThe City’s NOI response on February 20, 2018 contended the findings, stating that a qualified\nindividual completed the covered task, and that VA SCC witnessed a “recheck” which the City\nbelieves is not a covered task requiring operator qualifications.\nWhile the work being performed was considered a “recheck”, it still involved the investigating and\npinpointing of a gas leak, including bar holing and use of a CGI. Thus, a covered task was being\nperformed. Therefore, the City failed to ensure through evaluation that individuals performing a\ncovered task were qualified.\n120190005W_Warning Letter_03292019_text\nPage 3 of 6\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2019-0005W\n4. 192.1007 What are the required elements of an integrity manangement plan?\nA written Integrity Management Plan must contain procedures for developing\nand implementing the following elements:\n…\n(c) Evaluate and rank risk. An operator must evaluate the risks associated with\nits distribution pipeline. In this evaluation, the operator must determine the\nrelative importance of each threat and estimate and rank the risks posed to its\npipeline. This evaluation must consider each applicable current and potential\nthreat, the likelihood of failure associated with each threat, and the potential\nconsequences of such a failure. An operator may subdivide its pipeline into regions\nwith similar characteristics (e.g., contiguous areas within a distribution pipeline\nconsisting of mains, services and other appurtenances; areas with common\nmaterials or environmental factors), and for which similar actions likely would be\neffective in reducing risk.\nThe City failed to adequately evaluate and rank the risk associated with legacy gas line bores\nthrough sewer mains (cross bores) in its distribution system.\nDuring the inspection, the VA SCC inspector reviewed the City’s Gas Distribution Integrity\nManagement Plan, revised 02/06/2018 (IMP). The City’s IMP stated in part regarding cross bores:\n“8.5 Gas Line Bore through Sewer Main Mitigation Process DPU [City of Richmond’s\nDepartment of Public Utilities] Wastewater, Gas Maintenance and Construction\nDepartment are working to identify sewer mains and laterals bored though during the\ninstallation of gas mains and services. When located, DPU Wastewater or DPU Contractor\nshall submit a copy of the drawing showing sewer main location along with photograph of\nthe utility pipeline to DPU General Supervisor of gas maintenance for further evaluation\n…\nThe City has implemented additional preventative measures by preinspecting sewer mains\nand laterals utilizing CCTV technology. Once the location of these facilities are\ndetermined, as built drawings are created documenting distance of the manhole to sewer\nlateral, and location of the sewer lateral from main to property prior to beginning of the\nrenewal construction projects. The information collected are annotated in the GIS database.\nAll related documents are filed and maintain for the life of the pipe (Sewer Lateral). This\neffort will improve the quality of the City’s GIS database and knowledge of the facilities\nwhich will reduce the risk of boring gas lines through sewer mains and laterals during\nconstruction.”\nThe City’s IMP Appendix A, Table 5-4 Summary of Construction Practices, states directional\nboring was first deployed in 1989 and continues to be used.\nPHMSA’s DIMP FAQs, question C.3.b.3. states in part (emphasis added):\n“If operators used trenchless technologies without taking measures to locate sewer laterals\nand other unmarked facilities during construction, there may be a risk that their facilities\n120190005W_Warning Letter_03292019_text\nPage 4 of 6\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2019-0005W\nwere installed through the foreign facility. If this excavation damage threat applies to the\noperator, they must evaluate its risk to their system.\nDepending on the results of the risk evaluation, they may need to identify and implement\nmeasures to reduce this risk to existing and future facilities.”\nIn the City’s IMP Appendix B, Table 6-1, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)\nrecommendations were listed. In 1976, NTSB issued Recommendation Number P76-83-86. NTSB\nRecommendation P76-83-86 included recommendations for examining records to determine\nlocations where gas lines were installed near existing sewer facilities using directional boring,\ninspecting the locations, and taking corrective action where necessary.\nOverall, the City’s IMP reflects a program to act when cross bores are identified, and that\nimplements measures to prevent future occurrences. These efforts were identified by the City as\nbeing adopted in 2012 and 2015, respectively, in its October 8, 2018 response to the VA-SCC’s\nNotice of Investigation No. 2018-037302. However, specific actions being taken to identify the\nlegacy cross bores are not listed. Without knowledge of the magnitude of legacy cross bores that\nmay exist in its distribution system, the City cannot perform a complete evaluation and ranking of\nthe risk posed by this threat.\nTherefore, the City failed to adequately evaluate and rank the risk associated with legacy cross\nbores in its distribution system.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$213,268 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,132,679 for a related\nseries of violations. For violation occurring on or after November 2, 2015 and before November\n27, 2018, the maximum penalty may not exceed $209,002 per violation per day, with a maximum\npenalty not to exceed $2,090,022. For violations occurring prior to November 2, 2015, the\nmaximum penalty may not exceed $200,000 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to\nexceed $2,000,000 for a related series of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and\nsupporting documents involved in this case, and have decided not to conduct additional\nenforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to correct the\nitem(s) identified in this letter. Failure to do so will result in the City of Richmondbeing subject\nto additional enforcement action.\nPlease be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to\nbeing made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies\nfor confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, please submit all correspondence in this\nmatter to Robert Burrough, Director, PHMSA Eastern Region, 840 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 300,\n120190005W_Warning Letter_03292019_text\nPage 5 of 6\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2019-0005W\nWest Trenton, NJ 08628. Please refer to CPF 1-2019-0005W on each document you submit, and\nwhenever possible provide a signed PDF copy in electronic format. Smaller files may be emailed\nto robert.burrough@dot.gov. Larger files should be sent on USB flash drive accompanied by the\noriginal paper copy to the Eastern Region Office.\nSincerely,\nRobert Burrough\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n120190005W_Warning Letter_03292019_text\nPage 6 of 6","truncated":false,"body_characters":13842}