{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 120201010W","title":"TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2020-03-27","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 192.12(d), 192.12(e).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120201010w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120201010w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-120201010w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/120201010W","body":"Warning Letter involving TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.12(d),  192.12(e). The case was opened on 2020-03-27 and is reported as closed as of 2020-03-27. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n120201010W_Operator Response to Notice_04232020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120201010W/120201010W_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_04232020.pdf\n\n120201010W_Warning Letter_03272020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120201010W/120201010W_Warning%20Letter_03272020.pdf\n\n120201010W_Warning Letter_03272020_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/120201010W/120201010W_Warning%20Letter_03272020_text.pdf\n\n120201010W_Warning Letter_03272020_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nOVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY\nMarch 27, 2020\nMr. Richard Keyser\nSenior Vice President of Operations\nTexas Gas Transmission, LLC\n9 Greenway Plaza, Suite 2800\nHouston, TX 77046\nCPF 1-2020-1010W\nDear Mr. Keyser:\nFrom March 25 – 28, 2019, June 3 – 6, 2019, and August 27 – 29, 2019, a representative of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of\n49 United States Code (U.S.C.), inspected Texas Gas Transmission, LLC’s (TGT) underground\nnatural gas storage field records and procedures for the Graham Lake, Leesville, Midland, and\nWest Greenville storage fields in Muhlenberg County, Kentucky and Lawrence County, Indiana.\nAs a result of the inspections, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected\nand the probable violations are:\n1. § 192.12 Underground natural gas storage facilities.\n(a) ….\n(d) Each underground natural gas storage facility that uses a\ndepleted hydrocarbon reservoir or an aquifer reservoir for gas storage,\nincluding those constructed not later than July 18, 2017 must meet the\noperations, maintenance, integrity demonstration and verification,\nmonitoring, threat and hazard identification, assessment, remediation,\nsite security, emergency response and preparedness, and\nrecordkeeping requirements and recommendations of API RP 1171,\nsections 8, 9, 10, and 11 (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7) by\nJanuary 18, 2018.1\n1 The final rule, Pipeline Safety: Safety of Underground Natural Gas Storage Facilities, 85 FR 8104 (February 12,\n2020), revised § 192.12. This requirement is still present but is now codified in § 192.12(b)(2).\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2020-1010W\nTGT failed to meet the requirements of API RP 1171, Section 10. Specifically, TGT failed to\ndemonstrate that all applicable personnel were trained in its Emergency Response Plan and Well\nControl Plan in accordance with API RP 1171, Section 10.6.2 Training (Section 10.6.2).\nSection 10.6.2 states in part:\nStorage operations and applicable staff shall receive training in the use of the\nemergency preparedness/response plan. The training can include mock drills and\nparticipation in table-top exercises at regular intervals. The table-top exercises or\nmock drills can include civil emergency responders to enhance understanding and\nsuccessful incident response.\nA review of TGT’s written procedures established that TGT conducts this required training at an\ninterval of annually, not to exceed 15 months. At the time of the inspection, TGT failed to provide\nadequate documentation verifying that all employees required to be trained had attended the\ntraining of the emergency preparedness/response plan for the Midland storage facility as required\nby API RP 1171, Section 10.6.2. TGT’s attendance documentation for 2018 in Emergency\nResponse Plan and Well Control Plan training did not include one (1) personnel listed on their\norganizational chart for Midland Storage.\nTherefore, TGT failed to train all required personnel in 2018 in accordance with its established\ninterval, as required by Section 10.6.2.\n2. § 192.12 Underground natural gas storage facilities.\n(a) ….\n(d) Each underground natural gas storage facility that uses a\ndepleted hydrocarbon reservoir or an aquifer reservoir for gas storage,\nincluding those constructed not later than July 18, 2017 must meet the\noperations, maintenance, integrity demonstration and verification,\nmonitoring, threat and hazard identification, assessment, remediation,\nsite security, emergency response and preparedness, and\nrecordkeeping requirements and recommendations of API RP 1171,\nsections 8, 9, 10, and 11 (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7) by\nJanuary 18, 2018.\nTGT’s failed to meet the requirements of API RP 1171, Section 9. Specifically, TGT failed to\nrequest third-party well integrity evaluation data, as required by API RP 1171, Section 9.3.1 Well\nIntegrity Evaluation (Section 9.3.1).\nSection 9.3.1 states in part:\nThe operator shall evaluate the mechanical integrity of each active well, including\neach third-party well, that penetrates the storage reservoir and buffer zone or areas\ninfluenced by storage operations.\n120201010W_Warning Letter_03272020_text Page 2 of 5\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2020-1010W\nWell integrity evaluation methods typically used by operators include but are not\nlimited to review of design, completion, and well work records, wellhead and\ndownhole inspection, well pressure monitoring and testing, and gas sampling.\nThe operator shall request well integrity evaluation data from third-party well\nowner/operators following the frequency established using conclusions from the\nrisk assessment.\nActive well mechanical integrity evaluations shall include initial and subsequent\nevaluations as determined using the risk assessment and the information derived\nfrom the initial evaluation:\nDuring the inspections of the Graham Lake and West Greenville storage fields, TGT was asked to\nprovide records showing that they had requested third-party well integrity information. TGT could\nnot provide any records documenting that they requested this information. Therefore, TGT failed\nto meet the requirements of Section 9.3.1.\n3. § 192.12 Underground natural gas storage facilities.\n(a) …\n(d) Each underground natural gas storage facility that uses a\ndepleted hydrocarbon reservoir or an aquifer reservoir for gas storage,\nincluding those constructed not later than July 18, 2017 must meet the\noperations, maintenance, integrity demonstration and verification,\nmonitoring, threat and hazard identification, assessment, remediation,\nsite security, emergency response and preparedness, and\nrecordkeeping requirements and recommendations of API RP 1171,\nsections 8, 9, 10, and 11 (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7) by\nJanuary 18, 2018.\nTGT failed to meet the requirements of API RP 1171, Section 8. Specifically, TGT failed to\nidentify all threats to the well or the storage as required by API RP 1171, Section 8.4.2 Threat and\nHazard Identification and Analysis (Section 8.4.2).\nSection 8.4.2 states in part:\nThe operator shall evaluate the potential threats and hazards impacting storage\nwells and reservoirs. The operator should refer to the list of common threats and\nhazards in Table 1 and may supplement the list in Table 1 with other hazards or\nthreats identified by site-specific assessments.\nThe operator should estimate risk from potential events that could occur related to\npotential threats and hazards to individual facilities, such as wells, and by region\nwhen considering the reservoir.\nThe operator should assess potential threat and/or hazard interaction, such as the\nrelationship of the threat of casing damage during well drilling or service work that\ncould exacerbate corrosion processes.\n120201010W_Warning Letter_03272020_text Page 3 of 5\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2020-1010W\nDuring the Leesville Storage facility inspection, it was established that the facility has H2S gas as\npart of the gas being stored and gathered. TGT’s Storage Integrity Program and Risk Management\nModel failed to include this hazardous gas as a threat to the storage and wells. Table 1 of API RP\n1171 includes the threat of reservoir fluid compatibility issues with potential consequences of H2S\ngenerating bacteria, as well as internal corrosion that could result in well and/or pipeline\nrepairs/failures.\n4. § 192.12 Underground natural gas storage facilities.\n(a) ….\n(e) Operators of underground gas storage facilities must establish\nand follow written procedures for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies implementing the requirements of API RP 1170 and API\nRP 1171, as required under this section, including the effective dates as\napplicable, and incorporate such procedures into their written\nprocedures for operations, maintenance, and emergencies established\npursuant to § 192.605.2\nTGT failed to follow its written procedures for implementing the requirements of API RP 1171.\nSpecifically, TGT failed to follow its Storage Integrity Program requirement that all personnel be\ninformed of changes prior to implementing the change, in accordance with API RP 1171, Section\n11.11.1 Management of Change (Section 11.11.1).\nSection 11.11.1 states in part:\nRevision of procedures and processes is an acceptable practice, but the operator\nshall require changes to be accomplished in a controlled manner. The program\ndocumentation, framework, and procedures shall be revised before the change can\nbe implemented. Not all changes need be approved through a formal Management\nof Change (MOC) process. Some changes are expected and may not be subject to\na formal change control process. The operator should define the types of changes\ndetermined to be significant and requiring a MOC.\nDuring the inspection, it was established that TGT’s MOC required that all new procedures\nrequired training or notification. Specifically, the new Form 1500-18 was created to require\npersonnel to perform additional preventive and mitigative measures (P&M) for wells that did not\nhave taps on their wells. When the MOC documentation was examined, there were operating areas\nthat had not received training or notification in this new procedure. However, it was being used at\nthe Graham Lake and West Greenville area, and thus the change was implemented prior to all\nparties being trained or notified on the new form.\nTherefore, TGT failed to follow its written procedures for implementing the requirements of API\nRP 1171 regarding MOC.\n2 The final rule, Pipeline Safety: Safety of Underground Natural Gas Storage Facilities, 85 FR 8104 (February 12,\n2020), revised § 192.12. This requirement is still present but is now codified in § 192.12(c).\n120201010W_Warning Letter_03272020_text Page 4 of 5\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2020-1010W\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$213,268 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,132,679 for a related\nseries of violations. For violation occurring on or after November 2, 2015 and before November\n27, 2018, the maximum penalty may not exceed $209,002 per violation per day, with a maximum\npenalty not to exceed $2,090,022. For violations occurring prior to November 2, 2015, the\nmaximum penalty may not exceed $200,000 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to\nexceed $2,000,000 for a related series of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and\nsupporting documents involved in this case, and have decided not to conduct additional\nenforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to correct the\nitem(s) identified in this letter. Failure to do so will result in Texas Gas Transmission, LLC being\nsubject to additional enforcement action.\nPlease be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to\nbeing made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies\nfor confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, please submit all correspondence in this\nmatter to Robert Burrough, Director, PHMSA Eastern Region, 840 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 300,\nWest Trenton, NJ 08628. Please refer to CPF 1-2020-1010W on each document you submit, and\nwhenever possible provide a signed PDF copy in electronic format. Smaller files may be emailed\nto robert.burrough@dot.gov. Larger files should be sent on USB flash drive accompanied by the\noriginal paper copy to the Eastern Region Office.\nSincerely,\nRobert Burrough\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n120201010W_Warning Letter_03272020_text Page 5 of 5","truncated":false,"body_characters":12845}